The power of Congress over citizenship in Indian tribes is
plenary; it may adopt any reasonable method to ascertain who are
citizens, and if one method is unsatisfactory, it can try another;
nor is its power exhausted because the first plan is by inquiry in
a territorial court. The functions of a territorial court in such a
case are those of a commission, rather than of a court.
The Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 641, creating the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Citizenship Court and giving it power to examine, and in
case of error found, to annul judgments of courts of Indian
Territory determining citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations, was a valid exercise of power.
Congress has power to provide for the bringing of a suit in
regard to citizenship in Indian tribes in a court of equity in
which every class to be affected shall be represented and that
those not actually made parties but who belong to the classes
represented shall be bound by the decree.
Citizens are bound to take notice of the legislation of
Congress.
143 F. 716 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 204 U. S. 418
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action commenced in September, 1904, by
Page 204 U. S. 419
Mrs. Ella Adams, for herself and her minor children, defendants
in error, in the United States court for the Southern District of
the Indian Territory, to recover possession of a tract of land in
that territory. Defendants answered, and, upon trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was sustained by the
United States Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, and, on
further appeal, reaffirmed by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 143 F. 716.
The case arises out of the legislation of Congress designed to
secure the disintegration of the tribal organization of the Five
Civilized Tribes in the Indian Territory, and the distribution of
the property of those tribes among the individual Indians. A full
resume of this legislation and the general litigation following it
is to be found in
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U. S. 445, and
a full statement of the facts in this case is to be found in the
opinion of the United States circuit court of appeals. An entire
restatement of these matters is therefore unnecessary.
There is but a single matter to be determined. As counsel for
plaintiffs in error say:
"The assignment of errors presents but one question. If the
decree of the Choctaw-Chickasaw citizenship court, in the test case
known as the
Riddle case, vacated the decree that
defendant, Hill, had, theretofore, procured in the United States
court for the Southern District of the Indian Territory, wherein he
was adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe of Indians, this
case should be affirmed. If it did not, it should be reversed."
To properly appreciate and rightly answer this single question,
some things in the history of the legislation and litigation and
also some of the facts in this case must be noticed.
In order to divide the lands of these Indian nations, an
enumeration of the individuals entitled thereto became necessary.
By the Act of March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 645, c. 209, ยง 16, the
commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, generally known
Page 204 U. S. 420
as the Dawes Commission, was empowered to negotiate and
extinguish the tribal title to the lands and to make an allotment
thereof to the members of the tribe in severalty. By that of June
10, 1896, 29 Stat. 339, 340, c. 398, the commission was authorized
to hear the application and determine the right of each applicant
for citizenship in either of these tribes. The act also granted an
appeal to the proper United States district court in the Indian
Territory to any party aggrieved by the ruling of the commission,
and declared that the judgment of that court should be final. It
required the commission to make a complete roll of the citizens of
each of the tribes, to be "hereafter held and considered to be the
true and correct rolls of persons entitled to the rights of
citizenship in said several tribes." Hill, who is the principal
defendant, applied to be enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw
Nation, and his application was finally sustained by the court, and
he was, on March 8, 1898, adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw
tribe by blood, and entitled to be enrolled as such. The land in
controversy was selected and taken possession of by him in reliance
upon this adjudication of citizenship. On July 1, 1898, Congress
passed an act, 30 Stat. 591, c. 545, granting to the tribes an
appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the United States
courts of the Indian Territory in citizenship cases. Under the
authority of this act, many of these cases were appealed to this
Court, which affirmed the judgments.
Stephens v. Cherokee
Nation, supra. On March 21, 1902, an agreement was made
between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations,
which was confirmed by act of Congress July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 641,
c. 1362. This agreement and act were substantially that a court
known as the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court should be
created, and that that court should have power, in a suit in equity
brought by either or both of these tribes against any ten persons
who had been admitted to citizenship or enrollment by the terms of
the judgments of the several United States courts in the Indian
Territory, as representatives
Page 204 U. S. 421
of all persons similarly situated, to determine whether the
judgments of those courts should be annulled on account of certain
alleged irregularities. The agreement and act also provided that,
in case the citizenship courts should decide that those judgments
should be annulled the papers in any action in those courts,
wherein such a judgment had been rendered, should, upon seasonable
application of either party, be transferred to the citizenship
court, which should proceed to a hearing and determination of the
question of citizenship. Under this agreement and act, the court
was established and test suit brought in which a decree was entered
to the effect that the judgments of the United States courts in the
Indian Territory, whereby persons were admitted to citizenship in
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations under the Act of June 10, 1896,
were annulled and vacated. Hill was not named a party in that test
suit, nor did he thereafter apply for a transfer of his case to the
citizenship court. The above statement of facts is sufficiently
full for an understanding of the single question presented for
determination.
That single question may be divided into two. First, was the
decree in the Indian Territory court declaring Hill a citizen a
finality, beyond the power of Congress to in any manner disturb?
This was answered in the
Stephens case,
supra. In
that case, we held that Congress could authorize a review of the
judgments of the United States courts of the Indian Territory in
citizenship cases, and this although, by the terms of prior
legislation, those judgments had become final. While sustaining the
act authorizing such review and providing for appeals to this
Court, we construed it as limiting the appeals to the question of
the constitutionality or validity of the legislation, and not as
bringing before us the facts in the instances of all applications
for citizenship. In the opinion (page
174 U. S. 477)
we said:
"The contention is that the Act of July 1, 1898, in extending
the remedy by appeal to this Court, was invalid because
retrospective, an invasion of the judicial domain, and
destructive
Page 204 U. S. 422
of vested rights. By its terms, the act was to operate
retrospectively, and as to that it may be observed that, while the
general rule is that statutes should be so construed as to give
them only prospective operation, yet, where the language expresses
a contrary intention in unequivocal terms, the mere fact that the
legislation is retroactive does not necessarily render it
void."
"And while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set
aside the judgments of courts, compel them to grant new trials,
order the discharge of offenders, or direct what steps shall be
taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry, the grant of a new
remedy by way of review has been often sustained under particular
circumstances.
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386;
Sampeyreac v. United States,
7 Pet. 222;
Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall.
160;
Garrison v. New York, 21
Wall. 196;
Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S.
405;
Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle,
140 U. S.
334."
"The United States court in Indian Territory is a legislative
court, and was authorized to exercise jurisdiction in these
citizenship cases as a part of the machinery devised by Congress in
the discharge of its duties in respect of these Indian tribes, and,
assuming that Congress possesses plenary power of legislation in
regard to them, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States, it follows that the validity of remedial legislation of
this sort cannot be questioned unless in violation of some
prohibition of that instrument."
"In its enactment, Congress has not attempted to interfere in
any way with the judicial department of the government, nor can the
act be properly regarded as destroying any vested right, since the
right asserted to be vested is only the exemption of these
judgments from review, and the mere expectation of a share in the
public lands and moneys of these tribes, if hereafter distributed,
if the applicants are admitted to citizenship, cannot be held to
amount to such an absolute right of property that the original
cause of action, which is citizenship or not, is placed by the
judgment of a lower court
Page 204 U. S. 423
beyond the power of reexamination by a higher court, though
subsequently authorized by general law to exercise
jurisdiction."
This decision established that no such vested right was created
by the proceedings of the Dawes Commission or the judgments of the
courts of the Indian Territory on appeal from the findings of the
commission as prevented subsequent investigation. The power of
Congress over the matter of citizenship in these Indian tribes was
plenary, and it could adopt any reasonable means to ascertain who
were entitled to its privileges. If the result of one measure was
not satisfactory, it could try another. The fact that the first
provision was by an inquiry in a territorial court did not exhaust
the power of Congress or preclude further investigation. The
functions of the territorial courts in this respect were but little
more than those of a commission. While the Act of July 1, 1898,
provided for an appeal to this Court, and appeals were taken in
many cases, yet our inquiry stopped with the question of the
constitutionality of the legislation. In other words, we
entertained and decided the purely judicial question of the
validity of the means Congress had adopted for determining the
matter of citizenship. We did not attempt to pass upon the question
of citizenship in any particular case, nor determine whether the
applicant was or was not entitled to be enrolled as a citizen. It
is unnecessary to consider what would have been the effect of a
judgment of this Court, a court provided for in the Constitution,
on the question of the right of a litigant to citizenship. The
distinction between this Court and the courts established by act of
Congress in virtue of its power to ordain and establish inferior
courts is shown in
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.Appx.
697, in which we held that, while Congress could give to the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to inquire and report upon claims against
the government, it could not authorize an appeal from such report
to this Court unless our decision was made a final judgment, not
subject to congressional review. In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice
Taney said (pp. 699, 702):
Page 204 U. S. 424
"Congress may undoubtedly establish tribunals with special
powers to examine testimony and decide, in the first instance, upon
the validity and justice of any claim for money against the United
States, subject to the supervision and control of Congress, or a
head of any of the executive departments. In this respect, the
authority of the Court of Claims is like to that of an auditor or
comptroller, with this difference only: that in the latter case the
appropriation is made in advance, upon estimates furnished by the
different executive departments, of their probable expenses during
the ensuing year, and the validity of the claim is decided by the
officer appointed by law for that purpose, and the money paid out
of the appropriation afterwards made. In the case before us, the
validity of the claim is to be first decided, and the appropriation
made afterwards. But, in principle, there is no difference between
these two special jurisdictions created by acts of Congress for
special purposes, and neither of them possesses judicial power in
the sense in which those words are used in the Constitution. The
circumstance that one is called a court and its decisions called
judgments cannot alter its character nor enlarge its power. . . .
Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this Court beyond the
limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor
impose on it the authority or duty of hearing and determining an
appeal from a commissioner or auditor, or any other tribunal
exercising only special powers under an act of Congress; nor can
Congress authorize or require this Court to express an opinion on a
case where its judicial power could not be exercised, and where its
judgment would not be final and conclusive upon the rights of the
parties, and process of execution awarded to carry it into
effect."
This decree was followed by legislation which in a general way
provided that the rulings of this Court on appeals from the
judgments of the Court of Claims should be in effect judgments.
While that case is not entirely parallel to this, yet the line of
thought pursued in the opinion is suggestive.
Page 204 U. S. 425
We do not feel called upon to enlarge upon it. It is enough now
to hold that Congress, in giving to the Indian Territory courts
jurisdiction of appeals from the action of the Dawes Commission,
did not place the decisions of these courts beyond the reach of
further investigation. Hence, the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
creating the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, and giving to
it power to examine the judgments of the Indian Territory courts,
and determine whether they should not be annulled on account of
irregularities, was a valid exercise of power.
The other question is one of procedure, and not of power. It is
objected that the defendant Hill was not made a party to the
proceeding instituted in the citizenship court, but there were a
multitude, according to the report of the Dawes Commission,
probably one thousand, in whose favor judgments of citizenship have
been entered in the Indian Territory courts, and the act provided
that ten should be selected as representatives of the class. It
further authorized any individual, in case of an adverse judgment
by the citizenship court, to transfer his case from the territorial
to that court. Now, it is undoubtedly within the power of a court
of equity to name as defendants a few individuals who are in fact
the representatives of a large class having a common interest or a
common right -- a class too large to be all conveniently brought
into court -- and make the decree effective not merely upon those
individuals, but also upon the class represented by them.
Mandeville v.
Riggs, 2 Pet. 482;
Smith v.
Swormstedt, 16 How. 288;
Bacon v.
Robertson, 18 How. 480,
59 U. S. 489;
United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.
S. 427,
148 U. S. 480.
It was by way of extra precaution, and in order to more effectually
secure the rights of the individuals other than those named as
parties defendant in that suit, that Congress provided that anyone
might transfer his individual case from the territorial court to
the citizenship court, and there have the merits of his claim
decided. Hill, as every other citizen, was bound to take notice of
the legislation of Congress, and it is not to be doubted that he,
as
Page 204 U. S. 426
well as others similarly situated, was cognizant of the
proceedings that were being had in pursuance of such legislation.
He made no application to transfer his case, but chose to abide by
the outcome of the case against the ten representatives of his
class. The answers to these subordinate questions fully dispose of
the main question. Without further discussion, we refer to the
exhaustive opinion of Circuit Judge Sanborn, in delivering the
judgment of the court of appeals, with which, in the main, we fully
concur.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the court of
appeals is
Affirmed.