The Act of October 31, 1951, 65 Stat. 727, amending 28 U.S.C. §
1346 so as to withdraw the jurisdiction of federal district courts
over actions against the United States to recover compensation for
official services of "employees," applies to actions pending on the
effective date of the amendment. Pp.
343 U. S.
113-117.
(a) When a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any
reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases, all pending cases
fall with the law.
Insurance Co. v.
Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541. Pp.
343 U. S.
115-117.
(b) A different result is not required by the provision of 1
U.S.C. § 109 that "repeal of any statute shall not have the effect
to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability
incurred under such statute." P.
343 U. S.
117.
189 F.2d 255, affirmed.
Petitioner's action against the United States to recover
compensation for official services was dismissed by the District
Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 189 F.2d 255. This Court
granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 858.
Affirmed, p.
343 U. S.
117.
Page 343 U. S. 113
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1941, petitioner was appointed a civilian fire chief at Camp
Wheeler, Georgia, by a local army commander acting under authority
delegated by the Secretary of War. In 1948, petitioner brought this
action in the District Court to recover overtime compensation
allegedly due for his services as fire chief. Jurisdiction to enter
judgment against the United States was based on the Tucker Act,
which granted to the District Court jurisdiction, concurrent with
the Court of Claims, over certain civil actions against the United
States. [
Footnote 1]
At the time this action was commenced, Congress had provided
that nothing in the Tucker Act shall be construed as giving the
District Court
"jurisdiction of cases brought to recover fees, salary, or
compensation for official services of officers of the United States
or brought for such purpose by persons claiming as such officers or
as assignees or legal representatives thereof; but no suit pending
on the 27th day of June, 1898, shall abate or be affected by this
provision. [
Footnote 2]"
The District Court, holding that petitioner was an "officer of
the United States," entered judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 189 F.2d 255.
Page 343 U. S. 114
In
Beal v. United States, 182 F.2d 565 (1950), the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sustained jurisdiction of
the District Court over a suit brought by another civilian fire
fighter appointed by the War Department on the ground that he was
only an "employee," and not an "officer of the United States." We
granted certiorari in the case at bar to resolve the conflict of
decisions. 342 U.S. 858.
After certiorari had been granted in this case, the Act of
October 31, 1951, Pub.L. No. 248, became effective. Section 50(b)
of that Act amended the applicable clause of the Judicial Code "by
inserting, immediately after
officers' in such clause, the
words `or employees'. . . ." [Footnote 3] As a result of this amendment, we are
confronted at the threshold of this case with the question whether
the Act of October 31, 1951, withdrawing the jurisdiction of the
District Court over actions for compensation brought by
"employees," applies to an action pending on the effective date of
the Act. The power of Congress to withhold jurisdiction from the
District Court "in the exact degrees and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good" [Footnote 4] is not challenged.
The problem presented by this case has arisen before in the
administration of the Tucker Act. In 1887, jurisdiction concurrent
with the Court of Claims was given the circuit and district courts
in all cases involving claims below stated dollar amounts. In 1898,
difficulties in defending claims for compensation brought in
different courts prompted Congress to withdraw from the circuit and
district courts jurisdiction over cases "brought to recover fees,
salary, or compensation for official services of
Page 343 U. S. 115
officers of the United States. . . ," [
Footnote 5] thereby centralizing all such cases in the
Court of Claims. Congress made no provision for cases pending at
the effective date of the Act withdrawing jurisdiction and, for
this reason, Courts of Appeals ordered pending cases terminated for
want of jurisdiction.
United States v. McCrory, 91 F. 295
(1899);
United States v. Kelly, 97 F. 460 (1899).
Thereafter, Congress restored the jurisdiction of the circuit and
district courts to consider cases pending on the date that
jurisdiction had been withdrawn. [
Footnote 6]
The Act of October 31, 1951, withdrawing the jurisdiction of the
District Court over suits by "employees," did not reserve
jurisdiction over pending cases, [
Footnote 7] even though reservation of jurisdiction over
pending cases had been held required, and later had been made by
Congress in respect to the 1898 provisions withdrawing jurisdiction
over suits by "officers." Absent such a reservation, only the Court
of Claims has jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for
compensation brought by employees of the United States, even though
the District Court had jurisdiction over such claims when
petitioner's action was brought.
Merchants'
Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541 (1867).
In Ritchie, a case arising under the internal revenue laws,
jurisdiction was based upon an Act of 1833 granting the circuit
courts jurisdiction over all cases arising under the revenue laws.
After decision in the Circuit Court, and while an appeal to this
Court was pending, an Act of 1866 withdrew the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts
Page 343 U. S. 116
over cases arising under the internal revenue laws, without any
reservation saving cases such as Ritchie's. This Court held:
"It is clear that, when the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon
a statute the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction.
And it is equally clear that, where a jurisdiction conferred by
statute is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is,
so far, a repeal of the statute conferring the jurisdiction."
"It is quite possible that this effect of the act of 1866 was
not contemplated by Congress. The jurisdiction given by the act of
1833 in cases arising under the customs revenue laws is not taken
away or affected by it. In these cases, suits may still be
maintained against collectors by citizens of the same State. It is
certainly difficult to perceive a reason for discrimination between
such suits and suits under the internal revenue laws; but, when
terms are unambiguous, we may not speculate on probabilities of
intention."
5 Wall. at
72 U. S.
544-545. In another case arising under the same
jurisdictional statutes, the Court, in following
Ritchie,
stated the applicable rule as follows:
"Jurisdiction in such cases was conferred by an act of Congress,
and, when that act of Congress was repealed, the power to exercise
such jurisdiction was withdrawn, and, inasmuch as the repealing act
contained no saving clause, all pending actions fell, as the
jurisdiction depended entirely upon the act of Congress."
The Assessors v.
Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567,
76 U. S. 575
(1870). This rule -- that, when a law conferring jurisdiction is
repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all
Page 343 U. S. 117
cases fall with the law-has been adhered to consistently by this
Court. [
Footnote 8]
This case is not affected by the so-called general savings
statute, which provides that
"repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under
such statute. [
Footnote 9]"
Congress has not altered the nature or validity of petitioner's
rights or the Government's liability, but has simply reduced the
number of tribunals authorized to hear and determine such rights
and liabilities.
Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.
S. 506,
239 U. S. 508
(1916).
Compare Lynch v. United States, 292 U.
S. 571 (1934).
Under the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of October 31,
1951, the jurisdiction of the District Court does not extend to
actions for compensation brought by either "officers" or
"employees" of the United States. Since we find that Act applicable
to petitioner's action, the judgment of the District Court
dismissing petitioner's complaint for want of jurisdiction is
correct. Accordingly, the judgment below is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
24 Stat. 505 (1887), now 28 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 1346.
[
Footnote 2]
30 Stat. 494, 495 (1898), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(20). As
incorporated into the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the
provision read:
"The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this
section of:"
"
* * * *"
"(2) Any civil action to recover fees, salary, or compensation
for official services of officers of the United States."
28 U.S.C.(Supp. IV) § 1346(d).
[
Footnote 3]
65 Stat. 710, 727 (1951).
[
Footnote 4]
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182,
319 U. S. 187
(1943);
Cary v.
Curtis, 3 How. 236,
44 U. S. 245
(1845).
[
Footnote 5]
30 Stat. 494, 495 (1898).
See H.R.Rep.No.325, 55th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1898).
[
Footnote 6]
31 Stat. 33 (1900).
[
Footnote 7]
No mention of pending cases is found in the Act. In § 56(1) of
the same Act, Congress expressly saved "any rights or liabilities"
existing at the effective date of the Act under statutes repealed
by § 56. 65 Stat. 710, 730 (1951).
[
Footnote 8]
Ex parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506,
74 U. S. 514
(1869);
Baltimore & P. Railroad Co. v. Grant,
98 U. S. 398,
98 U. S. 401
(1879);
Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.
S. 679,
123 U. S. 680
(1887);
Gurnee v. Patrick County, 137 U.
S. 141,
137 U. S. 144
(1890);
Gwin v. United States, 184 U.
S. 669,
184 U. S. 675
(1902).
See Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.
S. 226,
260 U. S. 234
(1922).
This jurisdictional rule does not affect the general principle
that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary
implication.
Compare United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T.
R. Co., 270 U. S. 1,
270 U. S. 3
(1926),
with Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S.
56,
275 U. S. 61
(1927).
[
Footnote 9]
1 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 109.