1. Under § 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act, as amended,
the injured employee has the federal privilege of bringing his
action in any district in which the railroad is doing business,
though the district chosen be far from the district in which he
resides or in which the cause of action arose, and in another
State. P.
314 U. S.
52.
2. A state court may not validly exercise its equitable
jurisdiction to enjoin a resident of the State from prosecuting a
cause of action arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act
in a federal court of another State where the Act gave venue, on
the ground that the prosecution in that district is inequitable,
vexatious, and harassing to the carrier. P.
314 U. S.
53.
137 Ohio St. 409; 30 N.E.2d 982, affirmed.
Certiorari, 312 U.S. 671, to review a decree affirming the
dismissal on demurrer of a bill by the railroad company to enjoin
Kepner from further prosecution of a suit in the federal court for
the Eastern District of New York seeking recovery of damages under
the Federal Employers Liability Act for injuries resulting from an
accident in Ohio. The judgment was affirmed here by an equally
divided court, 313 U.S. 542; subsequently, a petition for rehearing
was granted, the judgment was vacated, and the case was restored to
the docket for reargument, 313 U.S. 597.
Page 314 U. S. 47
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have for decision in this case the question whether a state
court may validly exercise its equitable jurisdiction to enjoin a
resident of the state from prosecuting a cause of action arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a federal court of
another state where that Act gave venue, on the ground that the
prosecution in the federal court is inequitable, vexatious, and
harassing to the carrier.
As the issue was deemed a federal question of substance,
[
Footnote 1] undecided by this
Court and concerning which there was lack of uniformity in the
state court decisions, [
Footnote
2] certiorari was granted, 312 U.S. 671, the decree below
affirmed here by an equally divided court, 313 U.S. 542, and the
petition for rehearing allowed, 313 U.S. 597.
Page 314 U. S. 48
This proceeding originally was brought by the petitioner, an
interstate railroad, in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton
County, Ohio, against the respondent Kepner, an injured resident
employee, to enjoin his continued prosecution of a suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for his injuries. The
accident, according to the petition, occurred in Butler County,
Ohio, a county adjacent to that of respondent's residence, through
both of which counties petitioner's railroad ran. The petition
further showed that suitable courts, state and federal, were
constantly open, and that petitioner and the witnesses were
available for process therein. It was stated the federal court
chosen was seven hundred miles from the residence of the respondent
and numerous witnesses; that to present the case properly required
the personal attendance of approximately twenty-five locally
available witnesses -- the crew, inspectors. and the medical
attendants -- at a cost estimated to exceed the cost of the
presentation of the case at a convenient point by $4,000, with no
resulting benefit to the injured employee. Petitioner asserted
these facts established that the continued prosecution of the
federal court action would be an undue burden on interstate
commerce and an unreasonable, improper, and inequitable burden upon
petitioner itself.
The defendant railroad was doing business in the New York
district where the damage suit was filed as appears from a copy of
the complaint in the federal case made a part of the petition.
Respondent demurred for failure to state a cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction of the subject of the action. The trial court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action by an order which
was sustained by the Court of Appeals and, on rehearing, by the
Supreme
Page 314 U. S. 49
Court of Ohio. [
Footnote 3]
The basis for the decision below was that the respondent employee
was privileged to enjoy, without interference from a state court,
the venue allowed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
[
Footnote 4]
The statutory provision in regard to venue is in § 6, which, so
far as pertinent, reads as follows:
"Under this chapter, an action may be brought in a district
court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the
defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such
action."
Apr. 5, 1910, c. 143, Sec. 1, 36 Stat. 291, as amended March 3,
1911, c. 231, Sec. 291, 36 Stat. 1167, 45 U.S.C. § 56.
When the second Employers' Liability Act was enacted, venue of
actions under it was left to the general venue statute, 35 Stat.
65, which fixed the venue of suits in the United States courts
based in whole or in part upon the Act in districts of which the
defendant was an inhabitant. [
Footnote 5] Litigation promptly disclosed what Congress
considered deficiencies in such a limitation of the right of
railroad employees to bring personal injury actions, [
Footnote 6] with the result that the present
language was added. [
Footnote
7]
The reason for the addition was said to be the injustice to an
injured employee of compelling him to go to the possibly far
distant place of habitation of the defendant
Page 314 U. S. 50
carrier with consequent increased expense for the transportation
and maintenance of witnesses, lawyers, and parties away from their
homes. [
Footnote 8] The
legislative history throws little light on the reason for the
choice of the three standards for determining venue: the residence
of the carrier, the place where it is doing business, or the place
where the cause of action arose. At one time, the amendatory bill
fixed venue as
"the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be found at the time of commencing such action.
[
Footnote 9]"
Fears were expressed that so wide a choice might result in
injustice to the carrier, p. 2257. No doubt this language was
actually considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as
the language of the general venue statute for which the Committee
was providing an exception. Specific attention was called in the
Senate report to the
Macon Grocery case, interpreting the
general venue statute. That statute placed venue in the residence
of either party where the jurisdiction was founded on diversity of
citizenship alone. The language finally adopted must have been
deliberately chosen to enable the plaintiff, in the words of
Senator Borah, who submitted the report on the bill, "to find the
corporation at any point or place or State where it is actually
carrying on business, and there lodge his action, if he chooses to
do so." [
Footnote 10]
When petitioner sought an injunction in the Ohio court against
the further prosecution of the federal court action in New York,
the petition alleged that prosecution of the New York action would
entail "an undue burden" on interstate commerce. No objection to
the decree below upon that explicit ground appears in the petition
for
Page 314 U. S. 51
certiorari either in the specification of errors or reasons for
granting the writ. In petitioner's brief on the merits, it is
pointed out that this Court held, in
Denver & R.G.W. R. Co.
v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284,
that the disadvantages of litigation far from the scene of the
accident are not substantial enough to justify a state court in
forbidding the continuation of the litigation in a district where
the lines of the carrier run. This accords with
Hoffman v.
Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, where
it was said the carrier must
"submit, if there is jurisdiction, to the requirements of
orderly, effective administration of justice, although thereby
interstate commerce is incidentally burdened. [
Footnote 11]"
Since the carrier's exhibit of respondent's New York petition
shows an allegation that it is doing business in New York, we
assume that business to be such as is contemplated by the venue
provisions of Section 6. There is therefore no occasion to consider
further the suggestion that the suit in New York creates an
inadmissible burden upon interstate commerce.
The real contention of petitioner is that, despite the admitted
venue, respondent is acting in a vexatious and inequitable manner
in maintaining the federal court suit in a distant jurisdiction
when a convenient and suitable forum is at respondent's doorstep.
Under such circumstances, petitioner asserts power, abstractly
speaking, in the Ohio court to prevent a resident under its
jurisdiction
Page 314 U. S. 52
from doing inequity. Such power does exist. [
Footnote 12] In the
Matzinger
case, the Supreme Court of Ohio exercised this power to prevent the
continuation of a personal injury suit in Illinois by a resident
under its jurisdiction on an Ohio cause of action. Such power has
occasionally been exercised by one state over its citizens seeking
to enforce in other states remedies under the Employers' Liability
Act against defendants, locally available for the litigation.
[
Footnote 13] At times, the
injunction has been refused. [
Footnote 14]
We read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio to express the
view that, if it were not for Section 6 of the Employers' Liability
Act, the requested injunction would be granted on the undisputed
facts of the petition. Section 6 establishes venue for an action in
the federal courts. As such venue is a privilege created by federal
statute [
Footnote 15] and
claimed by respondent, the Supreme Court of Ohio felt constrained
by the Supremacy Clause to treat Section 6 as decisive of the
issue. It is clear that the allowance or denial of this federal
privilege is a matter of federal law, not a matter of state law
under
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64,
304 U. S. 72.
[
Footnote 16] Its correct
decision depends upon a construction of a federal act. [
Footnote 17] Consequently, the
action of a state court must be in accord with the federal
statute
Page 314 U. S. 53
and the federal rule as to its application, rather than state
statute, rule, or policy. [
Footnote 18]
Petitioner presses upon us the argument that the action of
Congress gave an injured railway employee the privilege of extended
venue, subject to the usual powers of the state to enjoin what in
the judgment of the state courts would be considered an improper
use of that privilege. This results, says petitioner, because the
Act does not in terms exclude this state power. [
Footnote 19] As courts of equity admittedly
possessed this power before the enactment of Section 6, the
argument continues, it is not to be lightly inferred that the venue
privilege was in disregard of this policy. But the federal courts
have felt they could not interfere with suits in far federal
districts where the inequity alleged was based only on
inconvenience. [
Footnote 20]
There is no occasion to distinguish between the power and the
propriety of its exercise in this instance, since the limits of the
two are here coextensive. The privilege was granted because the
general venue provisions worked injustices to employees. It is
obvious that no state statute could vary the venue, [
Footnote 21] and we think equally true that
no state court may interfere
Page 314 U. S. 54
with the privilege, for the benefit of the carrier or the
national transportation system, on the ground of inequity based on
cost, inconvenience, or harassment. When the section was enacted,
it filled the entire field of venue in federal courts. [
Footnote 22] A privilege of venue
granted by the legislative body which created this right of action
cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or expense. If it
is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative, a course followed in
securing the amendment of April 5, 1910, for the benefit of
employees. This Court held in
Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel.
Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, that
the burden on interstate commerce would be disregarded where the
carrier had lines in the distant state. The importance of
unhampered commerce is at least as great as that of a carrier's
freedom from harassing incidents of litigation. Whatever burden
there is here upon the railroad because of inconvenience or cost
does not outweigh the plain grant of privilege for suit in New
York. [
Footnote 23]
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Judicial Code, § 237(b).
[
Footnote 2]
McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N.E.2d 986, 11
N.E.2d 183;
Reed's Admrx. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182
Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794.
[
Footnote 3]
137 Ohio St. 206, 28 N.E.2d 586 and 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N.E.2d
982.
[
Footnote 4]
137 Ohio St. 409, 416, 30 N.E.2d 982.
[
Footnote 5]
First section of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, as
amended by the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, and act of
August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433.
[
Footnote 6]
Cound v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,173 F. 527;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
215 U. S. 501,
215 U. S. 506.
Senate Report No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
[
Footnote 7]
April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291.
[
Footnote 8]
Senate Report No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
[
Footnote 9]
Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 45, Part 3, p.
2253.
[
Footnote 10]
Id., Part 4, p. 4034.
[
Footnote 11]
Cf. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Co.,
292 U. S. 511,
292 U. S.
517-521;
Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry.
v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200,
266 U. S. 207.
Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co., 262 U.
S. 312, is limited to its particular facts,
292 U. S. 292 U.S.
511, at
292 U. S. 517;
Michigan Central v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, and
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.
S. 101, turn on the absence or inconsequential character
of business done within the states where the railroads were sued.
The
Mix case is differentiated from the
Foraker
and
Taylor cases because the carrier's lines or contracts
did not run or call for performance in the territory over which the
court where the objectionable action was filed had
jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 12]
New York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio
St. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349;
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.
S. 107;
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.
S. 115,
236 U. S.
123.
[
Footnote 13]
Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.L. Ry. Co., 204 Ind.
595, 185 N.E. 446;
Reed's Admrx. v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794;
Ex parte Crandall, 53
F.2d 969.
[
Footnote 14]
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271
P. 313;
Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Parrent, 260 Ill.App.
284;
Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385.
[
Footnote 15]
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.
S. 165.
[
Footnote 16]
A contrary view as to injunctions against actions in state
courts has been expressed. Roberts: Federal Liabilities of Carriers
(2d Ed.) Vol. 2, § 962.
[
Footnote 17]
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S.
379.
[
Footnote 18]
Calhoun Gold Mining Co. v. Ajax Gold Mining Co.,
182 U. S. 499,
182 U. S. 505;
Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 497,
184 U. S. 505,
184 U. S.
512-513;
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v.
Rankin, 241 U. S. 319,
241 U. S.
326-327;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.
Martin, 283 U. S. 209,
283 U. S.
213; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn,
284 U. S. 44,
284 U. S. 47;
Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.
S. 229,
295 U. S. 231;
cf. Roberts,
op cit. supra.
[
Footnote 19]
Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.
S. 349;
United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100;
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52;
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S.
1.
[
Footnote 20]
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Vigor, 90 F.2d 7;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp.
703, overruling
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Bole, 31 F. Supp.
221.
[
Footnote 21]
It was held in
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Schendel, 292 F. 326, 327-332, that, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, a state statute was unconstitutional which
forbade the doing of any act to further litigation in another
state, by testimony or otherwise, on a personal injury claim
arising locally.
[
Footnote 22]
Cf. New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.
S. 147,
244 U. S.
151.
[
Footnote 23]
We do not think petitioner's attempted distinction between a
prohibited injunction directed at the court and a permitted one
directed at the parties is valid. An order to the parties
forbidding prosecution would destroy venue effectually.
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 309 U. S.
4,
309 U. S. 9.
Cf. Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393,
296 U. S. 403.
Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.
S. 278, relied upon by petitioner would be pertinent
only if there were occasion for the state court to control federal
venue. It would then be exercised against the parties.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
Disagreement with the views of the majority on the construction
of a venue provision does not ordinarily call for expression. But,
inasmuch as the decision in this case unjustifiably limits long
settled powers of the state courts, and thereby brings into
disequilibrium the relationship of federal and state courts, I
think it proper to express my views.
Page 314 U. S. 55
The decision of the Court seems to be epitomized in this
sentence:
"A privilege of venue granted by the legislative body which
created this right of action cannot be frustrated for reasons of
convenience or expense."
As a general proposition, the suggestion that a privilege of
venue granted by the legislative body which creates the right of
action "cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or expense"
would be as novel as it is untenable. To give unique scope to this
venue provision different from the significance accorded all other
provisions of venue "granted by the legislative body which created"
the right is no less novel doctrine. For this departure from the
effect customarily given to venue provisions, no warrant is
avouched in the specific provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the general provisions of legislation defining the
relationship between federal and state courts, the principles
applied in the decisions of this Court, or settled doctrines of
equity jurisdiction. None is avouched because none is
available.
The opinion does not deny the historic power of courts of equity
to prevent a misuse of litigation by enjoining resort to vexatious
and oppressive foreign suits.
See e.g., Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107,
133 U. S.
118-120;
Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Slutz, 268
Mich. 388, 256 N.W. 458;
Mason v. Harlow, 84 Kan. 277, 114
P. 218;
Wilser v. Wilser, 132 Minn. 167, 156 N.W. 271;
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richey & Gilbert Co., 132
Wash. 526, 232 P. 355;
O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101
P. 755;
Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 601, 37 A. 372. Nor
does it question the familiar doctrine of
forum non
conveniens under which a court having statutory jurisdiction
may decline its facilities to a suit that in justice should be
tried elsewhere.
See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Co.,
285 U. S. 413,
285 U. S.
422-423;
Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U. S. 1,
308 U. S. 19;
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.
S. 123,
288 U. S.
130-131. These manifestations of a civilized judicial
system are firmly imbedded
Page 314 U. S. 56
in our law.
See Foster, Place of Trial in Civil
Actions, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 1217; Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col.L.Rev. 1. Nor does
the decision give new currency to the discredited notion that there
is a general lack of power in the state courts to enjoin
proceedings in federal courts.
Cf. Princess Lida v.
Thompson, 305 U. S. 456,
305 U. S. 466;
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345.
Nothing in Article III of the Constitution or in the legislation by
which Congress has vested judicial power in the federal courts
justifies such a doctrine.
And so the basis of the decision of the Court must be found, if
anywhere, in the terms of the venue provision of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. The section provide simply that an action
under the Act
"may be brought in a District Court of the United States, in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause
of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business
at the time of commencing such action,"
that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be
"concurrent" with that of the state courts, and that no action
brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed
to a federal court. 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. § 56. The phrasing of
the section is not unique: it follows the familiar pattern
generally employed by Congress in framing venue provisions.
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 112 (suits based upon diversity of
citizenship); 28 U.S.C. § 53 (suits by or against China Trade Act
corporations); 28 U.S.C. § 104 (suits for penalties and
forfeitures); 28 U.S.C. § 105 (suits for recovery of taxes); 28
U.S.C. § 41(26)(b) (interpleader). The decision cannot rest,
therefore, upon any peculiarities of the language of the
provision.
Nor can justification for the Court's conclusion be found in the
legislative history of the section or the clearly expressed reasons
of policy underlying its enactment. As the House and Senate
committee reports show, H.Rept.
Page 314 U. S. 57
No. 513, pp. 6-7, S.Rept. No. 432, pp. 3-4, 61st Cong., 2d
Sess., Congress was aware of the hardship by which under the
original Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65,
the plaintiff could bring his action only at the railroad's
"residence."
Cound v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 173
F. 527. The amendment of 1910 greatly enlarged the range of a
plaintiff's convenience in bringing suit. It is not disputed that
the amendment was intended to open to a plaintiff courts from which
he previously was barred. But that is not the question before us.
The problem is whether the Act was intended to give a plaintiff an
absolute and unqualified right to compel trial of his action in any
of the specified places he chooses, thereby not only depriving
state courts of their old power to protect against unjustly
oppressive foreign suits, but also forbidding federal courts to
decline jurisdiction "in the interest of justice" on familiar
grounds of
forum non conveniens. See Canada Malting
Co. v. Paterson Co., 285 U. S. 413,
285 U. S.
422-423. Nothing in the history of the 1910 amendment
indicates that its framers contemplated any such vast
transformation in the established relationship between federal and
state courts and in the duty of the federal courts to decline
jurisdiction "in the interest of justice." On the contrary, the
expressed considerations of policy underlying the amendment were
fundamentally the same as those underlying the equitable power to
restrain oppressive suits and the reciprocal doctrine of
forum
non conveniens: it does not comport with equity and justice to
allow a suit to be litigated in a forum where, on the balance,
unnecessary hardship and inconvenience would be cast upon one party
without any compensatingly fair convenience to the other party, but
where, on the contrary, the suit might more conveniently be
litigated in another forum available equally to both parties.
This doctrine of justice applies with especially compelling
force where the conveniences to be balanced are not
Page 314 U. S. 58
merely conveniences of conflicting private interests, but where
there is added the controlling factor of public interest. The
so-called "convenience" of a railroad concerns the important
national function of which the railroads are the agency. As in
other phases of federal railroad regulation, the interests of
carriers, employees, and the public must be balanced. Because of
the "direct concern of the public" in maintaining an economic and
efficient railroad system, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Brandeis, held that a carrier may not be sued by a
plaintiff where, under the circumstances of the particular facts,
such suit would impose an unfair burden upon railroads, and thereby
upon the nation.
Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co.,
262 U. S. 312. The
declaration by Congress that a court has jurisdiction and venue is
not a command that it must exercise its authority in such a case to
the unnecessary injury of a defendant and the public. This doctrine
has been consistently followed in a series of unanimous decisions.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.
S. 101;
Michigan Central v. Mix, 278 U.
S. 492;
Hoffman v. Foraker, 274 U. S.
21;
Denver & R.G.W. R. Co. v. Terte,
284 U. S. 284.
[
Footnote 2/1] Of course, Congress,
if it chose, could subject interstate carriers to the jurisdiction
of the state courts even in the situations in which this Court
found that assumption of jurisdiction would be an injustice to the
public. But Congress has not expressed a different view of the
governing public interest -- and these cases stand as
unchallenged
Page 314 U. S. 59
authorities that, notwithstanding the provision of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act conferring unqualified "concurrent
jurisdiction" upon the state courts, a plaintiff may in some
circumstances be barred from bringing his suit in one of the places
specified by the Act. In this respect, at least, a plaintiff's
"privilege of venue granted by the legislative body which created
this right of action" can "be frustrated for reasons of convenience
or expense."
The opinion of the Court attaches importance to a phrase taken
from Senator Borah's remarks on the floor of the Senate in
submitting the bill to amend the Act:
"The bill enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any
point or place or State where it is actually carrying on business,
and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so."
45 Cong.Rec. 4034. The context of this statement is set out in
the footnote. [
Footnote 2/2]
The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence, after
enactment, of situations not anticipated by even the
Page 314 U. S. 60
most gifted legislative imagination reveal the doubts and
ambiguities in statutes that so often compel judicial construction.
To illumine these dark places in legislative composition, all the
sources of light must be drawn upon. But the various aids to
construction are guides of experience, not technical rules of law.
See Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S.
41,
278 U. S. 48.
One of the sources which may be used for extracting meaning from
legislation is the deliberative commentary of the legislators
immediately in charge of a measure. Contemporary answers by those
authorized to give answers to questions raised about the meaning of
pending legislation obviously go a long way to elucidating doubtful
legislative purpose. But this rule of good sense does not mean that
every loose phrase, even of the proponent of a measure, is to be
given the authority of an encyclical. The language of a chairman of
a committee, like the language of all people, is merely a symbol of
thought. A speaker's casual, isolated general observation should
not be tortured into an expression of disregard for an established,
far-reaching policy of the law. Especially in the case of Senator
Borah, such imputation should not be made. As is well known, he
eyed most jealously the absorption of state authority by extension
of federal power. It would have been easy to vest the enforcement
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act entirely in the federal
courts. Instead, not only was concurrent jurisdiction given to the
state courts in the enforcement of this federal right, but removal
of a state action to the federal courts was prohibited. Instead of
being deemed hostile to the purposes of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and not to be entrusted with its administration, the
state courts were accepted as the most active agencies for its
enforcement. And yet, although nowhere in the course of the whole
legislative history of the Act in question -- the hearings, the
reports in both houses, the debates on the floor -- is there the
slightest intimation that the problem before us entered the mind of
any legislator,
Page 314 U. S. 61
we are asked to attribute to Senator Borah the uprooting of a
doctrine which is an old and fruitful part of the fabric of the law
of the states, as well as the law of the land, by a general
observation which has no relation to this doctrine and to which
respectful meaning can be given without such distortion.
To read the venue provision of the Act as do the majority of the
Court is to translate the permission given a plaintiff to enter
courts previously closed to him into a withdrawal from the state
courts of power historically exercised by them, and into an
absolute direction to the specified federal and state courts to
take jurisdiction. The implications of such a construction extend
far beyond the situation we now have here of an attempt by a state
court to enjoin an action brought in a federal court sitting in
another state. It seems to be generally held that the grant to the
state courts of jurisdiction concurrent with the federal courts
does not deprive one state court of the power to enjoin an
oppressive suit under the Act in a foreign state court. [
Footnote 2/3] Moreover, this Court has
expressly held that the venue provision of the Employers' Liability
Act does not prevent a state court from declining jurisdiction as a
forum non conveniens. Douglas v. New York, N.H. &
H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377. To
be sure, under the guise of applying local doctrines of equity
jurisdiction, a state court cannot defeat the proper assertion of a
federal right.
Page 314 U. S. 62
Resort to this Court may always be had to lay bare such an
unwarranted frustration.
American Railway Express Co. v.
Levee, 263 U. S. 19;
Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22. But
such supervisory power by this Court over the determination of
federal rights by state courts does not imply the denial of power
in the state courts to make such determinations in the first
instance.
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 56-57;
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130,
93 U. S.
136-137;
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.
S. 624,
111 U. S. 637;
cf. Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and State Courts, 38
Harv.L.Rev. 545, 596, 597. The long history of leaving the
effective enforcement of federal rights to state courts has
proceeded on recognition of the power of the state courts to
exercise in the first instance their settled doctrines of law and
equity. The opinion of the Court ignores these settled principles.
In an area demanding the utmost judicial circumspection,
dislocating uncertainty is thereby introduced.
If the privilege afforded a plaintiff to bring suit under the
Employers' Liability Act in one place, rather than in another, is
to be regarded as an absolute command to the federal courts to take
jurisdiction regardless of any considerations of justice and
fairness, why is not the same effect to be given the comparable
general venue provisions of § 51 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §
112? Nothing in the language or the history of the venue provision
of the Act differentiates it from the numerous other venue
provisions of the Judicial Code. Is the settled doctrine of
forum non conveniens to be deemed impliedly repealed by
every such venue provision? Surely it is much more consonant with
reason and right to read venue provisions in the familiar context
of established law, rather than to impute to Congress an
unconsidered, profound alteration in the relationship between the
federal and the state
Page 314 U. S. 63
courts and in the relations of the federal courts
inter
se. Cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S.
25.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS join in this
opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
International Milling Co. v. Columbia Co., 292 U.
S. 511, did not restrict, but expressly recognized, the
doctrine of the
Davis case. In finding the scope of the
Davis doctrine in the circumstances which gave rise to it,
the opinion in the
Milling Co. case only followed
traditional technique in the use of precedents. It made precisely
the same differentiation that Mr. Justice Brandeis, who articulated
the doctrine in the
Davis case, made in applying the
principle of the case to subsequent situations.
See St. Louis,
B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.
S. 200, and
Hoffman v. Foraker, 274 U. S.
21. The doctrine itself stands unchallenged. The present
decision does not challenge it.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"Mr. President, I wish to discuss very briefly the bill. The
bill as it is now pending, provides for three amendments to the
employers' liability law which is now upon the statute books. The
first has reference to the venue. . . . The objection which has
been made to the existing law, and this objection arises by reason
of the decision of some of the courts, is that the plaintiff may
sometimes be compelled to go a great distance in order to have his
cause of action against the defendant by reason of the fact that,
now, the action must be brought in certain instances in the
district in which the defendant is an inhabitant. In other words,
the corporation being an inhabitant of the State which creates it,
it might follow that the plaintiff would have to travel a long
distance in order, under certain conditions, to bring his action
against the defendant and come within the terms of the law. So, if
this bill should be passed, the law will be remedied in that
respect, in enabling the plaintiff to bring his action where the
cause of action arose or where the defendant may be doing business.
The bill enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any point
or place or State where it is actually carrying on business, and
there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so."
45 Cong.Rec. 4034.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Reed's Admrx. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Ky.
455, 206 S.W. 794;
Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v.
McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W. 218;
State ex rel. New
York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S.W.2d
272;
Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.L. R. Co., 204
Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446,
with which compare McConnell v.
Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N.E.2d 986, 11 N.E.2d 183;
cf. Ex
parte Crandall, 53 F.2d 969. The lower federal courts have
usually declined to enjoin suits under the Act brought in other
federal courts.
See Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
108 F.2d 980, 985, 986;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.
Vigor, 90 F.2d 7;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 56
F.2d 1019, 1020.