The word "conveyance," as used in § 98 of the Act of June 6,
1900, c. 786, 31 Stat. 321, 505, is not to be narrowly construed,
but includes leases, as well as transfers in fee.
One, who, under a lease of a mine, enters on the property and
expends money in developing it, gives a valuable consideration for
the lease and is protected by the recording act.
A deed altered after acknowledgment and having only one witness
is not entitled to registration under the recording act of June 6,
1900, and has no effect against persons without actual notice.
172 F. 73, reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the respondent, Chambers, against
Waskey and others to recover possession of a placer mining claim
and damages for gold extracted from the same. Waskey defended under
two leases from the parties alleged by him to be the owners. The
plaintiff had a verdict and a judgment which was affirmed by a
majority of the circuit court of appeals, 172 F. 73. The facts, as
they are to be taken under the
Page 224 U. S. 565
verdict, are these: Whittren was the original locator of the
claim. He made a deed of a part interest to Chambers, and
acknowledged it on April 21, 1902, the notary being the only
witness. In May, 1906, the deed was altered by consent of the
parties so as to convey one-half, and was filed for recording on
June 20 of that year. On September 24, 1905, Whittren conveyed
one-half to Eadie, and this deed was recorded. On June 11, 1906,
Whittren and Eadie, who were the record owners, made a lease of a
part to Waskey for two years, recorded on August 22, 1906, and on
June 20, 1906, Whittren made a lease of the other part to Eadie and
Waskey, which was recorded on August 30, 1906. Waskey denied the
validity of the deed to Chambers and also claimed as purchaser for
value without notice. The circuit court of appeals held that the
deed to Chambers was good as between the parties, and that Waskey
was not within the protection of the statute as a purchaser without
notice, and also that he gave no valuable consideration for his
lease, these questions having been raised below by exclusion of
evidence and instructions of the court.
The act of Congress reads:
"Every conveyance of real property within the district,
hereafter made, which shall not be filed for record as provided in
this chapter, shall be void against any subsequent innocent
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the
same real property, or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall
be first duly recorded."
Act of June 6, 1900, c. 786, title 3, § 98, 31 Stat. 321, 505;
Code, Part V, § 98. The circuit court of appeals went on the ground
that a lease creates only a chattel interest, and is not a
conveyance, and therefore is not within the protection of the
statute. But it is obvious that, in principle, the right of a
lessee is the same as that of a purchaser in fee, and it would be a
great misfortune, especially to mining interests, if a man taking a
lease from those whom the record showed and he believed
Page 224 U. S. 566
to be the owners, were liable, after spending large sums of
money on the faith of it, to be turned out by an undisclosed
claimant on the strength of an unrecorded deed. We find no words in
the statute that require such a result. On the contrary, the word
"conveyance" is defined, although for other purposes, as embracing
every written instrument except a will by which any interest in
lands is created. Act of 1900, Tit. 3, § 136, 31 Stat. 510, c. 786;
Code, Part. V, § 136.
See Tit. 2, § 1046, 31 Stat. 493;
Code Part IV, § 1046. And the statute provides for the recording of
leases, as well as of deeds and grants, Act of 1900, Tit. 1, § 15,
31 Stat. 327, c. 786; Code, Part III, § 15. Blackstone defines a
lease as a conveyance, 2 Comm. 317, and in Sheppard's Touchstone,
267, leases are ranked under the head of grants -- "as in other
grants." The point does not need authority except to exclude the
notion that the statute uses the word in a narrower sense.
It is said that Waskey was not a purchaser for value. By the
lease of June 11, he agreed to enter at once and work the mine
continuously, and to pay thirty percent of the gold and precious
minerals or metals extracted. The other agreement was similar,
except that one-eighth was to go to Whittren, one eighth to Eadie,
and the remainder, after paying mining expenses, to be divided
between Waskey and Eadie. His working the mine was a valuable
consideration, and nonetheless so if, in the event, he was
reimbursed for his expenditures and made a profit for his
trouble.
Waskey was in possession and at work before the deed to Chambers
was filed for recording, but we do not have to consider whether
possession under the lease would have the same effect as getting
the later instrument recorded before the earlier one, under § 98,
above quoted. For, although the deed to Chambers was filed before
the leases, it had no effect as against people without actual
notice. It never had but one witness, two being necessary to
authorize
Page 224 U. S. 567
the recording of a deed, and the only acknowledgment was before
the alteration. Therefore, it was filed without authority, was not
entitled to registration, and, as we have said, had no effect as
against the petitioner. Act of 1900, Tit. I, § 15, Tit. 3, §§ 82,
95, 31 Stat. 327, 503, 505, c. 786; Code, Part III, § 15; Part V,
§§ 82, 94.
Alaska Exploration Co. v. Northern Mining &
Trading Co., 152 F. 145.
Judgment reversed.