Intoxicating liquors in transit from a consignor in Illinois to
a consignee at Fort Sill Military Reservation were seized in
Oklahoma by state officers. The carrier instituted a proceeding in
the federal district court for the return of the liquors and to
restrain further interference with their transportation to
destination.
Held:
1. The transportation of the liquors through Oklahoma violated
no law of that State, and the seizure was illegal. P.
321 U. S.
386.
2. Upon the facts, the purchase and delivery of the liquors were
not in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1350. P.
321 U. S.
388.
3. Applicability of the federal assimilative crimes statute is
not decided. P.
321 U. S.
390.
4. Upon the record, the carrier, which had acted in good faith,
was not barred by the "clean hands" doctrine, and was entitled in
this proceeding to the relief sought. Pp.
321 U. S. 387,
321 U. S.
392.
137 F.2d 274 affirmed.
Page 321 U. S. 384
Certiorari, 320 U.S. 731, to review the affirmance of a decree
of injunction, 48 F. Supp. 594.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are officials of Oklahoma State and Oklahoma County
concerned with enforcement of Oklahoma's liquor laws. Respondent is
a common carrier by motor vehicle authorized by the Interstate
Commerce Commission to transport in interstate commerce various
commodities, including wines and liquors.
See U.S.C. Title
49, c. 8. In regular course of business, the respondent carrier
undertook to transport 225 cases of wines and liquors from East St.
Louis, Illinois, through Missouri, into Oklahoma and thence to a
consignee at Fort Sill, a military reservation within the
boundaries of Oklahoma. While the vehicle carrying the liquors was
momentarily stopped at Oklahoma City for the purpose of loading and
unloading other freight, the petitioner officials forcibly seized
and took away the liquors.
The carrier filed a complaint in the federal District Court
alleging that the seizure constituted an unlawful interference with
its authorized interstate transportation, and praying that the
Court order the officials to return the liquors so that it might
deliver them to the consignee at Fort Sill. The answer to the
complaint, in substance, admitted the material facts relative to
the shipment and seizure of the liquors, but denied the allegation
of the complaint that the seizure was unlawful. The answer did not
allege that judicial proceedings concerning the seized liquor were
pending, or were to be commenced, in an
Page 321 U. S. 385
Oklahoma state court. After a trial on stipulated facts, the
District Court ordered the liquors returned to the carrier and
forbade the officials to interfere with completion of the shipment.
48 F. Supp. 594. The Circuit Court of Appeals, one Judge
dissenting, affirmed. 137 F.2d 274.
Questions presented in the petition for review concerning
important state and federal relationships with regard to federal
enclaves prompted us to grant certiorari. 320 U.S. 731. Argument
has revealed, however, that the determinative issues are more
narrow: (1) did transportation of the liquors through Oklahoma
violate that State's law so as to justify their seizure? (2) should
the District Court have denied the carrier equitable relief because
of the "unclean hands" doctrine, even though seizure of the liquors
by the officials was illegal? This second question rests on the
disputed premise that introduction of the liquors into Fort Sill
would have violated the laws of the United States.
Petitioners do not claim, nor could they claim, that either of
these two separate questions should be decided in their favor on
the ground that Oklahoma has power to control liquor transactions
on the Fort Sill Reservation. With certain minor exceptions not
here material, Oklahoma ceded to the United States in 1913 whatever
authority it ever could have exercised in the Reservation.
[
Footnote 1] The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has recognized that the general power to govern the
Fort Sill area is vested in the United States, not in Oklahoma,
[
Footnote 2] and our decisions
lead to the same conclusion. [
Footnote 3]
Page 321 U. S. 386
First. Since power to govern Fort Sill is in the United
States, and since the seized liquors were not to be sold,
delivered, or otherwise disposed of in Oklahoma proper, as
distinguished from Fort Sill, the only Oklahoma laws called to our
attention which could have justified the seizure are those which
apply to liquor transportation. No Oklahoma law purports on its
face to prohibit or regulate interstate shipments of liquor into
and through the state to another state, or to an area subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. And we were
informed at the bar by Oklahoma's legal representative that no
state statute had been construed by any state court as applying to
such through shipments. Oklahoma law does make it unlawful
"to import, bring, transport, or cause to be brought or
transported
into the State . . . intoxicating liquor . . .
without a permit . . . as hereinafter provided."
Okla.Stat. 1941, Title 37, § 41. The argument is that the
Oklahoma legislature intended this statute to apply to liquor
imported into the Fort Sill Reservation because the latter is
located within the exterior boundaries of Oklahoma. Were this
statute intended to do no more than provide a means whereby the
state could protect itself from illegal liquor diversions within
the area which Oklahoma has power to govern, the interpretation
asked might well be an acceptable one.
Duckworth v.
Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390;
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131. But
the statute has no such limited purpose. No permit to transport
liquor into Oklahoma can be obtained at all except for scientific,
mechanical, medicinal, industrial, or sacramental purposes.
Okl.Stat. 1941, Title 37, § 42. To construe the state statute in
the manner urged would be to say that, although Oklahoma admittedly
has no power directly to regulate the liquor traffic on the
Reservation, the Oklahoma legislature intended practically to
exclude from the Reservation liquor which might be put to legal
uses under controlling United States laws. Neither the words
nor
Page 321 U. S. 387
the scheme of the statute in question, nor any other relevant
material pointed out to us indicates that the Oklahoma legislature
had such a purpose. Had the legislature expressed such a purpose,
questions would be raised which we need not here consider.
See
Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.
S. 518,
304 U. S. 533;
Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,
318 U. S. 285,
318 U. S. 295.
Consequently, we find no justification for the seizure in Oklahoma
law.
Second. But it is said that, despite the fact the
seizure was illegal and wholly without justification, the consignee
could not have received the liquors without violating the laws of
the United States, and, for that reason, the District Court should
have denied the carrier any relief under the "clean hands"
doctrine.
We may assume that, because of the clean hands doctrine, a
federal court should not, in an ordinary case, lend its judicial
power to a plaintiff who seeks to invoke that power for the purpose
of consummating a transaction in clear violation of law. [
Footnote 4] But this does not mean that
courts must always permit a defendant wrongdoer to retain the
profits of his wrongdoing merely because the plaintiff himself is
possibly guilty of transgressing the law in the transactions
involved. [
Footnote 5] The
maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands is
not applied by way of punishment for an unclean litigant, but "upon
considerations that make for the advancement of right and justice."
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,
290 U. S. 240,
290 U. S. 245.
It is not a rigid formula which "trammels the free and just
exercise of discretion."
Ibid., 290 U. S.
245-246.
Page 321 U. S. 388
Therefore, before deciding the applicability of the maxim to the
case at hand, we must examine the particular transactions and
circumstances involved, together with the federal laws which are
alleged to taint these transactions with illegality.
As shown by the stipulated facts in this record, the
circumstances of the liquor shipment were as follows: Fort Sill had
an Officers' Club, which provided, among other things, an officers'
mess, living quarters for some Officers, and other customary club
facilities. Several hundred Officer-members gave to the Club
Secretary, himself an Officer, separate written orders for liquor,
together with money or checks in payment for the respective orders.
Acting for the Officer-members, the Secretary telephoned from Fort
Sill to a dealer at East St. Louis, Illinois, and ordered the
liquors shipped to the Club. The dealer delivered the liquors to
the respondent carrier under a uniform through bill of lading. It
was this shipment which the state officials seized. Had the
shipment not been seized, it would have arrived at the Club for
delivery to the several Officers who had paid for it.
It is first contended that purchase and delivery of the liquors
was in violation of U.S.C. Title 10, § 1350, set out in the margin.
[
Footnote 6] The agreed facts,
summarized above, sufficiently show that the transactions were not
in violation of this statute.
Petitioners next argue that the liquor transactions here
involved were in violation of the assimilative crimes statute.
[
Footnote 7] This statute, it
is said, adopts all of the various
Page 321 U. S. 389
penal statutes of Oklahoma relating to liquor and makes them the
federal law applicable to the Fort Sill Reservation.
Cf. United
States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U. S.
1;
Franklin v. United States, 216 U.
S. 559. Petitioners' argument as to the applicability of
the assimilative crimes statute raises at least three distinct
questions, no one of which is easily resolved: (1) which, if any,
of the Oklahoma penal statutes are so designed that they could be
adopted by the assimilative crimes statute and applied to Fort
Sill? [
Footnote 8]
See
opinions of Circuit Court of Appeals,
supra; cf. Murray v. Joe
Gerrick & Co., 291 U. S. 315. (2)
If there are Oklahoma statutes which could be so adopted, are
Page 321 U. S. 390
all or any of them in conflict with federal policies as
expressed by Acts of Congress other than the assimilative crimes
statute or by valid Army Regulations [
Footnote 9] which have the force of law? [
Footnote 10]
Cf. Stewart & Co. v.
Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94,
309 U. S.
99-104. (3) Assuming that certain Oklahoma statutes are
adaptable, and are not inconsistent with federal policies, would
such statutes make penal the liquor transactions here stipulated to
have taken place? Inextricably involved in each of the three
questions is the further problem of whether certain of the Oklahoma
liquor statutes may be inconsistent with Oklahoma's constitution as
interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
See opinions of
the Circuit Court of Appeals,
supra; Ex parte Wilson, 6
Okl.Cr. 451, 119 P. 596;
Morse v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 445,
77 P.2d 757.
Considering the difficulty and importance of a correct decision
of the novel issues which an attempt to construe this federal
criminal statute would present, together with the other
circumstances of the present case, we are convinced that, in the
interest of sound administration of justice, we should refrain from
a complete exploration of these issues in this proceeding,
especially since these issues
Page 321 U. S. 391
are only collateral to the principal issue of the legality of
the seizure of the liquor. Were we to decide that the assimilative
crimes statute is not applicable to this shipment of liquors, we
would, in effect, be construing a federal criminal statute against
the United States in a proceeding in which the United States has
never been represented. And, on the other hand, should we decide
the statute outlaws the shipment, such a decision would be
equivalent to a holding that more than 200 Army Officers, sworn to
support the Constitution, had participated in a conspiracy to
violate federal law. Not only that, it would, for practical
purposes, be accepted as an authoritative determination that all
army reservations in the State of Oklahoma must conduct their
activities in accordance with numerous Oklahoma liquor regulations,
some of which, at least, are of doubtful adaptability. And all of
this would be decided in a case wherein neither the Army Officers
nor the War Department nor the Attorney General of the United
States has been represented, and upon a record consisting of
stipulations between a private carrier and the legal
representatives of Oklahoma.
Nor is it any answer to say that the carrier should be compelled
to sue in the Oklahoma state courts to reclaim the liquors in order
to give the Oklahoma courts the opportunity collaterally to pass
upon the question of whether these liquor transactions violate the
federal assimilative crimes statute. That broad question, though
some parts of it involve a consideration of the proper scope of the
state law adopted by the federal government, is, in the final
analysis, a question of the correct interpretation of a federal
criminal statute, and therefore an issue upon which federal courts
are not bound by the rulings of state courts.
Puerto Rico v.
Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253,
302 U. S. 266.
Indeed, Congress has vested in the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over the trial of all federal crimes. Judicial Code §
256 as amended. And so, even if the carrier
Page 321 U. S. 392
could bring suit in an Oklahoma state court to reclaim the
liquor, a point which is itself subject to some doubt, [
Footnote 11] the federal District
Court should not for that reason refuse relief in the present
suit.
The ultimate question in this part of the case is whether the
carrier, whose complete good faith is in no way questioned, should
have the court's doors shut to it. So to hold would be to say that
the state officials, who, so far as this record shows, had no
search warrant or judicial process of any kind, [
Footnote 12] could retain liquors which
they seized without authority of law. We do not find here any
"unconscientious or inequitable attitude" on the part of the
carrier.
International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U. S. 215,
248 U. S. 245.
And, so far as this record shows, the carrier, in seeking relief in
the courts against the unlawful seizure, has proceeded in the only
"practicable and adequate way" [
Footnote 13] available.
If the carrier's delivery of these liquors on the Fort Sill
Reservation would violate any federal law, federal agencies
Page 321 U. S. 393
exist which are charged with responsibilities to institute
appropriate proceedings against the carrier in federal tribunals.
In such proceedings, the parties would be the United States, and
the carrier and the issue of violation of federal laws would be
directly, and not collaterally, presented. The complicated federal
questions involved, concerning various federal statutes as well as
Army rules and regulations, could be answered upon an adequate
presentation of all factors essential to a right and just
determination.
And, similarly, if the several hundred Army Officers who ordered
and paid for these liquors have acted contrary to United States
Statutes, Army Regulations, or Orders of the Post Commandant, it is
not to be doubted that the Army or some other United States agency
is capable of determining what course shall be pursued. Should the
United States determine to proceed in the matter, it could do so at
such time and place as least would hamper essential military
training, and the Army Officers would be heard before they would be
stigmatized as lawbreakers and subjected as such to Army
discipline. We will not, at this time and upon this inadequate
record, resolve all doubts against the lawfulness of their conduct
in order to deny relief against a plainly unlawful seizure of their
property from an interstate carrier whose good faith has not been
questioned.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Oklahoma Laws, 1913, c. 52, p. 90.
[
Footnote 2]
See Utley v. State Industrial Commission, 176 Okl. 255,
55 P.2d 762;
In re Annexation of Reno Quartermaster Depot Military
Reservation to Independent School District No. 34, Canadian
County, 180 Okl. 274,
69 P.2d
659.
[
Footnote 3]
See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.,
304 U. S. 518,
304 U. S. 533;
Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,
318 U. S. 285,
318 U. S.
294.
[
Footnote 4]
See generally 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th
Ed., §§ 402, 403.
Cf. Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 F. 247, 252;
Bonnie & Co. v. Bonnie Bros., 160 Ky. 487, 495, 169
S.W. 871.
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., 43 U. S.
Phalen, 2 How. 376;
Kinsman v.
Parkhurst, 18 How. 289,
59 U. S. 293;
Stark v. Grant, 16 N.Y.S. 526;
Martin v. Hodge,
47 Ark. 378, 1 S.W. 694.
[
Footnote 6]
"The sale of or dealing in, beer, wine, or any intoxicating
liquors by any person in any post exchange or canteen or army
transport or upon any premises used for military purposes by the
United States is hereby prohibited. The Secretary of War is hereby
directed to carry the provisions of this section into full force
and effect."
31 Stat. 758; U.S.C. Title 10, § 1350.
See Note 9 infra.
[
Footnote 7]
"Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, . . . but
within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved
or acquired, described in section 272 of the Criminal Code . . . ,
shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made
penal by any laws of Congress, but which, if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or district in
which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force on
February 1, 1940, and remaining in force at the time of the doing
or omitting the doing of such act or thing, would be penal, shall
be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like
punishment."
54 Stat. 234, U.S.C. Title 18, § 468. Section 272 of the
Criminal Code, referred to in this Act, is broad enough to include
the Fort Sill Reservation. 35 Stat. 1143.
[
Footnote 8]
The Oklahoma liquor statutes pertaining to liquor imports
provide one illustration of the difficulties inherent in this
question. These penal statutes are designed to enforce a system of
licensing such imports by special permits issued by a state agency.
Okl.Stat. 1941, Title 37, §§ 41-48. Importation of liquors without
a special permit is made penal.
Ibid., §§ 41, 46. To hold,
therefore, that the assimilative crimes statute adopts Oklahoma's
penal liquor laws, the Court might further have to hold that that
statute compels federal officials on the Fort Sill Reservation to
apply for and obtain state permits before they can lawfully import
any liquors for any purpose. And a strong argument might be made
that, had Congress intended such a drastic result, it would have
considered the problem and used more express language.
See
Note 7 supra; Senate
Report No. 1699, Senate Judiciary Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.;
House Report No. 1584, House Judiciary Committee, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess.
Cf. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.
S. 518,
304 U. S.
533.
[
Footnote 9]
Army regulations have declared certain liquor policies for Army
reservations generally.
See, e.g., A.G. 250.1 (1-20-43),
concerning the sale of liquor upon premises used for military
purposes by the United States, published by the War Department on
January 25, 1943, in Circular No. 29, and A.R. 210-65, concerning
Army Exchanges, published by the War Department on March 19, 1943.
Petitioners have not contended that the liquor transactions here
were contrary to any Army Regulations, and no Regulations have come
to our attention which would indicate that there is a basis for
such a contention. Whether the declaration of policies contained in
these various regulations indicates an intention of the War
Department to permit all liquor transactions not expressly
prohibited, and whether, if it does, the War Department has the
power under Acts of Congress to permit such transactions, seem open
questions.
[
Footnote 10]
Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.
S. 481,
316 U. S.
484.
[
Footnote 11]
Nothing in the record or briefs justifies the conclusion that
the carrier could bring such a proceeding in the state courts.
And see Okl.Stat. 1941, Title 37, §§ 72, 86, and 89;
Blunk v. Waugh, 32 Okl. 616, 122 P. 717;
Lee v.
State, 180 Okl. 643,
71 P.2d 1090;
cf. 1942 Chevrolet Automobile Motor No. B A-193397 v.
State, 191 Okl. 26, 27,
128 P.2d 448.
Nor has there been any attempt to show that, if the carrier could
bring such a proceeding, the Army Officers, the War Department, and
the Attorney General of the United States could intervene on the
collateral issue of "clean hands."
[
Footnote 12]
Under Oklahoma law, there are no "property rights" in liquor.
Okl.Stat. 1941, Title 37, § 72. Officers with power to execute
criminal process may arrest without a warrant one who violates the
state liquor laws, and seize the property used in the violation,
and it is their duty to take the property before a Court which may
order it forfeited and destroyed.
Ibid., §§ 89, 90. As
stated in the body of the opinion, the record does not show that
proceedings of any kind were ever instituted, or sought to be
instituted, in the state courts.
[
Footnote 13]
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S.
79,
241 U. S. 84-85;
see also Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.,
125 U. S. 465.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and I are unable to agree with the Court's
decision.
The ultimate issue in this case is whether a federal court
should, by issuing an injunction, aid in the consummation of what
appears to be a violation of the Criminal Code of the United
States. For it must not be forgotten that a mandatory injunction,
the relief sought in this suit, "is
Page 321 U. S. 394
an extraordinary remedial process, which is granted not as a
matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion."
Morrison v. Work, 266 U.
S. 481,
266 U. S.
490.
A large shipment of wine and spirituous liquors was seized by
law enforcement officers of the Oklahoma while the liquor had
temporarily come to rest at the terminal of the Transit Company.
The liquor, in course of transit from East St. Louis, Illinois, to
the Fort Sill Military Reservation, was destined for the Officers
Club at the Reservation for delivery to several hundred members of
the Club on whose behalf its secretary was managing the importation
of the liquor. Upon seizure, the liquor was deposited in the County
Court House of Oklahoma County, where it is held as an illegal
shipment of intoxicating liquor subject to forfeiture and
destruction. Thereupon, the Transit Company brought this suit for a
mandatory injunction against the state officers, requiring them to
return the shipment and to refrain from interfering with its
delivery by the Transit Company at the Reservation. The injunction
issued, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, in two separate opinions,
approved, with one judge dissenting. 48 F. Supp. 594; 137 F.2d
274.
The facts establish that which was done, if it had been done in
Oklahoma proper, would, under its laws, have constituted a
misdemeanor. Delivery of the liquor on the Reservation would
therefore be an offense under the federal criminal law by virtue of
the Act of June 6th, 1940, 54 Stat. 234, whereby Congress made
applicable to the Reservation the penal laws of Oklahoma in
existence on February 1, 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 468. But even if there
were doubt that the importation of the liquor into the Reservation
under the circumstances of this record would offend the Criminal
Code of the United States, on the ground that the act if committed
within the jurisdiction of Oklahoma "by the laws thereof in force
on February 1, 1940, . . . would be penal," equity should resolve
the
Page 321 U. S. 395
doubt in favor of law by denying the extraordinary remedy of
injunction, instead of resolving it against law by granting the
injunction.
Oklahoma is, colloquially speaking, a dry State. Only for
strictly defined purposes may liquor from without the State be
lawfully brought into it for consumption. Prohibited importations
are penalized. If a transaction like the one before us related
wholly to Oklahoma soil, it would -- there can hardly be doubt --
be outlawed. The Circuit Judge, who speaks with special knowledge
of Oklahoma law, assures us that
"the State of Oklahoma, by its Constitution and laws, makes it
unlawful to possess, transport, furnish, or receive this particular
shipment of intoxicating liquor, and it is therefore contraband,
and subject to seizure and confiscation under the laws of the
State,"
137 F.2d at 279. Judge Murrah calls specific attention to an
Oklahoma statute which makes it a misdemeanor
"for any person in this State to receive directly or indirectly
any liquors, the sale of which are prohibited by the laws of this
State, from a common or other carrier. [
Footnote 2/1]"
The opinion of Judge Phillips recognizes that this Act of 1917
penalizes the
Page 321 U. S. 396
transaction before us within Oklahoma, but rejects its bearing
when a federal court is asked to grant an injunction involving this
law by suggesting that this statute is "unconstitutional." He bases
this suggestion on the argument that, inasmuch as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that a statute making mere possession of
over one quart of spirituous liquors unlawful is not "a reasonable
exercise of the police powers," and therefore beyond the power of
the legislature to make unlawful,
Ex parte Wilson, 6
Okl.Cr. 451, 475, 119 P. 596, 606, "it must likewise be beyond its
power to make unlawful the possession of intoxicating liquor for
personal use received from a common carrier." 137 F.2d at 277.
[
Footnote 2/2] In other words, it
is argued that, because the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
mere possession of liquor cannot be made a crime by Oklahoma,
Oklahoma cannot prohibit the receipt of liquor from a carrier. On
such reasoning, a law that has been on the Oklahoma statute books
for more than twenty-five years, and during that period actively
enforced and never questioned, is thrown into discard when a
federal court is asked to exercise its duty of discretion in
granting the extraordinary relief of an injunction. I am unable to
follow such reasoning, because Oklahoma law makes it baseless. The
validity of this provision, as already indicated, has been taken
for granted by the Oklahoma courts. It was the subject of
litigation in
De Hasque v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co.,
68 Okl. 183, 173 P. 73, and
Crossland v. State, 74 Okl.
58, 176 P. 944, and a conviction under this Section was
sustained
Page 321 U. S. 397
in
Walker v. State, 18 Okl.Cr. 661, 197 P. 520. This is
a specific statute, the continuing validity of which is wholly
unaffected by speculative doubts regarding other and irrelevant
liquor legislation of Oklahoma. The dissenting judge was justified
in reading the Act of 1917 as conclusively condemning the
transaction which the carrier was seeking to consummate as an
offense, were it subject to Oklahoma law. [
Footnote 2/3]
But the shipment of liquor in controversy was for delivery on
the Fort Sill Reservation -- that is, a place within the physical
boundaries of Oklahoma but beyond its jurisdiction. It was
stipulated between the parties that the purpose of the suit was to
enable the Transit Company to transport and deliver the shipment to
its destination in the Reservation. Such was the basis of the
District Court's decree requiring the return of the shipment and
enjoining interference with "delivery of said shipment to its
destination," and no place else. This brings us to the second half
of the question in this case: may the Transit Company, according to
the law that rules such matters on the Reservation, lawfully
deliver this liquor at Fort Sill? Of course, all transactions on
the Reservation are subject to regulation by Congress.
Constitution, Art. IV, §§ 3,
Page 321 U. S. 398
par. 2;
see Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.
S. 518;
Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n,
318 U. S. 261;
Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture,
318 U. S. 285. If
it chooses, Congress may provide a rule of law which runs counter
to the expressed dry policy of Oklahoma, and it may do so either
specifically for Fort Sill or generally for all federal
reservations. Congress has not done so. It has done the opposite.
For more than a hundred years, most of the rules of life on
national reservations have been controlled by the laws of the
States in which these reservations are located. By the Act of March
3, 1825, 4 Stat. 115, Congress provided that, when something is
done on a federal reservation which is not made penal by the laws
of Congress but which, under State law, if the State had
jurisdiction, would be punishable, the act should be equally
punished as wrongful if committed on the reservation. In thus
adopting the penal laws of the States as its code for lawful
conduct on federal reservations within the States, Congress did not
give to the States a free hand to impose the continuing process of
State lawmaking on places over which the United States has
jurisdiction. Only the laws of the States existing at the time when
the Act of March 3, 1825, was enacted became operative on the
reservations.
United States v.
Paul, 6 Pet. 141. And so, in view of the inevitable
modifications and additions in the penal laws of the States,
Congress has accommodated its adoption of those state laws, as the
governing federal law, by bringing up to date from time to time its
adoption for enforcement on federal reservations of the policies of
the States which have penal sanctions. Accordingly, the Act of
March 3, 1825, was in substance reenacted on April 5, 1866, 14
Stat. 12, 13, was carried forward in § 5391 of the Revised Statutes
of 1878, was again reenacted on July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 717, and
became § 289 of the Federal Penal Code of 1910, 35 Stat. 1088,
1145. Since then, and in relatively quick succession,
Page 321 U. S. 399
Congress has three times brought still nearer the effective date
of state penal laws applicable on federal reservations, to-wit, by
the amendments of June 15, 1933, 48 Stat. 152; June 20, 1935, 49
Stat. 394, and June 6, 1940, 54 Stat. 234. The last Amendment now
controls, whereby
"Whoever . . . shall do . . . any act or thing which is not made
penal by any laws of Congress, but which if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or district in
which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force on
February 1, 1940, and remaining in force at the time of the doing .
. . of such act or thing, would be penal shall be deemed guilty of
a like offense and be subject to a like punishment."
18 U.S.C. § 468.
The very important purpose of this legislation in the working of
our dual system, as expounded after the fullest consideration
heretofore given to this subject by this Court, bears
repetition:
"while the statute leaves no doubt where acts are done on
reservations which are expressly prohibited and punished as crimes
by a law of the United States, that law is dominant and
controlling, yet, on the other hand, where no law of the United
States has expressly provided for the punishment of offenses
committed on reservations, all acts done on such reservations which
are made criminal by the laws of the several states are left to be
punished under the applicable state statutes. When these results of
the statute are borne in mind, it becomes manifest that Congress,
in adopting it, sedulously considered the two-fold character of our
constitutional government, and had in view the enlightened purpose,
so far as the punishment of crime was concerned, to interfere as
little as might be with the authority of the states on that subject
over all territory situated within their exterior boundaries, and
which hence would be subject to exclusive state jurisdiction
Page 321 U. S. 400
but for the existence of a United States reservation. In
accomplishing these purposes, it is apparent that the statute,
instead of fixing by its own terms the punishment for crimes
committed on such reservations which were not previously provided
for by a law of the United States, adopted and wrote in the state
law, with the single difference that the offense, although punished
as an offense against the United States, was nevertheless
punishable only in the way and to the extent that it would have
been punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation
remained subject to the jurisdiction of the State."
United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U. S.
1,
219 U. S. 9-10.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Therefore, the crucial question in relation to our present
problem is whether any law of Congress has overridden the Oklahoma
Act of 1917 which makes unlawful the transaction that the Transit
Company seeks to consummate with the aid of an injunction issued by
a federal court.
There is no such law. Long before the Twenty-first Amendment,
Congress did provide that
"The sale of or dealing in, beer, wine or any intoxicating
liquors by any person in any post exchange or canteen or army
transport or upon any premises used for military purposes by the
United States is hereby prohibited."
Act of February 2,
Page 321 U. S. 401
1901, § 38, 31 Stat. 748, 758, 10 U.S.C. § 1350. Plainly, the
purpose of this legislation is not to supplant social policies in
regard to alcoholic liquor in the various States within which the
many federal enclaves are located except to the extent of providing
minimum regulations to restrict the free dealing in liquor at all
Army posts, including those within wet States. The specific barrier
thus erected by Congress against the liberal liquor policies of
some States should not now be used as a qualification of the
generality of the Assimilative Crimes Statute in order to serve as
a barrier against the prohibitory laws of other States. No such
policy can be drawn from the Act of 1901 -- quite the opposite is
implied. And, assuming that the military could assert such a policy
in the interest of Army morale, there is wholly lacking any
manifestation that the Army deems it necessary for the morale of
its officers that at Fort Sill conduct should be permitted which,
if committed in the surrounding territory of Oklahoma, would offend
its penal laws. So far as the War Department has indicated a
policy, its policy, like that of the Assimilative Crimes Statute,
is to adopt on military reservations the laws of their respective
States. Thus, in reference to A.G. 250.1, § VI, par. 4 (1-20-43) of
Circular No. 29 of the War Department, Jan. 25, 1943, provides:
"Beer of an alcoholic content not in excess of 3.2 percentum by
weight may be sold or dealt in upon any of the mentioned premises
unless a State enactment of the State in which the premises are
located prohibits the sale of or dealing in such beer throughout
the entire State."
And the Judge Advocate General has said that "War Department
policy does not favor sale of such (3.2) beer by exchanges in
States where its sale is absolutely prohibited. . . ." Bulletin of
the Judge Advocate General of the Army, July 1942, p. 100, §
310.
Even if there were more hypothetical doubt than the laws and
decisions of Oklahoma make manifest as to the
Page 321 U. S. 402
validity and vitality of the Act of 1917 and its applicability
to the importation of the liquor shipment involved in this case, if
the importation were into Oklahoma proper, such a contingency
should be left for determination by appropriate proceedings in the
state court to recover the liquor, and not be made the basis for an
injunction against the state law in the federal court. Since
federal law here, too, turns on state law by adoption through the
Assimilative Crimes Statute, the basis of our decision in
Penn
Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, supra, becomes relevant. Here,
as in that case, there is an "absence of some evidence of an
inflexible Congressional policy," 318 U.S. at
318 U. S. 275,
opposed to the policy expressed by the State. In this case, as in
that, we should therefore be slow to strike down state legislation
by elaborate implications. The discretionary powers of equity
particularly counsel against it. And even if there were more doubt
than appears regarding the adoption of the Act of 1917 by the
Assimilative Crimes Statute, whereby the delivery of the liquor by
the Transit Company on the Reservation would constitute a
misdemeanor, that doubt too should not be resolved against the law
in such a proceeding as this for an injunction. That question,
although federal, may also be litigated as part of the indicated
state court suit, where the Attorney General may intervene and then
come here if he chooses to assert whatever position the Government
deems it appropriate to press.
In my view, therefore, it was an inequitable exercise of
discretion to issue this injunction. Of course, "Equity does not
demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives."
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216,
292 U. S. 229.
But where the relief sought is not as to something past and
collateral, but where it is the very means, as is the case here,
for completing an outlawed transaction, a court of equity should
withhold its aid, and not become the promoter of wrongdoing. The
possible illegality of the seizure
Page 321 U. S. 403
of the liquor by the Oklahoma enforcement officers is quite
irrelevant to our problem. "A question of public policy is
presented -- not a mere adjudication of adversary rights between
the two parties."
Weil v. Neary, 278 U.
S. 160,
278 U. S. 171.
The abstention which equity exercises, as it should here, under the
shorthand phrase of the "clean hands doctrine" is not due to any
desire to punish a litigant for his uncleanliness.
"But the objection that the plaintiff comes with unclean hands
will be taken by the court itself. It will be taken despite the
wish to the contrary of all the parties to the litigation. The
court protects itself."
Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438,
277 U. S. 485.
It is hardly seemly for a federal court to order the return of
liquor seized with full knowledge by the court that the carrier
would use the liquor to share in the commission of a misdemeanor.
The penal statute here applicable is a police regulation violation
of which ought not to be furthered by a federal court. While its
violation does not imply moral turpitude, Congress has required
that army officers should also conform to the law of a State on
which military reservations are located in matters that are outside
military concern.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person in this State to
receive directly or indirectly any liquors, the sale of which are
prohibited by the laws of this State, from a common or other
carrier."
"It shall also be unlawful for any person in this State to
possess any liquor, the sale of which are prohibited by the laws of
this State, received directly or indirectly from a common or other
carrier in this State. This section shall apply to such liquors
intended for personal use, as well as otherwise, and to interstate
as well as intrastate shipments or carriage. Any person violating
any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be fined not less than $50.00 nor more than
$500.00 and by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more
than six months; Provided, however, that scientific institutions,
universities and colleges, and bonded apothecaries, druggists,
hospitals or pharmacists may receive and possess pure grain
alcohol, as provided by the laws of this State, to be used only for
such purposes as are prescribed by the laws of this State."
Laws 1917, ch. 186, p. 350, § 1.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Ex parte Wilson was decided in 1911. In 1913, the
Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute which made the possession of
more than one quart of liquor "
prima facie evidence of an
intention to convey, sell or otherwise dispose of such liquors."
Laws 1913, c. 26, p. 48, § 6, 37 O.S.A. § 82. The validity of this
statute was upheld (
Caffee v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 485, 148
P. 680), and the Oklahoma court ruled that it superseded the 1911
Act which had been held invalid.
Cf. Jenkins v. State, 28
Okl.Cr. 249, 230 P. 293;
Morse v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 445,
458, 77 P.2d 757.
[
Footnote 2/3]
At least one other provision of Oklahoma legislation may well be
found to outlaw the delivery of the shipment for the completion of
which the carrier is seeking the aid of the federal court. Chapter
16, p. 16, § 1 of the Laws of 1939 makes it
"unlawful for any person . . . to import, bring, transport, or
cause to be brought or transported into the Oklahoma, any
intoxicating liquor . . . without a permit first secured therefor
as hereinafter provided."
37 O.S.A. § 41. Permits may be issued, under § 2 of that Act,
only for the importation of alcohol for scientific, mechanical,
medicinal or sacramental purposes. 37 O.S.A. § 42. Since the
importation of the liquor here involved cannot possibly be said to
fall within the classifications for which permits are granted,
these statutory provisions as applied to the circumstances in this
case are penal, and, as such, may be applicable to the Reservation
under the Assimilative Crimes Act. 54 Stat. 234, 18 U.S.C. § 468.
See infra.
[
Footnote 2/4]
And see Webster, the sponsor of the bill in the Senate,
in Register of Debates in Congress (Gales & Seaton, 1825) Vol.
I, p. 338:
"As to the third section [the precursor of the present
Assimilative Crimes Act], it must be obvious, that, where the
jurisdiction of a small place, containing only a few hundreds of
people (a navy yard for instance), was ceded to the United States,
some provision was required for the punishment of offences, and as,
from the use to which the place was to be put, some crimes were
likely to be more frequently committed than others, the committee
had thought it sufficient to provide for these, and then to leave
the residue to be punished by the laws of the state in which the
yard, &c. might be. He was persuaded that the people would not
view it as any hardship that the great class of minor offences
should continue to be punished in the same manner as they had been
before the cession."