Disregard of the Safety Appliance Act is a wrongful act, and,
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit it was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the
party in default is implied --
ubi jus ibi remedium.
An employee of a railroad company has a right of action against
the company for damages sustained by reason of defective appliances
in violation of the Safety Appliance Act even though he was engaged
at the time in intrastate, and not interstate, commerce.
Congress may, in the exercise of the plenary power to regulate
commerce between the states, require installation of safety
appliances on cars used on highways of interstate commerce
irrespective of the use made of any particular car at any
particular time.
When Congress enters a field of regulation within its paramount
authority, state regulation of that subject matter is excluded, and
so
held that, without leave of Congress, a state can no
more make or enforce laws inconsistent with the Federal Safety Act
giving redress for injuries to workmen or travelers occasioned by
absence or insecurity of such safety devices than it can prescribe
the character of the appliances.
The right of private action by an employee injured while engaged
in duties unconnected with interstate commerce, but injured by a
defect in a safety appliance required by act of Congress, has such
relation to the operation of such act as a regulation of interstate
commerce that it is within the constitutional grant of authority to
Congress over that subject.
Page 241 U. S. 34
Although § 4 of the Safety Appliance Act of 1910 relieves the
carrier from statutory penalties while a car is being hauled to the
nearest available point for repairs, it does not relieve the
carrier from liability in a remedial action for the death or injury
of an employee caused by, or in connection with, the movement of a
defectively equipped car.
Whether the defective condition of a car under the Federal
Safety Appliance Act is or is not due to negligence of the carrier
is immaterial, as the Act imposes an absolute and unqualified duty
to maintain the appliance in secure condition; nor under § 8 of the
Act of 1893 and § 5 of the Act of 1910 is an employee deemed to
have assumed the risk although continuing in the employment after
knowledge of the defect.
222 F. 221 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety
Appliance Act and the validity of a verdict against the carrier,
are stated in the opinion.
Page 241 U. S. 36
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error, Rigsby, while in the employ of plaintiff
in error as a switchman in its yard at Marshall, Texas, was
engaged, with others of the yard crew, in taking some "bad order"
cars to the shops there to be repaired. The switch engine and crew
went upon a spur track, hauled out three cars, and switched them
upon the main line, intending to go back upon the spur track for
others, to be taken with the three to the shops, which were on the
opposite side of the main line from the spur track. Rigsby, in the
course of his duties, rode upon the top of one of the cars (a box
car) in order to set the brakes and stop them and hold them upon
the main line. He did this, and while descending from the car to
return to the spur track, he fell, owing to a defect in one of the
handholds or grab irons that formed the rungs of the ladder, and
sustained personal injuries. This car had been out of service and
waiting on the spur track for some days, perhaps a month. The
occurrence took place September 4, 1912. In an action for damages,
based upon the Federal Safety Appliance acts,
* the above facts
appeared without dispute, and it was admitted that the main line of
defendant's railroad was in daily use for the passage of freight
and passenger trains in interstate commerce. The trial court
instructed the jury, as matter of law, that they should return a
verdict in favor of plaintiff, the only question submitted to them
being the amount of the damages. The railway company excepted to
this charge and requested certain specific instructions based upon
the theory that the car was out of service and marked "bad order,"
which was notice to Rigsby of its condition; that there was no
evidence that the condition of the car had resulted from any
Page 241 U. S. 37
negligence of defendant; that it was at the time being taken to
the shop for repairs, and that, for these reasons, plaintiff could
not recover. The instructions were refused and exceptions taken.
The resulting judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals. 222 F. 221.
It is insisted that Rigsby was not within the protection of the
act because he was not coupling or uncoupling cars at the time he
was injured. The reference is to § 4 of the Act of March 2, 1893,
which requires "secure grab irons or hand holds in the ends and
sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and
uncoupling cars." This action was not based upon that provision,
however, but upon § 2 of the amendment of 1910, which declares:
"All cars must be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient
hand brakes; all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running
boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards, and
all cars having ladders shall also be equipped with secure hand
holds or grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such
ladders."
There can be no question that a box car having a hand brake
operated from the roof requires also a secure ladder to enable the
employee to safely ascend and descend, and that the provision
quoted was intended for the especial protection of employees
engaged in duties such as that which plaintiff was performing.
It is earnestly insisted that Rigsby was not under the
protection of the safety appliance acts, because, at the time he
was injured, he was not engaged in interstate commerce. By § 1 of
the 1903 amendment, its provisions and requirements and those of
the Act of 1893 were made to apply
"to all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles
used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce . . . and to
all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in
connection therewith,"
subject to an exception not now pertinent. And by § 5 of the
1910 amendment, the provisions of the previous acts
Page 241 U. S. 38
were made to apply to that act, with a qualification that does
not affect the present case. In
Southern Ry. v. United
States, 222 U. S. 20, which
was an action to recover penalties for a violation of the acts with
respect to cars some of which were moved in intrastate traffic, and
not in connection with any car or cars used in interstate commerce,
but upon a railroad which was a part of a through highway for
interstate traffic, it was held that the 1903 amendment enlarged
the scope of the original act so as to embrace all cars used on any
railway that is a highway of interstate commerce, whether the
particular cars are at the time employed in such commerce or not.
The question whether the legislation as thus construed was within
the power of Congress under the commerce clause was answered in the
affirmative, the Court saying (p.
222 U. S.
27):
"Speaking only of railroads which are highways of both
interstate and intrastate commerce, these things are of common
knowledge: both classes of traffic are at times carried in the same
car, and when this is not the case, the cars in which they are
carried are frequently commingled in the same train and in the
switching and other movements at terminals. Cars are seldom set
apart for exclusive use in moving either class of traffic, but
generally are used interchangeably in moving both, and the
situation is much the same with trainmen, switchmen, and like
employees, for they usually, if not necessarily, have to do with
both classes of traffic. Besides, the several trains on the same
railroad are not independent in point of movement and safety, but
are interdependent, for whatever brings delay or disaster to one or
results in disabling one of its operatives is calculated to impede
the progress and imperil the safety of other trains. And so the
absence of appropriate safety appliances from any part of any train
is a menace not only to that train, but to others."
It is argued that the authority of that case goes no further
than to sustain the penal provisions of the act,
Page 241 U. S. 39
and does not uphold a right of action by an employee injured
through a violation of its provisions unless he was engaged in
interstate commerce. That the scope of the legislation is broad
enough to include all employees thus injured, irrespective of the
character of the commerce in which they are engaged, is plain. The
title of the act, repeated in that of each supplement, is general:
"An Act to Promote the Safety of Employees and Travelers," etc.,
and in the proviso to § 4 of the supplement of 1910 there is a
reservation as to "liability in any remedial action for the death
or injury of any railroad employee." None of the acts, indeed,
contains express language conferring a right of action for the
death or injury of an employee, but the safety of employees and
travelers is their principal object, and the right of private
action by an injured employee, even without the employers'
liability act, has never been doubted. (
See Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1;
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester &c. Ry., 205 U. S.
1,
205 U. S. 8,
220 U. S. 220 U.S.
590,
220 U. S. 592;
St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.
S. 281,
210 U. S. 284,
210 U. S. 295;
Delk v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 220 U.
S. 580;
Cleveland &c. Ry. v. Baker, 91 F.
224;
Denver & R.G. R. Co. v. Arrighi, 129 F. 347;
Chicago &c. Ry. v. Voelker, 129 F. 522;
Chicago
Junction Ry. v. King, 169 F. 372.) A disregard of the command
of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default
is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law expressed in
1 Com. Dig. tit. Action upon Statute (F), in these words:
"So, in every case, where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing
for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same
statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the
recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law."
(Per Holt, Ch. J., Anon., 6 Mod. 26, 27.) This is but an
application of the maxim
Page 241 U. S. 40
ubi jus ibi remedium. See 3 Black.Com. 51,
123;
Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 411, 23 L.J.
Q.B. 121, 125. The inference of a private right of action in the
present instance is rendered irresistible by the provision of § 8
of the Act of 1893 that an employee injured by any car, etc., in
use contrary to the act shall not be deemed to have assumed the
risk, and by the language above cited from the proviso in § 4 of
the 1910 act.
Plaintiff's injury was directly attributable to a defect in an
appliance which, by the 1910 amendment, was required to be secure,
and the act must therefore be deemed to create a liability in his
favor unless it be beyond the power of Congress under the commerce
clause of the Constitution to create such a liability in favor of
one not employed in interstate commerce. In
Illinois C. R. Co.
v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473,
233 U. S. 477,
the Court said,
arguendo, with reference to this
topic:
"Considering the status of the railroad as a highway for both
interstate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two
classes of traffic in point of movement and safety, the practical
difficulty in separating or dividing the general work of the
switching crew, and the nature and extent of the power confided to
Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, we entertain
no doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by
a member of the crew in the course of its general work was subject
to regulation by Congress, whether the particular service being
performed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was in
interstate or intrastate commerce."
Judicial expressions in previous cases were referred to, and the
decision in
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463, was distinguished because the act of June 11,
1906, there pronounced invalid, attempted to regulate the liability
of every carrier in interstate commerce for any injury to any
employee, even though his employment had no relation whatever to
interstate commerce.
Page 241 U. S. 41
The doing of plaintiff's work, and his security while doing it,
cannot be said to have been wholly unrelated to the safety of the
main track as a highway of interstate commerce; for a failure to
set the brakes so as temporarily to hold the "bad order" cars in
place on that track would have been obviously dangerous to through
traffic, while an injury to the brakeman had a tendency to cause
delay in clearing the main line for such traffic. Perhaps upon the
mere ground of the relation of his work to the immediate safety of
the main track, plaintiff's right of action might be sustained.
But we are unwilling to place the decision upon so narrow a
ground, because we are convinced that there is no constitutional
obstacle in the way of giving to the act in its remedial aspect as
broad an application as was accorded to its penal provisions in
Southern Railway v. United States, supra. In addition to
what has been quoted from the opinions in that case and the
Behrens case, the following considerations are pertinent.
In the exercise of its plenary power to regulate commerce between
the states, Congress has deemed it proper, for the protection of
employees and travelers, to require certain safety appliances to be
installed upon railroad cars used upon a highway of interstate
commerce, irrespective of the use made of any particular car at any
particular time. Congress having entered this field of regulation,
it follows from the paramount character of its authority that state
regulation of the subject matter is excluded.
Southern Ry. v.
Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439.
Without the express leave of Congress, it is not possible, while
the federal legislation stands, for the states to make or enforce
inconsistent laws giving redress for injuries to workmen or
travelers occasioned by the absence or insecurity of such safety
devices, any more than laws prescribing the character of the
appliances that shall be maintained, or imposing penalties for
failure to maintain them, for the consequences
Page 241 U. S. 42
that shall follow a breach of the law are vital and integral to
its effect as a regulation of conduct, liability to private suit is
or may be as potent a deterrent as liability to public prosecution,
and in this respect there is no distinction dependent upon whether
the suitor was injured while employed or traveling in one kind of
commerce rather than the other. Hence, while it may be conceded,
for the purposes of the argument, that the mere question of
compensation to persons injured in intrastate commerce is of no
concern to Congress, it must be held that the liability of
interstate carriers to pay such compensation because of their
disregard of regulations established primarily for safeguarding
commerce between the states is a matter within the control of
Congress, for unless persons injured in intrastate commerce are to
be excluded from the benefit of a remedial action that is provided
for persons similarly injured in interstate commerce -- a
discrimination certainly not required by anything in the
Constitution -- remedial actions in behalf of intrastate employees
and travelers must either be governed by the acts of Congress or
else be left subject to regulation by the several states, with
probable differences in the law material to its effect as
regulatory of the conduct of the carrier. We are therefore brought
to the conclusion that the right of private action by an employee
injured while engaged in duties unconnected with interstate
commerce, but injured through a defect in a safety appliance
required by the act of Congress to be made secure, has so intimate
a relation to the operation of the act as a regulation of commerce
between the states that it is within the constitutional grant of
authority over that subject.
It is argued that the statute does not apply except where the
car is in use in transportation at the time of the injury to the
employee, and that, since it does not appear that the car in
question was in bad order because of any negligence on the part of
the railway company,
Page 241 U. S. 43
and it was being taken to the shop for repairs at the time of
the accident, there is no liability for injuries to an employee who
had notice of its bad condition, and was engaged in the very duty
of taking it to the shop. This is sufficiently answered by our
recent decision in
Great Northern R. v. Otos, 239 U.
S. 349,
239 U. S. 351,
where it was pointed out that, although § 4 of the Act of 1910
relieves the carrier from the statutory penalties while a car is
being hauled to the nearest available point for repairs, it
expressly provides that it shall not be construed to relieve a
carrier from liability in a remedial action for the death or injury
of an employee caused by or in connection with the movement of a
car with defective equipment. The question whether the defective
condition of the ladder was due to defendant's negligence is
immaterial, since the statute imposes an absolute and unqualified
duty to maintain the appliance in secure condition.
St. Louis
& Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.
S. 281,
210 U. S.
294-295;
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United
States, 220 U. S. 559,
220 U. S. 575;
Delk v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 220 U.
S. 580,
220 U. S.
586.
Of course, the employee's knowledge of the defect does not bar
his suit, for by § 8 of the Act of 1893, an employee injured by any
car in use contrary to the provisions of the act is not to be
deemed to have assumed the risk, although continuing in the
employment of the carrier after the unlawful use of the car has
been brought to his knowledge, and by § 5 of the Act of 1910, the
provisions of the 1893 act are made applicable to it, with a
qualification that does not affect remedial actions by
employees.
The circuit court of appeals correctly disposed of the case, and
its judgment is
Affirmed.
* Act of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531; amendatory act of
March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943; supplementary act of April 14,
1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298.