When a railroad is a highway for both interstate and intrastate
commerce, and the two classes of traffic are interdependent in
point of both movement and safety, Congress may, under the power
committed to it by the commerce clause of the Constitution,
regulate the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by an
employee engaged in general work pertaining to both classes of
commerce, whether the particular service performed at the time,
isolatedly considered, is in interstate or intrastate commerce.
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463, distinguished.
Notwithstanding its wider powers, Congress, in enacting the
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, has confined the
liability imposed by that act to injuries occurring to employees
when the particular service in which they are employed at the time
of injury is a part of interstate commerce.
Pedersen v. Del.,
Lac. & West. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.
An employee of a carrier in interstate commerce by railroad who
is engaged on a switch engine in moving several cars all loaded
with intrastate freight from one point in a city to another point
in the same city is not engaged in interstate commerce, and an
injury then sustained is not within the Employers' Liability Act of
1908.
The fact that an employee engaged in intrastate service expects,
upon completion of that task, to engage in another which is a part
of interstate commerce, is immaterial under the Employers'
Liability Act of 1908, and will not bring the action under that
act.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act of 1908 and the determination of whether
an injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time
of the injury, are stated in the opinion.
Page 233 U. S. 475
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In an action in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22,
1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, against a railroad
Page 233 U. S. 476
company, by a personal representative to recover for the death
of his intestate, the plaintiff prevailed, and the defendant took
the case by writ of error to the circuit court of appeals. That
court, desiring instruction upon a question of law arising in the
case, certified the question here under § 239 of the Judicial Code.
The facts shown in the certificate are these: the intestate was in
the service of the railroad company as a member of a crew attached
to a switch engine operated exclusively within the City of New
Orleans. He was the fireman, and came to his death, while at his
post of duty, through a head-on collision. The general work of the
crew consisted in moving cars from one point to another within the
city over the company's tracks and other connecting tracks.
Sometimes the cars were loaded, at other times empty, and at still
other times some were loaded and others empty. When loaded, the
freight in them was at times destined from within to without the
state or
vice versa; at other times was moving only
between points within the state, and at still other times was of
both classes. When the cars were empty, the purpose was usually to
take them where they were to be loaded or away from where they had
been unloaded. And oftentimes, following the movement of cars,
loaded or empty, to a given point, other cars were gathered up and
taken or started elsewhere. In short, the crew handled interstate
and intrastate traffic indiscriminately, frequently moving both at
once and at times turning directly from one to the other. At the
time of the collision, the crew was moving several cars loaded with
freight which was wholly intrastate, and upon completing that
movement was to have gathered up and taken to other points several
other cars as a step or link in their transportation to various
destinations within and without the state. The question of law upon
which the circuit court of appeals desires instruction is whether,
upon these facts, it can be said that the intestate at the time of
his fatal injury, was employed in
Page 233 U. S. 477
interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers'
Liability Act.
Considering the status of the railroad as a highway for both
interstate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two
classes of traffic in point of movement and safety, the practical
difficulty in separating or dividing the general work of the
switching crew, and the nature and extent of the power confided to
Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, we entertain
no doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by
a member of the crew in the course of its general work was subject
to regulation by Congress, whether the particular service being
performed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was in
interstate or intrastate commerce.
Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.
S. 612,
221 U. S. 618;
Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20,
222 U. S. 26;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194,
224 U. S. 213;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S. 432.
The decision in
Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463, is not to the contrary, for the Act of June 11,
1906, 34 Stat. 232, c. 3073, there pronounced invalid, attempted to
regulate the liability of every carrier in interstate commerce,
whether by railroad or otherwise, for any injury to any employee,
even though his employment had no connection whatever with
interstate commerce.
Passing from the question of power to that of its exercise, we
find that the controlling provision in the Act of April 22, 1908,
reads as follows:
"That every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
commerce between any of the several states . . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such
employee, to his or her personal representative, . . . for such
injury or death resulting
Page 233 U. S. 478
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or
other equipment."
Giving to the words "suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce" their natural meaning, as we think
must be done, it is clear that Congress intended to confine its
action to injuries occurring when the particular service in which
the employee is engaged is a part of interstate commerce. The act
was so construed in
Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Railroad Co., 229 U. S. 146. It
was there said (p.
229 U. S.
150):
"There can be no doubt that a right of recovery thereunder
arises only where the injury is suffered while the carrier is
engaged in interstate commerce and while the employee is employed
by the carrier in such commerce."
Again (p.
229 U. S.
152): "The true test always is: is the work in question
a part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged?"
And a like view is shown in other cases.
Mondou v. New York,
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., supra; Seaboard
Air Line Railway v. Moore, 228 U. S. 433;
St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Railway Co. v. Seale,
229 U. S. 156,
229 U. S. 158;
North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.
S. 248,
232 U. S. 256;
Grand Trunk Western Railway Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S.
42.
Here, at the time of the fatal injury, the intestate was engaged
in moving several cars, all loaded with intrastate freight, from
one part of the city to another. That was not a service in
interstate commerce, and so the injury and resulting death were not
within the statute. That he was expected, upon the completion of
that task, to engage in another which would have been a part of
interstate commerce is immaterial under the statute, for, by its
terms, the true test is the nature of the work being done at the
time of the injury.
The question is accordingly answered in the
negative.