This Court accepts the decision of the highest court of the
state as to the construction of a pure food statute and whether
specified articles are included within the prohibitions thereof,
and then determines whether, as so construed, the statute is valid
under the federal Constitution.
The police power of the state extends to imposing restrictions
having reasonable relation to preserving the health of its
people.
The nature and extent of such restrictions are matters for
legislative judgment in defining the policy of the state, and are
within the power of the state unless palpably unreasonable and
arbitrary.
A prohibition against the sale of food preservatives containing
boric acid is not so unreasonable and arbitrary as to amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law.
It is not enough to condemn a police statute as unconstitutional
under the due process clause that the innocuousness of the
prohibited article be debatable, for, if debatable, the legislature
is entitled to its own judgment.
In enacting a police statute, the legislature is not limited to
general directions, but may prohibit the sale of such specific
articles as it deems injurious.
The legislature may estimate degrees of evil and adjust its
legislation according to the existing exigency; and, without
offending the equal protection provision of the Constitution, may
prohibit the sale of particular articles -- such as food
preservatives containing boric acid -- if it does not exceed bounds
of reasonable classification.
This Court will not assume that goods are shipped from state to
state in small retail packages, and where the character of the
shipment is not shown, such packages cannot be classed with the
"original packages" within the rule protecting such packages from
subjection to the police laws of the state.
In this case, no question of the conflict of the state law with
action by Congress in regard to interstate shipment of food is
involved.
The provisions of the Pure Food Law of Illinois of 1907
prohibiting sale of food preservatives containing boric acid are
not unconstitutional
Page 238 U. S. 447
under the due process or equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or a to the sale within that the article
involved in this action in the package in which they were sold,
under the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution.
257 Ill. 587 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Pure Food Statute of Illinois of 1907,
are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of Illinois which affirmed a judgment of the Municipal Court
of Chicago finding the plaintiff in error guilty of a violation of
the "pure food" statute of that state and imposing a fine. 257 Ill.
587.
The violation consisted of a sale in Chicago of a preservative
compound known as "Mrs. Price's Canning Compound," alleged to be
intended as a "preservative of food," and to be "unwholesome and
injurious in that it contained boric acid."
The statute (Laws of Illinois 1907, p. 543; Hurd's Rev.Stat. c.
127b, §§ 8 and 22) provides:
"§ 8. DEFINES ADULTERATION. That, for the purpose of this act,
an article shall be deemed to be adulterated: . . ."
"In case of food: . . . "
Page 238 U. S. 448
"Fifth -- If it contains any added poisonous or other added
deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious to
health:
Provided, that when, in the preparation of food
products for shipment, they are preserved by an external
application, applied in such a manner that the preservative is
necessarily removed mechanically, or by maceration in water, or
otherwise, and directions for the removal of said preservatives
shall be printed on the covering of the package, the provisions of
this act shall be construed as applying only when such products are
ready for consumption, and formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, boric
acid, salicylic acid and all compounds and derivatives thereof are
hereby declared unwholesome and injurious. . . ."
"§ 22. SALE OF PRESERVATIVES PROHIBITED. No person, firm or
corporation shall manufacture for sale, advertise, offer or expose
for sale, or sell, any mixture or compound intended for use as a
preservative or other adulterant of milk, cream, butter or cheese,
nor shall he manufacture for sale, advertise, offer or expose for
sale, or sell any unwholesome or injurious preservative or any
mixture or compound thereof intended as a preservative of any food:
Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to
pure salt added to butter and cheese."
A trial by jury was waived. There was a stipulation of facts
setting forth, in substance, that the defendant had sold in Chicago
two packages of the preservative in question; that the compound
contained "boric acid;" that the label on the packages bore the
following statement:
"It is not claimed for this compound that it contains anything
of food value, but it is an antiseptic preparation, and, among its
many uses, may be employed to prevent canned fruits and vegetables
from souring and spoiling;"
that the preservative was not offered for sale or sold in any
food product, but only separately as a preservative, and that the
defendant was accorded a hearing before
Page 238 U. S. 449
the State Food Commission pursuant to the provisions of the food
law.
There was also introduced in evidence on behalf of the state an
envelop, used for enclosing the compound, upon which were
statements as to its uses, prices, etc. It was thus stated that the
preservative could be used "in canning all kinds of fruit," and was
"especially valuable for corn, beans, peas," etc. There was also
the statement on the envelop that the contents "of this package"
were sufficient for "four quarts," and that the retail prices were
from ten cents for one "package" to one dollar for fifteen
"packages." That was the case for the state.
A motion to dismiss was denied. The plaintiff then made an offer
of proof, and thereupon it was stipulated that a witness in court,
if sworn, would testify that the
"Price Canning Compound is an article of commerce, which has
been sold under that distinct name for a period of years, with the
ingredients and in the proportions contained in the sample taken by
the Food Department, which is the subject of this suit; that it has
acquired a wide reputation over a large number of states in the
Union as a distinctive article, used for canning by the
housewife;"
that "it is not sold to manufacturers of food or canners of food
for sale;" and that "boric acid is a constituent part of the
compound, and has been such during all the time that the compound
has been sold."
Objection to evidence offered that "there is no added ingredient
of any kind whatever, whether it be injurious, deleterious, or
otherwise," was sustained as not being addressed to the charge
made. The defendant (the plaintiff in error) also offered to prove
"that boric acid is not injurious to health or to the human
system," and that the "Price Canning Compound is not adulterated or
mislabeled in any way." The offer was rejected, and the defendant
excepted. In response to a further offer, it was conceded that the
witness, if placed upon the stand, would
Page 238 U. S. 450
testify that the compound "is an article of commerce, sold in
Illinois in the original package manufactured in Minnesota."
Upon this state of the record, the contention of the plaintiff
in error that the statute was inapplicable, or, if applicable, was
repugnant to the Constitution of the state and to the commerce
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution was
overruled.
The supreme court of the state thus construed the statute:
"We will first notice the objection of plaintiff in error that §
8 deals only with foods; that the declaration in that section that
boric acid is injurious and unwholesome is limited to foods
containing that substance as an added ingredient, and has no
application to a preservative which is not, and does not purport to
be, a food."
"Both §§ 8 and 22 are parts of one act, and the act as a whole
should be so construed as to give effect to its manifest purpose
and intent. Its main purpose is to protect health by preventing
adulteration of food by any unwholesome and injurious ingredient.
Boric acid is declared to be unwholesome and injurious, and the
sale of any food to which it is an added ingredient is prohibited.
It was well known to the legislature that various compounds are
manufactured and sold for preserving foods of different kinds. If
such preservatives contain unwholesome and injurious ingredients,
their use by the housewife, or anyone else, in preserving fruits or
food, would be as injurious to the health as if they had been added
by a dealer or manufacturer to fruits or other foods before placing
them on the market. The object of the act is to protect the public
health by preventing dealers from selling food to which had been
added, for the purpose of preserving it, ingredients injurious to
the health, or from selling any compound as a preservative which
contained any such ingredients. The prohibition is not against
the
Page 238 U. S. 451
sale of all preservatives, but is against only unwholesome or
injurious preservatives. . . . It is just as important to prohibit
the sale to the housewife of a compound containing boric acid, to
be used by her to preserve fruits and vegetables put up by her for
family use, as it is to prohibit the sale of fruits and vegetables
after such an ingredient has been added. We think the reasonable
construction of the act to be that the prohibition against boric
acid is not limited to foods to which it is an added ingredient,
but extends to compounds sold as a food preservative which contain
boric acid. The danger to health is as great from one as the other,
and the prohibition of both was necessary to effect the evident
purpose of the legislature."
257 Ill. pp. 592, 593.
The plaintiff in error challenges the correctness of this
construction, but this question is simply one of local law, with
which we are not concerned. We accept the decision of the supreme
court of the state as to the meaning of the statute, and, in the
light of this construction the validity of the act under the
federal Constitution must be determined.
Missouri Pacific Ry.
v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403,
164 U. S. 414;
W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.
S. 452,
180 U. S. 466;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 73;
Purity Extract Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.
S. 192,
226 U. S.
198.
The first federal question is presented by the contention that
the statute, as applied, effects a deprivation of property without
due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the
laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state has undoubted power to protect the health of its
people and to impose restrictions having reasonable relation to
that end. The nature and extent of restrictions of this character
are matters for the legislative judgment in defining the policy of
the state and the safeguards required. In the avowed exercise of
this power, the Legislature of Illinois has enacted a prohibition
-- as the statute is
Page 238 U. S. 452
construed -- against the sale of food preservatives containing
boric acid. And unless this prohibition is palpably unreasonable
and arbitrary, we are not at liberty to say that it passes beyond
the limits of the state's protective authority.
Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678,
127 U. S. 686;
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86,
137 U. S. 91;
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366,
169 U. S. 395;
Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.
S. 238,
183 U. S. 246;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11,
197 U. S. 25;
New York ex Rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S.
31,
211 U. S. 39;
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539,
211 U. S. 547;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U. S. 549,
219 U. S. 569;
Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.
S. 192,
226 U. S. 198;
Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.
S. 331,
233 U. S. 333.
The contention of the plaintiff in error could be granted only if
it appeared that, by a consensus of opinion, the preservative was
unquestionably harmless with respect to its contemplated uses --
that is, that it indubitably must be classed as a wholesome article
of commerce so innocuous in its designed use and so unrelated in
any way to any possible danger to the public health that the
enactment must be considered as a merely arbitrary interference
with the property and liberty of the citizen. It is plainly not
enough that the subject should be regarded as debatable. If it be
debatable, the legislature is entitled to its own judgment, and
that judgment is not to be superseded by the verdict of a jury upon
the issue which the legislature has decided. It is not a case where
the legislature has confined its action to the prohibition of that
which is described in general terms as unwholesome or injurious,
leaving the issue to be determined in each case as it arises. The
legislature is not bound to content itself with general directions
when it considers that more detailed measures are necessary to
attain a legitimate object.
Atlantic Coast Line v.
Georgia, 234 U. S. 280,
234 U. S. 288.
Legislative particularization in the exercise of protective power
has many familiar illustrations. The present case is one of such
particularization, where the statute -- read as the
Page 238 U. S. 453
state court reads it -- especially prohibits preservatives
containing boric acid. The legislature thus expressed its judgment,
and it is sufficient to say, without passing upon the opinions of
others adduced in argument, that the action of the legislature
cannot be considered to be arbitrary. Its judgment appears to have
sufficient support to be taken out of that category.
See
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S.
45,
220 U. S. 51;
Circular No. 15 (June 23, 1904), Bureau of Chemistry; Food
Inspection Decision 76 (July 13, 1907); Bulletin (December 31,
1914), Bureau of Chemistry, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
It is further urged that the enactment, as construed, contains
an unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiff in error,
but in this aspect, again, the question is whether the
classification made by the legislature can be said to be without
any reasonable basis. The legislature is entitled to estimate
degrees of evil, and to adjust its legislation according to the
exigency found to exist. And, applying familiar principle, it
cannot be said that the legislature exceeded the bounds of
reasonable discretion in classification when it enacted the
prohibition in question relating to foods and compounds sold as
food preservatives.
Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank,
207 U. S. 251,
207 U. S. 256;
Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U.
S. 338,
207 U. S. 354;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 78;
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.
S. 225,
222 U. S. 235;
Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700,
232 U. S. 706;
Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.
S. 224,
234 U. S. 227;
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373,
236 U. S.
383-384. We find no ground for holding the statute to be
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The remaining contention is that the statute as applied violates
the commerce clause. Treating the article as one on a footing with
adulterated food, the power of the state to prohibit sales within
its borders is broadly asserted on its behalf. On the other hand,
the plaintiff in error insists that the compound is not an
adulterated
Page 238 U. S. 454
food, and was not charged to be such, but was an article of
commerce manufactured in another state, and that whatever may be
the power of the State of Illinois over manufacture and sale apart
from interstate commerce, the state could not prohibit its
introduction and sale in the course of interstate commerce. It is
not necessary, however, to deal with the question in the scope thus
suggested. The sole ground for invoking the commerce clause in
order to escape the restrictions of the state law is sought to be
found in the doctrine with respect to sales in original packages.
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419;
Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U. S. 100;
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S.
1,
171 U. S. 22-23.
The record, however, is wholly insufficient to support the
contention. The stipulation of facts read in evidence by the state
set forth that the defendant had sold in Chicago "two packages" of
the compound. The state then introduced in evidence an "envelop
used for enclosing the compound." This, among other things, bore a
statement that the content of "this package is sufficient for four
quarts." And it set forth prices as follows: "Retail Price. 1
Package, 10c. 3 Packages, 25c. 7 Packages, 50c. 15 Packages,
$1.00." The clear inference from this evidence was that the
compound was offered for sale at retail in small packages (in
envelops) suitable for the consumer. The defendant made an offer of
proof, and, in lieu of the offered testimony, it was conceded that
the witness, if sworn, would testify that the compound mentioned in
the statement of claim "is an article of commerce sold in Illinois,
in the original package manufactured and made in Minnesota." As to
the nature of the package, nothing more was shown. All that was
admitted was entirely consistent with the view that the original
package referred to was simply the small package in the envelop
which the state had described, and no error can be charged to the
state court in so regarding it. Nothing appeared as to the
character
Page 238 U. S. 455
of the shipment from Minnesota to Illinois, and it would be
wholly unjustifiable to assume that, in commercial shipments into
the state, the small package was segregated or separately
introduced. If these small packages were associated in their
shipment into the state, as they naturally would be, and were
subsequently sold separately or in various lots, these separate
packages, although respectively in the original envelops, would not
be classed as "original packages" within the rule invoked, so as to
escape the local law governing domestic transactions. We have
repeatedly so held, in cases not materially different in this
respect.
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.
S. 343;
Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U.
S. 261;
Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v.
Lynch, 226 U. S. 192,
226 U. S.
199-201. The testimony offered by the plaintiff in
error, and treated as received, taken in connection with what had
already been proved as to the character of the packages put up for
retail sale, fell far short of the proof required to constitute a
defense upon the ground that the state law, otherwise valid, was
applied in contravention of the commerce clause.
It should be added that no question is presented in the present
case as to the power of Congress to make provision with respect to
the immediate containers (as well as the larger receptacle in which
the latter are shipped) of articles prepared in one state and
transported to another, so as suitably to enforce its regulations
as to interstate trade.
McDermott v. Wisconsin,
228 U. S. 115,
228 U. S. 135.
It does not appear that the state law as here applied is in
conflict with any federal rule.
Judgment affirmed.