1. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 sets up a procedure
whereby any person subject to any regulation or order promulgated
under the Act may, on "protest" of the regulation or order, secure
its review by the Administrator, and, if the protest is denied, the
Act confers on the Emergency Court (and on the Supreme Court upon
review of decisions of the Emergency Court) equity jurisdiction
Page 319 U. S. 183
to restrain the enforcement of regulations or price orders under
that Act, and withdraws that jurisdiction from every other court,
state or federal. P.
319 U. S.
186.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to confer equity
jurisdiction on any particular inferior federal court. P.
319 U. S.
187.
3. Congress had power to restrict the equity jurisdiction to
restrain enforcement of the Emergency Price Control Act, or of
regulations under it, to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of
its decisions, to this Court, and to require that a plaintiff
seeking such equitable relief resort to the Emergency Court only
after pursuing the prescribed administrative procedure. P.
319 U. S.
188.
4. The Emergency Price Control Act, § 204(d), in providing that
"no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction
or power to . . . restrain, enjoin, or set aside . . . any
provision of this Act," is not open to the objection that it
withholds from all courts authority to pass upon the
constitutionality of any provision of the Act or of any order or
regulation under it. The Act itself, § 204, saves to the Emergency
Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court, authority
to determine whether any regulation, order, or price schedule
promulgated under it is "not in accordance with law," and this
permits that the constitutional validity of the Act, and of orders
and regulations under it, be so determined. P.
319 U. S.
188.
5. Assuming that review in the Emergency Court is inadequate to
protect constitutional rights because § 204(c) prohibits all
interlocutory relief by that court, the separability clause of §
303 would require that effect be given to the other provisions of §
204, including that which withholds from the district courts
authority to enjoin enforcement of the Act. P.
319 U. S.
189.
49 F. Supp. 513 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges which
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal seeking an injunction
against enforcement of price regulations prescribed under the
Emergency Price Control Act.
Page 319 U. S. 184
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for our decision is whether the jurisdiction of the
district court below to enjoin the enforcement of price regulations
prescribed by the Administrator under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, was validly withdrawn by § 204(d) of the
Act. Appellants brought this suit in the district court for the
District of New Jersey for an injunction restraining appellee, the
United States Attorney for that district, from the prosecution of
pending and prospective criminal proceedings against appellants for
violation of §§ 4(a) and 205(b) of the Act, and of Maximum Price
Regulation No. 169. In view of the provisions of § 204(d) of the
Act, the district court of three judges, 28 U.S.C. § 380a,
dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction to entertain it.
The amended bill of complaint alleges that appellants are
established merchants owning valuable wholesale meat businesses, in
the course of which they purchase meat from packers and sell it at
wholesale to retail dealers; that Maximum Price Regulation No. 169,
promulgated by the Price Administrator under the purported
authority of § 2(a) of the Act, as originally issued and as
revised, fixed maximum wholesale prices for specified cuts of beef;
that in fixing such prices, the Administrator had failed to give
due consideration to the various factors affecting the cost of
production and distribution of meat in the industry as a whole;
that the Administrator had failed to fix or regulate the price of
livestock; that the conditions in the industry -- including the
quantity of meat available to packers for distribution to
wholesalers, the packers' expectation of profit, and the effect of
these conditions upon the prices of meat sold by packers to
wholesalers -- are such that appellants are and will be unable to
obtain a supply of meat from packers which they can resell to
retail dealers within the
Page 319 U. S. 185
prices fixed by Regulation No. 169; that enforcement of the
Regulation will preclude appellants' continuance in business as
meat wholesalers; that the Act, as thus applied to appellants, is a
denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, and involves an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the Administrator; that appellee threatens to
prosecute appellants for each sale of meat at a price greater than
that fixed by the Regulation, and to subject them to the fine and
imprisonment prescribed by §§ 4 and 205(b) of the Act for
violations of the Act or of price regulations prescribed by the
Administrator under the Act, and that such enforcement by repeated
prosecutions of appellants will irreparably injure them in their
business and property.
Section 203(a) sets up a procedure whereby any person subject to
any provision of any regulation, order or price schedule
promulgated under the Act may within sixty days "file a protest
specifically setting forth objections to any such provision and
affidavits or other written evidence in support of such
objections." He may also protest later on grounds arising after the
expiration of the original sixty days. The subsection directs that,
within a specified time,
"the Administrator shall either grant or deny such protest in
whole or in part, notice such protest for hearing, or provide an
opportunity to present further evidence in connection therewith. In
the event that the Administrator denies any such protest in whole
or in part, he shall inform the protestant of the grounds upon
which such decision is based, and of any economic data and other
facts of which the Administrator has taken official notice."
By § 204(a),
"Any person who is aggrieved by the denial or partial denial of
his protest may, within thirty days after such denial, file a
complaint with the Emergency Court of Appeals, created pursuant to
subsection (c), specifying
Page 319 U. S. 186
his objections and praying that the regulation, order, or price
schedule protested be enjoined or set aside in whole or in
part."
Subsection (b) provides that no regulation, order, or price
schedule, shall be enjoined
"unless the complainant establishes to the satisfaction of the
court that the regulation, order, or price schedule is not in
accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious."
Under subsections (b) and (d), decisions of the Emergency Court
may, by writ of certiorari, be brought for review to the Supreme
Court, which is required to advance the cause on its docket and to
expedite the disposition of it.
Although, by following the procedure prescribed by these
provisions of the Act, appellants could have raised and obtained
review of the questions presented by their bill of complaint, they
did not protest the price regulation which they challenge, and they
took no proceedings for review of it by the Emergency Court.
Appellants are thus seeking the aid of the district court to
restrain the enforcement of an administrative order without
pursuing the administrative remedy provided by the statute (
cf.
Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 318 U.
S. 675,
318 U. S.
686), and without recourse to the judicial review by the
Emergency Court of Appeals and by this Court which the statute
affords.
Moreover, the statute vests jurisdiction to grant equitable
relief exclusively in the Emergency Court and in this Court.
Section 204(d) declares:
"The Emergency Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court upon
review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any
regulation or order issued under section 2, of any price schedule
effective in accordance with the provisions of section 206, and of
any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule.
Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or
Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the
validity of any such regulation,
Page 319 U. S. 187
order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set
aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing
the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any
such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation,
order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement
of any such provision."
By this statute, Congress has seen fit to confer on the
Emergency Court (and on the Supreme Court upon review of decisions
of the Emergency Court) equity jurisdiction to restrain the
enforcement of price orders under the Emergency Price Control Act.
At the same time, it has withdrawn that jurisdiction from every
other federal and state court. There is nothing in the Constitution
which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any
particular inferior federal court. All federal courts, other than
the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the
exercise of the authority to "ordain and establish" inferior
courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the
Constitution. Article III left Congress free to establish inferior
federal courts or not, as it thought appropriate . It could have
declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies
afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this Court
as Congress might prescribe.
Kline v. Burke Construction
Co., 260 U. S. 226,
260 U. S. 234,
and cases cited;
McIntire v.
Wood, 7 Cranch 504,
11 U. S. 506. The
Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts
includes the power
"of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent,
or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the
exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good."
Cary v.
Curtis, 3 How. 236,
44 U. S. 245;
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.
S. 323,
303 U. S. 330;
Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506,
239 U. S. 509;
Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56;
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.
S. 118,
314 U. S. 129.
See also United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32,
11 U. S. 33;
Mayor v.
Cooper, 6 Wall. 247,
73 U. S.
252;
Page 319 U. S. 188
Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165,
195 U. S. 167;
Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1,
201 U. S. 24;
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U. S. 371,
308 U. S. 376.
In the light of the explicit language of the Constitution and our
decisions, it is plain that Congress has power to provide that the
equity jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of the Act, or of
regulations promulgated under it, be restricted to the Emergency
Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court. Nor can we
doubt the authority of Congress to require that a plaintiff seeking
such equitable relief resort to the Emergency Court only after
pursuing the prescribed administrative procedure.
Appellants argue that the command of § 204(d) that "no court,
Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to
. . . restrain, enjoin, or set aside . . . any provision of this
Act" extends beyond the mere denial of equitable relief by way of
injunction, and withholds from all courts authority to pass upon
the constitutionality of any provision of the Act or of any order
or regulation under it. They insist that the phrase "set aside" is
to be read broadly, as meaning that no court can declare
unconstitutional any such provision, and that, consequently, the
effect of the statute is to deny to those aggrieved, by statute or
regulation, their day in court to challenge its constitutionality.
But the statute expressly excepts from this command those remedies
afforded by § 204, including that of subsection (b), which gives to
complainants a right to an injunction whenever they establish to
the satisfaction of the Emergency Court that the regulation, order,
or price schedule is "not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary
or capricious." A construction of the statute which would deny all
opportunity for judicial determination of an asserted
constitutional right is not to be favored. The present Act has at
least saved to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of its
decisions,
Page 319 U. S. 189
to this Court, authority to determine whether any regulation,
order, or price schedule promulgated under the Act is "not in
accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious." We think it
plain that orders and regulations involving an unconstitutional
application of the statute are "not in accordance with law" within
the meaning of this clause, and that the constitutional validity of
the Act, and of orders and regulations under it, may be determined
upon the prescribed review in the Emergency Court.
Appellants also contend that the review in the Emergency Court
is inadequate to protect their constitutional rights, and that §
204 is therefore unconstitutional, because § 204(c) prohibits all
interlocutory relief by that court. We need not pass upon the
constitutionality of this restriction. For, in any event, the
separability clause of § 303 of the Act, would require us to give
effect to the other provisions of § 204, including that withholding
from the district courts authority to enjoin enforcement of the Act
-- a provision which, as we have seen, is subject to no
unconstitutional infirmity.
Since appellants seek only an injunction which the district
court is without authority to give, their bill of complaint was
rightly dismissed. We have no occasion to determine now whether, or
to what extent, appellants may challenge the constitutionality of
the Act or the Regulation in courts other than the Emergency Court,
either by way of defense to a criminal prosecution or in a civil
suit brought for some other purpose than to restrain enforcement of
the Act or regulations issued under it.
Affirmed.