1. A zoning ordinance dividing the City of Los Angeles into five
building zones and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be
erected in each zone
held constitutional in its general
scope (
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.
S. 365), and not violative of due process or equal
protection as applied to this case. P.
274 U. S.
327.
Page 274 U. S. 326
2. The plaintiff's lot was in a zone limited by the ordinance to
buildings for residences, churches, private clubs, educational
purpose, etc., and excluding buildings for private business other
than physicians' offices. The value of the lot would be much
enhanced if it could be used for business purposes, for which it
was favorably situated. Other property in the zone was largely
restricted by covenant to residential uses. The entire neighborhood
at the time of the ordinance was largely unimproved, but in course
of rapid development. The conclusion of the city council, on these
and other facts, that the public welfare would be promoted by
establishing the zone cannot be adjudged clearly arbitrary or
unreasonable, and this Court cannot in such circumstance substitute
its judgment for theirs. P.
274 U. S. 328.
195 Cal. 497 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of California, on an
original application for a writ of mandate commanding the Board of
Public Works of the City of Los Angeles to issue to the petitioners
a permit for the construction of a business building, suitable for
occupation by stores, upon property of the petitioners in that
city. An alternative writ was issued, returnable in the district
court of appeal, which found in favor of the petitioners, holding
the city zoning ordinances unreasonable and discriminatory. This
was reversed, and the ordinances upheld, by the subsequent judgment
of the supreme court, here under review.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding in mandamus brought in the state court to
compel defendants in error to issue a building permit enabling
plaintiffs in error to erect a business
Page 274 U. S. 327
building upon a lot lying within a district of the City of Los
Angeles restricted by the zoning ordinance of that city against
buildings of that character. The ordinance creates five zones,
designated as "A," "B," "C," "D," and "E." respectively, and
classifies the kind of buildings, structures, and improvements
which may be erected in each. The ordinance is of the now familiar
comprehensive type, but in the main regulates only the character of
buildings which lawfully may be erected, and does not prescribe
height and area limitations. It is assailed as being repugnant to
the due process of law and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The property of plaintiffs in error is in
zone "B," in which, generally stated, the use is limited to
buildings for residential purposes churches, private clubs,
educational, and similar purposes. All buildings for private
business are excluded, with the exception of offices of persons
practicing medicine. The state supreme court, in a well reasoned
opinion, upheld the ordinance and denied the relief sought. 195
Cal. 497.
And see Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195
Cal. 477.
The constitutional validity of the ordinance in its general
scope is settled by the recent decision of this Court in
Euclid
v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365,
and, upon the record here, we find no warrant for saying that the
ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to the facts in the
present case. The property of plaintiffs in error adjoins Wilshire
Avenue, a main artery of travel through and beyond the city, and if
such property were available for business purposes, its market
value would be greatly enhanced. The lands within the district
were, when the ordinance was adopted, sparsely occupied by
buildings, those in which business was carried on being limited to
a few real estate offices, a grocery store, a market, a fruit
stand, and a two-story business block. Much of the land
Page 274 U. S. 328
adjoining the boulevard within the restricted district had
already been sold with restrictions against buildings for business
purposes, although the property of plaintiffs in error and the
adjacent property had not been so restricted. The effect of the
evidence is to show that the entire neighborhood, at the time of
the passage of the zoning ordinance, was largely unimproved but in
course of rapid development. The common council of the city, upon
these and other facts, concluded that the public welfare would be
promoted by constituting the area, including the property of
plaintiffs in error, a zone "B" district, and it is impossible for
us to say that their conclusion in that respect was clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable. The most that can be said is that
whether that determination was an unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable. In such
circumstances, the settled rule of this Court is that it will not
substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body charged
with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the
question.
Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, pp.
272 U. S. 388,
272 U. S. 395;
Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292,
264 U. S. 294;
Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.
S. 394,
239 U. S. 408,
239 U. S. 412,
239 U. S.
413-414;
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U. S. 526,
242 U. S.
530-531;
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis,
240 U. S. 342,
240 U. S. 357;
Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446,
238 U. S.
452.
Judgment affirmed.
