Where petitioner's term of imprisonment has expired, but under
the sentence, he is still subject to confinement until a fine of
$100 and costs has been paid, and nothing in the record shows
whether such fine has been collected on execution as authorized by
the sentence, but if not collected or collectible, the petitioner
can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor;s oath, the
case is practically a moot one, upon which the time of this Court
should not be spent.
Conceding the full jurisdiction of this Court in habeas corpus,
and although the writ has been granted, in view of the special
circumstances therein involved, in a case similar, in some
respects, to the one at bar, it is a question in every case whether
the exercise of that jurisdiction is appropriate. The ordinary
procedure for correction of errors in criminal cases by writ of
error should be pursued unless special circumstances call for a
departure therefrom, and so
held in regard to a petition
for habeas corpus of one convicted in a District Court of the
United States for selling liquor to Indians in Indian country who
could and should have proceeded by writ of error from the circuit
court of appeals.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the
District of Nebraska on an indictment charging that he did
"wrongfully and unlawfully introduce into Indian country,
to-wit, into and upon the Winnebago Indian reservation, a
reservation set apart for the exclusive use and benefit of certain
tribes of the Winnebago Indians, certain spirituous, vinous, malt,
and other intoxicating liquors."
Upon this conviction, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and
the costs of prosecution, and to be imprisoned in the jail of
Douglas County, Nebraska, for the term of sixty days, and until
said fine and costs were paid. The imprisonment commenced on
February 19, 1906. Without pursuing his remedy by writ of error,
the petitioner, on April 2, 1906, filed in this Court his
application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the United
States has no police power or jurisdiction over the Winnebago
reservation, and that the law under which the
Page 202 U. S. 179
indictment was drawn is unconstitutional and void insofar as it
applies to the said Winnebago reservation, and that the United
States district court was wholly without jurisdiction in the
premises. The indictment was found under the Act of Congress of
January 30, 1897. 29 Stat. 506. April 30, 1906, the case was
submitted on petition, return, and a stipulation of facts.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sixty days named as the term of imprisonment had expired
before the case was submitted, and indeed had almost expired before
the application was made for the writ. There is nothing to show
whether the fine and costs have been collected upon execution, as
the sentence authorizes. If not so collected, and if they cannot be
collected, then, though possibly still in jail, he can shortly be
discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath. Rev.Stat. ยง 1042. This
section authorizes a discharge after a confinement of thirty days
on account of the nonpayment of fine and costs. So that, within
ninety days from February 19, the time the sentence took effect,
the petitioner can secure his discharge either by paying the fine
and costs or by taking the poor debtor's oath as above stated.
In
Ex Parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378,
which was an application for a writ of habeas corpus, it appeared
that, before a return to the writ could be made or other action
taken, the restraint of which the petitioner complained would
terminate, and it was held that the application for the writ should
be denied. Indeed, the case at bar in principle is not unlike
Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651;
Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U.
S. 170;
Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U.
S. 158, and
Jones v.
Montague,
Page 202 U. S. 180
194 U. S. 147, in
each of which, intermediate the ruling below and the time for
decision here, events had happened which prevented the granting of
the relief sought, and the appeals or writs of error were dismissed
on the ground that this Court did not spend its time in deciding a
moot case.
While the full jurisdiction of this Court in habeas corpus may
be conceded, there is in every case a question whether the exercise
of such jurisdiction is appropriate. In
Ex Parte Royall,
117 U. S. 241,
Royall, who was held under state process for trial on an indictment
charging an offense against the laws of the state, filed his
petition in habeas corpus in the circuit court of the United
States, praying release from that custody. The circuit court
refused to order his discharge, and from its ruling he appealed,
and at the same time filed an original petition in this Court. P.
117 U. S. 254. The
question was fully considered, and it was held that, while the
federal courts, circuit and Supreme, had jurisdiction in the
premises, there was a discretion whether, in any case, a writ
should be issued, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, speaking for the Court,
saying (p.
117 U. S.
251):
"That discretion should be exercised, in the light of the
relations existing under our system of government, between the
judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states and in
recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those
relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution. When the petitioner is in custody by state authority
for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the
United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or
judge thereof, or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign
state and domiciled therein, he is in custody under like authority
for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the
commission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under
color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations -- in such and like cases of urgency, involving the
authority and operations of the general
Page 202 U. S. 181
government, or the obligations of this country to, or its
relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States
have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus, and
discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state
authority."
And again, after commenting on the relations of state and
national courts (p.
117 U. S.
252):
"That these salutary principles may have full operation, and in
harmony with what we suppose was the intention of Congress in the
enactments in question, this Court holds that, where a person is in
custody, under process from a state court of original jurisdiction,
for an alleged offense against the laws of such state, and it is
claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the circuit court has a
discretion whether it will discharge him upon habeas corpus in
advance of his trial in the court in which he is indicted, that
discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special
circumstances requiring immediate action. When the state court
shall have finally acted upon the case, the circuit court has still
a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing,
the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error from
the highest court of the state, or whether it will proceed by writ
of habeas corpus summarily to determine whether the petitioner is
restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."
The propositions thus laid down have been upheld by repeated
decisions of this Court.
Ex Parte Fonda, 117 U.
S. 516;
In re Duncan, 139 U.
S. 449;
In re Wood, 140 U.
S. 278;
Cook v. Hart, 146 U.
S. 183;
In re Frederich, 149 U. S.
70;
New York v. Eno, 155 U. S.
89;
Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.
S. 100;
Andrews v. Swarta, 156 U.
S. 272;
Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.
S. 231;
Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.
S. 293;
Iasigi v. Van de Carr, 166 U.
S. 391;
In re Eckart, 166 U.
S. 481;
Baker v. Grice, 169 U.
S. 284;
Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.
S. 101,
171 U. S. 104;
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516;
Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184;
Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399;
Gusman v.
Marrero,
Page 202 U. S. 182
180 U. S. 81;
Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499;
Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138.
In
In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372;
In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1;
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, and
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459,
writs of habeas corpus were sustained, but in each of these cases,
the act charged against the petitioner was one for which he was
amenable alone to the laws of the United States, or he was
exercising some authority under those laws, and so they all come
within the exceptions noted in
Ex Parte Royall, supra.
While the same reasons do not apply when the petitioner is in
custody by virtue of the process of a federal court, yet a writ of
habeas corpus is not to be made use of as a writ of error
(
Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640;
Whitney v. Dick., 202 U. S. 132);
the ordinary procedure for the correction of errors in criminal
cases is by writ of error, and that method should be pursued unless
there be special circumstances calling for a departure therefrom.
Ex Parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584;
In re Huntington, 137 U. S. 63;
In re Lancaster, 137 U. S. 393;
In re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211;
Riggins v. United States, 199 U.
S. 547. Several of these cases, it is true, were
applications for habeas corpus prior to final decisions in the
lower courts, and the refusal of the writs was based, partly at
least, upon the proposition that the orderly administration of
justice would be better subserved by declining to exercise our
jurisdiction until the conclusion of the proceedings below. In
Ex Parte Mirzan, however, this Court declined to issue a
writ of habeas corpus after a conviction, holding that it might be
issued by the proper circuit court, and that application should be
made to that court except in cases where there were some special
circumstances making immediate action by this Court necessary or
expedient. In the case at bar, if there was any error in the
proceedings of the trial court, it could have been corrected by
writ of error from the court of appeals, and no reason is given why
that remedy should not have been pursued, except the request of the
district judge, who decided the
Page 202 U. S. 183
case. Reference is made to a decision of the Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit,
In re Boyd, 49 F. 48, but that only
announced the doctrine of some of the cases cited above -- that
ordinarily, prior to final judgment, a writ of habeas corpus ought
not to be issued.
It is true that we issued a writ of habeas corpus in a case in
some respects like the present,
In re Heff, 197 U.
S. 488, and it is relied upon by petitioner as authority
for this application; but it was shown in that case that there was
a direct conflict between the state and local federal courts in the
precise point of law involved, each asserting jurisdiction over the
same offense; that the court of appeals had already decided the
question adversely to the contention of petitioner, so that a writ
of error from that court would have accomplished nothing, and
further, that the matter involved opened up inquiry into questions
of great significance affecting the respective jurisdiction of the
nation and the states over large numbers of Indians. There were
special reasons therefore for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus
and investigating the matter in that case. But it does not follow
from the action then taken that it is necessary or proper for this
Court to issue a habeas corpus in every case involving the question
of the legality of a sale of liquor to Indians or the bringing of
liquor into the Indian country. It is enough that the cases be
disposed of in the orderly and customary mode of procedure. It may
be assumed that the trial courts will follow the rulings of this
Court, and if there be in any case a departure therefrom, the
proper appellate court will correct the error. To permit every
petty criminal case to be brought directly to this Court upon
habeas corpus on the ground of an alleged misconception or
disregard of our decisions would be a grievous misuse of our time,
which should be devoted to a consideration of the more important
legal and constitutional questions which are constantly arising and
calling for our determination.
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is
Denied.