1. The Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the States
the power to regulate matters of local concern with respect to
which Congress has not exercised its power, even though the
regulation affects interstate commerce. P.
313 U. S.
113.
2. The federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 does not include the
regulation of casual or occasional interstate transportation of
passengers by persons not engaged in such transportation as a
regular occupation or business, § 303(b)(9). P.
313 U. S.
112.
3. A California statute requires every "transportation agent,"
defined as one who sells or offers to sell or negotiate for
transportation on the public highways of the State, to obtain a
license assuring his fitness and to file a bond securing faithful
performance of the transportation contracts which he negotiates. It
applies alike to agents negotiating for interstate or intrastate
commerce, is not a revenue measure, and does not appear to increase
the cost of interstate commerce. Its apparent object is to
safeguard members of the public, desiring to secure transportation
by motor vehicle, from fraud and overreaching.
Held
consistent with the Commerce Clause when applied to a person who,
without having obtained the
Page 313 U. S. 110
license or furnished the bond, arranged for motor transportation
of passengers from California to Texas by.a carrier who, so far as
appears, made only the single trip. P.
313 U. S.
115.
4.
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S.
34, overruled. P.
313 U. S.
116.
41 Cal. App. 2d 965 reversed.
Certiorari, 312 U.S. 672, to review the reversal of a conviction
on a charge of misdemeanor.
Page 313 U. S. 111
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A statute of California, Ch. 390, Statutes of 1933, p. 1011, as
amended by Ch. 665, Statutes of 1935, p. 1833, defines a
transportation agent as one who "sells or offers for sale, or
negotiates for" transportation over the public highways of the
state, § 2, and requires every such agent to procure a license from
the State Railroad Commission authorizing him so to act. By §§ 6,
7, and 8, prerequisites to the license are determination by the
Commission of the applicant's fitness to exercise the licensed
privilege, the payment of a license fee of $1, and the filing by
the applicant of a bond in the sum of $1,000, conditioned upon the
faithful performance of the transportation contracts which he
negotiates. By § 16, any person acting as a transportation agent
without a license is guilty of a misdemeanor. The question for
decision is whether the statutory exaction of the license and bond
infringes the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl.
3, when applied to one who negotiates for the transportation
interstate of passengers over the public highways of the state.
Respondent was convicted of violation of the statute by
arranging for the transportation, by motor vehicle, of
Page 313 U. S. 112
passengers from Los Angeles, California, to Dallas, Texas, by
one who, so far as appears, made only the single trip in question.
The state appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction,
holding, on the authority of
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U. S. 34, that
the statute as applied infringes the Commerce Clause. We granted
certiorari, 312 U.S. 672, the question, considered in the light of
our decisions since the
Di Santo case, sustaining state
regulations affecting interstate transportation by motor vehicle,
being of importance.
Congress has not undertaken to regulate the acts for which
respondent was convicted or the interstate transportation to which
they related. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-327, which applies to certain classes of common and
contract interstate carriers by motor vehicle, excludes from its
operation the casual or occasional transportation by motor vehicle
of passengers in interstate commerce by persons not engaged in such
transportation as a regular occupation or business, § 303(b)(9).
Hence, we are concerned here only with the constitutional authority
of the state to regulate those who, within the state, aid or
participate in a form of interstate commerce over which Congress
has not undertaken to exercise its regulatory power.
The statute is not a revenue measure.
Cf. Texas Transport
& Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.
S. 150. It applies alike to transportation agents who
negotiate for transportation, intrastate as well as interstate, and
so does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Cf. Real
Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.
S. 325. It does not appear that the regulation will
operate to increase the cost of the transportation or, in respects
not already indicated, affect interstate commerce. It is not shown
to be other than what, on its face, it appears to be -- a measure
to safeguard the members of the public desiring to secure
transportation
Page 313 U. S. 113
by motor vehicle who are peculiarly unable to protect themselves
from fraud and overreaching of those engaged in a business
notoriously subject to those abuses.
As this Court has often had occasion to point out, the Commerce
Clause, in conferring on Congress power to regulate commerce, did
not wholly withdraw from the states the power to regulate matters
of local concern with respect to which Congress has not exercised
its power, even though the regulation affects interstate commerce.
Ever since
Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and
Cooley v.
Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been
recognized that there are matters of local concern the regulation
of which unavoidably involves some regulation of interstate
commerce, but which, because of their local character and their
number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by
Congress. Because of their local character, also, there is wide
scope for local regulation without impairing the uniformity of
control of the national commerce in matters of national concern,
and without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce which
were the principal objects sought to be secured by the Commerce
Clause. Notwithstanding the Commerce Clause, such regulation, in
the absence of Congressional action, has, for the most part, been
left to the states by the decisions of this Court, subject only to
other applicable constitutional restraints.
See cases
collected in
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, supra, 273 U. S.
40.
A state may license trainmen engaged in interstate commerce in
order to insure their skill and fitness.
Smith v. Alabama,
124 U. S. 465;
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama,
128 U. S. 96. It
may define the size of crews manning interstate trains.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.
S. 453;
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood,
283 U. S. 249, and
prescribe regulations for payment of their wages.
Erie R.
Co. v. Williams, 233
Page 313 U. S. 114
U.S. 685. It may require interstate passenger cars to be heated,
and guard posts to be placed on bridges of an interstate railroad.
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.
S. 628. It may limit the speed of interstate trains
within city limits.
Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.
S. 584. It may require an interstate railroad to
eliminate grade crossings.
Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility
Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394,
254 U. S. 409,
254 U. S. 412.
It may pass local quarantine laws applicable to merchandise moving
in interstate commerce as a means of protecting local health.
Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U.
S. 455;
Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health,
186 U. S. 380. It
may regulate and protect the safe and convenient use of its harbors
and navigable waterways unless there is conflict with some act of
Congress.
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., supra; see
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.
S. 261,
296 U. S. 267.
It may regulate pilots and pilotage in its harbors.
Cooley v.
Board of Port Wardens, supra. Where, as here, Congress has not
entered the field, a state may pass inspection laws and regulations
applicable to articles of interstate commerce designed to safeguard
the inhabitants of the state from fraud, provided only that the
regulation neither discriminates against nor substantially
obstructs the commerce.
Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S.
38;
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.
S. 461;
Patapsco Guana Co. v. North Carolina,
171 U. S. 345,
171 U. S.
357-358;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.
S. 501;
see also Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S.
398-412, and cases cited;
South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.
S. 177,
303 U. S.
185-191, and cases cited.
The present case is not one of prohibiting interstate commerce
or licensing it on conditions which restrict or obstruct it.
Cf. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47;
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U. S. 282. For
here, the regulation is applied to one who is not himself
Page 313 U. S. 115
engaged in the transportation, but who acts only as broker or
intermediary in negotiating a transportation contract between the
passengers and the carrier. The license required of those engaged
in such business is not conditioned upon any control or restriction
of the movement of the traffic interstate, but only on the good
character and responsibility of those engaged locally as
transportation brokers.
Fraudulent or unconscionable conduct of those so engaged which
is injurious to their patrons is peculiarly a subject of local
concern, and the appropriate subject of local regulation. In every
practical sense, regulation of such conduct is beyond the effective
reach of Congressional action. Unless some measure of local control
is permissible, it must go largely unregulated. In any case, until
Congress undertakes its regulation, we can find no adequate basis
for saying that the Constitution, interpreted as a working
instrument of government, has foreclosed regulation, such as the
present, by local authority.
In
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, this Court took a
different view. Following what it conceived to be the reasoning of
McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, it
held that a Pennsylvania statute requiring others than railroad or
steamship companies who engage in the intrastate sale of steamship
tickets or of orders for transportation to and from foreign
countries to procure a license by giving proof of good moral
character and filing a bond as security against fraud and
misrepresentation to purchasers was an infringement of the Commerce
Clause. Since the decision in that case, this Court has been
repeatedly called upon to examine the constitutionality of numerous
local regulations affecting interstate motor vehicle traffic. It
has uniformly held that, in the absence of pertinent Congressional
legislation, there is constitutional power in the states to
regulate interstate commerce by
Page 313 U. S. 116
motor vehicle wherever it affects the safety of the public or
the safety and convenient use of its highways, provided only that
the regulation does not in any other respect unnecessarily obstruct
interstate commerce.
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
286 U. S. 352,
286 U. S. 371;
Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U. S.
92,
289 U. S. 95;
see South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
supra, and cases cited;
H. P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79,
306 U. S. 83;
Eichholz v. Public Service Commission, 306 U.
S. 268;
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.
S. 598,
309 U. S. 603,
and see Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.
S. 132.
If there is authority in the state, in the exercise of its
police power, to adopt such regulations affecting interstate
transportation, it must be deemed to possess the power to regulate
the negotiations for such transportation where they affect matters
of local concern which are in other respects within state
regulatory power, and where the regulation does not infringe the
national interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce and in
preserving uniformity in the regulation of the commerce in matters
of national concern.
See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. Illinois, 298 U. S. 155.
The decision in the
Di Santo case was a departure from
this principle, which has been recognized since
Cooley v. Board
of Port Wardens, supra. It cannot be reconciled with later
decisions of this Court which have likewise recognized and applied
the principle, and it can no longer be regarded as controlling
authority.
Reversed.