1. Neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, nor § 20 of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738, deprives a federal district court of
jurisdiction to issue a restraining order and preliminary
injunction in a suit by the Government to prevent a union and its
officers from precipitating a nationwide strike in the bituminous
coal mines pending judicial interpretation of a labor contract
between the Government and the union, at a time when the mines are
being operated by the Government during a national emergency
pursuant to an executive order issued by the President under his
constitutional authority as President and as Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy and authority conferred upon him by the War Labor
Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163. Pp.
330 U. S.
269-289.
(a) The general term "employer," as used in the restrictive
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act, does
not include the Government. Pp.
330 U. S.
269-284.
(b) Neither the policy nor the legislative history of those Acts
discloses any intention of Congress to make them applicable to
disputes between the Government and its own employees. Pp.
330 U. S.
273-280.
Page 330 U. S. 259
(c) Views expressed in debates on the War Labor Disputes Act
eleven years after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot
be accepted as authoritative guides to the construction of the
latter, when some of those making the statements were not members
of Congress at the time of the passage of the Act and when none had
been a member of the committee which reported the bill. Pp.
330 U. S.
281-22.
(d) Neither the rejection of a substitute bill which would have
authorized injunctions upon application of the Attorney General to
restrain violations of the War Labor Disputes Act nor anything else
in the legislative history of that Act constitutes an authoritative
expression of Congress directing the courts to withhold injunctive
relief from the Government in disputes with its own employees. Pp.
330 U. S.
282-284.
(e) For the purpose of this case, the miners are employees of
the Government, even though the private managers of the mines have
been retained as operating managers for the Government and the
regulations provide that none of the earnings or liabilities
resulting from the operation of the mines are for the account or at
the risk or expense of the Government. Pp.
330 U. S.
284-288.
(f) In seizing and operating the mines, the Government was
exercising a sovereign function. P.
330 U. S.
289.
2. Even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act were applicable, the
District Court, in the circumstances of this case, had power to
issue a restraining order for the purpose of preserving existing
conditions pending a decision upon its own jurisdiction; and
disobedience is punishable as criminal contempt. Pp.
330 U. S.
289-295.
3. In this case, none of the procedural aspects of the trial
involved error so prejudicial as to require reversal of the
judgments for civil and criminal contempt. Pp.
330 U. S.
295-301.
(a) The proceedings complied with Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring criminal contempt to be
prosecuted on notice stating the essential facts constituting the
contempt charged. P.
330 U. S.
296.
(b) Rule 42(b) was not designed to cast doubt upon the propriety
of instituting criminal contempt proceedings on pleadings resting
only on information and belief. P.
330 U. S.
296.
(c) Although the requirement of Rule 42(b) that the notice
issuing to defendants describe the criminal contempt charged as
such was not complied with, this did not result in substantial
prejudice to defendants where they were fully aware that a criminal
contempt was charged, acted accordingly in their motions and
Page 330 U. S. 260
arguments, and actually enjoyed during the trial all the
enhanced protections accorded defendants in criminal contempt
proceedings. Pp.
330 U. S.
297-298.
(d) Defendants were properly tried by the court without a jury,
since their demand for a jury trial was based only on §11 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and this case was not one "arising under"
that Act. P.
330 U. S.
298.
(e) Having been accorded all rights and privileges owing to
defendants in criminal contempt cases, defendants were not
substantially prejudiced because their trial included a proceeding
in civil contempt and was carried on in the main equity suit. Pp.
330 U. S.
298-301.
(f) In the circumstances of this case, there was good cause for
the extension of the temporary restraining order at a time when
there was in progress argument on defendants' motion to vacate the
rule to show cause in the contempt proceedings. P.
330 U. S.
301.
4. The Government was entitled to obtain relief in this case by
way of civil contempt, and was not limited to a proceeding in
criminal contempt. Pp.
330 U. S.
301-302.
5. The contempt continued for 15 days from issuance of the
restraining order until the finding of guilty. Its willfulness was
not qualified by any concurrent attempt of defendants to challenge
the order. Immediately following the finding of guilty, defendant
Lewis, president of the union, stated openly in court that
defendants would adhere to their policy of defiance. This policy
was causing economic paralysis which was rapidly spreading from the
coal mines to practically every other major industry. It
constituted a serious threat to orderly constitutional government
and to the economic and social welfare of the nation. While Lewis
was the aggressive leader, he acted as the representative of the
union; and it was the members of the union who executed the
nationwide strike.
Held:
(a) The trial court properly found both Lewis and the union
guilty of both civil and criminal contempt. Pp.
330 U. S.
303-304.
(b) The record clearly warrants a fine of $10,000 against Lewis
for criminal contempt; and that fine is sustained. P.
330 U. S.
304.
(c) The record does not warrant the unconditional imposition of
a fine of $3,500,000 against the union, and the judgment against
the union is modified so as to require it (1) to pay a fine of
$700,000 and (2) to pay an additional fine of $2,800,000, unless it
shows within five days after the issuance of the mandate herein
that it has fully complied with the temporary restraining order and
the preliminary injunction. Pp.
330 U. S.
304-305.
Page 330 U. S. 261
6. In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, a trial judge may
properly take into consideration the extent of the willful and
deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of the
consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of
effectively terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the
public interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in the
future. P.
330 U. S.
303.
7. Because of the nature of these standards, great reliance must
be placed upon the discretion of the trial judge. P.
330 U. S.
303.
8. Where the purpose of judicial sanctions in civil contempt
proceedings is to coerce the defendant into compliance with the
court's order, the court must consider the character and magnitude
of the harm threatened by continued contumacy and the probable
effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the
desired result. P.
330 U. S.
304.
9. A court which has returned a conviction for contempt must, in
fixing the amount of a fine to be imposed as a punishment or as a
means of securing future compliance, consider the amount of
defendant's financial resources and the consequent seriousness of
the burden to that particular defendant. P.
330 U. S.
304.
70 F. Supp.
42, modified and affirmed.
In a Federal District Court, a union and its president were
adjudged guilty of criminal and civil contempt and fined for
violation of a temporary restraining order issued in a suit by the
Government in a labor dispute arising while the coal mines were in
the possession of, and were being operated by, the Government
pursuant to Executive Order 0728, 11 F.R. 5593, issued under the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy and authority conferred upon him by the War Labor
Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163.
70 F. Supp.
42. While an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia was pending, this Court granted certiorari
pursuant to § 240(a) of the Judicial Code. 329 U.S. 708, 709, 710.
Affirmed, except that the fine imposed on the union is
modified conditionally, p.
330 U. S. 307.
Page 330 U. S. 262
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In October, 1946, the United States was in possession of, and
operating, the major portion of the country's bituminous coal
mines. [
Footnote 1] Terms and
conditions of employment
Page 330 U. S. 263
were controlled "for the period of Government possession" by an
agreement [
Footnote 2] entered
into on May 29, 1946, between Secretary of Interior Krug, as Coal
Mines Administrator, and John L. Lewis, as President of the United
Mine Workers of America. [
Footnote
3] The Krug-Lewis agreement embodied far-reaching changes
favorable to the miners, [
Footnote
4] and, except as amended and supplemented therein, the
agreement carried forward the terms and conditions of the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of April 11, 1945. [
Footnote 5]
Page 330 U. S. 264
On October 21, 1946, the defendant Lewis directed a letter to
Secretary Krug and presented issues which led directly to the
present controversy. According to the defendant Lewis, the
Krug-Lewis agreement carried forward § 15 of the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of April 11, 1945. Under that
section, either party to the contract was privileged to give ten
days' notice in writing of a desire for a negotiating conference
which the other party was required to attend; fifteen days after
the beginning of the conference, either party might give notice in
writing of the termination of the agreement, effective five days
after receipt of such notice. Asserting authority under this
clause, the defendant Lewis, in his letter of October 21, requested
that a conference begin November 1 for the purpose of negotiating
new arrangements concerning wages, hours, practices, and other
pertinent matters appertaining to the bituminous coal industry.
[
Footnote 6]
Captain N. H. Collisson, then Coal Mines Administrator, answered
for Secretary Krug. Any contractual basis for requiring
negotiations for revision of the Krug-Lewis agreement was denied.
[
Footnote 7] In the opinion of
the Government, § 15 of the 1945 agreement had not been preserved
by the Krug-Lewis agreement; indeed, § 15 had been expressly
nullified by the clause of the latter contract providing that the
terms contained therein were to cover the period of Government
possession. Although suggesting that any negotiations looking
toward a new agreement be carried on with the mine owners, the
Government expressed willingness to discuss matters affecting the
operation of the mines under the terms of the Krug-Lewis
agreement.
Page 330 U. S. 265
Conferences were scheduled and began in Washington on November
1, both the union and the Government adhering to their opposing
views regarding the right of either party to terminate the
contract. [
Footnote 8] At the
fifth meeting, held on November 11, the union for the first time
offered specific proposals for changes in wages and other
conditions of employment. On November 13 Secretary Krug requested
the union to negotiate with the mine owners. This suggestion was
rejected. [
Footnote 9] On
November 15. the union, by John L. Lewis, notified Secretary Krug
that,
"Fifteen days having now elapsed since the beginning of said
conference, the United Mine Workers of America, exercising its
option, hereby terminates said Krug-Lewis Agreement as of 12:00
o'clock P.M., Midnight, Wednesday, November 20, 1946."
Secretary Krug again notified the defendant Lewis that he had no
power under the Krug-Lewis agreement or under the law to terminate
the contract by unilateral declaration. [
Footnote 10] The President of the United States
announced his strong support of the Government's position, and
requested reconsideration by the union in order to avoid a national
crisis. However, the defendant Lewis, as union president,
circulated to the mine workers copies of the November 15 letter to
Secretary Krug. This communication was for the "official
information" of union members.
The United States, on November 18, filed a complaint in the
District Court for the District of Columbia against
Page 330 U. S. 266
the United Mine Workers of America and John L. Lewis,
individually and as president of the union. The suit was brought
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, [
Footnote 11] and sought judgment to the effect that the
defendants had no power unilaterally to terminate the Krug-Lewis
agreement. And alleging that the November 15 notice was in reality
a strike notice, the United States, pending the final determination
of the cause, requested a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunctive relief.
The court, immediately and without notice to the defendants,
issued a temporary order [
Footnote 12] restraining the
Page 330 U. S. 267
defendants from continuing in effect the notice of November 15,
from encouraging the mine workers to interfere with the operation
of the mines by strike or cessation of work, and from taking any
action which would interfere with the court's jurisdiction and its
determination of the case. The order by its terms was to expire at
3:00 p.m. on November 27 unless extended for good cause shown. A
hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for 10:00 a.m. on the
same date. The order and complaint were served on the defendants on
November 18.
A gradual walkout by the miners commenced on November 18, and,
by midnight of November 20, consistent with the miners' "no
contract, no work" policy, a full-blown strike was in progress.
Mines furnishing the major part of the nation's bituminous coal
production were idle.
On November 21, the United States filed a petition for a rule to
show cause why the defendants should not be punished as and for
contempt, alleging a willful violation of the restraining order.
The rule issued, setting November 25 as the return day, and, if at
that time the contempt was not sufficiently purged, setting
November 27 as the day for trial on the contempt charge.
On the return day, defendants, by counsel, informed the court
that no action had been taken concerning the November 15 notice,
and denied the jurisdiction of the court to issue the restraining
order and rule to show cause. Trial on the contempt charge was
thereupon ordered to begin as scheduled on November 27. On November
26, the defendants filed a motion to discharge and vacate the rule
to show cause. Their motion challenged the jurisdiction of the
court, and raised the grave question of
Page 330 U. S. 268
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act [
Footnote 13] prohibited the granting of the temporary
restraining order at the instance of the United States. [
Footnote 14]
After extending the temporary restraining order on November 27,
and after full argument on November 27 and November 29, the court,
on the latter date, overruled the motion and held that its power to
issue the restraining order in this case was not affected by either
the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Clayton Act. [
Footnote 15]
The defendants thereupon pleaded not guilty and waived an
advisory jury. Trial on the contempt charge proceeded. The
Government presented eight witnesses, the defendants none. At the
conclusion of the trial on
Page 330 U. S. 269
December 3, the court found that the defendants had permitted
the November 15 notice to remain outstanding, had encouraged the
miners to interfere by a strike with the operation of the mines and
with the performance of governmental functions, and had interfered
with the jurisdiction of the court. Both defendants were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both criminal and civil contempt
dating from November 18. The court entered judgment on December 4,
fining the defendant Lewis $10,000, and the defendant union
$3,500,000. On the same day, a preliminary injunction, effective
until a final determination of the case, was issued in terms
similar to those of the restraining order.
On December 5, the defendants filed notices of appeal from the
judgments of contempt. The judgments were stayed pending the
appeals. The United States, on December 6, filed a petition for
certiorari in both cases. Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code
authorizes a petition for certiorari by any party and the granting
of certiorari prior to judgment in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Prompt settlement of this case being in the public interest, we
granted certiorari on December 9, 329 U.S. 708, and subsequently,
for similar reasons, granted petitions for certiorari filed by the
defendants, 329 U.S. 709;
329 U. S. 710. The
cases were consolidated for argument.
I
Defendants' first and principal contention is that the
restraining order and preliminary injunction were issued in
violation of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. We have come to
a contrary decision.
It is true that Congress decreed in § 20 of the Clayton Act that
"no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person
or persons . . . from recommending, advising, or persuading others
. . . " to strike. But by the
Page 330 U. S. 270
Act itself, this provision was made applicable only to cases
"between an employer and employees, or between employers and
employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment. . . . [
Footnote 16]"
For reasons which will be explained at greater length in
discussing the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we cannot
construe the general term "employer" to include the United States
where there is no express reference to the United States and no
evident affirmative grounds for believing that Congress intended to
withhold an otherwise available remedy from the Government as well
as from a specified class of private persons.
Moreover, it seems never to have been suggested that the
proscription on injunctions found in the Clayton Act is in any
respect broader than that in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Defendants
do not suggest in their argument that it is. This Court, on the
contrary, has stated that the Norris-LaGuardia Act "still further .
. . [narrowed] the circumstances under which the federal courts
could grant injunctions in labor disputes." [
Footnote 17] Consequently, we would feel
justified in this case to consider the application of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act alone. If it does not apply, neither does the
less comprehensive proscription of the Clayton Act; [
Footnote 18] if it does, defendant's
reliance on the Clayton Act is unnecessary.
By the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested the federal
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in a specified class of
cases. It would probably be conceded that the characteristics of
the present case would be such
Page 330 U. S. 271
as to bring it within that class if the basic dispute had
remained one between defendants and a private employer, and the
latter had been the plaintiff below. So much seems to be found in
the express terms of §§ 4 and 13 of the Act, set out in the margin.
[
Footnote 19] The
specifications in
Page 330 U. S. 272
§ 13 are in general terms, and make no express exception for the
United States. From these premises, defendants argue that the
restraining order and injunction were forbidden by the Act and were
wrongfully issued.
Even if our examination of the Act stopped here, we could hardly
assent to this conclusion. There is an old and well known rule that
statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or
privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express
words to that effect. [
Footnote
20] It has been stated, in cases in which there were
extraneous
Page 330 U. S. 273
and affirmative reasons for believing that the sovereign should
also be deemed subject to a restrictive statute, that this rule was
a rule of construction only. [
Footnote 21] Though that may be true, the rule has been
invoked successfully in cases so closely similar to the present
one, [
Footnote 22] and the
statement of the rule in those cases has been so explicit,
[
Footnote 23] that we are
inclined to give it much weight here. Congress was not ignorant of
the rule which those cases reiterated, and, with knowledge of that
rule, Congress would not, in writing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, omit
to use "clear and specific [language] to that effect" if it
actually intended to reach the Government in all cases.
But we need not place entire reliance in this exclusionary rule.
Section 2, [
Footnote 24]
which declared the public policy of
Page 330 U. S. 274
the United States as a guide to the Act's interpretation,
carries indications as to the scope of the Act. It predicates the
purpose of the Act on the contrast between the position of the
"individual unorganized worker" and that of the "owners of
property" who have been permitted to "organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association," and on the consequent
helplessness of the worker "to exercise actual liberty of contract
. . . and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment." The purpose of the Act is said to be to contribute to
the worker's
"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representatives . . . for
the purpose of collective bargaining. . . ."
These considerations, on their face, obviously do not apply to
the Government as an employer or to relations between the
Government and its employees.
If we examine §§ 4 and 13, on which defendants rely, we note
that they do not purport to strip completely from the federal
courts all their preexisting powers to issue injunctions, that they
withdraw this power only in a specified
Page 330 U. S. 275
type of case, and that this type is a case "involving or growing
out of any labor dispute." Section 13, in the first instance,
declares a case to be of this type when it "involves persons" or
"involves any conflicting or competing interests" in a labor
dispute of "persons" who stand in any one of several defined
economic relationships. And "persons" must be involved on both
sides of the case, or the conflicting interests of "persons" on
both sides of the dispute. The Act does not define "persons." In
common usage, that term does not include the sovereign, and
statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.
[
Footnote 25] Congress made
express provision, R.S. § 1, 1 U.S.C. § 1, for the term to extend
to partnerships and corporations, and in § 13 of the Act itself for
it to extend to associations. The absence of any comparable
provision extending the term to sovereign governments implies that
Congress did not desire the term to extend to them.
Those clauses in § 13(a) and (b) spelling out the position of
"persons" relative to the employer-employee relationship
affirmatively suggest that he United States, as an employer, was
not meant to be included. Those clauses require that the case
involve persons "who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft
or occupation," who "have direct or indirect interests therein,"
who are "employees of the same employer," who are "members of the
same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees," or
who stand in some one of other specified positions relative to a
dispute over the employer-employee relationship. Every one of these
qualifications in § 13(a) and (b), we think, relates to an economic
role ordinarily filled by a private individual or corporation, and
not by a sovereign government. None of them is at all suggestive of
any part played by the United States in its relations
Page 330 U. S. 276
with its own employees. We think that Congress' failure to refer
to the United States or to specify any role which it might commonly
be thought to fill is strong indication that it did not intend that
the Act should apply to situations in which United States appears
as employer.
In the type of case to which the Act applies, § 7 requires
certain findings of fact as conditions precedent to the issuance of
injunctions even for the limited purposes recognized by the Act.
One such required finding is that "the public officers charged with
the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling
to furnish adequate protection." Obviously, such finding could
never be made if the complainant were the United States, and
federal property were threatened by federal employees, as the
responsibility of protection would then rest not only on state
officers, but also on all federal civil and military forces. If
these failed, a federal injunction would be a meaningless form.
This provision, like those in §§ 2, 4 and 13, already discussed,
indicates that the Act was not intended to affect the relations
between the United States and its employees.
Defendants maintain that certain facts in the legislative
history of the Act so clearly indicate an intent to restrict the
Government's use of injunctions that all the foregoing arguments to
the contrary must be rejected.
Representative Beck of Pennsylvania indicated in the course of
the House debates that he thought the Government would be included
within the prohibitions of the Act. [
Footnote 26] Mr. Beck was not a member of the Judiciary
Committee which reported the bill, and did not vote
Page 330 U. S. 277
for its passage. We do not accept his views as expressive of the
attitude of Congress relative to the status of the United States
under the Act.
Representative Blanton of Texas introduced an amendment to the
bill which would have made an exception to the provision limiting
the injunctive power "where the United States Government is the
petitioner," and this amendment was defeated by the House.
[
Footnote 27] But the first
comment made on this amendment, after its introduction, was that of
Representative LaGuardia, the House sponsor of the bill, who
opposed it not on the ground that such an exception should not be
made, but rather on the ground that the express exception was
unnecessary. Mr. LaGuardia read the definition of a person
"participating or interested in a labor dispute" in § 13(b),
referred to the provisions of § 13(a), and then added: "I do not
see how in any possible way the United States can be brought in
under the provisions of this bill." When Mr. Blanton thereupon
suggested the necessity of allowing the Government to use
injunctions to maintain discipline in the army and navy, Mr.
LaGuardia pointed out that these services are not "a trade, craft
or occupation." Mr. Blanton's only answer to Mr. LaGuardia's
opposition was that the latter "does not know what extensions will
be made." A vote was then taken and the amendment defeated.
[
Footnote 28] Obviously this
incident does not reveal a Congressional intent to legislate
concerning the relationship between the United States and its
employees.
In the debates in both Houses of Congress, numerous references
were made to previous instances in which the United States had
resorted to the injunctive process in labor disputes between
private employers and private employees, [
Footnote 29]
Page 330 U. S. 278
where some public interest was thought to have become involved.
These instances were offered as illustrations of the abuses flowing
from the use of injunctions in labor disputes and the desirability
of placing a limitation thereon. The frequency of these references
and the attention directed to their subject matter are compelling
circumstances. We agree that they indicate that Congress, in
passing the Act, did not intend to permit the United States to
continue to intervene by injunction in purely private labor
disputes.
But whether Congress so intended or not is a question different
from the one before us now. Here, we are concerned only with the
Government's right to injunctive relief in a dispute with its own
employees. Although we recognize that Congress intended to withdraw
such remedy in the former situation, it does not follow that it
intended to do so in the latter. The circumstances in which the
Government sought such remedy in 1894 and 1922 were vastly
different from those in which the Government is seeking to carry
out its responsibilities by taking legal action against its own
employees, and we think that the references in question have only
the most distant and uncertain bearing on our present problem.
Indeed, when we look further into the history of the Act, we find
other events which unequivocally demonstrate that injunctive relief
was not intended to be withdrawn in the latter situation.
When the House had before it a rule for the consideration of the
bill, Representative Michener, a ranking minority member of the
Judiciary Committee and spokesman for the minority party on the
Rules Committee, made a general statement in the House concerning
the subject matter of the bill and advocating its immediate
consideration. In this survey, he clearly stated that the
Government's
Page 330 U. S. 279
rights with respect to its own employees would not be affected:
[
Footnote 30]
"Be it remembered that this bill does not attempt to legislate
concerning Government employees. I do not believe that the
enactment of this bill into law will take away from the Federal
Government any rights which it has under existing law, to seek and
obtain injunctive relief where the same is necessary for the
functioning of the Government."
In a later stage of the debate, Representative Michener repeated
this view in the following terms: [
Footnote 31]
"This deals with labor disputes between individuals, not where
the Government is involved. It is my notion that, under this bill,
the Government can function with an injunction, if that is
necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the Government. I
should like to see this clarified, but I want to go on record as
saying that, under my interpretation of this bill, the Federal
Government will not at any time be prevented from applying for an
injunction if one is necessary in order that the Government may
function."
Representatives Michener and LaGuardia were members of the
Judiciary Committee which reported and recommended the bill to the
House. They were the most active spokesmen for the Committee, both
in explaining the bill and advocating its passage. No member of the
House who voted for the bill challenged their explanations. At
least one other member expressed a like understanding. [
Footnote 32] We cannot but believe
that the House accepted
Page 330 U. S. 280
these authoritative representations as to the proper
construction of the bill. [
Footnote 33] The Senate expressed no contrary
understanding, [
Footnote 34]
and we must conclude that Congress, in passing the Act, did not
intend to withdraw the Government's existing rights to injunctive
relief against its own employees.
If we were to stop here, there would be little difficulty in
accepting the decision of the District Court upon the scope of the
Act. And the cases in this Court express consistent views
concerning the types of situations to which the Act applies.
[
Footnote 35] They have gone
no farther than to follow Congressional desires by regarding as
beyond the jurisdiction of the District Courts the issuance of
injunctions sought by the United States and directed to persons who
are not employees of the United States. None of these cases dealt
with the narrow segment of the employer-employee relationship now
before us.
Page 330 U. S. 281
But regardless of the determinative guidance so offered,
defendants rely upon the opinions of several Senators uttered in
May, 1943, while debating the Senate version of the War Labor
Disputes Act. [
Footnote 36]
The debate at that time centered around a substitute for the bill,
S. 796, as originally introduced. [
Footnote 37] Section 5 of the substitute, as amended,
provided,
"The district courts of the United States and the United States
Courts of the Territories or possessions shall have jurisdiction,
for cause shown, but solely upon application by the Attorney
General or under his direction . . . to restrain violations or
threatened violations of this act. [
Footnote 38]"
Following the rejection of other amendments aimed at permitting
a much wider use of injunctions and characterized as contrary to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, [
Footnote 39] several Senators were of the opinion that §
5 itself would remove some of the protection given employees by
that Act, [
Footnote 40] a
view contrary to what we have just determined to be the scope of
the Act as passed in 1932. Section 5 was defeated, and no
injunctive provisions were contained in the Senate bill.
We have considered these opinions, but cannot accept them as
authoritative guides to the construction of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. They were expressed by Senators,
Page 330 U. S. 282
some of whom were not members of the Senate in 1932, and none of
whom was on the Senate Judiciary Committee which reported the bill.
They were expressed eleven years after the Act was passed, and
cannot be accorded even the same weight as if made by the same
individuals in the course of the Norris-LaGuardia debates.
[
Footnote 41] Moreover,
these opinions were given by individuals striving to write
legislation from the floor of the Senate and working without the
benefit of hearings and committee reports on the issues crucial to
us here. [
Footnote 42] We
fail to see how the remarks of these Senators in 1943 can serve to
change the legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932, and we
accordingly adhere to our conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not affect the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue injunctions
when sought by the United States in a labor dispute with its own
employees.
It has been suggested, however, that Congress, in passing the
War Labor Disputes Act, effectively restricted the theretofore
existing authority of the Courts to issue injunctions in connection
with labor disputes in plants seized by the United States. Chief
reliance is placed upon the rejection by the Senate of § 5 of the
Connally substitute bill. [
Footnote 43] But it is clear that no comparable
Page 330 U. S. 283
action transpired in the House. Indeed, proposals in the House
and the House substitute [
Footnote 44] for S. 796 authorized the use of injunctions
in connection with private plants not yet seized by the United
States. These admitted inroads on the Norris-LaGuardia Act drew
much comment [
Footnote 45]
on the floor of the House, but nevertheless prevailed. Seizure was
also contemplated, and criminal sanctions were made available in
this situation, without specifically authorizing the use of
injunctions by the United States. The latter issue was not raised,
not debated and not commented upon in the House. But the fact that
the House version did not provide for the issuance of injunctions
to aid in the operation of seized plants is not the issue here.
Rather, it is whether the House expressed any intent to restrict
the existing authority of the courts. We find not the slightest
suggestion to that effect in either the House substitute bill or
the debates concerning it.
Nor can the action of the conference committee be construed as a
Congressional proscription of issuing injunctions to aid the United
States in dealing with employees in seized plants. Neither the
House nor Senate version, as these bills went to conference, in any
way placed this issue before the conferees. The conference
committee simply struck the broader provisions of the House bill
allowing injunctions to issue in private labor disputes and
Page 330 U. S. 284
had no occasion to consider the narrower question we have before
us now. The conferees, in producing the Act in its final form, did
nothing which suggests that the Congress intended to bar
injunctions sought by the Government to aid in the operation of
seized plants. We thus find nothing in the legislative background
of the War Labor Disputes Act which constitutes an authoritative
expression of Congress directing the courts to withhold from the
United States injunctive relief in connection with an Act designed
to strengthen the hand of the Government in serious labor
disputes.
The defendants contend, however, that workers in mines seized by
the Government are not employees of the federal Government; that in
operating the mines thus seized, the Government is not engaged in a
sovereign function; and that, consequently, the situation in this
case does not fall within the area which we have indicated as lying
outside the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is clear,
however, that workers in the mines seized by the Government under
the authority of the War Labor Disputes Act stand in an entirely
different relationship to the federal Government with respect to
their employment from that which existed before the seizure was
effected. That Congress intended such was to be the case is
apparent both from the terms of the statute and from the
legislative deliberations preceding its enactment. Section 3 of the
War Labor Disputes Act calls for the seizure of any plant, mine, or
facility when the President finds that the operation thereof is
threatened by strike or other labor disturbance and that an
interruption in production will unduly impede the war effort.
Congress intended that, by virtue of Government seizure, a mine
should become, for purposes of production and operation, a
Government facility in as complete a sense as if the Government
held full
Page 330 U. S. 285
title and ownership. [
Footnote 46] Consistent with that view, criminal
penalties were provided for interference with the operation of such
facilities. [
Footnote 47]
Also included were procedures for adjusting wages and conditions of
employment of the workers in such a manner as to avoid
interruptions in production. [
Footnote 48] The question with which we are confronted is
not whether the workers in mines under Government seizure are
"employees" of the federal Government for every purpose which might
be conceived, [
Footnote 49]
but whether,
Page 330 U. S. 286
for the purposes of this case, the incidents of the relationship
existing between the Government and the workers are those of
governmental employer and employee.
Executive Order 9728, in pursuance of which the Government
seized possession of the mines, authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to negotiate with the representatives of the miners, and
thereafter to apply to the National Wage Stabilization Board for
appropriate changes in terms and conditions of employment for the
period of governmental operation. [
Footnote 50] Such negotiations were undertaken, and
resulted in the Krug-Lewis agreement. That agreement contains many
basic departures from the earlier contract entered into between the
mine workers and the private operators on April 11, 1945, which,
except as amended and supplemented by the Krug-Lewis agreement, was
continued in effect for the period of Government possession. Among
the terms of the Krug-Lewis agreement were provisions for a new
mine safety code. Operating managers were directed to provide the
mine employees with the protection and benefits of Workmen's
Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws. Provision was made for
a Welfare and Retirement Fund and a Medical and Hospital Fund. The
agreement granted substantial wage increases, and contained terms
relating to vacations and vacation pay. Included were provisions
calling for changes in equitable grievance procedures.
It should be observed that the Krug-Lewis agreement was one
solely between the Government and the union.
Page 330 U. S. 287
The private mine operators were not parties to the contract, nor
were they made parties to any of its subsequent modifications. It
should also be observed that the provisions relate to matters which
normally constitute the subject matter of collective bargaining
between employer and employee. Many of the provisions incorporated
into the agreement for the period of Government operation had
theretofore been vigorously opposed by the private operators, and
have not subsequently received their approval.
It is descriptive of the situation to state that the Government,
in order to maintain production and to accomplish the purposes of
the seizure, has substituted itself for the private employer in
dealing with those matters which formerly were the subject to
collective bargaining between the union and the operators. The
defendants, by their conduct, have given practical recognition to
this fact. The union negotiated a collective agreement with the
Government, and has made use of the procedures provided by the War
Labor Disputes Act to modify its terms and conditions. The union
has apparently regarded the Krug-Lewis agreement as a sufficient
contract of employment to satisfy the mine workers' traditional
demand of a contract as a condition precedent to their work. The
defendant Lewis, in responding to a suggestion of the Secretary of
the Interior that certain union demands should be taken to the
private operators with the view of making possible the termination
of Government possession, stated in a letter dated November 15,
1946:
"The Government of the United States seized the mines and
entered into a contract. The mine workers do not propose to deal
with parties who have no status under the contract."
The defendant Lewis, in the same letter, referred to the
operators as "strangers to the Krug-Lewis Agreement," and to the
miners as the "400,000 men who now serve the Government of the
United States in the bituminous coal mines."
Page 330 U. S. 288
The defendants, however, point to the fact that the private
managers of the mines have been retained by the Government in the
role of operating managers with substantially the same functions
and authority. It is true that the regulations for the operations
of the mines issued by the Coal Mines Administrator provide for the
retention of the private managers to assist in the realization of
the objects of Government seizure and operation. [
Footnote 51] The regulations, however, also
provide for the removal of such operating managers at the
discretion of the Coal Mines Administrator. [
Footnote 52] Thus, the Government, though
utilizing the services of the private managers, has nevertheless
retained ultimate control.
The defendants also point to the regulations which provide that
none of the earnings or liabilities resulting from the operation of
the mines, while under seizure, are for the account or at the risk
or expense of the Government; [
Footnote 53] that the companies continue to be liable for
all Federal, State, and local taxes; [
Footnote 54] and that the mining companies remain subject
to suit. [
Footnote 55] The
regulations on which defendants rely represent an attempt on the
part of the Coal Mines Administrator to define the respective
powers and obligations of the Government and private operators
during the period of Government control. We do not at this time
express any opinion as to the validity of these regulations. It is
sufficient to state that, in any event, the matters to which they
refer have little persuasive weight in determining the nature of
the relation existing between the Government and the mine
workers.
Page 330 U. S. 289
We do not find convincing the contention of the defendants that,
in seizing and operating the coal mines, the Government was not
exercising a sovereign function, and that, hence, this is not a
situation which can be excluded from the terms of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the Executive Order which directed the
seizure of the mines, the President found and proclaimed that
"the coal produced by such mines is required for the war effort
and is indispensable for the continued operation of the national
economy during the transition from war to peace; that the war
effort will be unduly impeded or delayed by . . . interruptions [in
production]; and that the exercise . . . of the powers vested in me
is necessary to insure the operation of such mines in the interest
of the war effort and to preserve the national economic structure
in the present emergency. . . ."
Under the conditions found by the President to exist, it would
be difficult to conceive of a more vital and urgent function of the
Government than the seizure and operation of the bituminous coal
mines. We hold that, in a case such as this, where the Government
has seized actual possession of the mines, or other facilities, and
is operating them, and the relationship between the Government and
the workers is that of employer and employee, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not apply.
II
Although we have held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
render injunctive relief beyond the jurisdiction of the District
Court, there are alternative grounds which support the power of the
District Court to punish violations of its orders as criminal
contempt.
Attention must be directed to the situation obtaining on
November 18. The Government's complaint sought a declaratory
judgment in respect to the right of the defendants
Page 330 U. S. 290
to terminate the contract by unilateral action. What amounted to
a strike call, effective at midnight on November 20, had been
issued by the defendant Lewis as an "official notice." Pending a
determination of defendants' right to take this action, the
Government requested a temporary restraining order and injunctive
relief. The memorandum in support of the restraining order
seriously urged the inapplicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
the facts of this case, and the power of the District Court to
grant the ancillary relief depended in great part upon the
resolution of this jurisdictional question. In these circumstances,
the District Court unquestionably had the power to issue a
restraining order for the purpose of preserving existing conditions
pending a decision upon its own jurisdiction.
The temporary restraining order was served on November 18. This
was roughly two and one-half days before the strike was to begin.
The defendants filed no motion to vacate the order. Rather, they
ignored it, and allowed a nationwide coal strike to become an
accomplished fact. This Court has used unequivocal language in
condemning such conduct, [
Footnote 56] and has, in
United States v. Shipp,
203 U. S. 563
(1906), provided protection for judicial authority in situations of
this kind. In that case this Court had allowed an appeal from a
denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of
Tennessee. The petition had been filed by Johnson, then confined
under a sentence of death imposed by a state court. Pending the
appeal, this Court issued an order staying all proceedings
against
Page 330 U. S. 291
Johnson. However, the prisoner was taken from jail and lynched.
Shipp, the sheriff having custody of Johnson, was charged with
conspiring with others for the purpose of lynching Johnson, with
intent to show contempt for the order of this Court. Shipp denied
the jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt on the ground
that the stay order was issued pending an appeal over which this
Court had no jurisdiction because the constitutional questions
alleged were frivolous and only a pretense. The Court, through Mr.
Justice Holmes, rejected the contention as to want of jurisdiction,
and in ordering the contempt to be tried, stated:
"We regard this argument as unsound. It has been held, it is
true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make
them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt.
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200;
Ex parte
Fisk, 113 U. S. 713;
Ex parte
Rowland, 104 U. S. 604. But even if the
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Johnson's petition,
and if this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this court,
and this court alone, could decide that such was the law. It and it
alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was
properly before it. On that question, at least, it was its duty to
permit argument, and to take the time required for such
consideration as it might need.
See Mansfield, Coldwater &
Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S.
379,
111 U. S. 387. Until its
judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had
authority, from the necessity of the case, to make orders to
preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition,
just as the state court was bound to refrain from further
proceedings until the same time. Rev.Stat. § 766, act of March 3,
1893, c. 226, 27 Stat. 751. The fact that the petitioner was
entitled to argue his
Page 330 U. S. 292
case shows what needs no proof, that the law contemplates the
possibility of a decision either way, and therefore must provide
for it."
203 U. S. 203
U.S. 573.
If this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in
the
Shipp case, its order would have had to be vacated.
But it was ruled that only the Court itself could determine that
question of law. Until it was found that the Court had no
jurisdiction, " . . . it had authority, from the necessity of the
case, to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the
subject of the petition. . . ."
Application of the rule laid down in
United States v. Shipp,
supra, is apparent in
Carter v. United States, 135
F.2d 858. There a district court, after making the findings
required by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, issued a temporary
restraining order. An injunction followed after a hearing in which
the court affirmatively decided that it had jurisdiction and
overruled the defendants' objections based upon the absence of
diversity and the absence of a case arising under a statute of the
United States. These objections of the defendants prevailed on
appeal, and the injunction was set aside.
Brown v.
Coumanis, 135 F.2d 163 (1943). But in Carter, a companion
case, violations of the temporary restraining order were held
punishable as criminal contempt. Pending a decision on a doubtful
question of jurisdiction, the District Court was held to have power
to maintain the
status quo and punish violations as
contempt. [
Footnote 57]
Page 330 U. S. 293
In the case before us, the District Court had the power to
preserve existing conditions while it was determining its own
authority to grant injunctive relief. The defendants, in making
their private determination of the law, acted at their peril. Their
disobedience is punishable as criminal contempt.
Although a different result would follow were the question of
jurisdiction frivolous and not substantial, such contention would
be idle here. The applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the
United States in a case such as this had not previously received
judicial consideration, and both the language of the Act and its
legislative history indicated the substantial nature of the problem
with which the District Court was faced.
Proceeding further, we find impressive authority for the
proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until
it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. [
Footnote 58] This is true without regard
even for the constitutionality of the Act under which the order is
issued. In
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.
S. 181,
258 U. S.
189-190 (1922), this Court said:
"An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general
jurisdiction with equity powers, upon pleadings properly invoking
its action, and served upon persons made parties therein and within
the jurisdiction, must
Page 330 U. S. 294
be obeyed by them, however erroneous the action of the court may
be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a
seeming, but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for
the court of first instance to determine the question of the
validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error
by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience
of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.
[
Footnote 59]"
Violations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even
though the order is set aside on appeal,
Worden v. Searls,
121 U. S. 14
(1887), [
Footnote 60] or
though the basic action has become moot.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 221 U. S. 418
(1911).
We insist upon the same duty of obedience where, as here, the
subject matter of the suit, as well as the parties, was properly
before the court; where the elements of federal jurisdiction were
clearly shown; and where the authority of the court of first
instance to issue an order ancillary to the main suit depended upon
a statute, the scope and applicability of which were subject to
substantial doubt. The District Court, on November 29,
affirmatively decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was of no force
in this case, and that injunctive relief was therefore authorized.
Orders outstanding or issued after that date were to be obeyed
until they expired or were set aside by appropriate proceedings,
appellate or otherwise. Convictions for criminal contempt
intervening before that time may stand.
It does not follow, of course, that simply because a defendant
may be punished for criminal contempt for disobedience
Page 330 U. S. 295
of an order later set aside on appeal, that the plaintiff in the
action may profit by way of a fine imposed in a simultaneous
proceeding for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same
order. The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which
events prove was erroneously issued,
Worden v. Searls,
supra, at
121 U. S. 25,
121 U. S. 26;
Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp.,
86 F.2d 727 (1936);
S. Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co.,
191 F. 208 (1911); [
Footnote
61] and
a fortiori when the injunction or restraining
order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Nor does the reason
underlying United States v. Shipp,
supra, compel a
different result. If the Norris-LaGuardia Act were applicable in
this case, the conviction for civil contempt would be reversed in
its entirety.
Assuming, then, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to this
case and prohibited injunctive relief at the request of the United
States, we would set aside the preliminary injunction of December 4
and the judgment for civil contempt; but we would, subject to any
infirmities in the contempt proceedings or in the fines imposed,
affirm the judgments for criminal contempt as validly punishing
violations of an order then outstanding and unreversed.
III
The defendants have pressed upon us the procedural aspects of
their trial and allege error so prejudicial as to require reversal
of the judgments for civil and criminal contempt. But we have not
been persuaded.
Page 330 U. S. 296
The question is whether the proceedings will support judgments
for both criminal and civil contempt, and our attention is directed
to Rule 42(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. [
Footnote 62] The rule requires criminal
contempt to be prosecuted on notice stating the essential facts
constituting the contempt charged. In this respect, there was
compliance with the rule here. Notice was given by a rule to show
cause served upon defendants together with the Government's
petition and supporting affidavit. The pleadings rested only upon
information and belief, but Rule 42(b) was not designed to cast
doubt upon the propriety of instituting criminal contempt
proceedings in this manner. [
Footnote 63] The petition itself charged a violation of
the outstanding restraining order, and the affidavit alleged in
detail a failure to withdraw the notice of November 15, the
cessation of work in the mines, and the consequent
Page 330 U. S. 297
interference with governmental functions and the jurisdiction of
the court. The defendants were fairly and completely apprised of
the events and conduct constituting the contempt charged.
However, Rule 42(b) requires that the notice issuing to the
defendants describe the criminal contempt charged as such. The
defendants urge a failure to comply with this rule. The petition
alleged a willful violation of the restraining order, and both the
petition and the rule to show cause inquired as to way the
defendants should not be "punished as and for a contempt" of court.
But nowhere was the contempt described as criminal as required by
the rule.
Nevertheless, the defendants were quite aware that a criminal
contempt was charged. [
Footnote
64] In their motion to discharge and vacate the rule to show
cause, the contempt charged was referred to as criminal. [
Footnote 65] And in argument on the
motion, the defendants stated and were expressly informed that a
criminal contempt was to be tried. Yet it is now urged that the
omission of the words "criminal contempt" from the petition and
rule to show cause was prejudicial error. Rule 42(b) requires no
such rigorous application,
Page 330 U. S. 298
for it was designed to insure a realization by contemnors that a
prosecution for criminal contempt is contemplated. [
Footnote 66] Its purpose was sufficiently
fulfilled here, for this failure to observe the rule in all
respects has not resulted in substantial prejudice to the
defendants.
Not only were the defendant fully informed that a criminal
contempt was charged, but we think they enjoyed during the trial
itself all the enhanced protections accorded defendants in criminal
contempt proceedings. [
Footnote
67] We need not treat these at length, for defendants, in this
respect, urge only their right to a jury trial as provided in § 11
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But § 11 is not operative here, for it
applies only to cases "arising under this Act," [
Footnote 68] and we have already held that
the restriction upon injunctions imposed by the Act do not govern
this case. [
Footnote 69] The
defendants, we think, were properly tried by the court without a
jury.
If the defendants were thus accorded all the rights and
privileges owing to defendants in criminal contempt cases, they are
put in no better position to complain because their trial included
a proceeding in civil contempt and was carried on in the main
equity suit. Common
Page 330 U. S. 299
sense would recognize that conduct can amount to both civil and
criminal contempt. The same acts may justify a court in resorting
to coercive and to punitive measures. [
Footnote 70] Disposing of both aspects of the contempt
in a single proceeding would seem at least a convenient practice.
Litigation in patent cases has frequently followed this course,
[
Footnote 71] and the same
method can be noted in other situations in both federal and state
courts. [
Footnote 72] Rule
42(b), while demanding fair notice and recognition of the criminal
aspects of the case, contains nothing precluding a simultaneous
disposition of the remedial aspects of the contempt tried. Even if
it be the better practice to try criminal contempt alone and so
avoid obscuring the defendant's privileges in any manner, a
Page 330 U. S. 300
mingling of civil and criminal contempt proceedings must
nevertheless be shown to result in substantial prejudice before a
reversal will be required. [
Footnote 73] That the contempt proceeding carried the
number and name of the equity suit [
Footnote 74] does not alter this conclusion, especially
where, as here, the United States would have been the complaining
party in whatever suit the contempt was tried. In so far as the
criminal nature of the double proceeding dominates [
Footnote 75]
Page 330 U. S. 301
and in so far as the defendants' rights in the criminal trial
are not diluted by the mixing of civil with criminal contempt, to
that extent is prejudice avoided. [
Footnote 76] Here, as we have indicated, all rights and
privileges of the defendants were fully respected, and there has
been no showing of substantial prejudice flowing from the formal
peculiarities of defendants' trial.
Lastly, the defendants have assigned as error and argued in
their brief that the District Court improperly extended the
restraining order on November 27 for another ten days. There was
then in progress argument on defendants' motion to vacate the rule
to show cause, a part of the contempt proceedings. In the
circumstances of this case, we think there was good cause shown for
extending the order. [
Footnote
77]
IV
Apart from their contentions concerning the formal aspects of
the proceedings below, defendants insist upon the liability of the
United States to secure relief by way
Page 330 U. S. 302
of civil contempt in this case, and would limit the right to
proceed by civil contempt to situations in which the United States
is enforcing a statute expressly allowing resort to the courts for
enforcement of statutory orders.
McCrone v. United States,
307 U. S. 61
(1939), however, rests upon no such narrow ground, for the Court
there said that
"Article 3, Section 2, of the Constitution expressly
contemplates the United States as a party to civil proceedings by
extending the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary 'to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.'"
Id. at
307 U. S. 63.
The United States was fully entitled to bring the present suit and
to benefit from orders entered in its behalf. [
Footnote 78] We will not reduce the practical
value of the relief granted by limiting the United States, when the
orders have been disobeyed, to a proceeding in criminal contempt,
and by denying to the Government the civil remedies enjoyed by
other litigants, concluding the opportunity to demonstrate that
disobedience has occasioned loss. [
Footnote 79]
V
It is urged that, in any event, the amount of the fine of
$10,000 imposed on the defendant Lewis and of the fine of
$3,500,000 imposed on the defendant Union were arbitrary,
excessive, and in no way related to the evidence adduced at the
hearing.
Sentences for criminal contempt are punitive in their nature,
and are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the
court.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Page 330 U. S. 303
Co., supra, at
221 U. S. 441. The interests of orderly government
demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by
courts possessed of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter. One
who defies the public authority and willfully refuses his obedience
does so at his peril. In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the
trial judge may properly take into consideration the extent of the
willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the
seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the
necessity of effectively terminating the defendant's defiance as
required by the public interest, and the importance of deterring
such acts in the future. Because of the nature of these standards,
great reliance must be placed upon the discretion of the trial
judge.
The trial court properly found the defendants guilty of criminal
contempt. Such contempt had continued for 15 days from the issuance
of the restraining order until the finding of guilty. Its
willfulness had not been qualified by any concurrent attempt on
defendants' part to challenge the order by motion to vacate or
other appropriate procedures. Immediately following the finding of
guilty, defendant Lewis stated openly in court that defendants
would adhere to their policy of defiance. This policy, as the
evidence showed, was the germ center of an economic paralysis which
was rapidly extending itself from the bituminous coal mines into
practically every other major industry of the United States. It was
an attempt to repudiate and override the instrument of lawful
government in the very situation in which governmental action was
indispensable.
The trial court also properly found the defendants guilty of
civil contempt. Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings
may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two
purposes; to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's
order, and to compensate
Page 330 U. S. 304
the complainant for losses sustained.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., supra, at
221 U. S. 448,
221 U. S. 449.
Where compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the
complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence of
complainant's actual loss, [
Footnote 80] and his right, as a civil litigant, to the
compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the basic
controversy. [
Footnote
81]
But where the purpose is to make the defendant comply, the
court's discretion is otherwise exercised. It must then consider
the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued
contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction
in bringing about the result desired. [
Footnote 82]
It is a corollary of the above principles that a court which has
returned a conviction for contempt must, in fixing the amount of a
fine to be imposed as a punishment or as a means of securing future
compliance, consider the amount of defendant's financial resources
and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular
defendant.
In the light of these principles, we think the record clearly
warrants a fine of $10,000 against defendant Lewis for criminal
contempt. A majority of the Court, however, does not think that it
warrants the unconditional imposition of a fine of $3,500,000
against the defendant union. A majority feels that, if the court
below had assessed a fine of $700,000 against the defendant union,
this, under the circumstances, would not be
Page 330 U. S. 305
excessive as punishment for the criminal contempt theretofore
committed, and feels that, in order to coerce the defendant union
into a future compliance with the court's order, it would have been
effective to make the other $2,800,000 of the fine conditional on
the defendant's failure to purge itself within a reasonable time.
Accordingly, the judgment against the defendant union is held to be
excessive. It will be modified so as to require the defendant union
to pay a fine of $700,000, and further, to pay an additional fine
of $2,800,000 unless the defendant union, within five days after
the issuance of the mandate herein, shows that it has fully
complied with the temporary restraining order issued November 18,
1946, and the preliminary injunction issued December 4, 1946. The
defendant union can effect full compliance only by withdrawing
unconditionally the notice given by it, signed John L. Lewis,
President, on November 15, 1946, to J. A. Krug, Secretary of the
Interior, terminating the Krug-Lewis agreement as of twelve o'clock
midnight, Wednesday, November 20, 1946, and by notifying, at the
same time, its members of such withdrawal in substantially the same
manner as the members of the defendant union were notified of the
notice to the Secretary of the Interior above-mentioned; and by
withdrawing and similarly instructing the members of the defendant
union of the withdrawal of any other notice to the effect that the
Krug-Lewis agreement is not in full force and effect until the
final determination of the basic issues arising under the said
agreement.
We well realize the serious proportions of the fines here
imposed upon the defendant union. But a majority feels that the
course taken by the union carried with it such a serious threat to
orderly constitutional government, and to the economic and social
welfare of the nation, that a fine of substantial size is required
in order to emphasize the
Page 330 U. S. 306
gravity of the offense of which the union was found guilty. The
defendant Lewis, it is true, was the aggressive leader in the
studied and deliberate noncompliance with the order of the District
Court; but, as the record shows, he stated in open court, prior to
imposition of the fines, that "the representatives of the United
Mine Workers determined that the so-called Krug-Lewis agreement was
breached," and that it was the union's "representatives" who
"notified the Secretary of the Interior that the contract was
terminated as of November 20th." And certainly it was the members
of the defendant union who executed the nationwide strike. Loyalty
in responding to the orders of their leader may, in some minds,
minimize the gravity of the miners' conduct, but we cannot ignore
the effect of their action upon the rights of other citizens, or
the effect of their action upon our system of government. The
gains, social and economic, which the miners and other citizens
have realized in the past are ultimately due to the fact that they
enjoy the rights of free men under our system of government. Upon
the maintenance of that system depends all future progress to which
they may justly aspire. In our complex society, there is a great
variety of limited loyalties, but the overriding loyalty of all is
to our country and to the institutions under which a particular
interest may be pursued.
We are aware that the defendants may have sincerely believed
that the restraining order was ineffective, and would finally be
vacated. However, the Government had sought a declaration of its
contractual rights under the Krug-Lewis agreement, effective since
May 29, 1946, and solemnly subscribed by the Government and the
defendant union. The restraining order sought to preserve
conditions until the cause could be determined, and obedience by
the defendants would have secured this result. They had full
opportunity to comply with the order of the District Court, but
they deliberately refused obedience and
Page 330 U. S. 307
determined for themselves the validity of the order. When the
rule to show cause was issued, provision was made for a hearing as
to whether or not the alleged contempt was sufficiently purged. At
that hearing, the defendants stated to the court that their
position remained then in the status which existed at the time of
the issuance of the restraining order. Their conduct showed a total
lack of respect for the judicial process. Punishment in this case
is for that which the defendants had done prior to imposition of
the judgment in the District Court, coupled with a coercive
imposition upon the defendant union to compel obedience with the
court's outstanding order.
We have examined the other contentions advanced by the
defendants, but have found them to be without merit. The temporary
restraining order the the preliminary injunction were properly
issued, and the actions of the District Court in these respects are
affirmed. The judgment against the defendant Lewis is affirmed. The
judgment against the defendant union is modified in accordance with
this opinion, and, as modified, that judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins in this opinion except as to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which he thinks relieved the courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in this class of case.
* Together with No. 760,
United States v. Lewis; No.
781,
United Mine Workers of America v. United States; No.
782,
Lewis v. United States; and No. 811,
United Mine
Workers of America et al. v. United States, also on certiorari
to the same Court.
[
Footnote 1]
The United States had taken possession of the mines pursuant to
Executive Order 9728 of May 21, 1946, 11 F.R. 5593, in which the
President, after determining that labor disturbances were
interrupting the production of bituminous coal necessary for the
operation of the national economy during the transition from war to
peace, directed the Secretary of Interior to take possession of and
operate the mines and to negotiate with representatives of the
miners concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
The President's action was taken under the Constitution, as
President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy, and by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the
War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 1501-1511.
Section 3 of the Act authorizes the seizure of facilities necessary
for the war effort if and when the President finds and proclaims
that strikes or other labor disturbances are interrupting the
operation of such facilities.
Section 3 directs that the authority under that section to take
possession of the specified facilities will terminate with the
ending of hostilities and that the authority under that section to
operate facilities seized will terminate six months after the
ending of hostilities. The President on December 31, 1946,
proclaimed that hostilities were terminated on that day. 12 F.R.
1.
[
Footnote 2]
The initial paragraph of the contract provided:
"This agreement between the Secretary of the Interior, acting as
Coal Mines Administrator under the authority of Executive Order No.
9728 (dated May 21, 1946, 11 F.R. 5593), and the United Mine
Workers of America, covers for the period of Government possession
the terms and conditions of employment in respect to all mines in
Government possession which were as of March 31, 1946, subject to
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, dated April 11,
1945."
[
Footnote 3]
In compliance with Executive Order No. 9728 and § 5 of the War
Labor Disputes Act, the agreement had been submitted to and
approved by the National Wage Stabilization Board.
[
Footnote 4]
See p.
330 U. S. 286
infra.
[
Footnote 5]
The saving clause was in the following form:
"Except as amended and supplemented herein, this agreement
carries forward and preserves the terms and conditions contained in
all joint wage agreements effective April 1, 1941, through March
31, 1943, the supplemental agreement providing for the six (6) day
workweek, and all the various district agreements executed between
the United Mine Workers and the various Coal Associations and Coal
Companies (based upon the aforesaid basic agreement) as they
existed on March 31, 1943, and the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement, dated April 11, 1945."
[
Footnote 6]
The letter also charged certain breaches of contract by the
Government and asserted significant changes in Government wage
policy.
[
Footnote 7]
Captain Collisson also specifically denied breaches of contract
on the part of the Government.
[
Footnote 8]
Conferences were carried on without prejudice to the claims of
either party in this respect.
[
Footnote 9]
Secretary Krug and defendant Lewis met privately on November 13
and again on November 14.
[
Footnote 10]
Secretary Krug had been advised by the Attorney General, whose
opinion had been sought, that § 15 of the 1945 agreement was no
longer in force.
[
Footnote 11]
Judicial Code, § 274d, 28 U.S.C. § 400.
[
Footnote 12]
The pertinent part of the order was as follows:
"NOW, THEREFORE, it is by the Court this 18th day of November,
1946,"
"ORDERED, that the defendants and each of them and their agents,
servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active
concept or participation with them, be and they are hereby
restrained pending further order of this Court from permitting to
continue in effect the notice heretofore given by the defendant,
John L. Lewis, to the Secretary of Interior dated November 15,
1946; and from issuing or otherwise giving publicity to any notice
that or to the effect that the Krug-Lewis Agreement has been, is,
or will at some future date be terminated, or that said agreement
is or shall at some future date be nugatory or void at any, time
during Government possession of the bituminous coal mines; and from
breaching any of their obligations under said Krug-Lewis Agreement;
and from coercing, instigating, inducing, or encouraging the mine
workers at the bituminous coal mines in the Government's
possession, or any of them, or any person, to interfere by strike,
slowdown, walkout, cessation of work, or otherwise, with the
operation of said mines by continuing in effect the aforesaid
notice or by issuing any notice of termination of agreement or
through any other means or device; and from interfering with or
obstructing the exercise by the Secretary of the Interior of his
functions under Executive Order 9728; and from taking any action
which would interfere with this Court's jurisdiction or which would
impair, obstruct, or render fruitless, the determination of this
case by the Court;"
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this restraining order shall
expire at 3 o'clock p.m. on November 27th, 1946, unless before such
time the order for good cause shown is extended, or unless the
defendants consent that it may be extended for a longer
period;"
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction be set down for hearing on November 27th,
1946, at 10:00 o'clock a.m."
[
Footnote 13]
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101.
[
Footnote 14]
The grounds offered for the motion were:
"1. The Temporary Restraining Order is void in that this case
involves and grows out of a labor dispute. Under the provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 Stat. 70) and the provisions of
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 U.S.Stat.C. 323, p. 730, this
Honorable Court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this cause."
"2. Equity acts only where there is no plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law. The allegations of the Petition for the
Rule purport to show a violation of the War Labor Disputes Act -- a
serious offense -- in which field there is no place for equity
intervention."
"3. Observance of all the strict rules of criminal procedure is
required to establish criminal contempt. It is apparent that the
alleged facts set out in the unverified Petition and in the
affidavit of Captain Collisson, filed in support of the Rule, are
based wholly upon hearsay, information and belief, and are not
sufficient to sustain the Rule to Show Cause."
"4. The object of the Petition for the Rule is necessarily
punitive, and not compensatory. Accordingly, it being for criminal
contempt, the Petition should have been presented as an independent
proceeding, and not as supplemental to the original cause."
"5. The Temporary Restraining Order is beyond the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, and therefore void because it contravenes
the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States."
[
Footnote 15]
38 Stat. 730, 738, § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52.
[
Footnote 16]
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184,
257 U. S. 202
(1921);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443,
254 U. S. 470
(1921).
[
Footnote 17]
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219,
312 U. S. 231
(1941).
[
Footnote 18]
See also Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.
S. 797,
325 U. S. 805
(1945);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219,
312 U. S. 235,
312 U. S. 236
(1941).
[
Footnote 19]
"Sec. 4. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
single or in concert, any of the following acts:"
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;"
"(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or
of any employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or
promise as is described in section 3 of this Act;"
"(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or
unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of
value;"
"(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or
interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in,
or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United
States or of any State;"
"(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence;"
"(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in
promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;"
"(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any
of the acts heretofore specified;"
"(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the
acts heretofore specified; and"
"(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any
such undertaking or promise as is described in section 3 of this
Act."
"Sec. 13. When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this
Act --"
"(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect
interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or
who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of
employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or
more employers or associations of employers and one or more
employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more
employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or
associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or
associations of employees and one or more employees or associations
of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or
competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined)
of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter
defined)."
"(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person
participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought
against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry,
trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a
direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or
agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers
or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or
occupation."
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
"(d) The term 'court of the United States' means any court of
the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred
or defined or limited by Act of Congress, including the courts of
the District of Columbia."
[
Footnote 20]
Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S.
618,
92 U. S. 622
(1875);
United States v.
Herron, 20 Wall. 251,
87 U. S. 263;
see Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty &
Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152,
224 U. S. 155
(1912).
[
Footnote 21]
United States v. California, 297 U.
S. 175,
297 U. S. 186
(1936);
Green v. United
States, 9 Wall. 655,
76 U. S. 658
(1869).
[
Footnote 22]
United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.
S. 190,
215 U. S. 197
(1909);
United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.,
159 U. S. 548,
159 U. S.
553-555 (1895);
Dollar Savings Bank v. United
States, 19 Wall. 227,
86 U. S. 238,
86 U. S. 239
(1873).
[
Footnote 23]
"The most general words that can be devised (for example, any
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect not him (the
sovereign) in the least if they may tend to restrain or diminish
any of his rights or interests."
Dollar Savings Bank v. United
States, 19 Wall. 227,
86 U. S. 239
(1873).
"If such prohibition is intended to reach the government in the
use of known rights and remedies, the language must be clear and
specific to that effect."
United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.
S. 190,
215 U. S. 197
(1909).
In both these cases, the question, as in the present case, was
whether the United States was divested of a certain remedy by a
statute or a rule of law which, without express reference to the
United States, made that remedy generally unavailable.
[
Footnote 24]
"Sec. 2. In the interpretation of this Act and in determining
the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States,
as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited,
the public policy of the United States is hereby declared as
follows:"
"Whereas, under prevailing economic conditions, developed with
the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to
organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association,
the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with
his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the
following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States are hereby
enacted."
[
Footnote 25]
United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.
S. 600,
312 U. S. 604
(1941);
United States v. Fox, 94 U. S.
315,
94 U. S. 321
(1876).
[
Footnote 26]
75 Cong.Rec. 5473. An amendment by Representative Beck, designed
to save to the United States the right to intervene by injunction
in private labor disputes, was defeated. 75 Cong.Rec. 5503,
5505.
[
Footnote 27]
75 Cong.Rec. 5503.
[
Footnote 28]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 29]
Most frequently mentioned was the Government action in
connection with the railway strikes of 1894 and 1922.
[
Footnote 30]
75 Cong.Rec. 5464.
[
Footnote 31]
75 Cong.Rec. 5509.
[
Footnote 32]
Representative Schneider, at 75 Cong.Rec. 5514, stated:
"And it has also been pointed out that the enactment of this
bill will not take away from the Federal Government any rights
which it has under existing law to seek and obtain injunctive
relief where the same is deemed by Government officials to be
necessary for the functioning of the Government."
"In other words, a tremendous field in which the injunction can
still be used effectively will remain after the enactment of this
bill."
[
Footnote 33]
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.
S. 110,
315 U. S. 125
(1942);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443,
254 U. S. 444,
254 U. S. 475
(1921).
[
Footnote 34]
We have been cited to no instances in which the consideration of
the Senate was directed to the specific issue of the relationship
between the United States and its own employees. The use of the
injunction by the Government was in question, but primarily in
respect to those instances in which the United States had taken
action in private labor disputes,
e.g., 75 Cong.Rec. 4509,
4619, 4620, 4693, 5001, 5005. Silence upon the status of the
Government as employer is not inconsistent with the desires of the
House to exclude from the Act those disputes in which the United
States is seeking relief against its own employees.
[
Footnote 35]
United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318
U.S. 741 (1943);
see United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U. S. 219,
312 U. S. 227
(1941). In accord is
United States v. Weirton Steel
Co., 7 F. Supp.
255 (1934);
cf. Anderson v. Bigelow, 130 F.2d 460
(1942).
[
Footnote 36]
It was upon § 3 of this Act that the President based in part the
seizure of the bituminous coal mines.
See note 1 supra.
[
Footnote 37]
89 Cong.Rec. 3812. The substitute bill embodied two amendments
proposed by Senator Connally on the floor of the Senate. 89
Cong.Rec. 3809.
[
Footnote 38]
Section 5 of the substitute bill originally did not limit the
issuance of injunctions to those sought by the Attorney General,
but Senator Wagner's proposal to insert "but solely upon
application by the Attorney General or under his direction" was
accepted. 89 Cong.Rec. 3986.
[
Footnote 39]
A great number of the references to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
were made in connection with the proposed Taft and Reed amendments.
89 Cong.Rec. 3897, 3984, 3985, 3986.
[
Footnote 40]
Senators Connally and Danahar expressed this view, and other
Senators were apparently in accord. 89 Cong.Rec. 3988-3989.
[
Footnote 41]
See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.
S. 110,
315 U. S. 125
(1942);
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.
S. 488,
283 U. S. 493
(1931);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443,
254 U. S. 474
(1921).
[
Footnote 42]
89 Cong.Rec. 3889, 3890, 3904-5.
[
Footnote 43]
Section 5, as we have noted before, would have permitted issuing
injunctions to restrain violations of the Act. It is not at all
clear that the rejection of a proposal in this form should, in any
event, be of determinative significance in the case at bar. Here,
the United States resorted to the District Court for vindication of
its right under a formal contract, said to be operative "for the
period of Government possession" and mutually adopted by the
parties concerned as a satisfactory solution to a grave situation.
The District Court, to preserve existing conditions, issued a
restraining order and a preliminary injunction, effective until
contractual rights could be ascertained. True, the action of the
defendant Lewis in calling a strike, in addition to terminating the
contract, suggests a violation of § 6 of the War Labor Disputes
Act. But Senate disapproval of using injunctions to avert the
latter event does not necessarily imply a desire to diminish the
contractual rights and remedies of the United States.
[
Footnote 44]
89 Cong.Rec. 5382.
[
Footnote 45]
See, for example, 89 Cong.Rec. 5241, 5243, 5299, 5305,
5321, 5325.
[
Footnote 46]
Thus, in the legislative debates Senator Connally stated:
". . . but it does seem to me that the power and authority and
sovereignty of the Government of the United States are so
comprehensive that, when we are engaged in war and a plant is not
producing, we can take it over, and that, when we do take it over,
it is a Government plant, just as much as if we had a fee simple
title to it,. . . ."
89 Cong.Rec. 3811-3812.
See also id. at 3809, 3884,
3885, 5722.
[
Footnote 47]
War Labor Disputes Act, § 6, provided:
"(a) Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession
of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any person (1) to
coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person,
to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other
interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility,
or (2) to aid any such lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other
interruption interfering with the operation of such plant, mine, or
facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of such
interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or direction
thereof or for the payment of strike, unemployment, or other
benefits to those participating therein. No individual shall be
deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason
only of his having ceased work or having refused to continue to
work or to accept employment."
"(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."
[
Footnote 48]
Id., § 5.
[
Footnote 49]
Thus, according to § 23 of the Revised Regulations for the
Operation of the Coal Mines Under Government Control, issued by the
Coal Mines Administrator on July 8, 1946:
". . . nothing in these regulations shall be construed as
recognizing such personnel as officers and employees of the Federal
Government within the meaning of the statutes relating to Federal
employment."
And see § 16. Section 23 also provides, however:
"All personnel of the mines, both officers and employees, shall
be considered as called upon by Executive Order No. 9728, to serve
the Government of the United States. . . ."
[
Footnote 50]
After the negotiation of the Krug-Lewis agreement, the changes
agreed upon therein were approved by the National Wage
Stabilization Act, and thereafter by the President. This procedure
is provided for in § 5 of the War Labor Disputes Act.
[
Footnote 51]
Revised Regulations for the Operation of the Coal Mines under
Government Control, § 15.
[
Footnote 52]
Regulations, §§ 16, 31.
[
Footnote 53]
Regulations, §§ 17, 40.
[
Footnote 54]
Regulations, § 24.
[
Footnote 55]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 56]
"If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders
which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them
aside, then are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now
fittingly calls the 'judicial power of the United States' would be
a mere mockery."
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418,
221 U. S. 450
(1911).
[
Footnote 57]
"It cannot now be broadly asserted that a judgment is always a
nullity if jurisdiction of some sort or other is wanting. It is now
held that, except in case of plain usurpation, a court has
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and if it be
contested and on due hearing it is upheld, the decision unreversed
binds the parties as a thing adjudged.
Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66;
Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S.
381,
310 U. S. 403;
Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165. So, in the matter
of federal jurisdiction, which is often a close question, the
federal court may either have to determine the facts, as in
contested citizenship, or the law, as whether the case alleged
arises under a law of the United States."
[
Footnote 58]
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181
(1922);
Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389 (1936);
Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157 (1935);
O'Hearne
v. United States, 62 App.D.C. 285, 66 F.2d 933 (1933);
Schwartz v. United States, 217 F. 866 (1914);
Brougham
v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857 (1913);
Blake
v. Nesbet, 144 F. 279 (1905);
see Alemite Mfg. Corp. v.
Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (1930).
[
Footnote 59]
See Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833
(1930).
[
Footnote 60]
See Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process
Corp., 86 F.2d 727 (1936).
[
Footnote 61]
See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U.
S. 448,
284 U. S. 453
(1932);
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.
S. 324,
194 U. S. 329
(1904);
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211,
214 (1935). In accord in the case of settlement is
Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S.
451-452 (1911):
". . .when the main cause was terminated . . . between the
parties, the complainant did not require, and was not entitled to,
any compensation or relief of any other character."
[
Footnote 62]
Rule 42(b) regulates various aspects of a proceeding for
criminal contempt where the contempt is not committed in the actual
presence of the court:
"DISPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt except
as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing,
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and
shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt
charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally
by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on
application of the United States attorney or of an attorney
appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause
or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury
in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled
to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge
is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with
the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt, the
court shall enter an order fixing the punishment."
[
Footnote 63]
Conley v. United States, 59 F.2d 929 (1932);
Kelly
v. United States, 250 F. 947 (1918);
see National Labor
Relations Board v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 74 App.D.C. 361, 122
F.2d 964, 965 (1941).
[
Footnote 64]
It could be well argued that the use of the word "punished" in
the petition and rule to show cause was in itself adequate notice,
for "punishment" has been said to be the magic word indicating a
proceeding in criminal, rather than civil, contempt. Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Col.L.Rev. 780,
789, 790 (1943). But "punishment," as used in contempt cases, is
ambiguous. "It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its
character and purpose. . . ."
Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 441
(1911).
Noteworthy also is the allegation in the affidavit that the
defendants' violation of the restraining order had "interfered with
this Court's jurisdiction." And the charge in the petition of
"willfully . . . and deliberately" disobeying the restraining order
indicates an intention to prosecute criminal contempt.
[
Footnote 65]
See point 4,
note
14 supra. The points and authorities in support of the
motion used similar language.
[
Footnote 66]
The rule in this respect follows the suggestion made in
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, 214, 215
(1935). Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Advisory
Committee, March, 1945, p. 34.
[
Footnote 67]
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.
S. 517,
267 U. S. 537
(1925);
see Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S.
42, 66,
266 U. S. 67
(1924).
[
Footnote 68]
Section 11 provides in part:
"In all cases arising under this Act in which a person shall be
charged with contempt in a court of the United States (as herein
defined), the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
contempt shall have been committed. . . ."
[
Footnote 69]
We believe, and the Government admits, that the defendants would
have been entitled to a jury trial if § 11 applied to the instant
contempt proceeding and if this case arose under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
[
Footnote 70]
"It may not be always easy to classify a particular act as
belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of the
characteristics of both."
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.
S. 324,
194 U. S. 329
(1904).
See Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.
S. 217,
285 U. S. 221
(1932);
Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade of
Chicago, 201 F. 20, 24 (1912).
[
Footnote 71]
"In patent cases, it has been usual to embrace in one proceeding
the public and the private remedy -- to punish the defendant if
found worthy of punishment, and, at the same time, or as an
alternative, to assess damages and costs for the benefit of the
plaintiff. . . ."
Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810, 813 (1884). Examples
of this procedure appear in
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson,
259 U. S. 107
(1922);
Matter of Christensen Engineering Co.,
194 U. S. 458
(1904);
Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co., 93 F.2d 577 (1937);
Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 F. 565 (1911).
[
Footnote 72]
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wilkinson, 266 U.
S. 503 (1925);
In re Swan, 150 U.
S. 637 (1893);
In re Ayers, 123 U.
S. 443 (1887);
Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v.
Board of Trade of Chicago, 201 F. 20 (1912).
See Phillips
Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel &
Tin Workers, 208 F. 335, 340 (1913). Instances in the state
courts include
Carey v. District Court of Jasper County,
226 Iowa 717, 285 N.W. 236 (1939);
Holloway v. Peoples Water
Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917);
Grand Lodge, K.P. of
New Jersey v. Jansen, 62 N.J.Eq. 737, 48 A. 526 (1901).
[
Footnote 73]
We are not impressed with defendants' attack on the pleadings as
insufficient to support a judgment for civil contempt. The
petition, affidavit, and rule to show cause did not expressly
mention civil contempt or remedial relief, but the affidavit
contained allegations of interference with the operation of the
mines and with governmental functions. These claims do not negative
remedial or coercive relief. More significantly, the affidavit
charged disobedience of the restraining order by failing to
withdraw the notice of Nov. 15. We will not assume that the
defendants were not instantly aware that a usual remedy in such a
situation is to impose coercive sanctions until the act is
performed. This is a function of civil contempt.
Lamb v.
Cramer, 285 U. S. 217,
285 U. S. 221
(1932);
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S.
42,
266 U. S. 66
(1924);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 449
(1911). Furthermore, defendants' counsel, in argument on the motion
to vacate, remarked that the United States was proceeding upon the
theory of civil contempt, and attempted only to demonstrate the
inability of the United States to seek this relief. And when the
Government's suggestions for fines were before the Court,
defendants' counsel argued the excessiveness of the fines for
either civil or criminal contempt.
[
Footnote 74]
Criminal contempt was apparently tried out in the equity suit in
the patent cases in
note 71
supra. And this was the practice followed in
Matter of
Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458
(1904);
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.
S. 324 (1904);
City of New Orleans v.
Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387 (1874). In none of
these cases in this Court, however, has there been an affirmative
discussion of the propriety of proceeding in this manner.
Compare Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 445
(1911);
United States ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Bittner, 11 F.2d 93, 95 (1926),
with Nye v. United
States, 313 U. S. 33,
313 U. S. 42
(1941).
[
Footnote 75]
Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S.
33,
313 U. S. 42
(1941);
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.
S. 107,
259 U. S. 110
(1922);
In re Merchants Stock & Grain Co.,
223 U. S. 639,
223 U. S. 642
(1911);
Matter of Christensen Engineering Co.,
194 U. S. 458,
194 U. S. 461
(1904).
[
Footnote 76]
In
Federal Trade Commission v. A. McLean & Son, 94
F.2d 802 (1938), it could not be said that the criminal element had
been dominant and clear from the very outset of the case. The same
is true of
Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910 (1930).
[
Footnote 77]
Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a temporary restraining order should expire according to its terms
"unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown,
is extended for a like period.. . . ." There being sufficient cause
for the extension, there is no conflict with the subsequent clause
of Rule 65(b) requiring that
"the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for
hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all
matters except older matters of the same character. . . ."
[
Footnote 78]
Section 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 41, extends the
jurisdiction of the District Courts to "all suits of a civil
nature, at common law or in equity, brought by the United States. .
. ."
[
Footnote 79]
The Court in the
McCrone case affirmed 100 F.2d 322 and
noted,
307 U. S. 307 U.S.
61,
307 U. S. 63,
note 4, the conflict with
Federal Trade Commission v. A. McLean
& Son, 94 F.2d 802, 804 (1938), upon which defendants now
rely.
[
Footnote 80]
Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U.
S. 448,
284 U. S.
455-456 (1932);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S.
443-444 (1911);
Parker v. United States, 126
F.2d 370, 380 (1942);
Judelshon v. Black, 64 F.2d 116
(1933);
Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910, 914 (1930).
[
Footnote 81]
See 330 U. S.
294-295
supra.
[
Footnote 82]
Cf. Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
204 U. S. 599
(1907).
See also In re Chiles,
22 Wall. 157,
89 U. S. 168
(1874).
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in the judgment.
The historic phrase "a government of laws, and not of men,"
epitomized the distinguishing character of our political society.
When John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights, he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was
expressing the aim
Page 330 U. S. 308
of those who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence
and founded the Republic. "A government of laws and not of men" was
the rejection in positive terms of rule by fiat, whether by the
fiat of governmental or private power. Every act of government may
be challenged by an appeal to law, as finally pronounced by this
Court. Even this Court has the last say only for a time. Being
composed of fallible men, it may err. But revision of its errors
must be by orderly process of law. The Court may be asked to
reconsider its decisions, and this has been done successfully again
and again throughout our history. Or what this Court has deemed its
duty to decide may be changed by legislation, as it often has been,
and, on occasion, by constitutional amendment.
But, from their own experience and their deep reading in
history, the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from
being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power
however disguised. "Civilization involves subjection of force to
reason, and the agency of this subjection is law." [
Footnote 2/1] The conception of a government by
laws dominated the thoughts of those who founded this Nation and
designed its Constitution, although they knew as well as the
belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made, interpreted
and enforced by men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who
were to be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined
training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations
of private interest may reasonably be expected to be "as free,
impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit." So
strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a
reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with
extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how
exalted his public office or how righteous
Page 330 U. S. 309
his private motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what
courts are for. And no type of controversy is more peculiarly fit
for judicial determination than a controversy that calls into
question the power of a court to decide. Controversies over
"jurisdiction" are apt to raise difficult technical problems. They
usually involve judicial presuppositions, textual doubts, confused
legislative history, and like factors hardly fit for final
determination by the self-interest of a party.
Even when a statute deals with a relatively uncomplicated
matter, and the "words in their natural sense as they would be read
by the common man" would appear to give an obvious meaning,
considerations underlying the statute have led this Court to
conclude that "the words cannot be taken quite so simply."
See
Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.
S. 390,
270 U. S. 400.
How much more true this is of legislation like the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. This Act altered a long process of judicial history, but
altered it by a scheme of complicated definitions and
limitations.
The Government here invoked the aid of a court of equity in
circumstances which certainly were not covered by the Act with
inescapable clarity. Colloquially speaking, the Government was
"running" the mines. But it was "running" them not as an employer,
in the sense that the owners of the coal mines were the employers
of the men the day before the Government seized the mines. Nor yet
was the relation between the Government and the men like the
relation of the Government to the civil service employees in the
Department of the Interior. It would be naive or willful to assert
that the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in a situation like that
presented by this bill raised a question so frivolous that any
judge should have summarily thrown the Government out of court
without day. Only when a court is so obviously traveling outside
its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities
may an order issued by a
Page 330 U. S. 310
court be disobeyed and treated as though it were a letter to a
newspaper. Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part
of a court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to
entertain a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation,
that it has no power over the particular controversy. Whether a
defendant may be brought to the bar of justice is not for the
defendant himself to decide.
To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a court cannot be
circumvented by a frivolous inquiry into the existence of a power
that has unquestionably been withheld. Thus, the explicit
withdrawal from federal district courts of the power to issue
injunctions in an ordinary labor dispute between a private employer
and his employees cannot be defeated, and an existing right to
strike thereby impaired, by pretending to entertain a suit for such
an injunction in order to decide whether the court has
jurisdiction. In such a case, a judge would not be acting as a
court. He would be a pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial
power.
That is not this case. It required extended arguments, lengthy
briefs, study and reflection preliminary to adequate discussion in
conference before final conclusions could be reached regarding the
proper interpretation of the legislation controlling this case. A
majority of my brethren find that neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act
nor the War Labor Disputes Act limited the power of the district
court to issue the orders under review. I have come to the contrary
view. But to suggest that the right to determine so complicated and
novel an issue could not be brought within the cognizance of the
district court, and eventually of this Court, is to deny the place
of the judiciary in our scheme of government. And if the district
court had power to decide whether this case was properly before it,
it could make appropriate orders so as to afford the necessary time
for fair consideration and decision while
Page 330 U. S. 311
existing conditions were preserved. To say that the authority of
the court may be flouted during the time necessary to decide is to
reject the requirements of the judicial process.
It does not mitigate such defiance of law to urge that hard-won
liberties of collective action by workers were at stake. The most
prized liberties themselves presuppose an independent judiciary
through which these liberties may be, as they often have been,
vindicated. When in a real controversy, such as is now here, an
appeal is made to law, the issue must be left to the judgment of
courts, and not the personal judgment of one of the parties. This
principle is a postulate of our democracy.
And so I join the opinion of the Court insofar as it sustains
the judgment for criminal contempt upon the broad ground of
vindicating the process of law. [
Footnote 2/2] The records of this Court are full of
cases, both civil and criminal, involving life or land or small
sums of money, in which the Court proceeded to consider a federal
claim that was not obviously frivolous. It retained such cases
under its power until final judgment, though the claim eventually
turned out to be unfounded and the judgment was one denying the
jurisdiction either of this Court or of the court from which the
case came. In the case before us, the District Court had power "to
preserve the existing conditions" in the discharge of "its duty to
permit argument, and to take the time required for such
consideration as it might need" to decide whether the controversy
involved a labor dispute to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied.
United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563,
203 U. S. 573,
and
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181.
Page 330 U. S. 312
In our country, law is not a body of technicalities in the
keeping of specialists or in the service of any special interest.
There can be no free society without law administered through an
independent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for
himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then
tyranny. Legal process is an essential part of the democratic
process. For legal process is subject to democratic control by
defined, orderly ways which themselves are part of law. In a
democracy, power implies responsibility. The greater the power that
defies law, the less tolerant can this Court be of defiance. As the
Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, this Court, beyond any other
organ of society, is the trustee of law and charged with the duty
of securing obedience to it.
It only remains to state the basis of my disagreement with the
Court's views on the bearing of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.
70, 29 U.S.C. § 101, and the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163,
50 U.S.C.App. § 1501. As to the former, the Court relies
essentially on a general doctrine excluding the Government from the
operation of a statute in which it is not named, and on the
legislative history of the Act. I find the countervailing
considerations weightier. The Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor
disputes except under conditions not here relevant. The question
before a court of equity, therefore, is whether a case presents a
labor dispute as defined by the Act. Section 13(c) defines "labor
disputes":
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee."
That the controversy before the district court comes within this
definition does not need to be labored. The
Page 330 U. S. 313
controversy arising under the Lewis-Krug contract concerned
"terms or conditions of employment," and was therefore a "labor
dispute," whatever further radiations the dispute may have had. The
Court deems it appropriate to interpolate an exception regarding
labor disputes to which the Government is a party. It invokes a
canon of construction according to which the Government is excluded
from the operation of general statutes unless it is included by
explicit language.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act has specific origins and definite
purposes, and should not be confined by an artificial canon of
construction. The title of the Act gives its scope and purpose, and
the terms of the Act justify its title. It is an Act "to define and
limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity." It does not
deal with the rights of parties, but with the power of the courts.
Again and again the statute says "no court . . . shall have
jurisdiction," or an equivalent phrase. Congress was concerned with
the withdrawal of power from the federal courts to issue
injunctions in a defined class of cases. Nothing in the Act
remotely hints that the withdrawal of this power turns on the
character of the parties. The only reference to parties underscores
their irrelevance to the issue of jurisdiction, for the power of
the courts is withdrawn in a labor dispute "regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." The limitation on the jurisdiction of the court
depends entirely on the subject matter of the controversy. Section
13(a) defines it:
"A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect
interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or
who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of
employers or employees; . . . "
Page 330 U. S. 314
Neither the context nor the content of the Act qualifies the
terms of that section. Did not the suit brought by the Government
against Lewis and the United Mine Workers "grow out of a labor
dispute" within the terms of § 13(a)?
As already indicated, the Court now finds an exception to the
limitation which the Norris-LaGuardia Act placed upon the equity
jurisdiction of the district court not in the Act, but outside it.
It invokes a canon of construction that a sovereign is
presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless
named in it. At best, this canon, like other generalities about
statutory construction, is not a rule of law. Whatever
persuasiveness it may have in construing a particular statute
derives from the subject matter and the terms of the enactment in
its total environment.
"This rule has its historical basis in the English doctrine that
the Crown is unaffected by acts of Parliament not specifically
directed against it. . . . The presumption is an aid to consistent
construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when their
purpose is in doubt, but it does not require that the aim of a
statute fairly to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly
stated."
So wrote the late Chief Justice for the whole Court in
United States v. California, 297 U.
S. 175,
297 U. S. 186,
and this point of view was very recently applied in
United
States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742,
327 U. S. 749.
It is one thing to read a statute so as not to bind the sovereign
by restrictions, or to impose upon it duties, which are applicable
to ordinary citizens. It is quite another to interpolate into a
statute limiting the jurisdiction of a court, the qualification
that such limitation does not apply when the Government invokes the
jurisdiction. No decision of this Court gives countenance to such a
doctrine of interpolation. The text, context, content, and
historical setting of the Norris-LaGuardia Act all converge to
indicate the unrestricted withdrawal by Congress from the federal
district courts of the
Page 330 U. S. 315
power to issue injunctions in labor disputes, excepting only
under circumstances explicitly defined and not here present. The
meaning which a reading of the text conveys and which is confirmed
by the history which led Congress to free the federal courts from
entanglements in these industrial controversies through use of the
injunction, ought not to be subordinated to an abstract canon of
construction that carries the residual flavor of the days when a
personal sovereign was the lawmaker.
Moreover, the rule proves too much. If the United States must
explicitly be named to be affected, the limitations imposed by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the district court's jurisdiction could
not deprive the United States of the remedies it therefore had.
Accordingly, the courts would not be limited in their jurisdiction
when the United States is a party and the Act would not apply in
any proceeding in which the United States is complainant. It would
mean that, in order to protect the public interest, which may be
jeopardized just as much whether an essential industry continued
under private control or has been temporarily seized by the
Government, a court could, at the behest of the Attorney General of
the United States, issue an injunction as courts did when they
issued the
Debs, the
Hayes, and the
Railway
Shopmen's injunctions. [
Footnote
2/3] But it was these very injunctions, secured by the Attorney
General of the United States under claim of compelling public
emergency, that gave the most powerful momentum to the enactment of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This history is too familiar to be
rehearsed. It is surely surprising to conclude that, when a long
and persistent effort to take the federal courts out of the
industrial conflict, insofar as the labor injunction put them into
it, found its way to the statute books,
Page 330 U. S. 316
the Act failed to meet the grievances that were most dramatic
and deepest in the memory of those most concerned with the
legislation.
It is urged, however, that legislative history cuts down what
might otherwise be the scope of the Act. Reliance is placed on
statements by two Representatives during the House debates on the
Bill, calculated to show that Congress purposed to exclude from the
limitation of the jurisdiction of the district courts labor
disputes involving "employees" of the Government, at least where
injunctions are sought by the Attorney General. Since both
statements came from spokesmen for the Bill, they carry weight. The
nature of these remarks, the circumstances under which they were
delivered, as well as their setting, define their meaning and the
significance to be given them as a gloss upon the Act.
There was before the House an Amendment by Representative
Blanton which would have made the Act applicable "except where the
United States Government is the petitioner." (75 Cong.Rec. 5503.)
Representative LaGuardia opposed the Amendment, remarking "I do not
see how in any possible way the United States can be brought in
under the provisions of this bill." If this is to be read apart
from the meaning afforded by the context of the debates and the
whole course of the legislation, it would mean that the
jurisdiction to grant a
Debs injunction continued
unaffected. No one would have been more startled by such a
conclusion that Mr. LaGuardia. The fact is that a situation like
the present, where the Government for a time has some relation to a
labor dispute in an essentially private industry, was evidently not
in the thought of Congress. Certainly it was not discussed. Mr.
LaGuardia's statement regarding the position of the United States
under the Act followed his reading of § 13(b), under which a person
is to be deemed interested in a labor dispute only if "engaged in
the same industry, trade,
Page 330 U. S. 317
craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs." His brief,
elliptical remark plainly conveyed that the business of the
Government of the United States is not an "industry, trade, craft,
or occupation." This is made unequivocally clear by the colloquy
that followed. Mr. Blanton inquired whether Mr. LaGuardia was
willing
"for the Army and the Navy to form a labor union and affiliate
themselves with the American Federation of Labor and not permit the
Government of the United States to preserve its rights?"
The short answer for Mr. LaGuardia to have made was "The United
States is not subject to the provisions of the Act, because, by
employer, we mean a private employer." Instead of that, Mr.
LaGuardia replied, "Oh, the Army and the Navy are not in a trade,
craft, or occupation." In short, the scope of the limitation upon
the jurisdiction of the courts depended not on party, but on
subject matter. Representative Blanton's amendment was rejected by
125 to 21.
The second Representative upon whom the Court relies is Mr.
Michener. He said,
"Be it remembered that this bill does not attempt to legislate
concerning Government employees. I do not believe that the
enactment of this bill into law will take away from the Federal
Government any rights which it has under existing law, to seek and
obtain injunctive relief where the same is necessary for the
functioning of the Government."
(75 Cong.Rec. 5464.) Later he added
". . . This deals with labor disputes between individuals, not
where the Government is involved. It is my notion that, under this
bill, the Government can function with an injunction, if that is
necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the Government. I
should like to see this clarified, but I want to go on record as
saying that, under my interpretation of this bill, the Federal
Government will not at any time be prevented from applying for an
injunction if one is necessary in order that the Government may
function."
(Id. at 5509.) What Mr.
Page 330 U. S. 318
Michener gave as his interpretation of what survived the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was precisely the claim of the Government in
asking for the
Debs injunction. That injunction was sought
and granted in order that the Government might function. Insofar,
then, as Mr. Michener's statements imply that the United States
could again get a
Debs injunction, his understanding is
belied by the whole history of the legislation, as reflected in its
terms. [
Footnote 2/4] These
statements can only mean, then, that if, say, employees in the
Treasury Department had to be enjoined so that government could go
on, it was Representative Michener's view that an injunction could
issue. No attempt was made to make this view explicit in the Act.
It was not discussed, and only one statement appears to share it.
[
Footnote 2/5] In any event, it
does not imply a broader exemption than that of which
Representative LaGuardia spoke.
It is to be noted that the discussion in the House followed
passage in the Senate of that which subsequently became the Act. It
is a matter of history that the Senate Judiciary Committee was the
drafting and driving force behind the Bill. The Bill had extended
consideration by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
followed by weighty reports and full discussion on the Senate
floor. We are not pointed to a suggestion or a hint in the Senate
proceedings that the withdrawal of jurisdiction to issue
Page 330 U. S. 319
injunctions in labor disputes was subject to a latent exception
as to injunctions sought by the Government. The whole
contemporaneous history is against it. The experience which gave
rise to the Norris-LaGuardia Act only underscores the unrestricted
limitation upon the jurisdiction of the courts, except in
situations of which this is not one. To find implications in the
fact that, in the course of the debates, it was not explicitly
asserted that the district courts could not issue an injunction in
a labor controversy even at the behest of the Government is to find
the silence of Congress more revealing than the natural meaning of
legislation and the history which begot it. The remarks of Mr.
LaGuardia and Mr. Michener ought not to be made the equivalent of
writing an amendment into the Act. It is one thing to draw on all
relevant aids for shedding light on the dark places of a statute.
To allow inexplicit remarks in the give-and-take of debate to
contradict the very terms of legislation and the history behind it
is to put out the controlling light on meaning shed by the explicit
provisions of an Act in its setting.
But even if we assume that the Act was not intended to apply to
labor disputes involving "employees" of the United States, are the
miners in the case before us "employees" of the United States
within the meaning of this interpolated exception? It can hardly be
denied that the relation of the miners to the United States is a
hybrid one. Clearly, they have a relation to the Government other
than that of employees of plants not under Government operation.
Equally clearly, they have a relation and a status different from
the relation and status of the clerks at the Treasury Department.
Never in the country's history have the terms of employment of the
millions in Government service been established by collective
bargaining. But the conditions of employment -- hours, wages
holidays,
Page 330 U. S. 320
vacations, Health and Welfare Program, etc. -- were so fixed for
the miners during the period of Government seizure. The proper
interpretation of this collective agreement between the Government
and the United Mine Workers is precisely what is at the bottom of
this controversy. Neither a spontaneous nor a sophisticated
characterization would resort to the phrase "Government employees,"
without more, in speaking of the miners during the operation of the
mines by the Government. The only concrete characterization of the
status of employees in seized plants was expressed by Under
Secretary Patterson at a hearing on the predecessor bill to that
which became the law under which this seizure was made. He spoke of
the role of the Government as that of "[a] receiver that would be
charged with the continuity of operation of the plant." [
Footnote 2/6] Nothing in the Acts
authorizing seizure of
Page 330 U. S. 321
private plants indicates that the employees of these plants were
to be considered employees of the United States in the usual and
natural meaning of the term. In the full debates on bills providing
for Government seizure of plants, Congressional leaders clearly
indicated their understanding that, as the law then stood, there
could be no injunctions in labor disputes in seized plants.
[
Footnote 2/7]
But not only was such the understanding when the legal question
emerged in the course of considering the need of war legislation.
Recent legislation and its history
Page 330 U. S. 322
are relevant not merely because they show later understanding of
the terms of an older statute. The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943
is directly and primarily involved in this case. The whole
controversy arises under the authority to seize mines given by that
Act. The real question before us is whether, in authorizing such
seizure and operation, Congress also gave to the United States the
right to prevent interference with its statutory operation through
the equitable remedies here invoked.
By the War Labor Disputes Act, Congress created a new
relationship among the Government, the plant owners, the employees.
The rights, duties, remedies incident to that relation are those
given by the Act. Congress naturally addressed itself to possible
interferences with the Government's operation of seized plants. It
dealt specifically with this subject. It gave the Government
specific remedies which it might invoke against such interference.
[
Footnote 2/8] Remedy by injunction
was not given. It was not merely omitted. A fair reading of the
legislative history shows that it was expressly and definitively
denied. As reported out of the Senate Committee, S. 796 provided
for plant seizure. It did not include the injunction among the
remedies for interference with Government operation. [
Footnote 2/9] But when the Bill reached the
floor of the Senate, Senator Connally, sponsor of the Bill, offered
and urged an amendment giving the district courts jurisdiction to
restrain violations of the measure. [
Footnote 2/10] He accepted, somewhat reluctantly,
the
Page 330 U. S. 323
amendment of Senator Wagner to limit the proposed amendment to
an injunction at the behest of the Attorney
Page 330 U. S. 324
General, precisely as was here sought and granted. [
Footnote 2/11] On motion of Senator
Danaher, this proposal was rejected by the Senate after full
debate, [
Footnote 2/12]
participated in by Senators especially conversant with the history
and scope of the existing remedies available to the Government.
With this remedy denied to the Government, the Bill was passed and
sent to the House. [
Footnote
2/13] The House did not like the Bill. Its version did not see
fit specifically to add to the limited seizure provisions of the
Selective Service Act of 1940 although apparently it assumed that
there could be seizure under existing law in the case of failure by
defense plants to produce as a result of labor troubles. Instead,
the House version provided stringent anti-strike and anti-lockout
provisions as to plants in private operation, and by specific
amendment to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the district courts were
authorized to restrain violations of such provisions. But this
pro tanto repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not made
available to the United States as a remedy against interference
with operation of plants seized under the earlier 1940 Act.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The bill then went to conference. What came out was, so far as
here material, the bill that had passed the Senate. The United
States was granted power to seize and operate
Page 330 U. S. 325
defense plants whose production was hampered by labor disputes.
Specific remedies were formulated by Congress against interference
with the Government's operation. The injunction was not included.
[
Footnote 2/15] In neither house
was further attempt made to reintroduce the Connally proposal
giving the Government relief by injunction. Nor was it suggested
that the Government had such redress under existing law. On the
floor of the Senate, Senator Thomas of Utah, Chairman of the
Committee on Education and Labor, said:
"Mr. President, I ask the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Hatch],
the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Danaher], and the Senator from
Texas [Mr. Connally], the sponsor of the bill, whether there is a
unanimous opinion on the part of those three great lawyers that
there will not be a reopening of the district courts to
industry-labor disputes? . . . I should like that point to be made
so firmly and so strongly that no lawyer in the land who would like
to take advantage of the situation created by the mere mention of
the words 'district court' will resort to the court in order to
confuse our industry-labor relations."
Mr. Connally answered:
"Mr. President, . . . I think I speak for the Senator from
Vermont and the Senator from New Mexico and the Senator from
Connecticut and also the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Van Nuys],
although he is not present, when I say that there is no
jurisdiction whatever conferred by this bill providing for resort
to the United States district court, except the one mentioned by
the Senator from Connecticut, which is merely the right to go there
for a civil action for damages, and
Page 330 U. S. 326
no jurisdiction whatever is given over labor disputes. Does that
answer the Senator?"
"MR. THOMAS of Utah. I thank the Senator for making that
statement, and I hope it will satisfy the lawyers of the
country."
"MR. CONNALLY. I am sure it will. [
Footnote 2/16]"
Under these circumstances, the bill became law, and the seizure
giving rise to this controversy was made under that law. The
separate items of this legislative history cannot be judged in
isolation. They must be considered together, and as part of the
course of legislation dealing with injunctions in labor disputes.
To find that the Government has the right which Senator Connally's
amendment sought to confer, but which the Congress withheld, is to
say that voting down the amendment had the same effect as voting it
up.
Events since the passage of the Act underscore what would appear
to be the controlling legislative history of the War Labor Disputes
Act, and prove that Congress saw fit not to authorize district
courts to issue an injunction in cases like this. To meet the grave
crisis growing out of the strike on the railroads last May,
Congress, upon the recommendation of the President and the Attorney
General, deemed additional legislation necessary for dealing with
labor disputes. The proposals in each house carried a provision
which authorized an injunction to issue for violation of the War
Labor Disputes Act. [
Footnote
2/17] Senator Mead proposed an amendment to delete the
provisions for injunctions. [
Footnote
2/18] In the debates that followed, no one suggested that the
new proposal was unnecessary, that the
Page 330 U. S. 327
jurisdiction proposed to be conferred already existed, or that
if granted, as requested by the Attorney General, it would not, as
Senator Mead claimed, repeal
pro tanto the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The debates show clearly that what was
contemplated was a change in the War Labor Disputes Act, whereby a
new and an additional remedy would be authorized. [
Footnote 2/19] The Bill never became law.
As is well known, as the debates clearly show, as Senator
Connally admitted, the War Labor Disputes Act was directed
primarily against stoppage in the coal mines. [
Footnote 2/20] The situation that Congress feared
was exactly that which has occurred, and which underlies this
controversy. To deal with the situation, Congress gave the United
States the power to seize the mines. To effectuate this power, the
Government was given authority to invoke criminal penalties for
interferences with the operation of the mines. Senator Connally
sought more. He wanted Congress to empower the district courts to
enjoin interference. The Senate did not want an injunction to issue
and voted the proposal down. The Senate's position was adopted
by
Page 330 U. S. 328
the Conference Committee. The House of Representatives yielded
its view and approved the Conference report. The whole course of
legislation indicates that Congress withheld the remedy of
injunction. This Court now holds that Congress authorized the
injunction.
I concur in the Court's opinion insofar as it is not
inconsistent with these views, and, under the compulsion of the
ruling of the majority that the court below had jurisdiction to
issue its orders, I join in the Court's judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Pound, The Future of Law (1937) 47 Yale L.J. 1, 13.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Since, in my view, this was not a conviction for contempt in a
case "arising under this Act," the jury provisions of § 11 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act do not apply. For obvious reasons, the
petitioners do not claim that the Constitution of the United States
affords them a right to trial by jury.
[
Footnote 2/3]
United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724;
In re Debs,
158 U. S. 564;
United States v. Hayes, unreported, D.Ind.1919;
United
States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A.F.L., 283 F. 479, 286 F.
228, 290 F. 978.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Compare Representative LaGuardia's reply to a proposed amendment
by Representative Beck which would have exempted from the operation
of the Act disputes "where the welfare, health, or lives of a
public are concerned who are not parties to such labor dispute, or
where a labor dispute involves the obstruction of any
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce." Mr. LaGuardia
claimed that the amendment was out of order because not germane to
the purposes of the legislation. "The present bill refers only to
disputes between employees and employer. . . . The public is fully
protected by penal and other statutes. . . ." 75 Cong.Rec.
5503.
[
Footnote 2/5]
See statement of Representative Schneider, 75 Cong.Rec.
5514.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Hearings on S. 2054 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14. The
characterization was accepted by members of the Committee which
approved the Bill.
Id. at pp. 16, 18, 130. Senator
Connally refers to the private employer who "will continue to
operate it under the supervisions of the Government."
Id.
at 55.
See also p. 57. While at one point he referred to
the United States as an employer (
id. at 120), he did so
in a special context for the purposes of a discussion about
collective bargaining with reference to wages. As to wages, of
course, the Government would stand
in loco "employer"
during its operation of the plant.
The analogy of equity receivership is not inapt. In a limited
sense, employees of plants in receivership in a federal court may
be considered employees of the United States, since the operation
of the plant is under the jurisdiction and control of a United
States officer. But no one aware of the background of mischief
which the Act was intended to remedy could find an intention in
Congress to allow injunctions in labor disputes involving plants in
receivership.
Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co.,
321 U. S. 50,
321 U. S. 55,
321 U. S. 58-61.
No series of cases contributed more to the feeling that the federal
courts abused their equity jurisdiction than those involving
employees of railroads in equity receivership.
See, e.g.,
1 Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, cc. XXIII to XXV;
Gregory, Labor and the Law, 95-97; Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal
Consequences -- An Examination of the Receivership Precedent for
the Labor Injunction (1931) 40 Yale L.J. 507,
passim. If
injunctions will not issue in disputes involving employees of
railroads or other industries in receivership under operation by
the federal courts, nothing relevant to the construction of the
statute warrants the inference that Congress allowed the injunction
to be available in disputes involving employees of plants in
"receivership" under operation of the Secretary of the
Interior.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See especially the debates on a proposed amendment to
the Smith-Connally Bill whereby Senator Connally sought to add the
injunction as a remedy against violation of the Act.
"Mr. Connally. . . . The provision is limited to plants which
the Government takes over. It would not change the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in any respect,
except in the one particular case . .
."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. Langer. Mr. President, is it not true that, unless section
5 is stricken from the bill, that a portion of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act will be repealed?"
"Mr. Danaher. It would certainly be overridden; . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) 89 Cong.Rec. 3988-89.
See also the
statements of Senators Taft, Vandenberg, and Wagner,
and
compare those of Senators Revercomb and Barkley;
and
see the colloquy between Senators Connally and Vandenberg,
id. at 3906, quoted
infra, 330
U.S. 258fn2/10|>note 10.
[
Footnote 2/8]
57 Stat. 163, 165-66, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1506(b).
[
Footnote 2/9]
S.Rep. No. 147, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 2/10]
89 Cong.Rec. 3809.
And see p. 3906:
"MR. VANDENBERG . . ."
"I am very anxious that there shall be additional statutory
protection to the uninterrupted production of war necessities, but
I am wondering whether in order to achieve that purpose it is
necessary for me to impinge upon a very profound hostility I have
always had to the use of injunctions in labor disputes. I voted for
the original Norris-LaGuardia Act, and I have always felt that one
of the most useful things we ever did, not only as a matter of fair
play, but in respect to the status of the courts, was substantially
to separate from court jurisdiction the responsibility of, in
effect, umpiring labor disputes."
"What I wish to ask the able Senator from Texas, if I may, is
this: in his proposal, on page 4, it is provided that any person
who willfully violates any provision of the act is to be guilty of
a felony, and subject to a fine or imprisonment. Is not that a
conclusive penalty? Is it necessary in addition to go back into all
the old injunctive process in connection with labor disputes?"
"MR CONNALLY. That is not a legal inquiry really. Of course, it
might be that we could get along without the provision. Like the
Senator, I voted for the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and I favored the
policy embodied therein. This provision, however, applies only to
plants taken over by the Government. It seems to me that, if the
Government is to operate a plant, it should have the widest and the
fullest authority to operate it as it wants to do and to prevent
interruption. Therefore, because of the attitude of some who were
interested in the bill, I inserted section 5. I do not think the
bill would be very seriously crippled if it were eliminated, but I
think it is improved by its remaining in. I do not think it would
be fatal to strike out that provision, but I hope that will not be
done."
"MR. VANDENBERG. I thank the Senator for his frank statement.
When the Government has taken over the operation of a plant and it
becomes, in essence, a Government operation, it is rather difficult
to resist the argument that the Government should not be deprived
of any instrumentality in the enforcement, virtually, of its
sovereignty."
"MR. CONNALLY. That is true."
"MR. VANDENBERG. Nevertheless, I apprehend that the very fact
that the injunctive process is restored in the Senator's bill is
the reason why it appears in the additional amendment offered by
the able Senator from Ohio, where, it seems to me, it becomes
decidedly more offensive, using that word in the sense in which I
have used it."
The reference is to an amendment proposed by Senator Taft
authorizing injunctions in any circuit court of appeals at the
request of the Attorney General in case of failure to obey orders
of the War Labor Board, or whenever "operations are hindered or
reduced by lockout, strike, or otherwise." This applied apparently
to plants in private operation. 89 Cong.Rec. 3897-98.
Compare the Bill passed by the House,
330
U.S. 258fn2/14|>note 14.
[
Footnote 2/11]
89 Cong.Rec. 3907, 3988-89.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Id. at 3989.
[
Footnote 2/13]
Id. at 3993.
[
Footnote 2/14]
Compare § 4(b) and (c)
with § 12(a) and (b),
89 Cong.Rec. 5382-83. For the earlier seizure provisions
see 54 Stat. 885, 892, 50 U.S.C.App. § 309.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See Conference Report on S. 796, H.R. No. 531, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 2/16]
89 Cong.Rec. 5754. The Senators mentioned by Mr. Connally were
the managers on the part of the Senate of the bill in
conference.
[
Footnote 2/17]
H.R. 6578, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 2/18]
Cong.Rec. 6166.
[
Footnote 2/19]
See particularly the statements of Senator Mead (p.
6171), Senator Morse (p. 6169), Senator Pepper (pp. 6169, 6170),
Senator Wagner (p. 6170), Senator Wheeler (p. 6172), Senator
Barkley (p. 6175), Senator Fullbright (p. 6171).
[
Footnote 2/20]
Senator Connally said:
"Mr. Lewis appeared before the Truman Committee 3 or 4 weeks
ago. I happen to be a member of that committee, and when he said he
did not regard his no-strike agreement as binding . . . , I
determined then that, if I could get this bill before the Senate, I
was going to bring it up and press it in order that, if he did
disregard the agreement, the President or the Government of the
United States would have a weapon with which to meet the threat and
the danger."
89 Cong.Rec. 3886.
See also H.Rep.No. 440, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 6. The references to the coal situation in the
debates are innumerable.
See, e.g., 89 Cong.Rec. 3767,
3886, 3888, 3889, 3900-3901.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
For the reasons given in the Court's opinion, we agree that
neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor the War Labor Disputes Act
barred the Government from obtaining the injunction it sought in
these proceedings. The "labor disputes" with which Congress was
concerned in the Norris-LaGuardia Act were those between private
employers and their employees. As to all such "labor disputes," the
Act drastically limited the jurisdiction of federal courts; it
barred relief by injunction except under very narrow circumstances,
whether injunction be sought by private employers, the Government,
or anyone else. But the attention of Congress was neither focused
upon, nor did it purport to affect, "labor disputes," if such they
can be called, between the Government and its own employees. There
was never an intimation in the progress of the Act's passage that a
labor dispute within the Act's meaning would arise because of
claims against the Government asserted collectively by employees of
the Interior, State, Justice, or any other Government department.
Congress had never in its history provided a program for fixing
wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees by collective
bargaining. Working conditions
Page 330 U. S. 329
of Government employees had not been the subject of collective
bargaining, nor been settled as a result of labor disputes. It
would require specific congressional language to persuade us that
Congress intended to embark upon such a novel program or to treat
the Government employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a
"labor dispute" in the industrial sense.
We have no doubt that the miners became Government employees
when the Government took over the mines. It assumed complete
control over the mines and their operation. The fact that it
utilized the managerial forces of the private owners does not
detract from the Government's complete authority. For whatever
control Government agents delegated to the private managers, those
agents had full power to take away and exercise themselves. If we
thought, as is here contended, that the Government's possession and
operation of the mines were not genuine, but merely pretended, we
should then say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred these
proceedings. For anything less than full and complete Government
operation for its own account [
Footnote
3/1] would make this proceeding the equivalent of the
Government's seeking an injunction for the benefit of the private
employers. We think the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits that. But,
as we read the War Labor Disputes Act and the President's order
taking over the mines against the background of circumstances which
prompted both, we think, apparently contrary to the implications of
the regulations, that the Government operates these mines for its
own account as a matter of law; [
Footnote 3/2] and those who work in them, during
Page 330 U. S. 330
the period of complete Government control, are employees of the
Government.
Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapplicable, we agree that
the District Court had power in these proceedings to enter orders
necessary to protect the Government against an invasion of the
rights it asserted, pending adjudication of the controversy its
complaint presented to the court. It is therefore unnecessary for
us to reach the question of whether the District Court also had
power to enter these orders under the doctrine of
United States
v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563. We
agree that the court had power summarily to coerce obedience to
those orders and to subject defendants to such conditional
sanctions as were necessary to compel obedience. And we agree that,
in such civil contempt proceedings to compel obedience, it was not
necessary for the court to abide by all the procedural safeguards
which surround trials for crime. Without such coercive powers,
courts could not settle the cases and controversies before them.
Courts could not administer justice if persons were left free
pending adjudication to engage in conduct which would either
immediately interrupt the judicial proceedings or so change the
status quo of the subject matter of a controversy that no
effective
Page 330 U. S. 331
judgment could be rendered. Disorder in the courtroom, or so
near to it as to interrupt a trial, and disobedience of an
affirmative court order, are typical examples of offenses which
must necessarily be dealt with summarily. To remove such imminent
interference with orderly judicial proceedings, courts must have
power to act immediately. In recognition of this fact, the contempt
power came into existence. [
Footnote
3/3] This power is of ancient lineage, [
Footnote 3/4] has always been exercised by our courts,
and has the express recognition of Congress under the name of
contempt. Rev.Stat. § 725, 28 U.S.C. § 385. Where the court
exercises such coercive power, however, for the purpose of
compelling future obedience, those imprisoned "carry the keys of
their prison in their own pockets,"
In re Nevitt, 117 F.
448, 461; by obedience to the court's valid order, they
Page 330 U. S. 332
can end their confinement; and the court's coercive power in
such a "civil contempt" proceeding ends when its order has been
obeyed.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 441,
221 U. S. 445.
See also Doyle v. London Guaranty & Accident Co.,
204 U. S. 599,
204 U. S. 607.
The District Court did not enter a conditional decree here. But
this Court has modified the District Court's decree to provide as
part of the judgment such a coercive sanction in the form of a
conditional fine. We agree with the Court's decision in this
respect. [
Footnote 3/5]
The
Gompers decision and many others have pointed out
that the object of such coercive contempt proceedings is not to
punish for an offense against the public, but to compel obedience
to valid court orders. Yet the decision of this Court also approves
unconditional fines of criminal punishment for past disobedience.
We cannot agree to this aspect of the Court's judgment. At a very
early date, this Court declared, and recently it has reiterated,
that, in contempt proceedings, courts should never exercise more
than "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204,
19 U. S. 231;
In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224,
326 U. S.
227.
Page 330 U. S. 333
In certain circumstances, criminal contempt culminating in
unconditional punishment for past disobedience may well constitute
an exercise of "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed." Thus, in situations which would warrant only a use of
coercive sanctions in the first instance, criminal punishment might
be appropriate at a later stage if the defendant should persist in
disobeying the order of the court. Without considering the
constitutional requisites of such criminal punishment, we believe
the application of it inappropriate and improper here. The
imposition of criminal punishment here was an exercise of far more
than "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." For
here, the great and legitimate "end proposed" was affirmative
action by the defendants to prevent interruption of coal production
pending final adjudication of the controversy. Coercive sanctions
sufficient to accomplish this end were justified. From the record,
we have no doubt but that a conditional civil sanction would bring
about at least as prompt and unequivocal obedience to the court's
order as would criminal punishment for past disobedience. And this
would accomplish a vindication of the District Court's authority
against a continuing defiance. Consequently, we do not believe that
the accomplishment of the justifiable "end proposed" called for
summary criminal punishment, which is designed to deter others from
disobedience to court orders, or to avenge a public wrong, rather
than the imposition of a coercive sanction. And, for the reasons
stated by MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, we think that the flat $700,000
criminal fine against the defendant union is excessive by
constitutional and statutory standards.
In determining whether criminal punishment or coercive sanction
should be employed in these proceedings, the question of intent --
the motivation of the contumacy -- becomes relevant. Difficult
questions of law were presented by this case. It is plain that the
defendants acted
Page 330 U. S. 334
willfully for they knew that they were disobeying the court's
order. But they appear to have believed in good faith, though
erroneously, that they were acting within their legal rights. Many
lawyers would have so advised them. This does not excuse their
conduct; the whole situation emphasized the duty of testing the
restraining order by orderly appeal, instead of disobedience and
open defiance. However, as this Court said in
Cooke v. United
States, 267 U. S. 517,
267 U. S.
538,
"the intention with which acts of contempt have been committed
must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the
degree of guilt and the penalty which should be imposed."
We think it significant that the conduct which was prohibited by
the restraining order for violation of which these defendants have
been punished for contempt is also punishable under the War Labor
Disputes Act. That Act provides a maximum punishment of $5,000 fine
and one year imprisonment for those who interfere with the
operation of mines taken over by the United States. Had the
defendants been tried under that statute, their punishment would
have been limited thereby, and, in their trial, they would have
enjoyed all the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights.
Whatever constitutional safeguards are required in a summary
contempt proceeding, whether it be for criminal punishment or for
the imposition of coercive sanction, we must be ever mindful of the
danger of permitting punishment by contempt to be imposed for
conduct which is identical with an offense defined and made
punishable by statute.
In re Michael, 326 U.
S. 224,
326 U. S. 226.
[
Footnote 3/6]
Page 330 U. S. 335
The situation of grave emergency facing the country when the
District Court acted called for the strongest measures -- measures
designed to produce quick and unqualified obedience of the court's
order. If the $10,000 fine on defendant Lewis and the $3,500,000
fine on the defendant union be treated as coercive fines, they
would not necessarily be excessive. For they would then be payable
only if the defendants continued to disobey the court's order.
Defendants could then avoid payment by purging themselves. The
price of continued disobedience would be the amount of the fines.
See Doyle v. London Guaranty & Accident Co., supra, at
204 U. S. 602.
The fines would be fixed so as to produce the greatest likelihood
that they would compel obedience.
We should modify the District Court's decrees by making the
entire amount of the fines payable conditionally. On December 7,
1946, Mr. Lewis directed the mine workers to return to work until
midnight, March 31, 1947. But, so far as we are aware, the notice
which purported to terminate the contract has not been withdrawn.
Thus, there has been, at most, only a partial compliance with the
temporary injunction.
Hence, our judgment should provide that the defendants pay their
respective fines only in the event that full and unconditional
obedience to the temporary injunction, including withdrawal of the
notice which purported to terminate the contract, is not had on or
before a day certain.
[
Footnote 3/1]
An analogy is a taking by the Government of a leasehold interest
in property in whole or in part.
See United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Section 9 of the Selective Service Act, 54 Stat. 892, 50
U.S.C.App. § 309, granted power
"to take immediate possession of any . . . plant . . . and
through the appropriate branch, bureau, or department of the Army
or Navy to manufacture therein such product . . . as may be
required. . . ."
And it provides for payment:
"The compensation to be paid . . . as rental for use of any
manufacturing plant while used by the United States, shall be fair
and just. . . ."
Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 164, 50
U.S.C.App.Supp. V § 309, extended this authority to include power
to take immediate possession of any
"mine . . . equipped for the manufacture, production, or mining
of any articles or materials which may be required for the war
effort . . . whenever the President finds . . . and proclaims that
there is an interruption of the operation of such . . . mine . . .
as a result of a strike or other labor disturbance . . . and that
the exercise of such power and authority is necessary to insure the
operation of such . . . mine . . . in the interest of the war
effort."
[
Footnote 3/3]
See e.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U.
S. 517,
267 U. S.
534-537; Fox, Contempt of Court (1927) B; Beale,
Contempt of Court, 21 Harv.L.Rev. (1908) 161, 169-170.
[
Footnote 3/4]
"As early as the time of Richard III, it was said that the
chancellor of England compels a party against whom an order is
issued by imprisonment; (2 R. III, 9, pl. 22) and, a little later,
it was said in the chancery that"
"a decree does not bind the right, but only binds the person to
obedience, so that if the party will not obey, then the chancellor
may commit him to prison till he obey, and that it is all the
chancellor can do."
"(27 H. VIII, 15.) This imprisonment was by no means a
punishment, but was merely to secure obedience to the writ of the
king. Down to within a century, it was very doubtful if the
chancellor could, under any circumstances, inflict punishment for
disobedience of a decree. If the decree commanded the defendant to
transfer property, the chancellor acquired power as early as the
sixteenth century to sequester the property as security for
performance; but if the decree were for the doing of any other act,
or were a decree for an injunction, the chancellor was helpless if
he could not compel obedience by imprisonment. . . . In any case,
the contempt of a defendant who had violated a decree in chancery
could be purged by doing the act commanded and paying costs; or, if
his disobedience had been the violation of a negative injunction,
he could purge himself of contempt by undoing what he had done and
paying costs."
Beale,
supra.
[
Footnote 3/5]
"In the case of contempt in violating an order or decree of a
court of equity, we have an entirely different problem. . . . If
the court limits itself to its proper action in such cases, namely,
process of imprisonment merely to prevent the violation of the
decree, and if the imprisonment is to cease as soon as the danger
of disobedience has ceased, the jury, which is thought necessary to
pass upon the desert of a defendant to suffer punishment, is not
required. . . . So far, therefore, as popular clamor demands a
trial by jury in such case, it seems to go beyond the requirements
of justice, and the statutes which commit the trial of questions of
fact in such process of a jury are not likely permanently to prove
satisfactory. This statement, however, is to be limited to cases of
merely preventive imprisonment. Where the court inflicts a definite
term of imprisonment by way of punishment for the violation of its
orders, the case does not differ, it would seem, from the case of
criminal contempt out of court, and regular process and trial by
jury should be required."
Id., 173, 174.
[
Footnote 3/6]
See also In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564;
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418;
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.
S. 604,
233 U. S. 610,
233 U. S. 611;
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87;
Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378,
249 U. S. 383;
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S.
42;
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421,
284 U. S. 440;
Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33;
Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252,
314 U. S. 264;
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.
S. 412;
In re Bradley, 318 U. S.
50. Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in Inferior Federal Courts, 37
Harv.L.Rev. 1010, 1043-1045 (1924) and authorities there collected;
Nelles and King, Contempt by Publications in the United States, 28
Col.L.Rev. 401 (1928).
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting.
An objective reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act removes any
doubts as to its meaning and as to its applicability to the facts
of this case. Section 4 provides in
Page 330 U. S. 336
clear, unmistakable language that
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . . ."
That language, which is repeated in other sections of the Act,
is sufficient by itself to dispose of this case, without further
ado. But when proper recognition is given to the background and
purpose of the Act, it becomes apparent that the implications of
today's decision cast a dark cloud over the future of labor
relations in the United States.
Due recognition must be given to the circumstances that gave
rise to this case. The Government was confronted with the necessity
of preserving the economic health of the nation; dire distress
would have eventuated here and abroad from a prolonged strike in
the bituminous coal mines. It was imperative that some effective
action be taken to break the stalemate. But those factors do not
permit the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon for
misapplying statutes according to the grave exigencies of the
moment. That can have tragic consequences even more serious and
lasting than a temporary dislocation of the nation's economy
resulting from a strike of the miners.
The whole thrust of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is directed toward
the use of restraining orders and injunctions in cases arising out
of labor disputes between private employers and private employees.
It was in that setting that the abuses of federal equity power had
flourished, and it was those abuses that led to the adoption of the
Act. The application of the Act to the instant situation is thus
clear. It cannot be denied that this case is one growing out of a
labor dispute between the private coal operators and the private
miners. That is a matter of common knowledge. Executive Order No.
9728, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to take
possession of and to operate the coal mines, explicitly stated that
this action
Page 330 U. S. 337
was taken "as a result of existing or threatened strikes and
other labor disturbances." Those strikes and labor disturbances
grew out of the relations between the operators and the miners. The
Government further recognized that fact by its subsequent refusal
to negotiate with the miners on their demands, and its insistence
that these demands be addressed to the private mine owners. It is
precisely in situations arising out of disputes of this nature that
Congress has said that no court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction.
The crux of this case is whether the fact that the Government
took over the possession and operation of the mines changed the
private character of the underlying labor dispute between the
operators and the miners so as to make inapplicable the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The answer is clear. Much has been said about
the Government's status as employer and the miners' status as
Government employees following the seizure. In my opinion, the
miners remained private employees despite the temporary gloss of
Government possession and operation of the mines; they bear no
resemblance whatever to employees of the executive departments, the
independent agencies, and the other branches of the Government.
But, when all is said and done, the obvious fact remains that this
case involves and grows out of a labor dispute between the
operators and the miners. Government seizure of the mines cannot
hide or change that fact. Indeed, the seizure took place only
because of the existence of the dispute and because it was thought
some solution might thereafter result. The dispute, however,
survived the seizure, and is still very much alive. And it still
retains its private character, the operators on the one side, and
the coal miners on the other.
The important point, and it cannot be overemphasized, is that
Congress has decreed that strikes and labor disturbances
Page 330 U. S. 338
growing out of private labor disputes are to be dealt with by
some means other than federal court restraining orders and
injunctions. Further confirmation, if any be needed, is to be found
in the terms and in the history of the War Labor Disputes Act. To
this clearly enunciated policy of making "government by injunction"
illegal, Congress has made no exception where the public interest
is at stake or where the Government has seized the private
properties involved. Congress can so provide. But it has not done
so as yet; until it does, we are not free to sanction the use of
restraining orders and injunctions in a case of this nature.
The Government's seizure of the coal mines thus becomes
irrelevant to the issue. The federal equity power to issue
restraining orders and injunctions simply cannot be invoked in this
case, since it grows out of a private labor dispute. And it makes
no difference that the party seeking the proscribed relief is the
Government, rather than a private employer. The touchstone of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is the existence of a labor dispute, not the
status of the parties. Among the specific evils which the framers
of the Act had in mind were the injunctions secured by the
Government in the
Debs, the
Hayes and the
Railway Shopmen's cases. The Act was drawn to prevent,
among other things, the recurrence of such injunctions. The
Government concededly could not obtain an injunction in a private
labor dispute where there has been no seizure of private
properties, no matter how great the public interest in the dispute
might be. To permit the Government to obtain an injunction where
there has been a seizure would equally flout the language and
policy of the Act. In whatever capacity the Government acts, this
statute closes the doors of the federal courts where a restraining
order or injunction is sought in a case arising out of a private
labor dispute.
Page 330 U. S. 339
Moreover, if seizure alone justifies an injunction contrary to
the expressed will of Congress, some future Government could easily
utilize seizure as a subterfuge for breaking any or all strikes in
private industries. Under some war-time or emergency power, it
could seize private properties at the behest of the employers
whenever a strike threatened or occurred on a finding that the
public interest was in peril. A restraining order could then be
secured on the specious theory that the Government was acting in
relation to its own employees. The workers would be effectively
subdued under the impact of the restraining order and contempt
proceedings. After the strike was broken, the properties would be
handed back to the private employers. That essentially is what has
happened in this case. That is what makes the decision today so
full of dangerous implications for the future. Moreover, if the
Government is to use its seizure power to repudiate the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and to intervene by injunction in private
labor disputes, that policy should be determined by Congress. It is
not the function of this Court to sanction that policy where
Congress has remained silent. Once Congress has spoken, it will be
time enough to consider the constitutional issues raised by an
application of that policy.
Since, in my view, the restraining order and the temporary
injunction in this case are void and without effect, there remains
for me only the contention that the defendants are guilty of
criminal contempt for having willfully ignored the void restraining
order. It is said that the District Court had the power to preserve
existing conditions while it was determining its own authority to
grant injunctive relief; hence, the defendants acted at their own
peril in disobeying the restraining order. Eloquent pleas are made
for the supremacy of the judiciary over the individual and the
requirement that a person
Page 330 U. S. 340
obey court orders until they are reversed by orderly and proper
proceedings. Heavy emphasis is placed upon
United States v.
Shipp, 203 U. S. 563.
These arguments have a seductive attractiveness here.
Ordinarily, of course, it is better policy to obey a void order
than run the risk of a contempt citation. And, as a general
proposition, individuals cannot be allowed to be the judges of the
validity of court orders issued against them. But the problem
raised by the violation of the restraining order in this case must
be viewed against the background and language of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Unlike most other situations, this Act specifically prohibits
the issuance of restraining orders except in situations not here
involved. There is no exception in favor of a restraining order
where there is some serious doubt about the court's jurisdiction;
indeed, the prohibition against restraining orders would be futile
were such an exception recognized, for the minds of lawyers and
judges are boundless in their abilities to raise serious
jurisdictional objections. And so, Congress has flatly forbidden
the issuance of all restraining orders under this Act. It follows
that, when such an order is issued despite this clear prohibition,
no man can be held in contempt thereof, however unwise his action
may be as a matter of policy. When he violates the void order, 28
U.S.C. § 385 comes into operation, forbidding punishment for
contempt except where there has been disobedience of a "lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command" of a court.
This absolute outlawry of restraining orders in cases involving
private labor disputes is not without reason. The issuance of such
orders prior to the adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had a long
and tortured history. Time and again, strikes were broken merely by
the issuance of a temporary restraining order purporting to
maintain the
status quo. Because of the highly fluid
character of labor disputes, the delay involved in testing an
order
Page 330 U. S. 341
of that nature often resulted in neutralizing the rights of
employees to strike and picket. And, too often, these orders did
more than stabilize existing conditions -- they called for
affirmative change. The restraining order in the instant case is
but one example of this. While purporting to preserve the
status quo, it actually commands the defendants to rescind
the strike call -- thereby affirmatively interfering with the labor
dispute.
Congress was well aware of this use of restraining orders to
break strikes. After full consideration, it intentionally and
specifically prohibited their use, with certain exceptions not here
relevant. We are not free to disregard that prohibition. Hence, the
doctrine of the
Shipp case has no relation whatever to our
present problem. That case dealt with an order of this Court
staying the execution of a convicted felon, an order which lay
within the recognized power of this Court and which had not been
validly prohibited by Congress. Naturally, no man could violate
that order with impunity. But we are acting here in the unique
field of labor relations, dealing with a type of order which
Congress has definitely proscribed. If we are to hold these
defendants in contempt for having violated a void restraining
order, we must close our eyes to the expressed will of Congress and
to the whole history of equitable restraints in the field of labor
disputes. We must disregard the fact that to compel one to obey a
void restraining order in a case involving a labor dispute, and to
require that it be tested on appeal, is to sanction the use of the
restraining order to break strikes -- which was precisely what
Congress wanted to avoid. Every reason supporting the salutary
principle of the
Shipp case breaks down when that
principle is applied in this setting. I would therefore reverse the
judgment of the District Court
in toto.
It has been said that the actions of the defendants threatened
orderly constitutional government and the
Page 330 U. S. 342
economic and social stability of the nation. Whatever may be the
validity of those statements, we lack any power to ignore the plain
mandates of Congress and to impose vindictive fines upon the
defendants. They are entitled to be judged by this Court according
to the sober principles of law. A judicial disregard of what
Congress has decreed may seem justified for the moment in view of
the crisis which gave birth to this case. But such a disregard may
ultimately have more disastrous and lasting effects upon the
economy of the nation than any action of an aggressive labor leader
in disobeying a void court order. The cause of orderly
constitutional government is ill served by misapplying the law as
it is written, inadequate though it may be, to meet an emergency
situation, especially where that misapplication permits punitive
sanctions to be placed upon an individual or an organization.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
This case became a
cause celebre the moment it began.
No good purpose can be served by ignoring that obvious fact. But it
cannot affect our judgment, save only perhaps to steel us, if that
were necessary, to the essential and accustomed behavior of judges.
[
Footnote 4/1] In all cases, great
or small, this must be to render judgment evenly and
dispassionately according to law, as each is given understanding to
ascertain and apply it.
Page 330 U. S. 343
No man or group is above the law. Nor is any beyond its
protection.
In re Yamashita, 327 U. S.
1, dissenting opinion
327 U. S. 41.
These truths apply equally to the Government. When its power is
exerted against the citizen or another in the nation's courts,
those tribunals stand not as partisans, but as independent and
impartial arbiters to see that the balance between power and right
is held even. In discharging that high function, the courts
themselves, like the parties, are subject to the law's majestic
limitations. We are not free to decide this case, or any, otherwise
than as in conscience we are enabled to see what the law
commands.
I
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER has shown conclusively, I think, that
the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, applies to
this situation. The legislative history he marshals so accurately
and cogently compels the conclusion that the War Labor Disputes Act
of 1943, 57 Stat. 163, not only confirms the applicability of the
earlier statute, but itself excludes resort to injunctive relief
for enforcement of its own provisions in situations of this
sort.
That Act expressly provides the remedies for its enforcement.
Beyond seizure of plants, mines and facilities for temporary
[
Footnote 4/2] governmental
operation, they are exclusively
Page 330 U. S. 344
criminal in character. [
Footnote
4/3] They do not include injunctive or other equitable relief.
Nor was the omission unintentional, or due to oversight. It was
specific and deliberate.
The Senate thoroughly considered and debated various proposals
for authorizing equity to intervene in labor disputes, one by the
Act's sponsor in that body. Positively, repeatedly and
unwaveringly, it rejected all of them. They were likewise rejected
in conference, where the Senate's view prevailed over that of the
House. The latter body had not been inattentive to the problem. It
sought and failed to secure the very thing this Court now says, in
effect, was included. [
Footnote
4/4] That issue and that policy were indeed the main thrust and
focus of the legislative struggle, and the outcome was not
negative; it was positive, and conclusive against using or giving
the equitable remedies.
Page 330 U. S. 345
Surely we have not come so far toward complete inversion of
legislative history as to write out of the law the views concerning
a matter of such major policy held by the chamber which prevailed
at the final stage of enactment and to write into the law
diametrically opposing views of another chamber which yielded at
that time. The case, as MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER demonstrates beyond
any doubt, cannot be one where inattention, oversight or inaction
may explain or give significance to what was done by the House of
Representatives. That body was defeated, not simply silent, in the
outcome. Willingly or otherwise, it acquiesced in the Senate's
policy of refusing to authorize injunctive relief, and, in doing
so, joined formally and effectively in the final act which made
that policy law.
This means to me that Congress, in that action, did not simply
confirm the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy, or leave it untouched
with respect to situations within the War Labor Disputes Act's
coverage. It means that Congress was not departing from or
nullifying that policy. Rather, by the later Act, Congress adopted
the same policy, the long prevailing national policy, for those
situations.
The Senate, and, at the end, the Congress, were not declining
expressly to authorize labor injunctions only to turn squarely
about and nullify that refusal in the same breath, merely by virtue
of the fact that the employees of seized plants necessarily were
made subject temporarily to ultimate governmental operating
direction and control. [
Footnote
4/5] We cannot attribute to Congress an intent so
duplicitous.
Page 330 U. S. 346
Thus, to construe the Act not only would bring the provision for
temporary control into collision with its remedial provisions as
the history shows they were intended to apply. It would be to find
Congress guilty of using a devious method for achieving indirectly
exactly the thing it expressly declined to do. The words
"governmental employee," "employee . . . for the purposes of this
case" or "relationship . . . of employer and employee," none of
which appear in the statute, cannot be given effect consistently
with our function to write into the Act, by judicial interpolation,
remedial provisions which Congress flatly and finally declined to
incorporate.
Whether Congress acted wisely in this refusal is not our
concern. But it is not irrelevant to the Act's meaning, purpose and
effect that there were good reasons, indeed strong ones, for
Congress to continue to follow the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy,
rather than break away from it at that crucial time. Under the
statute, practically every industrial or mining facility, together
with many of transportation, [
Footnote
4/6] was subject to seizure and governmental operation.
Introducing the labor injunction into the Act's structure therefore
would have been tantamount to repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
for the duration of the emergency powers, since seizure was
authorized whenever the President should find, after investigation,
and proclaim that there was an interruption of operations "as a
result
Page 330 U. S. 347
of a strike or other labor disturbance." § 3. Ready means thus
would have been made available, if such had been the statute's
purpose, for suspending the Norris-LaGuardia policy and provisions
in any case where they might become operative.
Congress was thoroughly familiar with the history and effects of
injunctions in labor disputes, with the long settled national
policy against them, and with the universal abhorrence in the ranks
of labor, however otherwise divided, toward them. In view of all
these things, Congress well may have felt, and, I think, did feel,
as my brother's recital of the history shows, that it was both
unnecessary and unwise -- perhaps would even be harmful to
furtherance of the war effort -- in substance to repeal the Norris
LaGuardia policy for the duration of the war emergency, and thus to
resurrect, in that critical situation, the long disused instruments
that Act had outlawed.
It is important in this connection that 1943, rather than 1945
or 1946, was the year in which the War Labor Disputes Act was
adopted. We were then not yet over the hump of the war. But neither
had we reached the peak of labor disturbances which came only after
active hostilities ceased, more than two years later. [
Footnote 4/7] The great body of American
workers was bending to the patriotic duty of peak production for
war purposes. By comparison with what occurred after the fighting
ended, the volume of man-days
Page 330 U. S. 348
lost was about one-tenth of the later postwar peak loss.
[
Footnote 4/8] Moreover, at that
time, the War Labor Board, specially constituted to deal with such
disturbances, was functioning with a high degree of efficiency in
their settlement. [
Footnote 4/9]
There was nevertheless strong feeling that labor disputes should
not be allowed to interrupt war production, regardless of cause or
blame. And from this arose the demand for more effective powers to
deal with them.
It was in this setting, and to meet the problems it had thrown
up, not the later one out of which this controversy arose, that the
War Labor Disputes Act was adopted. The Act was exactly what its
title indicated -- a measure for dealing with labor disputes in the
emergency of the war. Congress, it is true, anticipated that, for a
limited period after the end of fighting, the same emergency powers
would be needed. [
Footnote 4/10]
But this does not mean that those
Page 330 U. S. 349
powers were shaped, or are now to be measured in scope, so as to
meet all of the situations which since have arisen in the vastly
changed circumstances; or that Congress intended them to be met by
repealing the settled policy against injunctions in labor disputes
in the sweeping manner now accomplished by the Court's decision. On
the contrary, in June of 1943, Congress dealt with the situation
then before it and refused to authorize such relief because that
situation did not demand this.
In view of all these considerations, I cannot believe that
Congress, in effect and by indirection, was exerting its war power
to the greatest possible extent, or was thereby either repealing or
suspending the nation's settled policy against injunctions in labor
disputes. Rather, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress was
relying exclusively upon the added powers of enforcement expressly
conferred by the Act -- namely, the power of seizure and the force
of the criminal sanction to accomplish the needed results.
[
Footnote 4/11]
These were, in themselves, powerful sanctions. They carried with
them the added and very great sanction of
Page 330 U. S. 350
aroused public opinion [
Footnote
4/12] which would follow not simply upon interruption of
essential war production, but more particularly upon such an event
in any facility taken over and operated under governmental
auspices. Congress, after mature deliberation, concluded that these
sanctions were adequate, and, for that reason, made them exclusive.
In no other way can its repeated and final refusals to confer the
strenuously sought equitable remedies be made consistent with the
legislative and general history, or be given meaning and effect. To
construe the Act as permitting what Congress thus so explicitly
refused to allow is to go beyond our function, and intrude upon
that of Congress. This we have no right or power to do. If the
situation presented by the facts of this case is one which goes
beyond the powers Congress has conferred for dealing with it, that
is a matter for Congress' consideration, not for correction by this
Court.
Accordingly, upon the specific terms of the War Labor Disputes
Act itself, upon the legislative history as summarized by MR.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, and upon the historical setting in which the
statute was enacted as defining the problems it was designed to
meet, together with shaping the nature and scope of the measures
required to meet
Page 330 U. S. 351
them, I conclude that that Act in no way impaired but on the
contrary adopted and incorporated the policy of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act concerning the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes.
II
This conclusion substantially compels the further one that
United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, has
no valid application to the situation presented by this case.
This Court has not yet expressly denied -- rather, it has
repeatedly confirmed -- Congress' power to control the jurisdiction
of the inferior federal courts and its own appellate jurisdiction.
Const., Art. III, § 2.
Ex parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506;
Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U. S. 182,
319 U. S. 187,
and authorities cited.
See Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923), 37 Harv.L.Rev.
49, 67ff. That power includes the power to deny jurisdiction, as
well as to confer it.
Ibid. And where Congress has acted
expressly to exclude particular subject matter from the
jurisdiction of any court, except this Court's original
jurisdiction, I know of no decision here which holds the exclusion
invalid, or that a refusal to obey orders or judgments contravening
Congress' mandate is criminal or affords cause for punishment as
for contempt.
If that were the law, the result could only be to nullify the
congressional power over federal jurisdiction for a great volume of
cases. And if it should become the law, for every case raising a
question not frivolous concerning the court's jurisdiction to enter
an order or judgment, that punishment for contempt may be imposed
irrevocably simply upon a showing of violation, the consequences
would be equally or more serious. The force of such a rule, making
the party act on pain of certain punishment regardless of the
validity of the order violated or the court's
Page 330 U. S. 352
jurisdiction to enter it as determined finally upon review,
would be not only to compel submission. [
Footnote 4/13] It would be also, in practical effect
for many cases, to terminate the litigation, foreclosing the
substantive rights involved without any possibility for their
effective appellate review and determination.
This would be true, for instance, wherever the substantive
rights asserted or the opportunity for exercising them would vanish
with obedience to the challenged order.
Cf. Ex parte Fisk,
113 U. S. 713. The
First Amendment liberties especially would be vulnerable to
nullification by such control. Thus, the constitutional rights of
free speech and free assembly could be brought to naught, and
censorship established widely over those areas merely by applying
such a rule to every case presenting a substantial question
concerning the exercise of those rights. This Court has refused to
countenance a view so destructive of the most fundamental
liberties.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516. These and other constitutional rights would be
nullified by the force of invalid orders issued in flat violation
of the constitutional provisions securing them, and void for that
reason. The same thing would be true also in other cases involving
doubt, where statutory or other rights asserted or the benefit of
asserting them would vanish, for any practical purpose, with
obedience.
Indeed, it was because these were so often the effects not
simply of final orders entered after determination upon the merits,
but of interlocutory injunctions and ex parte restraining orders,
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act became law, and, as I think, the War
Labor Disputes Act continued in force its policy. For, in labor
disputes, the effect of such
Page 330 U. S. 353
orders, it was pointed out officially and otherwise, [
Footnote 4/14] is generally not merely
failure to maintain the
status quo pending final decision
on the merits. It is also most often to break the strike without
regard to its legality or any conclusive determination on that
account, and thus to render moot and abortive the substantive
controversy. [
Footnote 4/15]
Page 330 U. S. 354
It is not every case, therefore, where substantial doubt appears
concerning either the issues in the main cause or the court's
jurisdiction to issue interlocutory or other orders in which
violation will bring the so-called
Shipp doctrine into
play. If that were true, then indeed would a way have been found to
nullify the constitutional limitations placed upon the powers of
courts, including the control of Congress over their jurisdiction.
Then also, the liberties of our people would be placed largely at
the mercy of invalid orders issued without power given by the
Constitution, and in contravention of power constitutionally
withheld by Congress.
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.
S. 713;
Thomas v. Collins, supra.
Indeed, the
Shipp doctrine, thus broadly conceived,
would go far toward nullifying the historic jurisdiction of this
Court and others in habeas corpus, for it would do this in the many
situations where the cause of commitment is violation of a
doubtfully valid court order and the ground asserted for release is
the court's lack of jurisdiction to enter it. Thus, in this case,
if the party Lewis had been imprisoned rather than fined, the broad
application now made of the
Shipp decision would dictate
that he could not be released by habeas corpus even though it were
now held here that the restraining orders were beyond the District
Court's jurisdiction to issue. [
Footnote 4/16] If those
Page 330 U. S. 355
orders were valid, for purposes of finally and conclusively
imposing punishment in contempt, regardless of the court's want of
power to issue them, this would be so whether the punishment were
fine or imprisonment. And it clearly would follow in cases of
criminal contempt, [
Footnote
4/17] perhaps in others, that the court's lack of jurisdiction
could furnish no basis for granting relief unless the penalty were
found to be cruel and unusual or, in the case of a fine, excessive.
[
Footnote 4/18]
I cannot believe that the historic powers of our courts in
habeas corpus or the rights of citizens, confirmed as these have
been for so long by an unbroken line of decisions, [
Footnote 4/19] have been or can be
overthrown and subverted,
Page 330 U. S. 356
merely by the fact that the question of the court's power to
issue the order violated may be doubtful, and not merely frivolous.
Nor do I think the
Shipp decision accomplished or
purported to accomplish so much.
Certainly if its purpose had been to overrule the decisions so
thoroughly established, and to trench so heavily upon the historic
liberties they and the Constitution itself secure, some note would
have been taken of that fact. So great a revolution hardly could
have been wrought unanimously or without attentive recognition of
what was being done. There was indeed reference in the opinion to
the previous decisions. The Court stated:
"It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court
having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without
liability to process for contempt,"
citing the
Sawyer, Fisk, and
Rowland cases.
[
Footnote 4/20] 203 U.S. at
203 U. S. 573.
But there was not the slightest suggestion, by this reference or
otherwise, that the Court had any purpose whatever to impair the
force of those decisions, much less to overrule them. Nor, in fact,
was this its intent. It mentioned them only to put them aside as
inapplicable to the situation before it.
Indeed, in
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
decided five years after the
Shipp decision, a unanimous
Court joined in citing
Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.
S. 604, in context consistent only with the view that
its doctrine, and therefore that of others like it decided prior to
the
Shipp case, remained fully effective. P.
221 U. S. 436.
There was no intimation, as otherwise necessarily would have been
given, that the
Shipp decision had reversed or modified
the
Rowland case, or any like it, in any way. And in
Page 330 U. S. 357
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, not
only the Court, p.
209 U. S. 143,
but the opposing distinguished counsel, pp. 135, 139 [argument of
counsel omitted from electronic version], all concurred in
reaffirming the
Rowland ruling. Harlan, J., dissenting,
retracted his former contrary view (
see 330
U.S. 258fn4/19|>note 19
supra) in this respect. 209
U.S. at
209 U. S. 169,
209 U. S. 174.
And Holmes, J., who spoke for the Court in the
Shipp case,
joined with the Court's reaffirmation of the
Rowland
doctrine in both the
Gompers and
Young
opinions.
The Court in
Shipp was dealing with a situation quite
different from the ones presented in the previous decisions and in
this case. In none of them was the action which violated the
court's order such as would have defeated its jurisdiction not only
to enter the order, but also to proceed with the cause before it in
any manner except to deal with the matter of contempt. [
Footnote 4/21] In them, the Court was
not
Page 330 U. S. 358
faced with the necessity for taking action to vindicate its
power to hear and determine the main controversy, as well as the
incidental one arising upon the validity of the interlocutory or
other order. Nor is it here.
But exactly such a situation was presented in the
Shipp
case. The conduct there held to be contempt not only was in itself
criminal and in violation, as it turned out, of this Court's lawful
order for taking the appeal in Johnson's case. It ousted this Court
altogether of jurisdiction to take any action in that cause. It
rendered the cause moot, thereby putting an end to any proceedings
concerning it here or elsewhere. Shipp's alleged conduct
constituted therefore the most serious possible interference with
the due and orderly course of administering justice. It utterly
destroyed the power of all courts to act. Further, the order
violated was not made directly in contravention of an act of
Congress, as was true in the
Fisk case, and, as I think,
in this one. It rather was made in complete conformity with the
statutes conferring authority on this Court to take jurisdiction of
and hear such causes. Nothing in it violated either a congressional
mandate and policy or the rights of any party.
Moreover the decision was not effective, as its doctrine is now
said to be, to put Shipp to any choice of obedience on pain of
certain punishment regardless of the violated order's validity or
invalidity as ultimately determined on review. No such situation
was presented on the facts, and no such ruling could properly have
been made. Shipp had not been convicted. The case came here upon a
challenge
in limine, not after the event, made upon the
pleadings
Page 330 U. S. 359
in the contempt proceedings to their validity. The basis
asserted was the invalidity of the order allowing the appeal in
Johnson's case, for alleged want of jurisdiction of this Court to
enter it. [
Footnote 4/22] That
contention was rejected, and the order was held valid. It was in
this connection only that the Court stated it had "jurisdiction to
determine its jurisdiction" in doubtful cases. That statement was
not a ruling that, regardless of a violated order's ultimate
validity as determined on review, [
Footnote 4/23] punishment in contempt for violating it
could be irrevocably imposed. It was merely a statement of the
reason for the order's validity. [
Footnote 4/24] The holding was that this Court had
jurisdiction,
Page 330 U. S. 360
as, of course, it does in doubtful as well as clear cases, to
determine whether the federal courts -- the Circuit Court and,
accordingly, this Court also -- had power to pass upon Johnson's
petition for habeas corpus. [
Footnote
4/25]
From that ruling, and from it alone, the consequence followed
that
Shipp could be held in contempt on proof, still to be
made, that he had done acts in violation of the order as thus
conclusively determined to be valid by the court of last resort.
This was a far cry from holding that punishment in contempt can be
laid irrevocably, regardless of the outcome on review concerning
the order's validity. The Court, by its ruling, was not making void
orders valid for purposes of punishment by way of contempt. Only if
the Court has held its own order which Shipp violated invalid would
such a question have been presented.
The
Shipp decision, therefore, was in fact simply an
application of the long established rule that punishment in
contempt may be inflicted on proof of violation of a valid order of
court as determined finally on review. It did not overrule, nor was
it in any way inconsistent with, the long prior course of decisions
holding that, when an order is void for want of jurisdiction, it
may be disobeyed with impunity pending, but depending upon
determination of its invalidity by appeal, habeas corpus, or other
mode
Page 330 U. S. 361
of review.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra; Ex
parte Young, supra. It was an application, in the
circumstances presented, of the settled rule that one who takes it
upon himself to violate an order of court he thinks void thereby
takes the risk that on review he will be sustained and, in the
contrary event and then only, will he be subject irrevocably to
punishment for contempt.
Ibid.
In my judgment, this is the rule properly applicable in this
case, the only one consistent with the settled and unvaried course
of decision, with the commands of the War Labor Disputes Act, of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and with § 268 of the Judicial Code, 36
Stat. 1163, 28 U.S.C. § 385.
Apart from immediate and other interferences with judicial
proceedings not presented here, that section authorizes punishment
for contempt only for disobedience of a "
lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
(Emphasis added.) The section by its terms, apart from the
exceptions not here applicable, limits power to punish for contempt
to violations of lawful orders, thereby necessarily excluding
others. Nor did it purport to make lawful for that purpose
interlocutory orders issued without jurisdiction as determined
finally upon review. [
Footnote
4/26]
This case, unlike the
Shipp case, in no way involves
interference with any of the legal proceedings or the due
Page 330 U. S. 362
course of administering justice in any sense contemplated by §
268 or by the
Shipp decision. No court, trial or
appellate, was deprived by the defendant's conduct of jurisdiction
or power to take any action in any of the proceedings, collateral
or in the main suit, which existed at the beginning of the
controversy. The order therefore falls exclusively within the
concluding clause of § 268, and the power to punish for contempt on
account of its violation depends by the command of that clause,
upon the order's lawful character.
Since, in my opinion, the order was jurisdictionally invalid
when issued, by virtue of the War Labor Disputes Act and its
adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy, it follows that the
violation gave no sufficient cause for sustaining the conviction
for contempt.
Ex parte Fisk, supra. Lewis and the United
Mine Workers necessarily took the risk that the order would be
found valid on review and, in that event, that punishment for
contempt would apply. They did not take the risk that it would
apply in any event, even if the order should be found void as
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to enter.
See the
dissenting opinion in
Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d
858, 862. The
Shipp case furnishes no precedent for such a
view, nor do I know of any other in this Court which does.
[
Footnote 4/27]
On the contrary, that view has been long rejected, and I do not
think we should disturb or depart from that settled course of
decision now.
"If the command of the writ (of mandamus) was in excess of
jurisdiction, so necessarily
Page 330 U. S. 363
were the proceedings for contempt in not obeying."
Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604,
104 U. S.
617-618. The power of the federal courts to issue stay
orders to maintain the status quo pending appeal, like other
matters affecting their jurisdiction except in the case of this
Court's original jurisdiction, is subject to Congress' control.
That control has been exercised, in my view, to exclude such
jurisdiction in cases of this character. And, this being true, I do
not think either we or any other court subject to that mandate has
power to punish as for contempt the violation of such an order
issued in contravention of Congress' command.
Ex parte Fisk,
supra.
III
The issues concerning the manner in which the contempt
proceeding was conducted are in themselves of great moment, apart
from the foregoing conclusions, which I think are dispositive of
the controversy. And the Court's ruling upon them are of such a
character that I cannot accede by silence.
At times in our system, the way in which courts perform their
function becomes as important as what they do in the result. In
some respects, matters of procedure constitute the very essence of
ordered liberty under the Constitution. For this reason, especially
in the Bill of Rights, specific guaranties have been put around the
manner in which various legal proceedings shall be conducted. They
differentiate sharply between the procedures to be followed in
criminal proceedings and in civil ones. These differences mark one
of the great constitutional divides. [
Footnote 4/28] They separate the zone of punishment for
crime, with all its odious consequences, from that of giving civil
relief, where no such consequences attend, not partially but
completely.
Page 330 U. S. 364
In any other context than one of contempt, the idea that a
criminal prosecution and a civil suit for damages or equitable
relief could be hashed together in a single criminal-civil
hodgepodge would be shocking to every American lawyer and to most
citizens. True, the same act may give rise to all these varied
legal consequences. But we have never adopted -- rather, our
Constitution has totally rejected -- the continental system of
compounding criminal proceedings with civil adjudications.
[
Footnote 4/29] Our tradition is
exactly the contrary, and few would maintain that this has had no
part in bringing about the difference existing today for individual
freedom here and in Europe.
I do not think the Constitution contemplated that there should
be in any case an admixture of civil and criminal proceedings in
one. Such an idea is altogether foreign to its spirit. There can be
no question that contempt power was conferred adequate to sustain
the judicial function in both civil and criminal forms. But it does
not follow that the Constitution permits lumping the two together
or discarding for the criminal one all of the procedural safeguards
so carefully provided for every other such proceeding.
The founders did not command the impossible. They could not have
conceived that procedures so irreconcilably inconsistent in many
ways [
Footnote 4/30] could be
applied simultaneously.
Page 330 U. S. 365
Nor was their purpose to create any part of judicial power, even
in contempt, wholly at large, free from any constitutional
limitation or to pick and choose between the conflicting civil and
criminal procedures and remedies at will. Much less was it to allow
mixing civil remedies and criminal punishments in one lumped form
of relief, indistinguishably compounding them and thus putting both
in unlimited judicial discretion, with no possibility of applying
any standard of measurement on review. [
Footnote 4/31]
Page 330 U. S. 366
If this can be done in any case, it can be done in others. And
that being true, if it can be done at all, not simply a loophole,
but a very large breach has been left in the wall of procedural
protections thrown around the citizen's punishment for crime. For
it is to be recalled that, under the Court's ruling here upon the
Shipp doctrine, not merely the violation of valid judicial
orders, but also the disobedience of invalid orders issued in
excess of any court's jurisdiction becomes a crime, and punishable
as such by summary proceedings in criminal contempt, although the
substantive rights involved in the litigation are wholly civil
ones. The vastly expanded area of criminal conduct under this
conception would afford equally wide room for dispensing with the
criminal procedural protections under the unrestricted scope,
otherwise than by "judicial discretion," which the present ruling
concerning criminal or criminal-civil proceedings in contempt
affords.
In my opinion, our system does not comprehend a power so
unconfined anywhere within its broad borders, and it is time the
large confusion about this were swept away. [
Footnote 4/32] It
Page 330 U. S. 367
is not necessary in this case to ask or decide whether all of
the Constitution's criminal procedural protections thrown about all
other criminal prosecutions, without suggestion of explicit
exception, apply to criminal contempt proceedings. It is enough
that we are sure some of them apply, as this Court has ruled
repeatedly. [
Footnote 4/33] It
does not matter that some of those which incontestably are
applicable may not have been put in issue or preserved for review
in this case. [
Footnote 4/34] The
question cuts more deeply than the
Page 330 U. S. 368
application of any specific guaranty. It affects the right to
insist upon or have the benefit of any.
The case is characteristic of the long existing confusion
concerning contempts and the manner of their trial, among other
things, in that most frequently the question of the nature and
character of the proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is
determined at its end in the stage of review, rather than, as it
should be and as, in my opinion, it must be, at the beginning.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418,
221 U. S. 444.
And this fact, in itself, illustrates the complete jeopardy in
which rights are placed when the nature of the proceeding remains
unknown and unascertainable until the final action on review.
Not only is one thus placed in continuing dilemma throughout the
proceedings in the trial court concerning which set of procedural
rights he is entitled to stand upon -- whether upon the criminal
safeguards or only on the civil. He also does not and cannot know
until it is too late, that is, until the appellate phase is ended,
whether one group or the other of appellate jurisdictional and
procedural rules applies. Indeed he may find that his right of
review has been taken either prematurely, or too late, depending
entirely on whether the appellate court finally concludes that the
proceeding has been civil or criminal in character. [
Footnote 4/35]
Page 330 U. S. 369
See Swayzee, Contempt of Court in Labor Injunction
Cases (1935) 21-22.
Precisely for these reasons, this Court, when confronted in the
Gompers case,
supra, with a proceeding
commingling civil and criminal features, such as we have here,
refused to countenance such a mixture, and, finding that the
proceedings had been civil, held the criminal penalty of fixed
terms of imprisonment to be invalid. [
Footnote 4/36] The Court said:
"There was therefore a departure -- a variance -- between the
procedure adopted and the punishment imposed, when, in answer to a
prayer for remedial
Page 330 U. S. 370
relief, in the equity cause, the court imposed a punitive
sentence appropriate only to a proceeding at law for criminal
contempt. The result was as fundamentally erroneous as if in an
action of 'A vs. B, for assault and battery,' and judgment entered
had been that the defendant be confined in prison for twelve
months."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
449.
Not only must the punishments be kept separate and distinct.
[
Footnote 4/37] This must be done
with the entire proceedings. [
Footnote 4/38] Punishment and civil relief must be
correlated with the character of the proceeding. Procedural
rights
Page 330 U. S. 371
not only in matters of practice, [
Footnote 4/39] but in others "which involve substantial
rights and constitutional privileges," [
Footnote 4/40] are so distinct, and in some instances
contradictory, that "manifestly" they cannot be intermingled. Nor
can those applicable in criminal proceedings be disregarded when
criminal penalty is sought. Not only such matters as the privilege
against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, the
necessity for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, [
Footnote 4/41] the allowance of costs, the
appropriate mode of review, [
Footnote
4/42] with attendant limitations of time and other differences,
require this. What is most important, because the application and
observance of all these rights and others depend upon it, is that
the person charged is entitled to know from the beginning, not
merely at the
Page 330 U. S. 372
end or some intermediate stage, [
Footnote 4/43] in which sort of proceeding he is
involved.
This, the Court said,
"is not a mere matter of form, for manifestly every citizen,
however unlearned in the law, by a mere inspection of the papers in
contempt proceedings ought to be able to see whether it was
instituted for private litigation or for public prosecution. . . .
He should not be left in doubt as to whether relief or punishment
was the object in view. He is not only entitled to be informed of
the nature of the charge against him, but to know that it is a
charge, and not a suit.
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S.
542,
92 U. S. 559."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
446.
This rule has now been incorporated also in Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, [
Footnote 4/44] and was applicable in this case. By the
terms of that rule, the charge of criminal contempt was required to
be "prosecuted on notice," and it was further commanded that the
notice state "the essential facts constituting the criminal
contempt charged and describe it as such," which was not done here.
The rule was adopted to outlaw "the frequent confusion between
criminal and civil contempt proceedings," following immediately a
suggestion made in
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80
F.2d 211. [
Footnote 4/45]
Page 330 U. S. 373
See also Nye v. United States, 313 U. S.
33,
313 U. S. 42-43.
But it flatly incorporates the effect of the decision in the
Gompers case,
supra.
The language used by the Court was language of the Constitution,
reinforced by citation of the
Cruikshank case. Careful as
it was about expressly overruling prior decisions [
Footnote 4/46] where the Sixth Amendment's
requirement [
Footnote 4/47] had
not been observed, there can be no doubt that the Court was
announcing for the future that the constitutional requirement must
be complied with. And the
Page 330 U. S. 374
result in the case itself accorded with what this view required.
[
Footnote 4/48]
One who does not know until the end of litigation what his
procedural rights in trial are, or may have been, has no such
rights. He is denied all by a hide-and-seek game between those that
are criminal and those that are civil. The view which would seem to
be the only one consistent with the whole spirit of the
Constitution, and with the nature of our free institutions, is that
all of the constitutional guaranties applicable to trials for crime
should apply to such trials for contempt, excepting only those
which may be wholly inconsistent with the nature and execution of
the function the court must perform. [
Footnote 4/49] As has been said, courts, in performing
this function, are not above the Constitution; rather, they are
empowered to perform it in order to make the Constitution itself
operative. [
Footnote 4/50]
Accordingly, not the least, but the greatest, possible application
of it to this phase of their work is the only rule consistent with
their place in the constitutional scheme.
In re Michael,
326 U. S. 224,
326 U. S.
227.
Hence, whatever may be true of indictment and jury trials, I see
no compelling reason whatever for not applying
Page 330 U. S. 375
the other limitations of the Sixth Amendment. None of them is
inconsistent with the due and proper performance of the court's
function in criminal contempt. Some, at the least, are applicable
by virtue of the due process guaranty of the Fifth Amendment.
"Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt,
except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused
should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity
to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this
includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to
call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of
complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in
mitigation of the penalty to be imposed."
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.
S. 517,
267 U. S. 537.
Only one case, apart from those involving indictment or jury trial,
has held the Sixth Amendment inapplicable in such proceedings.
[
Footnote 4/51] Whether or not
that case was a departure from our long established tradition that
in criminal proceedings the defendant is entitled to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, other departures should not be
made.
Surely the rights to a speedy and public trial, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense, and, as the
Gompers
case held, to be informed of the nature as well as the cause of the
accusation, cannot be denied
Page 330 U. S. 376
in our system to any person charged with crime, with the single
exception of contempts committed in the immediate presence of the
court by way of interference with the proceedings. Those guaranties
are in no way inconsistent with the court's proper and complete
discharge of its function in contempt. And they would seem to be
essential to any conception of a fair trial as the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause comprehends this.
When the assertion and securing of all other rights depends upon
one, that one is the core of all. Here, the right "to know that it
was a charge, and not a suit" comprehended all other procedural
rights in the trial and appellate courts. Without this, none could
be asserted or maintained. The denial of that right, deferring it
until the decision here is handed down, is, in my opinion, not only
a denial of all. It is a violation both of the Constitution and of
Rule 42(b).
But we are told that this, and all that followed or may have
followed from it, make no difference, because there was no
prejudice. There are at least two answers. This Court has held that
the denial of constitutional guaranties in trials for crime is, in
itself, prejudice.
Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U. S. 750,
328 U. S. 765,
and cases cited in
330
U.S. 258fn4/19|>note 19. The other, there was prejudice, and
in the most important thing beyond knowing the nature of the
proceeding in advance of trial -- namely, in the penalty
itself.
IV
Not only was the penalty against the union excessive, as the
Court holds. Vice infected both "fines" more deeply. As the
proceeding itself is said to have been both civil and criminal, so
are the two "fines." Each was imposed in a single lump sum, with no
allocation of specific portions as among civil damages, civil
coercion and criminal punishment. The Government concedes that some
part of each
Page 330 U. S. 377
"fine" was laid for each purpose. But the trial court did not
state, and the Government has refused to speculate, how much was
imposed in either instance for each of those distinct remedial
functions.
This was in the teeth of the
Gompers and other previous
decisions here. The law has fixed standards for each remedy, and
they are neither identical nor congealable. They are, for damages
in civil contempt, the amount of injury proven, and no more,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, at
221 U. S. 444;
for coercion, what may be required to bring obedience, and not
more, whether by way of imprisonment or fine; [
Footnote 4/52] for punishment, what is not cruel
and unusual or, in the case of a fine, excessive within the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition. And for determining excessiveness of
criminal fines, there are analogies from legislative action which,
in my opinion, are controlling. [
Footnote 4/53]
Page 330 U. S. 378
The Government concedes that the Eighth Amendment's limitation
applies to penalties in criminal contempt; and that, in civil
contempt, the damages awarded cannot exceed the proven amount of
injury. It also concedes, as I understand, that purely coercive
relief can be no greater than is necessary to secure obedience.
But, in its view, there was no necessity here for allocation of
specific amounts in order to comply with these distinct standards.
Rather, punishment and damages may be lumped with a third undefined
amount for civil coercion, and the whole mass sustained without
reference to the constituent elements or any of the established
standards for measuring them, other than by overall application of
the Eighth Amendment's limitation to the mass. And, in this view,
it maintains neither "fine" is excessive.
Obviously, however, when all these distinct types and functions
of relief are lumped together, in a single so-called
Page 330 U. S. 379
"fine," none of the long established bases for measurement can
be applied, for there is nothing to which they can apply. We can
only speculate upon what portion of each "fine" may have been laid
to compensate for damages, what for punishment, and what, if any,
[
Footnote 4/54] for civil
coercion. Moreover, the District Court made no findings whatever
concerning the amount of civil damages sustained, even if it could
be assumed that there was evidence to sustain such findings.
[
Footnote 4/55] And, on the
record, none of the "fine" was made contingent, affording an
opportunity for compurgation, as is required for coercive
penalties. [
Footnote 4/56]
Page 330 U. S. 380
It follows that we have no basis except our own speculative
imagination by which to determine whether the so-called "fines," or
either of them, are excessive as damages, or indeed as coercive
relief looking to the future, or as penalty for past crime.
In this state of things, it is utterly impossible to perform our
function of review in the manner heretofore required, even within
the broad limits prescribed for cases of civil and criminal
contempt. This commingling of the various forms of relief, like
that of the proceedings themselves, deprives these contemnors of
any possibility for having the scope of the relief given against
them measured according to law.
That is no insubstantial deprivation. When hybrid proceedings
can produce hybrid penalties, concealing what is for punishment and
what remedial, what criminal and what civil, and in the process can
discard constitutional procedural protections against just such
consequences as convenience or other wholly discretionary impulse
may command, then indeed, to the extent we allow this will we have
adopted the continental tradition of the civilians, and rejected
our own. No case in this Court heretofore has ever sustained such
conglomerate proceedings and penalties. [
Footnote 4/57]
That the Government is complainant here, both as "employer"
seeking remedial relief and in sovereign capacity [
Footnote 4/58]
Page 330 U. S. 381
seeking to vindicate the court's authority by criminal penalty,
does not nullify all these long established limitations or put the
courts wholly at large, limited by nothing except their unconfined
discretion as to the scope and character of the relief allowable.
Power there is to take adequate measures when violation is clearly
shown and adequate proof is made to sustain them. For proven
violation, criminal penalty within the Eighth Amendment's limits as
we would measure similar impositions placed by Congress, at the
most; for damages proven and found, civil award commensurate with
the finding; and for coercion, civil relief by way of imprisonment
or "fine," but, in either case, contingent only, not final, giving
opportunity for compurgation and for termination, on its being
made, of further penalty for the future.
These are the limitations the law has prescribed. They apply
equally when the Government is complainant, and whether in one
capacity or the other, or both, as when others are. [
Footnote 4/59] They cannot be dispensed
with, separately or by conglomerating all into a single
indiscriminate lump, at the suit of the Government or another, in
this case or for others. To permit this would be to throw overboard
the limitations prescribed by law, and make the courts purely
discretionary arbitrators of controversies. That cannot be done in
our system.
Page 330 U. S. 382
The Court seemingly recognizes this, in part, in the revision it
makes of the District Court's penalties. Lewis' fine is affirmed in
amount, but wholly changed in character. Instead of composite
relief, as the District Court made it, the Court makes that fine
wholly a criminal penalty, thus, in effect, increasing the amount
of his criminal imposition. The union's fine, though held excessive
and "reduced," by what standard is not apparent, is replaced by a
flat criminal fine of $700,000 plus a contingent penalty of
$2,800,000 said to be entirely for civil coercion, although the
strike was ended in December. Any award for civil damages allegedly
sustained apparently is eliminated.
The Court thus purports to make separate the distinct items of
relief commingled in the District Court's action. But, in doing so,
in my opinion, it wholly disregards the established standard for
measuring criminal fines and its own, as well as the District
Court's, function relating to them. If Lewis and the union had been
convicted on indictment and jury trial in a proceeding surrounded
by all the constitutional and other safeguards of criminal
prosecution for violating the War Labor Disputes Act, the maximum
fines which could be applied by that Act's terms would be $5,000
for each. In addition, Lewis could have been imprisoned for a year.
[
Footnote 4/60]
In my opinion, when Congress prescribes a maximum penalty for
criminal violation of a statute, that penalty fixes the maximum
which can be imposed, whether the conviction is in a criminal
proceeding, as such, for its violation, or is for contempt for
violating an order of court to observe it temporarily.
Gompers
v. United States, 233 U. S. 604,
233 U. S. 612.
If the fine or other penalty in such a case can be multiplied twice
or any other number of times merely by bringing a civil suit,
securing a temporary restraining order, and then convicting the
person who violates
Page 330 U. S. 383
it of criminal contempt, regardless of the order's validity and
of any of the usual restraints of criminal procedure, the way will
have been found to dispense with substantially all of those
protections relating not only to the course of the proceedings, but
to the penalty itself.
But it is in relation to the flat criminal fine of $700,000
against the union that the Court's disregard of the constitutional
and other standards is most apparent. By what measuring rod this
sum has been arrived at as the appropriate and lawful amount I am
unable to say, unless, indeed it is simply by a rough estimate of
what the union should be forced to pay on all counts. Never has a
criminal fine of such magnitude been heretofore laid and sustained,
so far as I am able to discover. And only for treason, with one
other possible exception, [
Footnote
4/61] has Congress authorized one so large. Moreover, the
Court's enumeration of factors to be taken into account indicates
expressly, as I read the opinion, that one is the coercive effect
of the imposition for the future, though it is thoroughly settled
that, in contempt, criminal punishment is to be laid only for past
conduct. [
Footnote 4/62]
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, and
authorities cited.
Thus, the Court, in effect, imposes double coercive penalties,
in view of the additional contingent award of $2,800,000 for that
specific and sole purpose. I think the criminal fine of $700,000
not only constitutionally excessive far beyond any heretofore
sustained for violation of any statute or order of court. It is
also an unlawful commingling of civil coercive and criminal
penalties, without the essential contingent feature in the coercive
phase, under our prior decisions.
Page 330 U. S. 384
Moreover, it is the District Court's function, not ours, in the
first instance to fix the amounts of criminal fines. In equity
proceedings for coercive relief, appellate courts, including this
one, have power to revise and fix awards for such purposes, and, if
damages also are sought, to review amounts awarded for this purpose
for consistency with the proof.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R.
Co., supra. But, in a criminal proceeding which is at law even
in contempt,
ibid., our function is not, in the first
instance, to fix the fines ourselves. That function is the District
Court's.
Ibid. We can only determine whether those imposed
by it are excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
In its revision of the penalties, therefore, the Court, in my
opinion, not only fails to unscramble the coercive and criminal
elements, as the prior decisions here require to be done. [
Footnote 4/63] It imposes grossly
excessive criminal penalties, determined in amount by wholly
arbitrary estimate related to no previously established standard
legislatively or judicially fixed. And, in doing so, it usurps the
District Court's function. All this flows, in part at least, from
its basic error, which is its failure to follow the rule of the
Gompers and other cases that not only civil and criminal
penalties, but also civil and criminal proceedings, are altogether
different and separate things, and, under the Constitution, must be
kept so.
Much more is involved in this controversy than the issues which
have been discussed. The issues in the main suit have not been
determined, and it would be beyond our function to intimate opinion
concerning them now. But
Page 330 U. S. 385
beyond this controversy as a whole lie still graver questions.
They involve opposing claims concerning the right to strike and the
power of the Government, as against this, to keep the nation's
economy going. Those are indeed grave matters.
No right is absolute. Nor is any power, governmental or other,
in our system. There can be no question that it provides power to
meet the greatest crises. Equally certain is it that, under "a
government of laws, and not of men," such as we possess, power must
be exercised according to law; and government, including the
courts, as well as the governed, must move within its
limitations.
This means that the courts and all other divisions or agencies
of authority must act within the limits of their respective
functions. Specifically, it means in this case that we are bound to
act in deference to the mandate of Congress concerning labor
injunctions as in judgment and conscience we conceive it to have
been made. The crisis here was grave. Nevertheless, as I view
Congress' action, I am unable to believe that it has acted to meet,
or authorized the courts to meet, the situation which arose in the
manner which has been employed.
No man or group is above the law. All are subject to its valid
commands. So are the government and the courts. If, as I think,
Congress has forbidden the use of labor injunctions in this and
like cases, that conclusion is the end of our function. And if
modification of that policy is to be made for such cases, that
problem is for Congress in the first instance, not for the
courts.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this opinion.
[
Footnote 4/1]
"Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are
called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will
bend."
Holmes, J., dissenting, in
Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197,
193 U. S.
400-401.
[
Footnote 4/2]
"
Provided, That whenever any such plant, mine, or
facility has been or is hereafter so taken by reason of a strike,
lock-out, threatened strike, threatened lock-out, work stoppage, or
other cause, such plant, mine, or facility
shall be returned to
the owners thereof as soon as practicable, but in no event more
than sixty days after the restoration of the productive efficiency
thereof prevailing prior to the taking of possession thereof.
. . ."
(Emphasis added.) War Labor Disputes Act § 3, Act of June 25,
1943, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 1501, 1503.
[
Footnote 4/3]
"Sec. 6. (a) Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the
possession of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any
person (1) to coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or
encourage any person, to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down,
or other interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine, or
facility, or (2) to aid any such lock-out, strike, slow-down, or
other interruption interfering with the operation of such plant,
mine, or facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of
such interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or
direction thereof or for the payment of strike, unemployment, or
other benefits to those participating therein. No individual shall
be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason
only of his having ceased work or having refused to continue to
work or to accept employment."
"(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."
War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, § 6.
[
Footnote 4/4]
The issue is not avoided, nor is the effect of final legislative
rejection nullified, by the easy device of resting the power said
to exist upon common law rules of statutory construction which, if
otherwise pertinent, were in the very teeth of Congress' positive
refusal to confer the power after the fullest and most attentive
consideration. That device only conceals the true issue.
See
also 330
U.S. 258fn4/11|>note 11.
[
Footnote 4/5]
Seizure without such ultimate control, of course, would have
been only one-sided, halfway seizure, operative only against
management and owners. But seizure with such control did not
require or mean that the control was to be exercised by labor
injunctions. There was, and is, no inconsistency whatever between
conferring the one power and denying the other. For this is exactly
what Congress has done with reference to all plants not subject to
the seizure power. Besides imputing to Congress the purpose to do
with one hand what the other denied was being done, the
identification of these two very distinct things serves only to
confuse and make obscure the real question. This is simply whether
Congress intended to abrogate for seized plants or to continue in
force the established policy against labor injunctions as a method
of exercising the powers of ultimate control conferred upon the
Government.
[
Footnote 4/6]
Section 2(c) excludes carriers as defined in Title I of the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, or carriers by air as subject
to Title II of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 181.
[
Footnote 4/7]
The available statistics speak in terms of "strikes" for 1943
and "work stoppages arising from labor-management disputes" for
1945 and 1946. For 1943, 13,500,529 man-days were lost through
strikes. For 1945, 38,025,000 man-days were lost through work
stoppages, and 113,000,000 man-days were so lost in 1946. In 1943,
there were 3,752 strikes. In 1945, there were 4,750 work stoppages,
and, in 1946, 4,700.
See Strikes in 1943, Bull. No. 782,
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Work Stoppages Caused by
Labor-Management Disputes in 1945, Bull. No. 878, U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics; Review of Labor-Management Disputes, 1946, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Release, January 11, 1947.
[
Footnote 4/8]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/7|>note 7.
[
Footnote 4/9]
See Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs
of the House of Representatives on S. 796, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
25-26.
"The War Labor Board was set up to deal with industrial
relations. While this Board may not have a perfect record, it has a
very good record to its credit, particularly when we consider the
great problems it must deal with."
89 Cong.Rec. 5339.
The number of War Labor Board cases resulting in plant seizures
by the United States, so far as statistics are available, is as
follows: four cases from June 25, 1943, the date of the passage of
the War Labor Disputes Act, to December 31, 1943; seventeen cases
from January 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944; fifteen cases from
January 1, 1945, to August, 1945. We are informed that in no
instance of seizure except the one under consideration was a labor
injunction issued at the behest of the Government.
[
Footnote 4/10]
Section 3 provides:
"Provided further, That possession of any plant, mine, or
facility shall not be taken under authority of this section after
the termination of hostilities in the present war, as proclaimed by
the President, or after the termination of the War Labor Disputes
Act; and the authority to operate any such plant, mine, or facility
under the provisions of this section shall terminate at the end of
six months after the termination of such hostilities as so
proclaimed."
It may be noted that, on December 31, 1946, the President, by
proclamation No. 2714, announced the end of hostilities. 12
Fed.Reg. 1. The emergency powers conferred by the Act terminate six
months thereafter.
[
Footnote 4/11]
If general common law rules of statutory construction were
appropriate for criteria to determine such issues as this case
presents for the meaning of the Act, certainly that rule would be
equally applicable with any other which dictates that when a
statute provides specific remedies adequate for enforcing its
provisions those remedies alone are deemed to be made available.
But, in view of the legislative and other history, this case is not
one to be turned, in my opinion, by such vague, conveniently
selective, and often, as here, contradictory canons of
construction.
[
Footnote 4/12]
It is this sanction upon which Congress has chosen to rely
ultimately, for instance, in the Railway Labor Acts, though
provision is made for preliminary resort to processes of
conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration before the use of
ultimate economic force by strike or lockout, when the sanction of
public opinion comes chiefly into play.
See Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 321 U. S.
50;
General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 320 U. S. 323. On
the whole, that policy, and the sanctions provided, have worked
successfully to eliminate stoppages in railway transportation. And,
as of June, 1943, it may be fairly assumed that Congress, in
declining to authorize the issuance of labor injunctions, was
conscious of, and chose to rely upon, this accepted sanction,
together with the specific ones then conferred by the War Labor
Disputes Act.
[
Footnote 4/13]
More especially when account is taken of the vast liberty,
called "discretion," which courts are said to have, and in this
case are held to have, in fixing punishments for contempts.
But
see 330 U. S.
[
Footnote 4/14]
"The restraining order and the preliminary injunction invoked in
labor disputes reveal the most crucial points of legal
maladjustment. Temporary injunction relief without notice, or, if
upon notice, relying upon dubious affidavits, serves the important
function of staying defendant's conduct regardless of the ultimate
justification of such restraint. The preliminary proceedings, in
other words, make the issue of final relief a practical nullity. .
. . The suspension of strike activities, even temporarily, may
defeat the strike for practical purposes and foredoom its
resumption, even if the injunction is later lifted."
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 200-201.
"Time is the essence of the strike. Keeping the injunction alive
by dilatory tactics blunts the edge of the only effective
instrument that labor possesses, namely, the strike."
"The bill now before us makes it well nigh impossible to secure
a restraining order except under the well defined and limited
conditions set out in sections 7 and 8."
75 Cong.Rec. 5489.
See also People ex rel. Sandnes v.
Sheriff of King's County, 164 Misc. 355, 299 N.Y.Supp. 9,
16.
[
Footnote 4/15]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/14|>note 14.
Ex parte Fisk,
113 U. S. 713,
presents another clear illustration of the type of right which
would be wholly nullified by general application of the alleged
broad conception of the
Shipp doctrine. There, the Circuit
Court, in contravention of explicit acts of Congress, as this Court
found, had ordered Fisk to submit to oral examination before trial
in a removed civil cause, the examination to be before a justice of
the court and according to procedure prescribed by state law for
the state court from which the case was removed. Fisk refused to
obey the order, standing upon the Circuit Court's lack of
jurisdiction to enter it, was held in contempt for this, and fined
$500 and ordered imprisoned until the fine was paid. He brought
habeas corpus to secure release from the imprisonment thus
imposed.
This Court held void both the order for examination and the
order of commitment as beyond the Circuit Court's jurisdiction, and
granted petitioner's release from custody. The Court said:
"Not only is no such power [of examination] conferred, but it is
prohibited by the plain language and the equally plain purpose of
the acts of Congress. . . . The Circuit Court was therefore without
authority to make the orders for the examination of petitioner in
this case, and equally without authority to enforce these orders by
process for contempt."
Pp.
113 U. S. 724,
113 U. S. 726.
Had Fisk submitted, as
Shipp is now said to require should
be done, not only would the specific commands of Congress have been
nullified. His right, secured by those commands, could never have
been vindicated. The statutes would have been made dead
letters.
[
Footnote 4/16]
Indeed, at least one state court has held this result to follow,
and, in his dissenting opinion in
In re Sawyer,
124 U. S. 200,
124 U. S. 224,
Harlan, J., stated this to be his view of the law (
see,
however, 330
U.S. 258fn4/19|>note 19), as apparently also it was of
Waite, C.J. P.
124 U. S. 223.
See Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 200 Minn.
599 (certiorari);
but see the dissenting opinion, 200
Minn. at 612; Collateral Attack Upon Labor Injunctions Issued in
Disregard of Anti-Injunction Statutes (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 1136;
People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164
Misc. 355.
[
Footnote 4/17]
See 330 U. S.
[
Footnote 4/18]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4/19]
Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604;
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713;
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443,
123 U. S. 507;
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200;
In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586;
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516
(arising under state law).
And see Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123,
209 U. S. 143;
cf. pp. 135, 139 [argument of counsel omitted from
electronic version], collecting the authorities.
In the
Sawyer case, supra, the Court said:
"The case cannot be distinguished in principle from that of a
judgment of the common bench in England in a criminal prosecution,
which was
coram non judice, or the case of a sentence
passed by the circuit court of the United States upon a charge of
an infamous crime, without a presentment, or indictment by a grand
jury.
Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Rep. 68, 76;
Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U. S. 417;
Ex parte
Bain, 121 U. S. 1."
124 U.S. at
124 U. S. 221.
Hardly can it be said that the
Sawyer decision went on the
ground that the question of jurisdiction to enter the order was not
substantial, in view of the length and detail of the Court's
opinion, which gave no hint of such a suggestion, and in view also
of the fact that Field, J., concurred in a separate opinion and
Waite, C.J., and Harlan, J., wrote separate dissents taking the
position which the Court now accepts for this case.
See
330
U.S. 258fn4/16|>note 16
supra. Harlan, J., however,
receded from his view in
Ex parte Young, supra, where he
dissented on other grounds. 209 U.S. at
209 U. S. 169,
209 U. S.
174.
[
Footnote 4/20]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/19|>note 19.
[
Footnote 4/21]
In
Ex parte Rewland, 104 U. S. 604, the
county commissioners' disobedience of an order commanding them to
collect a certain tax did not moot the controversy, which was
whether the judgment debtor, by proceeding against the proper
county official, the tax collector, could satisfy its judgment by
forcing collection of the tax; and, the order being held void,
their action in disobeying it was held not to be contempt.
The disobedience of the petitioner in
Ex parte Fisk,
113 U. S. 713,
deprived the plaintiff in the suit against him of the use of his
testimony, but did not defeat this suit or the ability of the
courts to decide whether he could be forced to submit to
examination.
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/19|>note 19,
supra.
In
Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, the
refusal of the city officials to obey an order enjoining them from
removing a police judge did not vitiate judicial power to decide
the issue whether the city officials possessed the removal power.
The controversy remained, and, as this Court pointed out, it was
determinable by mandamus or
quo warranto. This Court held
the order invalid, and the officials not guilty of contempt.
In
Ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, the
refusal of the grandparents to give up the child upon order issued
by a federal court did not destroy the power of the court, which
had already been exercised, though improperly, the Court held, to
determine whether the child was properly in their custody or in the
custody of the father. As the contempt order was held void, habeas
corpus was granted.
Moreover, in none of these cases did the disobedience destroy
the jurisdiction of the trial and appellate courts to determine
jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 4/22]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/24|>note 24. The order allowing appeal directed
"that all proceedings be stayed and the custody of the said
appellant be retained during this appeal."
[
Footnote 4/23]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/24|>note 24. The Court was reviewing its own
order, the one that was violated.
[
Footnote 4/24]
The statement was made in response to counsel's contention that
the order allowing the appeal was void, and therefore would not
support a conviction for contempt. The Court rejected the premise,
not the conclusion.
The basis of counsel's contention was that the Circuit Court
lacked jurisdiction, and therefore that this Court also lacked
jurisdiction. His brief stated:
"The only question, therefore, is whether Johnson's proceeding
in habeas corpus in the Circuit Court did or did not in fact
constitute a 'case that involves the construction or application of
the Constitution of the United States.' If it did, this Court had
appellate jurisdiction of it, and should proceed to inquire whether
its order has been disobeyed. If it did not, this Court had no
jurisdiction of it,
and should now so hold for the purposes of
this proceeding. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) And elsewhere, the brief stated:
"We assume that it will hardly be contended that the mere
allowance of an appeal is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction
of a case which from its nature is not appealable. Such action is
pro forma only, and, as it is necessarily had in every
such case, the jurisdiction of the court would always be
established by an
ex parte order."
In answer to these arguments, the Government's brief said:
"Certainly no one would challenge the jurisdiction of this Court
if the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the
defendants here deny the jurisdiction of this court simply as a
corollary to their contention that the Circuit Court did not
possess jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction of this court is not
dependent upon contentions, and it has jurisdiction to take the
case and retain it for final determination whether it turns out
that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction or not."
[
Footnote 4/25]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/24|>note 24. No argument was made that, even if
the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, this Court did not. Thus, the
statement in the opinion
"[b]ut even if the circuit court had no jurisdiction to
entertain Johnson's petition, and if this court had no jurisdiction
of the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide that
such was the law,"
203 U.S. at
203 U. S. 573,
means "[b]ut even if the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain Johnson's petition, and if, for that reason, this Court
had no jurisdiction of the appeal," etc.
[
Footnote 4/26]
It has been held that habeas corpus will not lie where the
disobedience was to a lawful, but erroneous, order of a court.
Ex parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38.
See also Locke v. United
States, 75 F.2d 157, 159:
"Error must be corrected by appeal, and cannot be tested by
disobedience. . . . Willful disobedience of an injunction, however
erroneous, issued by a court having jurisdiction while such
injunction is in force unreversed, constitutes contempt of
court."
And it has been said that if an injunction is reversed on appeal
on grounds other than "jurisdiction," the violator may nevertheless
be punished for criminal, though not for civil, contempt.
Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14;
Salvage Process Corporation v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process
Corporation, 86 F.2d 727.
[
Footnote 4/27]
To be distinguished are cases in which Congress provides an
adequate but limited opportunity for challenging the validity of
administrative or other orders, but forecloses such opportunity
when it is not taken as prescribed.
See Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414;
cf. dissenting opinion, p.
321 U. S. 460.
See also United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.
S. 287;
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.
S. 549;
Estep v. United States, 327 U.
S. 114;
Gibson v. United States, 329 U.
S. 338. That is very different from affording no
opportunity whatever except by obedience.
[
Footnote 4/28]
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.
S. 414, dissenting opinion, at
321 U. S.
479ff.
[
Footnote 4/29]
Thus, in some civil law countries, damages, as well as other
penalties, are assessed in a criminal proceeding.
See
Schwenk, Criminal Codification and General Principles of Criminal
Law in Argentina, Mexico, Chile and the United States: A
Comparative Study (1942) 4 La.L.Rev. 351, 373-374; Goirand and
Thompson, The French Judicial System and Procedure in French Courts
(1919) 14.
See also Esmein, A History of Continental
Criminal Procedure (1913) 429-430.
[
Footnote 4/30]
Upon the authorities, the following procedural provisions of the
Bill of Rights, at least, would seem to apply to criminal contempt:
the provision against double jeopardy,
see In re Bradley,
318 U. S. 50; the
provision against self-incrimination,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 444;
the provision for due process insofar as it necessitates "suitable
notice and adequate opportunity to appear and to be heard,"
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421,
284 U. S. 440;
and, although the Sixth Amendment protections have been said not to
apply as such to criminal contempts,
Myers v. United
States, 264 U. S. 95, 104,
264 U. S. 105;
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. at
284 U. S. 440,
but see text infra, doubtless at least the provisions for
"a speedy and public trial," for "compulsory process," and for the
assistance of counsel,
see Cooke v. United States,
267 U. S. 517, are
implied in the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment. And it
has been said that the protection against cruel and unusual
punishments in the Eighth Amendment applies to criminal contempt,
United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136,
139.
There are also protections not expressly included in the Bill of
Rights which apply in criminal contempt,
e.g., that the
defendant is presumed to be innocent and must be proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 444.
And see Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.
S. 378,
249 U. S.
383:
"Existing within the limits of and sanctioned by the
Constitution, the power to punish for contempt committed in the
presence of the court is not controlled as to modes of accusation
and methods of trial generally safeguarding the rights of the
citizen. This, however, expresses no purpose to exempt judicial
authority from constitutional limitations, since its great and only
purpose is to secure judicial authority from obstruction in the
performance of its duties to the end that means appropriate for the
preservation and enforcement of the Constitution may be
secured."
[
Footnote 4/31]
See 330 U. S.
[
Footnote 4/32]
The confusion, at least as to the matter of indictments and jury
trial,
cf. 330
U.S. 258fn4/33|>note 33, has its origin in historical error
exposed in Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927), and
Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
"Inferior" Federal Courts -- A Study in Separation of Powers (1924)
37 Harv.L.Rev. 1010.
"Down to the early part of the eighteenth century, cases of
contempt, even in and about the common law courts, when not
committed by persons officially connected with the court, were
dealt with by the ordinary course of law,
i.e., tried by
jury, except when the offender confessed or when the offense was
committed 'in the actual view of the court.'"
Frankfurter and Landis,
supra, at 1042. Until 1720,
"there is no instance in the common law precedents of punishment
otherwise than after trial in the ordinary course and not by
summary process."
Id., 1046.
However, Wilmot, J., in 1765, influenced by Star Chamber
procedure and precedents, although the Star Chamber had been
abolished in 1641, stated that it was "immemorial usage" to punish
all contempts summarily.
Almon's Case, Wilmot's Notes, p.
243. And although this opinion was not published until thirty-seven
years later,
"there is ample evidence that, as a result of private
communication between Wilmot and Blackstone, Wilmot's views of 1765
found their way 'both in phrase and matter' into the four volumes
of the famous Commentaries published in 1769. . . ."
Frankfurter and Landis,
supra, at 1046, n, 128.
Wilmot's error "has bedeviled the law of contempt both in England
and in this country ever since."
Id., 1047.
This history furnishes a slender thread indeed for thinking that
the Constitution makers had no purpose to apply the usual
procedural protections to criminal contempts.
". . . [I]t is very doubtful whether, at the date of the
Constitution that doctrine (of
Almon's Case, supra) did
form part of the common law adopted by the United States. Mr.
Justice Wilmot's undelivered judgment lay concealed until the year
1802, and, so far as is known, was not cited in an English Court
until the hearing of
Burdett v. Abbott in 1811. It was
first cited with approval from the Bench in 1821, and was not
therefore adopted as the common law of England until after the
establishment of the American Constitution."
Fox,
supra, at 207.
[
Footnote 4/33]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/30|>note 30. It has been ruled consistently,
however, that the rights to have the proceeding begun by
indictment, Amend. V, and tried by jury, Amend. VI, do not apply.
E.g., Eilenberger v. District Court, 134 U. S.
31;
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.
S. 604;
In re Debs, 158 U.
S. 564.
[
Footnote 4/34]
Defendants have not argued either in the District Court or in
this Court that they are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.
And they expressly waived in open court whatever rights they had to
an advisory jury. On the other hand, if, as I think, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's provisions have been adopted for this and
like cases,
cf. Part I, § II of that Act, of its own
force, secured the right of trial by jury and forbade waiver
otherwise than in writing. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 23(a).
[
Footnote 4/35]
In civil cases under Rule 73, appeal is taken by filing notice
thereof "within the time prescribed by law," and generally, though
there are exceptions, the time is three months. 28 U.S.C. § 230;
Mosier v. Federal Reserve Bank, 132 F.2d 710, 712. In
criminal cases, the Federal Rules now allow taking an appeal by
filing notice of appeal, as in civil cases. But an appeal must be
taken by a defendant within 10 days after entry of judgment or
after denial of motion for new trial. Rule 37(a)(2). In
Nye v.
United States, 313 U. S. 33, it
was held that 28 U.S.C. § 230, rather than the Criminal Appeals
Rules, governed timeliness in a criminal contempt appeal. But the
new Criminal Rules would seem to apply to criminal contempts.
Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323, 324.
See
Rules 42 and 54; 55 Stat. 779, 18 U.S.C. § 689.
On certiorari, if the Rules of Criminal Procedure govern, there
is also a difference. In civil cases, the time for petitioning for
certiorari is three months. In criminal cases, the petition must be
filed within thirty days after entry of judgment. Rule 37(b)(2).
Compare Nye v. United States, supra, at
313 U. S. 42, n.
6, as to the law prior to the new Criminal Rules.
The largest present difference between appeals in civil and
criminal contempts is that,
"except in connection with an appeal from a final judgment or
decree, a party to a suit may not review upon appeal an order
fining or imprisoning him for the commission of a civil
contempt."
Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U. S. 105,
299 U. S. 107,
and cases cited.
Compare Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.
S. 217. On the other hand, if the contempt is criminal,
it may be directly reviewed.
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson,
259 U. S. 107. It
has been held that where the contempt is both civil and criminal,
the criminal procedure governs for purposes of review so that there
may be immediate review of both the part that is civil and the part
that is criminal.
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, supra, at
259 U. S. 111;
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. at
313 U. S.
42-43.
[
Footnote 4/36]
There as here the contempt proceedings were entitled and
conducted as collateral to civil litigation between the parties and
the order for contempt had been grounded upon disobedience to a
restraining order issued in the course of the litigation, conduct
which would have sustained either civil or criminal penalty. The
Court of Appeals had held the proceeding criminal. But this Court
held it to be civil, since it was collateral, not an independent
suit at law to vindicate the public interest. Hence, it followed
that the criminal penalty could not stand. Neither the
Norris-LaGuardia Act nor the War Labor Disputes Act was then in
force.
[
Footnote 4/37]
Throughout the opinion, the Court insisted the two forms of
relief are altogether incompatible, not only for interchangeability
between the two types of proceeding, but necessarily for
commingling in indistinguishable conglomeration. Imprisonment as
penalty for criminal contempt could be imposed for fixed terms,
but, in civil contempt, this could not be done, the court's power
being limited to remedial or coercive imprisonment -- that is,
until the person convicted should comply with the court's order. So
also with fines, which, in civil contempt, can be no more in amount
than is commensurate with the injury inflicted or is necessary to
secure compliance and must be contingent, whereas the limitation
requiring correlation to the amount of injury does not apply to
fines in criminal proceedings. 221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
442-444,
221 U. S. 449.
The same distinction applies as to the payment of costs. 221 U.S.
at
221 U. S. 447.
See 330 U. S.
As will appear, this distinction is of paramount importance in
this case. And so it was in the
Gompers case, for the main
cause had been settled, and the Court held this required not only
reversal, but dismissal of the contempt proceeding, which would not
have been true in one for criminal contempt. 221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
451-452.
[
Footnote 4/38]
As with the factor of relief, the opinion throughout uses
alternative, not conjunctive, language concerning the two types of
proceedings. Civil contempts, it said,
"are between the original parties, and are instituted and tried
as a part of the main cause. But, on the other hand, proceedings at
law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant,
and are not a part of the original cause."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S. 445.
See also 221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
446.
[
Footnote 4/39]
For example, most frequently, perhaps, the methods and times for
securing appellate review, which, at the time of the
Gompers decision, included whether the case could be
reviewed by writ of error or appeal. 221 U.S. at
221 U. S. 444;
cf. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.
S. 324.
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/40|>note 40;
see also 330
U.S. 258fn4/35|>note 35.
[
Footnote 4/40]
"The question as to the character of such proceedings has
generally been raised, in the appellate court, to determine whether
the case could be reviewed by writ of error or on appeal.
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S.
324. But it may involve much more than mere matters of
practice. For, notwithstanding the many elements of similarity in
procedure and in punishment, there are some differences between the
two classes of proceedings which involve substantial rights and
constitutional privileges. Without deciding what may be the rule in
civil contempt, it is certain that, in proceedings for criminal
contempt, the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he must be
proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be
compelled to testify against himself.
Bond v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616;
United States
v. Jose, 63 F. 951;
State v. Davis, 50 W.Va. 100, 40
S.E. 331;
King v. Ohio Ry. Co., 7 Biss. 529;
Sabin v.
Fogarty, 70 F. 482;
Drakeford v. Adams, 98 Ga. 724,
25 S.E. 833."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
444.
[
Footnote 4/41]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/40|>note 40.
[
Footnote 4/42]
See notes
330
U.S. 258fn4/35|>35,
330
U.S. 258fn4/37|>37,
330
U.S. 258fn4/39|>39.
[
Footnote 4/43]
Cf. 330
U.S. 258fn4/40|>note 40.
[
Footnote 4/44]
"A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of
this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts
constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.
The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States
attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose,
by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. . . ."
Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[
Footnote 4/45]
Judge L. Hand's opinion in the
McCann case reads in
part as follows:
". . . The respondent will often find it hard to tell whether
the prosecution is not a remedial suit, undertaken on behalf of the
client. This can be made plain if the judge enters an order
in
limine directing the attorney to prosecute the respondent
criminally on behalf of the court, and if the papers supporting the
process contain a copy of this order or allege its contents
correctly. We think that,
unless this is done, the prosecution
must be deemed to be civil, and will support no other than a
remedial punishment. Nothing of the sort was done here, and
the order must be reversed. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) 80 F.2d 211, 214-215.
The possibilities of confusion are multiplied when the contempt
is instituted in a suit in which the United States is a party,
since the United States may bring civil, as well as criminal,
contempt proceedings.
McCrone v. United States,
307 U. S. 61.
[
Footnote 4/46]
The Court said:
"Inasmuch, therefore, as proceedings for civil contempt are a
part of the original cause, the weight of authority is to the
effect that they should be entitled therein. But the practice has
hitherto been so unsettled in this respect that we do not now treat
it as controlling, but only as a fact to be considered along with
others, as was done in
Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S.
25, in determining a similar question."
221 U.S. at
221 U. S.
446.
[
Footnote 4/47]
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S.Const. Amend. VI. (Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 4/48]
Not only in the ruling that reversal was required for the
imposition of the criminal penalty in the proceeding held to be
civil, but also in the order for dismissal on the ground that the
cause, including the contempt phase, had become moot.
See
330
U.S. 258fn4/37|>note 37
supra.
[
Footnote 4/49]
Cf. In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224,
326 U. S. 227;
dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in
Toledo Newspaper
Publishing Co. v. United States, 247 U.
S. 402,
247 U. S. 422;
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S.
42,
266 U. S.
67:
"The only substantial difference between such a proceeding as we
have here [criminal contempt] and a criminal prosecution by
indictment or information is that, in the latter, the act
complained of is the violation of a law, and, in the former, the
violation of a decree. In the case of the latter, the accused has a
constitutional right of trial by jury, while, in the former, he has
not."
[
Footnote 4/50]
See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.
S. 378,
249 U. S. 383,
quoted in
330
U.S. 258fn4/30|>note 30
supra.
[
Footnote 4/51]
Blackner v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421,
284 U. S. 440.
The ruling was first made in
Myers v. United States,
264 U. S. 95,
264 U. S.
104-105, in connection with a statutory venue problem
relating to judicial districts and divisions which is correlative
constitutionally to the right of jury trial. The ruling was
reasserted in
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S.
87,
267 U. S. 117,
which held that the pardoning power extended to criminal contempts.
In the
Grossman case, the statement was obviously dictum.
In the
Myers case, it was dictum as to all guaranties
except perhaps that of trial in the district where the crime was
committed, a guaranty, as stated above, correlated to jury
trial.
[
Footnote 4/52]
As stated in
330
U.S. 258fn4/37|>note 37, coercive relief is civil in
character,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co.,
221 U. S. 418,
221 U. S. 442,
the decree being when imprisonment is imposed that the defendant
stand committed unless and until he performs the act required by
the court's order. When this is done, the sentence is discharged,
for the defendant carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.
In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461. The limitation is a
corollary of the civil character of the remedy. This forbids
imposition of fixed-term sentences for coercive purposes.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, although they
have "incidental" coercive effects.
Id., at
221 U. S.
443.
The purpose and character of the relief, not its particular
form, determine its limits.
Id. at
221 U. S. 443,
citing
Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
204 U. S. 599,
204 U. S. 605,
204 U. S. 607.
Hence, when a fine is used in substitution for coercive
imprisonment, it also must be contingent, giving opportunity for
compurgation. Unless this is done, the fine takes on punitive
character.
Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
supra.
[
Footnote 4/53]
It is in defining the nature and character of criminal penalties
that legislative judgment and, within the authority it confers, the
judgment of the trial court, rather than appellate courts, have the
widest range. Legislative experience and judgment in this field
therefore furnish a measure entitled to great, and in some
instances, I think, conclusive, weight for consideration of the
allowable range of punishment, as such, in criminal contempts where
the penalty is undefined by statute.
The only crime for which the amount of the fine has no maximum
is treason, where the fine authorized is not less than $10,000. 18
U.S.C. § 2. For rescue of one convicted of a capital crime while
going to or during execution, the fine may be not more than
$25,000. 18 U.S.C. § 248. Maximum fines of $20,000 are set for
offering a bribe to a judicial officer and for acceptance of a
bribe by a judge. 18 U.S.C. §§ 237, 238. The same maximum is set
for mailing matter with intent to increase weight in order to
increase the compensation of a railroad mail carrier. 18 U.S.C. §
358. In some cases of embezzlement and like crimes, the fine may be
the amount embezzled,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 173, and, in one
instance, twice that amount. 18 U.S.C. § 172. But ordinarily, the
maximum allowed by Congress has been $10,000, and often it is
less.
Moreover, where Congress itself has fixed a maximum fine for
criminal punishment of the act held to be a contempt, that judgment
would seem to furnish a standard to be applied in the contempt
proceeding.
See In re Michael, 326 U.
S. 224,
326 U. S. 227.
In this case, the War Labor Disputes Act authorized a fine of not
over $5.000 or imprisonment for not over one year, or both. 50
U.S.C.App. § 1506(b).
[
Footnote 4/54]
The fines in this case were flat fines imposed absolutely,
without contingency for compurgation or otherwise. The court acted
on the Government's recommendation, which, as to the union, was
made on the basis of $250,000 a day for the fourteen days elapsed
after the restraining orders issued and the violations occurred. No
part of the fine was laid contingently upon future conduct. Both
penalties, therefore, would seem to be strictly criminal, or
criminal combined with civil damages for past conduct, not coercive
in the sense of coercive relief as contemplated in the decisions,
see 330
U.S. 258fn4/52|>note 52, although the amounts fixed for each
fine gave it "incidental" coercive effect in the popular sense.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4/55]
The Government's asserted loss in revenues, chiefly relied on
for this purpose, was not only highly speculative, rather than
proven in amount. It was injury which would have followed from the
strike had it arisen before or after seizure. Such damages may
result from any strike, whether the Government or another is
"employer," and would seem to be both speculative and indirect
within the rule forbidding the award of such damages.
Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 41.
[
Footnote 4/56]
See notes
330
U.S. 258fn4/54|>54,
330
U.S. 258fn4/57|>57. The order for coercive fines reads, by
analogy to the order for coercive imprisonment,
cf.
330
U.S. 258fn4/52|>note 52, that, unless there is obedience to
the order of the court, the fine shall be paid on or before a day
certain, in default of which the defendant shall be imprisoned
until it is paid.
See Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident
Co., 204 U. S. 599,
204 U. S. 602.
In the case of corporations or unincorporated associations, the
default provision is either that the responsible officers be
imprisoned,
Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 379, or
perhaps that execution issue against the contemnor's property.
See United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F. Supp.
435,
436.
Compare Rev.Stat. § 1041, 18 U.S.C. § 569,
with
38 Stat. 738, 28 U.S.C. § 387.
[
Footnote 4/57]
See the opinion of the Court,
330 U. S. 330 U.S.
258,
330 U. S. 300.
Only in rare instances have other federal courts, after
consideration, done so.
See Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co.,
190 F. 565.
See also the discussion, by way of dictum, in
Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810, 811, 813. In still
other instances, the two types of contempt have been mingled
without discussion.
See Chicago Directory Co. v. United States
Directory Co., 123 F. 194.
And see Wilson v. Byron Jackson
Co., 93 F.2d 577, dismissing for jurisdictional reasons an
appeal from an order adjudging the appellants guilty of civil and
criminal contempt.
[
Footnote 4/58]
The two capacities are distinct, not identical. Each, it is
true, may be exercised ultimately in the public interest. But if,
in the capacity of temporary "employer," the Government is to have
the benefits of that status, it should be subject also to its
limitations, except as Congress otherwise provides. To jumble the
two capacities, as is done here, is only to nullify the rights in
trial and remedy of employees and others.
[
Footnote 4/59]
The limitations upon criminal contempt, procedural and remedial,
always apply to the Government, for it alone can bring that
proceeding. It cannot defeat them by mingling that proceeding and
relief with civil ones merely by virtue of being also the
complaining civil litigant.
[
Footnote 4/60]
See 330
U.S. 258fn4/53|>note 53
supra.
[
Footnote 4/61]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4/62]
The opinion states:
"In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may
properly take into consideration . . . the necessity of effectively
terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the public
interest. . . ."
330 U. S. 330 U.S.
258,
330 U. S.
303.
[
Footnote 4/63]
The statement in the
Gompers opinion, 221 U.S. at
221 U. S. 443,
that criminal penalties have incidental coercive effects and civil
ones incidental penal effects, was not intended to contradict its
ruling that criminal penalties cannot be imposed in civil contempt
proceedings or therefore commingled indistinguishably.