1. Concurrent findings of fact by district court and circuit
court of appeals are conclusive when not plainly erroneous.
2. The amended Railway Labor Act seeks to avoid interruptions of
interstate commerce resulting from disputes concerning pay, rules,
or working conditions on the railroads, by the promotion of
collective bargaining between the carrier and the authorized
representative of its employees, and by mediation and arbitration
when such bargaining does not result in agreement. To facilitate
agreement, it gives to employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively through a representative of their own selection, doing
away with company interference and "company unions." Section 2,
Ninth, makes it the duty of the National Mediation Board, when any
dispute arises among a carrier's employees "as to who are the
representatives of such employees," to investigate the dispute and
to certify the name of the organization authorized to represent the
employees; and it commands that,
"Upon receipt of such certification, the carrier shall treat
with the representative so certified as the representative of the
craft or class for the purposes of this Act."
Held:
(1) That the duty to "treat" with the representative so
certified is mandatory. P.
300 U. S. 547.
(2) The statute does not undertake to compel agreement, and does
not preclude the employer from entering into individual contracts
directly with individual employees, but it requires the employer to
"treat with" the authorized representative of the employees, that
is, to meet and confer with their representative, to listen to
their complaints, and to make reasonable effort to compose
differences. P.
300 U. S.
548.
(3) The duty is to treat with the authorized representative
exclusively. P.
300 U. S.
548.
(4) The duty is enforceable by injunction. P.
300 U. S.
549.
Page 300 U. S. 516
3. A court of equity may refuse to act when it cannot give
effective relief; but whether a decree should be refused as useless
is a matter of judgment addressed to the special circumstances of
each case. P.
300 U. S.
550.
4. In determining whether the duty of a carrier to treat with
the authorized representative of its employees is enforceable by
mandatory injunction, weight is attached to the judgment of
Congress that conference between carriers and employees is a
powerful aid to industrial peace; and it will not be assumed that
such negotiation will not result in agreement or lead to successful
mediation or arbitration. P.
300
U.S. 551.
5. The peaceable settlement of labor controversies that may
seriously impair the ability of an interstate carrier to perform
its service to the public is a matter of public concern. P.
300 U. S.
552.
6. Courts of equity go much farther in furtherance of the public
interest than when only private interests are involved. P.
300 U. S.
552.
7. The fact that, by the Railway Labor Act, Congress has
indicated its purpose to make negotiation between carrier and
employees obligatory in case of industrial controversy is, in
itself, a declaration of public interest and policy. P.
300 U. S.
552.
8. The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to
such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their
employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption
of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders. P.
300 U.S. 553.
9. It was for Congress to choose the means by which its
objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate
railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, expressed in the
Railway Labor Act and confirmed by the history of industrial
disputes and of railroad labor relations, is not open to review
here. P.
300 U.S. 553.
10. The activities of "back shop" employees engaged on heavy
repairs on locomotives and cars withdrawn from service for long
periods are
held to bear such relation to the interstate
activities of the carrier as to be regarded as part of them --
(
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463 distinguished) -- all subject to the power of
Congress over interstate commerce. P.
300 U. S.
554.
11. Although the carrier in this case might have turned over its
back shop repair work to independent contractors, its determination
to make its own repairs, and the nature of the work done, brought
its relations with the back shop employees within the purview of
the Railway Labor Act. P.
300 U. S.
557.
12. The provisions of the Railway Labor Act prohibiting company
unions and imposing on the railway the duty of "treating with"
Page 300 U. S. 517
the authorized representative of its employees for the purpose
of negotiating a labor dispute do not infringe the rights of the
carrier under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. P.
300 U. S.
557.
13. In this regard, the Railway could complain only of
infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of the
employees. P.
300 U. S.
558.
14. Under § 2, Fourth, of the Railway Labor Act, at an election
participated in by a majority of the employees entitled to vote,
the vote of a majority of the participants determines the choice of
representative. P.
300 U. S.
559.
15. A certificate of the National Mediation Board, certifying,
in conformity with the Railway Labor Act, that, as the result of an
election, a specified union has been designated to represent a
craft of employees, and showing on its face the total number of
votes case in favor of each candidate, is not void because it fails
to state the total number of eligible voters in the craft, but is
prima facie sufficient, and the omitted fact is open to
inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command of the statute, §
2, Ninth. P.
300 U. S.
561.
16. Section 9 of the Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70,
which provides that
"every restraining order or injunction granted in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a
prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be expressly
complained of in the bill of complaint or petition filed in such
case and as shall be expressly included in . . . findings of fact
made and filed by the court"
is not inconsistent with the mandatory injunction in this case.
P.
300 U. S.
562.
17. Specific provisions of a later Act cannot be rendered
nugatory by more general provisions of an earlier Act. P.
300 U. S.
563.
84 F.2d 641 affirmed. D.C.,
11 F. Supp.
621.
Certiorari, 299 U.S. 529, to review the affirmance of a decree
rendered by the District Court against the Railway Company in a
suit by the Federation. The decree commanded the Company to treat
with the Federation as the duly accredited representative of the
Company's shop craft employees in respect of pay, working
conditions, etc., and restrained the Company from interfering with,
influencing, or coercing such employees in their free choice of
their representatives, etc.
Page 300 U. S. 538
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions as to the constitutional validity
of certain provisions of the Railway Labor Act of May 20, 1926, c.
347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1934, c. 691,
48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, and as to the nature and
extent of the relief which courts are authorized by the act to
give.
Respondents are System Federation No. 40, which will be referred
to as the Federation, a labor organization affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor and representing shop craft employees
of petitioner railway, and certain individuals who are officers and
members of the System Federation. They brought the present suit in
equity in the District Court for Eastern Virginia, to compel
petitioner, an interstate rail carrier, to recognize and treat with
respondent Federation as the duly accredited representative of the
mechanical department employees of petitioner, and to restrain
petitioner from in any way interfering with, influencing, or
coercing its shop craft employees in their free choice of
representatives, for the purpose of contracting with petitioner
with respect to rules, rates of pay, and working conditions, and
for the purpose of considering and settling disputes between
petitioner and such employees.
Page 300 U. S. 539
The history of this controversy goes back to 1922, when,
following the failure of a strike by petitioner's shop employees
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, other employees
organized a local union known as the "Mechanical Department
Association of the Virginian Railway." The Association thereupon
entered into an agreement with petitioner providing for rates of
pay and working conditions, and for the settlement of disputes with
respect to them, but no substantial grievances were ever presented
to petitioner by the Association. It maintained its organization
and held biennial elections of officers, but the notices of
election were sent out by petitioner and all Association expenses
were paid by petitioner.
In 1927, the American Federation of Labor formed a local
organization which, in 1934, demanded recognition by petitioner of
its authority to represent the shop craft employees, and invoked
the aid of the National Mediation Board, constituted under the
Railway Labor Act, as amended, to establish its authority. The
Board, pursuant to agreement between the petitioner, the
Federation, and the Association, and in conformity to the statute,
held an election by petitioner's shop craft employees to choose
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining with
petitioner. As the result of the election, the Board certified that
the Federation was the duly accredited representative of
petitioner's employees in the six shop crafts.
Upon this and other evidence, not now necessary to be detailed,
the trial court found that the Federation was the duly authorized
representative of the mechanical department employees of
petitioner, except the carmen and coach cleaners; that the
petitioner, in violation of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, had
failed to treat with the Federation as the duly accredited
representative of petitioner's employees; that petitioner had
sought to influence its employees against any affiliation with
labor organizations other than an association maintained by
petitioner, and to
Page 300 U. S. 540
prevent its employees from exercising their right to choose
their own representative; that for that purpose, following the
certification, by the National Mediation Board, of the Federation,
as the duly authorized representative of petitioner's mechanical
department employees, petitioner had organized the Independent Shop
Craft Association of its shop craft employees, and had sought to
induce its employees to join the independent association, and to
put it forward as the authorized representative of petitioner's
employees. [
Footnote 1]
Upon the basis of these findings, the trial court gave its
decree applicable to petitioner's mechanical department employees
except the carmen and coach cleaners. It directed petitioner to
"treat with" the Federation and to
"exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to
settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such
agreements or otherwise. . . ."
It restrained petitioner from
"entering into any contract, undertaking or agreement of
whatsoever kind concerning rules, rates of pay or working
conditions affecting its Mechanical Department employees, . . .
except . . . with
Page 300 U. S. 541
the Federation,"
and from "interfering with, influencing or coercing" its
employees with respect to their free choice of representatives "for
the purpose of making and maintaining contracts" with
petitioner
"relating to rules, rates of pay and working conditions or for
the purpose of considering and deciding disputes between the
Mechanical Department employees"
and petitioner. The decree further restrained the petitioner
from organizing or fostering any union of its mechanical department
employees for the purpose of interfering with the Federation as the
accredited representative of such employees.
11 F. Supp.
621.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
approved and adopted the findings of the District Court and
affirmed its decree. 84 F.2d 641. This Court granted certiorari to
review the cause as one of public importance. 299 U.S. 529.
Petitioner here, as below, makes two main contentions: first,
with respect to the relief granted, it maintains that § 2, Ninth,
of the Railway Labor Act, which provides that a carrier shall treat
with those certified by the Mediation Board to be the
representatives of a craft or class, imposes no legally enforceable
obligation upon the carrier to negotiate with the representative so
certified, and that in any case the statute imposes no obligation
to treat or negotiate which can be appropriately enforced by a
court of equity. Second, that § 2, Ninth, insofar as it attempts to
regulate labor relations between petitioner and its "back shop"
employees, is not a regulation of interstate commerce authorized by
the commerce clause because, as it asserts, they are engaged solely
in intrastate activities, and that, so far as it imposes on the
carrier any obligation to negotiate with a labor union authorized
to represent its employees, and restrains it from making agreements
with any other labor organization, it is a denial of due process
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Other minor objections to the
decree, so far as relevant to
Page 300 U. S. 542
our decision, will be referred to later in the course of this
opinion.
The concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below are not
shown to be plainly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. We
accordingly accept them as the conclusive basis for decision,
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S.S.
Clerks, 281 U. S. 548,
281 U. S. 558;
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U. S.
3,
299 U. S. 4, and
address ourselves to the questions of law raised on the record.
First. The Obligation Imposed by the Statute. By title
III of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat.
456, 469, Congress set up the Railroad Labor Board as a means for
the peaceful settlement, by agreement or by arbitration, of labor
controversies between interstate carriers and their employees. It
sought
"to encourage settlement without strikes, first by conference
between the parties, failing that, by reference to adjustment
boards of the parties' own choosing and, if this is ineffective, by
a full hearing before a national board."
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Railroad Labor Board,
261 U. S. 72,
261 U. S. 79.
The decisions of the Board were supported by no legal sanctions.
The disputants were not
"in any way to be forced into compliance with the statute or
with the judgments pronounced by the Labor Board, except through
the effect of adverse public opinion."
Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
267 U. S. 203,
267 U. S.
216.
In 1926, Congress, aware of the impotence of the Board, and of
the fact that its authority was generally not recognized or
respected by the railroads or their employees, made a fresh start
toward the peaceful settlement of labor disputes affecting
railroads, by the repeal of the 1920 Act and the adoption of the
Railway Labor Act. Report, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
No. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks, supra, 281 U. S. 563.
By the new measure, Congress continued its policy of encouraging
the amicable adjustment of labor disputes by their voluntary
submission
Page 300 U. S. 543
to arbitration before an impartial board, but it supported that
policy by the imposition of legal obligations. It provided means
for enforcing the award obtained by arbitration between the parties
to labor disputes. Section 9. In certain circumstances, it
prohibited any change in conditions, by the parties to an
unadjusted labor dispute, for a period of thirty days, except by
agreement. Section 10. It recognized their right to designate
representatives for the purposes of the act "without interference,
influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the
self-organization or designation of representatives by the other."
Section 2, Third. 44 Stat. 577. Under the last-mentioned provision,
this Court held, in the
Railway Clerks Case, supra, that
employees were free to organize and to make choice of their
representatives without the "coercive interference" and "pressure"
of a company union organized and maintained by the employer, and
that the statute protected the freedom of choice of
representatives, which was an essential of the statutory scheme,
with a legal sanction which it was the duty of courts to enforce by
appropriate decree.
The prohibition against such interference was continued and made
more explicit by the amendment of 1934. [
Footnote 2] Petitioner does not challenge that part of
the
Page 300 U. S. 544
decree which enjoins any interference by it with the free choice
of representatives by its employees, and the fostering, in the
circumstances of this case, of the company union. That contention
is not open to it in view of our decision in the Railway Clerks
Case,
supra, and of the unambiguous language of § 2,
Third, and Fourth, of the act, as amended.
But petitioner insists that the statute affords no legal
sanction for so much of the decree as directs petitioner to "treat
with" respondent Federation
"and exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions,
and to settle all disputes whether arising out of the application
of such agreements or otherwise."
It points out that the requirement for reasonable effort to
reach an agreement is couched in the very words of § 2, First,
which were taken from § 301 of the Transportation Act, and which
were held to be without legal sanction in that Act.
Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra,
267 U. S. 215.
It is argued that they cannot now be given greater force as
reenacted in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, and continued in the
1934 amendment. But these words no longer stand alone and unaided
by mandatory provision of the statute, as they did when first
enacted. The amendment of the Railway Labor Act added new
provisions in § 2, Ninth, which makes it the duty of the Mediation
Board, when any dispute arises among the carrier's employees, "as
to who are the representatives of such employees," to investigate
the dispute and to certify, as was done in this case, the name of
the organization authorized to represent the employees. It commands
that,
"upon receipt of such certification, the carrier shall treat
with the representative so certified as the representative of the
craft or class for the purposes of this Act. "
Page 300 U. S. 545
It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that
this requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that
its command, in a proper case, be enforced by the courts. The
policy of the Transportation Act of encouraging voluntary
adjustment of labor disputes, made manifest by those provisions of
the act which clearly contemplated the moral force of public
opinion as affording its ultimate sanction, was, as we have seen,
abandoned by the enactment of the Railway Labor Act. Neither the
purposes of the later act, as amended, nor its provisions when
read, as they must be, in the light of our decision in the
Railway Clerks Case, supra, lend support to the contention
that its enactments, which are mandatory in form and capable of
enforcement by judicial process, were intended to be without legal
sanction. [
Footnote 3]
Experience had shown, before the amendment of 1934, that when
there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to
represent the employees, and when there was willingness of the
employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their
grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally
followed and strikes had been avoided. [
Footnote 4] On the other hand, a prolific source of
dispute had been the maintenance by the railroads of company unions
and the denial by railway management
Page 300 U. S. 546
of the authority of representatives chosen by their employees.
Report of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, No.
1944, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-2. [
Footnote 5] Section 2, Ninth, of the amended act, was
specifically aimed at this practice. It provided a means for
ascertaining who are the authorized representatives of the
employees through intervention
Page 300 U. S. 547
and certification by the Mediation Board, and commanded the
carrier to treat with the representative so certified. That the
command was limited in its application to the case of intervention
and certification by the Mediation Board indicates not that its
words are precatory, but only that Congress hit at the evil "where
experience shows it to be most felt."
Keokee Consol. Coke Co.
v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224,
234 U. S.
227.
Petitioner argues that the phrase "treat with" must be taken as
the equivalent of "treat" in its intransitive sense, as meaning
"regard" or "act towards," so that compliance with its mandate
requires the employer to meet the authorized representative of the
employees only if and when he shall elect to negotiate with them.
This suggestion disregards the words of the section, and ignores
the plain purpose made manifest throughout the numerous provisions
of the act. Its major objective is the avoidance of industrial
strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of
employer and employee. The command to the employer to "treat with"
the authorized representative of the employees adds nothing to the
1926 Act, unless it requires some affirmative act on the of the
employer.
Compare the
Railway Clerks case,
supra. As we cannot assume that its addition to the
statute was purposeless, we must take its meaning to be that which
the words suggest, which alone would add something to the statute
as
Page 300 U. S. 548
it was before amendment, and which alone would tend to effect
the purpose of the legislation. The statute does not undertake to
compel agreement between the employer and employees, but it does
command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be
reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with
the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their
complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences -- in
short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor
disputes such as is contemplated by § 2, First.
Petitioner's insistence that the statutes does not warrant so
much of the decree as forbids it to enter into contracts of
employment with its individual employees is based upon a
misconstruction of the decree. Both the statute and the decree are
aimed at securing settlement of labor disputes by inducing
collective bargaining with the true representative of the employees
and by preventing such bargaining with any who do not represent
them. The obligation imposed on the employer by § 2, Ninth, to
treat with the true representative of the employees as designated
by the Mediation Board, when read in the light of the declared
purposes of the act, and of the provisions of § 2, Third and
Fourth, giving to the employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively through the representative of their own selection, is
exclusive. It imposes the affirmative duty to treat only with the
true representative, and hence the negative duty to treat with no
other. We think, as the government concedes in its brief, [
Footnote 6] that
Page 300 U. S. 549
the injunction against petitioner's entering into any contract
concerning rules, rates of pay, and working conditions, except with
respondent, is designed only to prevent collective bargaining with
any one purporting to represent employees, other than respondent,
who has been ascertained to be their true representative. When read
in its context, it must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of
labor contracts, generally applicable to employees in the
mechanical department, with any representative other than
respondent, but not as precluding such individual contracts as
petitioner may elect to make directly with individual employees.
The decree, thus construed, conforms, in both its affirmative and
negative aspects, to the requirements of § 2.
Propriety of Relief in Equity. Petitioner contends
that, if the statute is interpreted as requiring the employer to
negotiate with the representative of his employees, its obligation
is not the appropriate subject of a decree in equity; that
negotiation depends on desires and mental attitudes which are
beyond judicial control; and that, since equity cannot compel the
parties to agree, it will not
Page 300 U. S. 550
compel them to take the preliminary steps which may result in
agreement.
There is no want of capacity in the court to direct complete
performance of the entire obligation; both the negative duties not
to maintain a company union and not to negotiate with any
representative of the employees other than respondent and the
affirmative duty to treat with respondent. Full performance of both
is commanded by the decree in terms which leave in no uncertainty
the requisites of performance. In compelling compliance with either
duty, it does far less than has been done in compelling the
discharge of a contractual or statutory obligation calling for a
construction or engineering enterprise,
New Orleans, M. &
T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12;
Wheeling Traction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 248 F.
205;
see Gas Securities Co. v. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir
Co., 259 F. 423, 433;
Board of Commissioners v. A. V.
Wills & Sons, 236 F. 362, 380;
Jones v. Parker,
163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044, or in granting specific performance of
a contract for the joint use of a railroad bridge and terminals,
Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1;
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.,
163 U. S. 564;
cf. Prospect Park & Coney Island R. Co. v. Coney Island
& Brooklyn R. Co., 144 N.Y. 152, 39 N.E. 17, 26 L.R.A.
610. Whether an obligation has been discharged, and whether action
taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday
subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their
decrees.
It is true that a court of equity may refuse to give any relief
when it is apparent that that which it can give will not be
effective or of benefit to the plaintiff. Equity will not decree
the execution of a partnership agreement, since it cannot compel
the parties to remain partners,
see Hyer v. Richmond Traction
Co., 168 U. S. 471,
168 U. S. 482,
or compel one to enter into performance of a contract of personal
service which it cannot adequately control,
Rutland
Marble Co.
Page 300 U. S. 551
v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339,
77 U. S. 358;
Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328,
168 U. S. 336;
Tobey v. Bristol, Fed.Cas. No. 14,065;
Weeks v.
Pratt, 43 F.2d 53, 57; Railway Labor Act, § 2, Tenth. But the
extent to which equity will go to give relief where there is no
adequate remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule. It rests,
rather, in the sound discretion of the court.
Willard v.
Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557,
75 U. S. 565;
Joy v. St. Louis, supra, 138 U. S. 47;
Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481,
266 U. S. 490;
Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90, 92.
Whether the decree will prove so useless as to lead a court to
refuse to give it is a matter of judgment to be exercised with
reference to the special circumstances of each case, rather than to
general rules, which, at most, are but guides to the exercise of
discretion. It is a familiar rule that a court may exercise its
equity powers, or equivalent mandamus powers,
United States ex
rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352,
289 U. S. 359,
to compel courts, boards, or officers to act in a matter with
respect to which they may have jurisdiction or authority, although
the court will not assume to control or guide the exercise of their
authority,
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Humboldt S.S.
Co., 224 U. S. 474;
Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
246 U. S. 638;
see Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.
S. 175,
267 U. S. 184;
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.
S. 206,
281 U. S.
218.
In considering the propriety of the equitable relief granted
here, we cannot ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately
expressed in legislation, that where the obstruction of the company
union is removed, the meeting of employers and employees at the
conference table is a powerful aid to industrial peace. Moreover,
the resources of the Railway Labor Act are not exhausted if
negotiation fails in the first instance to result in agreement. If
disputes concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions, are "not adjusted by the parties in conference," either
party may invoke the mediation services of the
Page 300 U. S. 552
Mediation Board, § 5, First, or the parties may agree to seek
the benefits of the arbitration provision of § 7. With the coercive
influence of the company union ended, and in view of the interest
of both parties in avoiding a strike, we cannot assume that
negotiation, as required by the decree, will not result in
agreement, or lead to successful mediation or arbitration, or that
the attempt to secure one or another through the relief which the
district court gave is not worth the effort.
More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy
without appreciable consequences to the public. The peaceable
settlement of labor controversies, especially where they may
seriously impair the ability of an interstate rail carrier to
perform its service to the public, is a matter of public concern.
That is testified to by the history of the legislation now before
us, the reports of committees of Congress having the proposed
legislation in charge, and by our common knowledge. Courts of
equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are
accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.
S. 176,
294 U. S. 185;
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission,
290 U. S. 264,
290 U. S.
270-273;
City of Harrisonville W. S. Dickey Clay
Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334,
289 U. S. 338;
Beasley v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 191 U.
S. 492,
191 U. S. 497;
Joy v. St. Louis, supra, 138 U. S. 47;
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U.
S. 393,
136 U. S.
405-406;
Conger v. New York, West Shore &
Buffalo R. Co., 120 N.Y. 29, 32, 33, 23 N.E. 983. The fact
that Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiation
obligatory is in itself a declaration of public interest and policy
which should be persuasive in inducing courts to give relief. It is
for similar reasons that courts, which traditionally have refused
to compel performance of a contract to submit to arbitration,
Tobey v. Bristol, supra, enforce statutes commanding
performance of arbitration agreements,
Red
Cross
Page 300 U. S. 553
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.
S. 109,
264 U. S. 119,
264 U. S. 121;
Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.
S. 263,
284 U. S.
278.
The decree is authorized by the statute and was granted in an
appropriate exercise of the equity powers of the court.
Second. Constitutionality of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act.
(A) Validity Under the Commerce Clause. The power of Congress
over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the
relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably
calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by
strikes and their attendant disorders.
Wilson v. New,
243 U. S. 332,
243 U. S.
347-348. The Railway Labor Act, § 2, declares that its
purposes, among others, are "to avoid any interruption to commerce
or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein," and "to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." The
provisions of the act and its history, to which reference has been
made, establish that such are its purposes, and that the latter is
in aid of the former. What has been said indicates clearly that its
provisions are aimed at the settlement of industrial disputes by
the promotion of collective bargaining between employers and the
authorized representative of their employees, and by mediation and
arbitration when such bargaining does not result in agreement. It
was for Congress to make the choice of the means by which its
objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate
railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, supported as it is
by our long experience with industrial disputes, and the history of
railroad labor relations, to which we have referred, is not open to
review here. [
Footnote 7] The
means chosen are appropriate
Page 300 U. S. 554
to the end sought, and hence are within the congressional power.
See Railway Clerks case,
supra, 281 U. S. 570;
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.
S. 330,
295 U. S.
369.
But petitioner insists that the Act, as applied to its "back
shop" employees, is not within the commerce power, since their
duties have no direct relationship to interstate transportation. Of
the 824 employees in the six shop crafts eligible to vote for a
choice of representatives, 322 work in petitioner's "back shops" at
Princeton, W. Va. They are there engaged in making classified
repairs, which consist of heavy repairs
Page 300 U. S. 555
on locomotives and cars withdrawn from service for that purpose
for long periods (an average of 105 days for locomotives and 109
days for cars). The repair work is
Page 300 U. S. 556
upon the equipment used by petitioner in its transportation
service, 97 percent of which is interstate. At times, a continuous
stream of engines and cars passes through the "back shops" for such
repairs. When not engaged in repair work, the back shop employees
perform "store order work," the manufacture of material such as
rivets and repair parts, to be placed in railroad stores for use at
the Princeton shop and other points on the line.
The activities in which these employees are engaged have such a
relation to the other confessedly interstate activities of the
petitioner that they are to be regarded as a part of them. All,
taken together, fall within the power of Congress over interstate
commerce.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 221 U. S. 612,
221 U. S. 619;
cf. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co.,
229 U. S. 146,
229 U. S. 151.
Both courts below have found that interruption by strikes of the
back shop employees, if more than temporary, would seriously
cripple petitioner's interstate transportation. The relation of the
back shop to transportation is such that a strike of petitioner's
employees there, quite apart from the likelihood of its spreading
to the operating department, would subject petitioner to the
danger, substantial, though possibly indefinable in its extent, of
interruption of the transportation service. The cause is not remote
from the effect. The relation between than is not tenuous. The
effect on commerce cannot be regarded as negligible.
See United
States v. Railway Employees' Department of American Federation of
Labor, 290 F. 978, 981, holding participation of back shop
employees in the nationwide railroad shopmen's strike of 1922 to
constitute an interference with interstate commerce. As the
regulation here in question is shown to be an appropriate means of
avoiding that danger, it is within the power of Congress.
Page 300 U. S. 557
It is no answer, as petitioner suggests, that it could close its
back shops and turn over the repair work to independent
contractors. Whether the railroad should do its repair work in its
own shops or in those of another is a question of railroad
management. It is petitioner's determination to make its own
repairs which has brought its relations with shop employees within
the purview of the Railway Labor Act. It is the nature of the work
done and its relation to interstate transportation which afford
adequate basis for the exercise of the regulatory power of
Congress.
The
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463,
207 U. S. 498,
which mentioned railroad repair shops as a subject beyond the power
to regulate commerce, are not controlling here. Whatever else may
be said of that pronouncement, it is obvious that the commerce
power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as its
subject matter. It is enough for present purposes that experience
has shown that the failure to settle, by peaceful means, the
grievances of railroad employees with respect to rates of pay,
rules or working conditions, is far more likely to hinder
interstate commerce than the failure to compensate workers who have
suffered injury in the course of their employment.
(B)
Validity of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act Under the Fifth
Amendment. The provisions of the Railway Labor Act applied in
this case, as construed by the court below, and as we construe
them, do not require petitioner to enter into any agreement with
its employees, and they do not prohibit its entering into such
contract of employment as it chooses, with its individual
employees. They prohibit only such use of the company union as,
despite the objections repeated here, was enjoined in the
Railway Clerks case,
supra, and they impose on
petitioner only the affirmative duty of "treating with" the
authorized representatives of its employees for the purpose of
negotiating a labor dispute.
Page 300 U. S. 558
Even though Congress, in the choice of means to effect a
permissible regulation of commerce, must conform to due process,
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., supra,
295 U. S. 347;
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States,
284 U. S. 80,
284 U. S. 97;
see Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U. S. 555,
295 U. S. 589,
it is evident that where, as here, the means chosen are appropriate
to the permissible end, there is little scope for the operation of
the due process clause. The railroad can complain only of the
infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of its
employees.
Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.
S. 685,
233 U. S. 697;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.
S. 571,
235 U. S. 576;
Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.
S. 338,
236 U. S. 349;
cf. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210,
243 U. S. 214.
And the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth,
see West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, decided this day,
ante, is not
a guarantee of untrammeled freedom of action and of contract. In
the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, Congress can
subject both to restraints not shown to be unreasonable. Such are
the restraints of the Safety Appliance Act,
Johnson v. Southern
Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1; of the
act imposing a wage scale on rail carriers;
Wilson v. New,
supra; of the Railroad Employers' Liability Act,
Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1; of the
act fixing maximum hours of service for railroad employees whose
duties control or affect the movement of trains,
Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra; of
the act prohibiting the prepayment of seamen's wages,
Patterson
v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169.
Each of the limited duties imposed upon petitioner by the
statute and the decree do not differ in their purpose and nature
from those imposed under the earlier statute and enforced in the
Railway Clerks case,
supra. The quality of the
action compelled, its reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness
of the compulsion, must be
Page 300 U. S. 559
judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the
exercise of governmental power. If the compulsory settlement of
some differences, by arbitration, may be within the limits of due
process,
see Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden
Co., 284 U. S. 151, it
seems plain that the command of the statute to negotiate for the
settlement of labor disputes, given in the appropriate exercise of
the commerce power, cannot be said to be so arbitrary or
unreasonable as to infringe due process.
Adair v. United States, 208 U.
S. 161, and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S.
1, have no present application. The provisions of the
Railway Labor Act invoked here neither compel the employer to enter
into any agreement nor preclude it from entering into any contract
with individual employees. They do not "interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to
discharge them."
See the
Railway Clerks case,
supra, 281 U. S.
571.
There remains to be considered petitioner's contentions that the
certificate of the National Mediation Board is invalid, and that
the injunction granted is prohibited by the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, of March 23, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115.
Validity of the Certificate of the National Mediation
Board. In each craft of petitioner's mechanical department, a
majority of those voting cast ballots for the Federation. In the
case of the blacksmiths, the Federation failed to receive a
majority of the ballots of those eligible to vote, although a
majority of the craft participated in the election. In the case of
the carmen and coach cleaners, a majority of the employees eligible
to vote did not participate in the election. There has been no
appeal from the ruling of the District Court that the designation
of the Federation as the representative of the carmen and coach
cleaners was invalid. Petitioner assails
Page 300 U. S. 560
the certification of the Federation as the representative of the
blacksmiths because less than a majority of that craft, although a
majority of those voting, voted for the Federation.
Section 2, Fourth, of the Railway Labor Act provides:
"The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the
right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or
class for the purposes of this Act."
Petitioner construes this section as requiring that a
representative be selected by the votes of a majority of eligible
voters. It is to be noted that the words of the section confer the
right of determination upon a majority of those eligible to vote,
but is silent as to the manner in which that right shall be
exercised. Election laws providing for approval of a proposal by a
specified majority of an electorate have been generally construed
as a requiring only the consent of the specified majority of those
participating in the election.
Carroll County v. Smith,
111 U. S. 556;
Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. County Court of Davidson
County, 1 Sneed.(Tenn.) 637;
Montgomery County Fiscal
Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629, 47 S.W. 773. Those who do not
participate "are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the
majority of those voting."
Cass County v. Johnston,
95 U. S. 360,
95 U. S. 369,
and see Carroll County v. Smith, supra.
We see no reason for supposing that § 2, Fourth, was intended to
adopt a different rule. If, in addition to participation by a
majority of a craft, a vote of the majority of those eligible is
necessary for a choice, an indifferent minority could prevent the
resolution of a contest, and thwart the purpose of the act, which
is dependent for its operation upon the selection of
representatives. There is the added danger that the absence of
eligible voters may be due less to their indifference than to
coercion by the employer. The opinion of the trial court discloses
that the
Page 300 U. S. 561
Mediation Board scheduled an election to be determined by a
majority of the eligible voters, but that the Federation's
subsequent protest that the Railway was influencing the men not to
vote caused the Board to hold a new election to be decided by the
ballots of a majority of those voting.
It is significant of the congressional intent that the language
of § 2, Fourth, was taken from a rule announced by the United
States Railroad Labor Board, acting under the labor provisions of
the Transportation Act of 1920, Decision No. 119,
International
Association of Machinists v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. 2 Dec.U.S.Railroad Labor Board, 87, 96, par. 15. Prior to
the adoption of the Railway Labor Act, this rule was interpreted by
the Board, in Decision No. 1971,
Brotherhood of Railway &
S.S. Clerks v. Southern Pacific Lines, 4 Dec.U.S.Railroad
Labor Board 625, where it appeared that a majority of the craft
participated in the election. The Board ruled, p. 639, that a
majority of the votes cast was sufficient to designate a
representative. A like interpretation of § 2, Fourth, was sustained
in
Association of Clerical Employees v. Brother of Railway
& S.S. Clerks, 85 F.2d 152.
The petitioner also challenges the validity of the certificate
of the National Mediation Board in this case because it fails to
state the number of eligible voters in each craft or class. The
certificate states that respondent "has been duly designated and
authorized to represent the mechanical department employees" of
petitioner. It also shows on its face the total number of votes
cast in each craft in favor of each candidate, but omits to state
the total number of eligible voters in each craft. Petitioner
insists that this is a fatal defect in the certificate, upon the
basis of those cases which hold that where a finding of fact of an
administrative officer or tribunal is prerequisite to the making of
a rule or order, the finding must be explicitly
Page 300 U. S. 562
set out.
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.
S. 388;
United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & P.R. Co., 294 U. S. 499;
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States,
295 U. S. 193.
The practice contended for is undoubtedly desirable, but it is
not required by the present statute or by the authorities upon
which petitioner relies. The National Mediation Board makes no
order. The command which the decree of the court enforces is that
of the statute, not of the Board. Its certificate that the
Federation is the authorized representative of the employees is the
ultimate finding of fact prerequisite to enforcement by the courts
of the command of the statute. There is no contention that this
finding is conclusive in the absence of a finding of the basic
facts on which it rests -- that is to say, the number of eligible
voters, the number participating in the election, and the choice of
the majority of those who participate. Whether the certification,
if made as to those facts, is conclusive it is unnecessary now to
determine. But we think it plain that, if the Board omits to
certify any of them, the omitted fact is open to inquiry by the
court asked to enforce the command of the statute.
See Dismuke
v. United States, 297 U. S. 167,
297 U. S.
171-173. Such inquiry was made by the trial court which
found the number of eligible voters, and thus established the
correctness of the Board's ultimate conclusion. The certificate
which conformed to the statutory requirement, was
prima
facie sufficient, and was not shown to be invalid for want of
the requisite supporting facts.
Validity of the Injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Petitioner assails the decree for its failure to conform
to the requirements of § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
provides:
"Every restraining order or injunction granted in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a
prohibition of such specific act
Page 300 U. S. 563
or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of
complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly
included in . . . findings of fact made and filed by the
court."
The evident purpose of this section, as its history and context
show, was not to preclude mandatory injunctions, but to forbid
blanket injunctions against labor unions, which are usually
prohibitory in form, and to confine the injunction to the
particular acts complained of and found by the court. We deem it
unnecessary to comment on other similar objections, except to say
that they are based on strained and unnatural constructions of the
words of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and conflict with its declared
purpose, § 2, that the employee
"shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."
It suffices to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the
present decree only so far as its provisions are found not to
conflict with those of § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act,
authorizing the relief which has been granted. Such provisions
cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
See the
Railway Clerks case,
supra, 281 U. S. 571;
cf. Callahan v. United States, 285 U.
S. 515,
285 U. S. 518;
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S.
1,
172 U. S. 22;
International Alliance v. Rex Theatre Corp., 73 F.2d 92,
93.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The court found that, after the certification by the Mediation
Board,
"the defendant, by and through its officers, agents and
servants, undertook by means of the circulation of a petition or
petitions addressed to the National Mediation Board to have the
certification of the National Mediation Board aforesaid altered,
changed, or revoked so as to deprive its Mechanical Department
employes of the right to representation by said System Federation
No. 40, Railway Employes Department of the American Federation of
Labor, so designated as aforesaid, and thereafter did cause to be
organized the Independent Shop Crafts Association by individual
Mechanical Department employes by circulating or causing to be
circulated applications for membership in said Independent Shop
Crafts Association notwithstanding the certification as aforesaid
by the National Mediation Board of said System Federation No. 40,
Railway Employes Department of the American Federation of Labor, as
the authorized representative of its Mechanical Department
employes, . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 2 of the act, as amended in 1934, declares that its
purposes, among others, are
"(2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise,
of the right of employees to join a labor organization"
and
"(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of
employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the
purposes of this Act (chapter)."
The section was also amended to provide that "neither party
shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in
its choice of representatives," § 2, Third, and that
"it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way
with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the
carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor
organization . . . or to influence or coerce employees in an effort
to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members
of any labor organization,"
§ 2, Fourth.
[
Footnote 3]
The 1934 amendment imposed various other obligations upon the
carrier, to which criminal penalties were attached,
e.g.,
prohibitions against helping unions, by contributions of funds, or
assistance in the collection of dues, § 2, Fourth; against
requiring employees to promise to join or not to join a labor
union, § 2, Fifth; against changing rates of pay, etc., without
specifying a conference upon thirty days' notice, § 2, Seventh;
and see the requirement that the carrier post notices that
all disputes will be determined in accordance with the act, § 2,
Eighth.
[
Footnote 4]
In the first two years after the enactment of the Railway Labor
Act of 1926, 363 cases concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions were submitted to the United States Board of Mediation,
and about 25 percent of these were withdrawn by the parties. Yet,
during the same period, more than 600 direct and voluntary
settlements were negotiated.
See United States Board of
Mediation, First Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1927, pp. 10, 11; Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1928, pp. 11, 58, 59.
Compare National Mediation
Board, Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1936, at p. 1:
"For every dispute submitted to . . . these Boards, there were
many others considered and settled in conferences between
representatives of carriers and of the employees as required by §
2, second, of the Act."
See also testimony of William M. Leiserson, Chairman of
the National Mediation Board until February 1, 1937, at Hearing by
National Labor Relations Board in the case of
Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1:
"If we have a threat of a strike now [on the railroads] it might
be on a big fundamental question, like wages and hours, and we
usually find we can settle those by arbitration or otherwise. . . .
But if the issues involved were discrimination or discharge of men
because they had joined the organization, or the question would be
the right of the organization to represent them, we could not have
settled those strikes."
See Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to
Organize, National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic
Research, Bull. No. 1, August, 1936, pp. 17-18.
[
Footnote 5]
See also statement by Representative Crosser, in charge
of the bill on the floor, in Hearings, House Committee on Rules,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 9861, pp. 10-11, 13:
"The purpose of the bill is . . . [
inter alia] to
outlaw the attempt that has been made in numerous instances by
employers who control alleged labor unions, and thereby to use a
slang phrase, to 'gum up the works'. . . . We have had 8 years of
operation of this act, and we have prevented any strikes. But
strikes have been threatened because of the defects which have been
found in this bill."
Under the 1926 Act, disputes over the designation of employee
representatives could be dealt with by the old United States
Mediation Board only by agreement of the parties. The carriers
agreed to an election conducted by the Board but nine times in six
years,
see testimony of William M. Leiserson, Chairman of
National Mediation Board until February 1, 1937, at Hearing by
National Labor Relations Board in the case of
Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1;
Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organize, National
Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic Research, Bull. No. 1,
August, 1936, p. 50. The 1934 amendment was followed by a large
increase in the number of representation disputes submitted to the
National Mediation Board.
See infra, Note 7
[
Footnote 6]
(Note 35a.)
"The Government interprets the negative obligations imposed by
the statute and decree as having the following effect:"
"When the majority of a craft or class has (either by secret
ballot or otherwise) selected a representative, the carrier cannot
make with anyone other than the representative a collective
contract (
i.e., a contract which sets rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions), whether the contract covers the class as a
whole or a part thereof. Neither the statute nor the decree
prevents the carrier from refusing to make a collective contract
and hiring individuals on whatever terms the carrier may by
unilateral action determine. In hirings of that sort, the
individual does not deal in a representative capacity with the
carrier, and the hiring does not set general rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions. Of course, as a matter of voluntary action,
not as a result of the statute or the decree, the carrier may
contract with the duly designated representative to hire
individuals only on the terms of a collective understanding between
the carrier and the representative; but any such agreement would be
entirely voluntary on the carrier's part, and would in no sense be
compelled."
"If the majority of a craft or class has not selected a
representative, the carrier is free to make with anyone it pleases
and for any group it pleases contracts establishing rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions."
[
Footnote 7]
There was evidence available to Congress that the labor policy
embodied in the Railway Labor Act had been successful in curbing
strikes. In the eight years subsequent to the passage of the 1926
Act, there were only two small railroad strikes. Since the 1934
amendment, there has been but one.
See National Mediation
Board, First Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1935, p. 8; Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June
30, 1936, p. 1.
In the water transportation and motor transportation fields,
there were frequent strikes. A table submitted by the United States
(
see Respondent's Brief,
Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, No. 365, October Term 1936, p. 57), and
derived from United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletins No. R. 339 (1936), p. 4; No. R. 389 (1936),
p. 4; Monthly Labor Review (May-September, 1936), Monthly "Analysis
of Strikes," shows the following:
bwm:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Man-days of idleness due to labor strikes
---------------------------------------------
1933 1934 1935 (1936 Jan.-May)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Water Transportation 32,752 1,068,867 749,534 119,820
Motor Transportation 155,565 859,657 202,393 46,054
Railroads 0 0 56 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ewm:
Yet there were many disputes between rail carriers and their
employees. Apart from the more trivial grievances and differences
of opinion in the interpretation of agreements, 876 disputes,
principally over changes in rates of pay, rules or working
conditions, were referred to the United States Board of Mediation
between 1926 and 1934. The following table, derived from its Eighth
Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1934, pp. 4-5,
indicates the success of the mediation and arbitration machinery
set up by the Railway Labor Act.
bwm:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Ending June 30
Manner of Disposition
-----------------------------------------------------
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 Total
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediation Agreements 57 84 46 25 24 45 23 17 321
Withdrawn by Parties 24 45 43 20 21 69 20 26 268
Arbitration Agreements 27 14 10 4 2 4 3 9 73
Closed Account:
Refusal to Arbitrate 0 0 9 3 1 47 39 50 149
Retired or closed,
other causes 3 2 21 10 5 5 10 9 65
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ewm:
But statistics show that many more labor disputes were settled
by direct negotiation,
supra, footnote 4 and Congress might reasonably have feared that
the action of certain railroads in negotiating only with unions
dominated by them would prevent such settlements and lead to
strikes.
See supra, footnote 5 That there were many disputes, apparent and
latent, for which the 1926 Act had not provided adequate machinery
is shown by the large number of representation disputes (more than
230) referred to the National Mediation Board in the first two
years of its existence,
see First Annual Report, For the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1935, p. 9; Second Annual Report, For
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936, pp. 5, 7.
It is the belief of the National Mediation Board that peace in
the railroad industry is largely due to the 3,485 collective
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, and working conditions,
which were filed by June 30, 1936 (
see National Mediation
Board, Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1936, p. 26). In its First Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1935, it concluded (p. 36):
"The absence of strikes in the railroad industry, particularly
during the last two years when widespread strikes, the usual
accompaniment of business recovery, prevailed throughout the
country, is to be explained primarily not by the mediation
machinery of the Railway Labor Act, but by the existence of these
collective labor contracts. For, while they are in existence, these
contracts provide orderly, legal processes of settling all disputes
as a substitute for strikes and industrial warfare."