The provision in Rev.Stat. § 2326 for the trial of adverse
claims to a mining patent "by a court of competent jurisdiction"
does not relate to any particular court, state or federal, but it
was the intention of Congress in this legislation to leave open to
suitors all courts competent to determine the question of the right
of possession.
A controversy between rival claimants under that and the
previous section can be properly determined by a state court if the
usual conditions of federal jurisdiction do not exist, and the
judgment of the Supreme Court of a state in such case cannot be
reviewed by this Court simply because the parties were claiming
rights under a federal statute.
The court does not undertake to say that no case can arise under
this legislation, which turns upon a disputed construction, and
therefore presents a question essentially federal in its
nature.
This was an action brought on August 27, 1897, in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Colorado by William
H. Blackburn, a citizen of the State of Colorado, against the
Portland Gold Mining Company, a corporation of the State of Iowa,
and W. S. Stratton, a citizen of the State of Colorado.
It was alleged in the complaint that the amount in dispute in
the cause exceeded, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of two
thousand dollars; that the suit was of a civil nature at common
law, and arose under the laws of the United States; that it was an
adverse suit, and a suit arising under the provisions of sections
2325 and 2326, Revised Statutes of the United States, and is what
is known as a suit in support of an adverse claim; that the
defendant, W. S. Stratton, had applied for a patent for a portion
of the Fairplay Lodge mining claim, survey lot No. 9331, under and
by virtue of the provisions of section 2325, and that the plaintiff
Blackburn, under and by virtue of section 2326, had filed his
adverse claim and protest
Page 175 U. S. 572
against the entry of said portion of said Fairplay claim, upon
the ground that a part thereof was held and owned by the plaintiff
as a part and parcel of the Eacho Lodge mining claim; that said W.
S. Stratton, on or about the 4th day of February, 1897, had made
application in the United States land office at Pueblo, Colorado,
for patent on said portion of said Fairplay Lodge mining claim
under said section 2325, and that, at the time he made his said
application, he was not the real owner of said portion of Fairplay
Lodge mining claim, neither did he have any interest or title
whatsoever therein; that long prior to said time, the said Stratton
had by good and sufficient deed conveyed all his right, title, and
interest in and to said claim to the Portland Gold Mining Company,
defendant, and for that reason the plaintiff brought this action
against the said the Portland Gold Mining Company jointly with said
Stratton; that, on February 1, 1897, and ever since, the plaintiff
was and is the owner of and in actual possession of the Eacho Lodge
mining claim, 1,500 by 300 feet, situate in the Cripple Creek
mining district, El Paso County, State of Colorado, and that
plaintiff has the legal right to occupy and possess the same by
virtue of a full compliance with the local rules and regulations of
miners in said mining district and of the laws of the United States
and of the State of Colorado, and by preemption, discovery, and
location thereof as a lode mining claim located on the public
domain of the United States; that, on February 4, 1897, the
defendant wrongfully and unlawfully entered into and upon a parcel
of the said Eacho Lodge mining claim described as follows, to-wit:
all that part of said claim which is intersected by the exterior
lines of survey No. 9331, known as the Fairplay Lodge mining claim,
as shown by plat marked B, filed on July 28, 1899, in the land
office of the United States at Pueblo, Colorado, with the adverse
claim of plaintiff against the entry of said survey lot for patent;
that the defendant has ever since wrongfully withheld possession of
said parcel of Eacho Lodge mining claim from the plaintiff, to his
damage in the sum of one thousand dollars; that this suit is
brought in support of said adverse claim within thirty days after
the filing of said adverse claim, and that plaintiff
Page 175 U. S. 573
has necessarily disbursed and expended the sum of one thousand
dollars for plats, abstracts, and copies of papers filed in said
land office with said adverse claim, and also a reasonable counsel
fee, to-wit, two hundred dollars for the expense of preparing his
said adverse claim.
The plaintiff prayed for a judgment that he is the owner and
entitled to the possession of and patent to the above-described
parcel of said Eacho Lodge mining claim, and for the recovery of
the same; for the sum of one thousand dollars damages, for the sum
of three hundred dollars expended in behalf of said adverse claim,
and for costs of suit.
On November 8, 1897, the defendants, the Portland Gold Mining
Company and W. S. Stratton, moved the court to dismiss the cause
for the following alleged reasons:
1st. That the court has no jurisdiction either of the parties or
the subject matter of said suit.
2d. That both the plaintiff and defendants in said suit are
citizens of the State of Colorado, and the same is not one wholly
between citizens of different states.
3d. That it does not appear in said complaint that the amount in
controversy in said suit is two thousand dollars.
4th. That it appears from said complaint that said suit is one
which cannot under the Constitution and statutes of the United
States be brought into this Court.
On December 20, 1897, the court entered judgment dismissing the
cause for want of jurisdiction and signed a bill of exceptions at
the request of the plaintiff, and also certified that the said
question of jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States
was the only one involved in the said cause, and was the sole
question upon which said cause was dismissed, and also allowed the
present writ of error.
Page 175 U. S. 574
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
As the court below filed no opinion, we are not distinctly
informed upon which of the several grounds alleged the court
proceeded in dismissing the cause for want of jurisdiction, and
therefore it will be necessary for this Court to consider each and
all of them.
First, then, Does the record disclose that the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two
thousand dollars? The allegation in the complaint is "that the
amount in dispute in this cause exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum of two thousand dollars;" and it is also made to
appear that the matter in dispute is the title to a mining claim,
for which, and for damages and expenses amounting to thirteen
hundred dollars, the plaintiff demands judgment. The defendants did
not think fit to traverse these allegations, but moved to dismiss
on the face of the complaint. Upon such a motion, as upon a
demurrer, a court will not incline to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction unless the facts appearing of record create a legal
certainty of that conclusion.
Barry v. Edmunds,
116 U. S. 550;
Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115. We
are not impressed by the criticism that the amount, instead of the
matter, in dispute, is alleged to have exceeded two thousand
dollars. The meaning of such an allegation is clear, and in the
absence of any traverse thereof, and of any pretense that in point
of fact the matter in dispute did not exceed the sum or value of
two thousand dollars, we think that the record fairly imports the
necessary jurisdictional amount.
The next contention, that the circuit court could not take
jurisdiction because the record did not disclose that the
controversy was between citizens of different states, seems to us
to have been well founded. The complaint alleged that Stratton, one
of the defendants, was a citizen of the same state as the
plaintiff. Not only was Stratton named as a party defendant in the
complaint, but a summons was sued out against him as such, and the
motion to dismiss the complaint was made
Page 175 U. S. 575
in behalf of Stratton as well as of the Portland Gold Mining
Company.
It is, however, argued that, as it is alleged in the complaint
that Stratton had conveyed by deed his interest in the mining claim
to the Portland Gold Mining Company, Stratton was a nominal party
only, whose presence on the record would not defeat the
jurisdiction of the court as between the other parties, and cases
are cited in which it has been held that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts will not be defeated by the mere joinder or
nonjoinder of formal parties.
Wormley v.
Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421;
Wood v.
Davis, 18 How. 467;
Walden v. Skinner,
101 U. S. 577.
But considering the nature of the suit and the relief sought
thereby, we are not prepared to hold that Stratton was a purely
formal and unnecessary party. It is clear from the provisions of
sections 2325 and 2326, Revised Statutes, that they contemplate a
controversy between an applicant for a patent and an adverse
claimant. Under the first of these sections, Stratton, as the
complaint shows, made personal application in the United States
land office at Pueblo for a patent.
In order, therefore, that a controversy could arise under these
sections, Stratton must have complied with the provisions of
section 2325 by having located a piece of land and by having filed
in the land office an application under oath for a patent, showing
compliance, together with a plat and field notes of the claim, made
by or under the direction of the United States surveyor general,
showing accurately the boundaries of the claim, which shall be
distinctly marked by monuments on the ground, and by having posted
a copy of such plat, together with a notice of such application for
a patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat
previous to the filing of the application for a patent, and by
filing an affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has
been duly posted, and by filing a copy of the notice in the land
office.
It is quite evident under these provisions and the allegations
of the complaint that, when Blackburn desired to file an adverse
claim, he was informed by the proceedings in the
Page 175 U. S. 576
land office that Stratton was the applicant for the patent and
was asserting his compliance with the statute, and was therefore a
proper and necessary party to make defendant. Why he included the
Portland Gold Mining Company as a party defendant is not quite
evident, but it may be conjectured that he wished to raise some
question as to the validity of Stratton's proceedings in the land
office after he had, as alleged, parted with his interest in the
claim. However this may be, we are of opinion that Blackburn could
not proceed safely and formally to raise an issue by an adverse
claim without making the person claiming the patent a party
defendant when he instituted his proceedings in court.
Nevertheless, even if the circuit court could not take
jurisdiction of the case because the controversy was not between
citizens of different states, it is claimed that the court had
jurisdiction because an adverse suit, or suit brought in support of
a protest and adverse claim, under the provisions of sections 2325
and 2326 of the Revised Statutes, is a suit arising under the laws
of the United States in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court, regardless of the citizenship of the parties.
This presents an important question, one that has been
differently answered in the lower courts which have been called
upon to decide it.
Burke v. Bunker Hill Mining Co., 46 F.
644;
Trafton v. Nougues, 4 Sawyer 178;
Rutter v.
Shoshone Mining Co., 75 F. 37;
Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 87 F. 801.
It may be well to quote in full the language of the sections in
question:
"SEC. 2325. A patent for any land claimed and located for
valuable deposits may be obtained in the following manner: any
person, association, or corporation authorized to locate a claim
under this chapter, having claimed and located a piece of land for
such purposes, who has or have complied with the terms of this
chapter may file in the proper land office an application for a
patent, under oath, showing such compliance, together with a plat
and filed notes of the claim or claims in common, made by or under
the direction of the United States
Page 175 U. S. 577
surveyor general, showing accurately the boundaries of the claim
or claims, which shall be distinctly marked by monuments on the
ground, and shall post a copy of such plat, together with a notice
of such application for a patent, in a conspicuous place on the
land embraced in such plat previous to the filing of the
application for a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least
two persons that such notice has been duly posted, and shall file a
copy of the notice in such land office, and shall thereupon be
entitled to a patent for the land, in the manner following: the
register of the land office, upon the filing of such application,
plat, field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice
that such application has been made, for the period of sixty days,
in a newspaper to be by him designated as published nearest to such
claim, and he shall also post such notice in his office for the
same period. The claimant, at the time of filing this application
or at any time thereafter within the sixty days of publication,
shall file with the register a certificate of the United States
surveyor general that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been
expended or improvements made upon the claim by himself or
grantors, that the plat is correct, with such further description
by such reference to natural objects or permanent monuments as
shall identify the claim, and furnish an accurate description, to
be incorporated in the patent. At the expiration of the sixty days
of publication, the claimant shall file his affidavit showing that
a plat and notice have been posted in a conspicuous place on the
claim during such period of publication. If no adverse claim shall
have been filed with the register and the receiver of the proper
land office at the expiration of the sixty days of publication, it
shall be assumed that the applicant is entitled to a patent, upon
the payment to the proper officer of five dollars per acre, and
that no adverse claim exists, and thereafter no objection from
third parties to the issuance of a patent shall be heard, except it
be shown that the applicant has failed to comply with the terms of
this chapter."
"SEC. 2326. Where an adverse claim is filed during the period of
publication, it shall be upon oath of the person or persons making
the same, and shall show the nature, boundaries,
Page 175 U. S. 578
and extent of said adverse claim, and all proceedings, except
the publication of notice and making and filing of the affidavit
thereof, shall be stayed until the controversy shall have been
settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
adverse claim waived. It shall be the duty of the adverse claimant,
within thirty days after filing his claim, to commence proceedings
in a court of competent jurisdiction, to determine the question of
the right of possession, and prosecute the same with reasonable
diligence to final judgment, and a failure so to do shall be a
waiver of his adverse claim. After such judgment shall have been
rendered, the party entitled to the possession of the claim, or any
portion thereof, may, without giving further notice, file a
certified copy of the judgment roll with the register of the land
office, together with the certification of the surveyor general
that the requisite amount of labor has been expended or
improvements made thereon, and the description required in other
cases, and shall pay to the receiver five dollars per acre for his
claim, together with the proper fees, whereupon the whole
proceedings and the judgment roll shall be certified by the
register to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and a
patent shall issue thereon for the claim, or such portion thereof
as the applicant shall appear, from the decision of the court, to
rightly possess. If it appears from the decision of the court that
several parties are entitled to separate and different portions of
the claim, each party may pay for his portion of the claim, with
the proper fees, and file the certificate and description by the
surveyor general, whereupon the register shall certify the
proceedings and judgment roll to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, as in the preceding case, and patent shall issue to
the several parties according to their respective rights. Nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent the alienation of
the title conveyed by a patent for a mining claim to any person
whatever."
The first observation to be made is that Congress did not intend
to prescribe jurisdiction in any particular court, state or
federal.
"It shall be the duty of the adverse claimant, within thirty
days after filing his claim, to
commence proceedings
Page 175 U. S. 579
in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the
question of the right of possession, and prosecute the same with
reasonable diligence to final judgment."
The natural inference from this language is that the competency
of the adjudicating court was not to be determined by the mere fact
that the mining claims in controversy consisted of lands the title
to which was in the United States. If that fact alone were to be
decisive, no other than a federal court would have been mentioned.
We think the intention of Congress in this legislation was to leave
open to suitors all courts competent to determine the question of
the right of possession. If the parties to the controversy were
citizens of different states, and if the matter in dispute exceeded
the sum or value of two thousand dollars, then the claimant might
elect to commence proceedings in a federal or in a state court,
because either would be competent to determine the question of the
right of possession. But if the usual conditions of federal
jurisdiction did not exist -- that is, if there was no adverse
citizenship and if the matter in dispute did not exceed two
thousand dollars -- then the party claimant could proceed in a
state court.
The Court has frequently been vainly asked to hold that
controversies in respect to lands, one of the parties to which had
derived his title directly under an act of Congress, for that
reason alone presented a federal question. Thus, in
Romie v.
Casanova, 91 U. S. 379, which
was an action brought to recover the possession of certain lands in
the City of San Jose, the question to be determined was which of
two parties had actually obtained a grant of the particular
premises in question. The title of the city had originated before
the cession of California to the United States. But this Court
said:
"The title of the city was not drawn in question. Even if it
depended upon the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo and the several acts
of Congress to ascertain and settle private land claims in
California, the case would not be different. Both parties admit
that title, and their litigation extends only to the determination
of the rights which they have severally acquired under it."
Accordingly, the writ of error to the Supreme Court of
California was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Page 175 U. S. 580
Again, in
McStay v. Friedman, 92 U. S.
723, where in ejectment for a part of the lands
confirmed to the City of San Francisco by an act of Congress, the
validity and operative effect of which were not questioned, this
Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the Supreme Court of California, saying:
"No federal question was involved in the decision of the supreme
court. The city title was not drawn in question. The real
controversy was as to the transfer of that title to the plaintiffs
in error, and this did not depend upon the 'Constitution, or any
treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.'"
Gold Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S.
199, was a suit in equity in a state court of
California, and brought on petition into the circuit court of the
United States on the allegation that its determination involved the
construction of certain laws of the United States affecting rights
in public and mineral lands. The circuit court remanded the case to
the state court on the ground that no real or substantial
controversy, properly within the jurisdiction of a federal court,
appeared to be involved. That judgment of the circuit court was
affirmed by this Court in an opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Waite, a
portion of which was as follows:
"The attempt to transfer this cause was made under that part of
section 2 of the act of 1875 which provides for the removal of
suits 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.' In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, a case"
"may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of
the United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the
construction of either."
"
Cohen v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 379. Or when"
"the title or right set up by the party may be defeated by one
construction of the Constitution or law of the United States, or
sustained by the opposite construction."
Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 822.
"
* * * *"
"In this petition, the defendants set forth their ownership, by
title derived under the laws of the United States, of certain
valuable mines that can only be worked by the hydraulic process,
which necessarily requires the use of the
Page 175 U. S. 581
channels of the river and its tributaries in the manner
complained of, and they allege that they claim the right to this
use under the provisions of certain specified acts of Congress.
They also allege that the action arises under, and that its
determination will necessarily involve and require the construction
of, the laws of the United States specifically enumerated, as well
as the preemption laws. They state no facts to show the right they
claim, or to enable able the court to see whether it necessarily
depends upon the construction of the statutes. . . . The statutes
referred to contain many provisions; but the particular provision
relied on is nowhere indicated. A cause cannot be removed from a
state court simply because, in the progress of the litigation, it
may become necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or
laws of the United States. The decision of the case must depend
upon that construction. The suit must, in part at least, arise out
of a controversy between the parties in regard to the operation and
effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved. . . .
Before, therefore, a circuit court can be required to retain a
cause under this jurisdiction, it must in some form appear upon the
record, by a statement of facts, 'in legal and logical form,' such
as is required in good pleading, . . . that the suit is one which
'really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy' as to
a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the
Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States."
What is meant by the provision in section 2326, that the
question of the right of possession should be determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was thus spoken of in
Chambers v.
Harrington, 111 U. S. 350:
"It is apparent that the statute requires a judicial proceeding
in a competent court. What is a competent court is not specifically
stated, but it undoubtedly means a court of general jurisdiction,
whether it be a state court or a federal court, and as the very
essence of the trial is to determine rights by a regular procedure
in such court, after the usual methods, which rights are dependent
upon the laws of the United States, we see no reason why, if the
amount in controversy is
Page 175 U. S. 582
sufficient in a case tried in a court of the United States, or a
proper case is made on a writ of error to a state court, the
judgment may not be brought to this Court for review as in other
similar cases."
This statement is not inconsistent with the cases herein
previously cited, as the right to review the judgment of a state
court is said to be limited to a proper case having been made,
clearly implying that some federal question should be involved, and
that a mere controversy as to the right of possession would not
make such a proper case; for otherwise every case arising under
section 2326 would be a proper case.
In
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135
U. S. 299, Mr. Justice Miller, in discussing the scope
of these sections, said:
"It is true that there are no very distinctive words declaring
what kind of adverse claim is required to be set up as a defense
against the party making publication; but throughout the whole of
these sections and the original statute from which they were
transferred to the Revised Statutes, the words 'claim' and
'claimant' are used. This word is, in all legislation of Congress
on the subject, used in regard to a claim not yet perfected by a
title from the government by way of a patent. And the purpose of
the statute seems to be that where there are two claimants to the
same mine, neither of whom has yet acquired the title from the
government, they shall bring their respective claims to the same
property, in the manner prescribed in the statute, before some
judicial tribunal located in the neighborhood where the property
is, and that the result of this judicial investigation shall govern
the action of the officers of the land department in determining
which of these claimants shall have the patent, the final evidence
of title, from the government."
The ruling in
Bushnell v. Crooke Mining & Smelting
Co., 148 U. S. 682, is
directly applicable to the present case. There, a writ of error
brought to this Court a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State
of Colorado. The suit was in ejectment brought by the Crooke Mining
Company in a state court against Bushnell, to recover possession of
a certain portion of the surface
Page 175 U. S. 583
location of a mining claim on Ute mountain, and grew out of
conflicting and interfering locations of mining claims. The claim
of the latter was first located, but when the company applied for a
patent Bushnell filed an adverse claim to a portion of the same
location, and thereafter, under section 2326 of the Revised
Statutes, and within the time prescribed therein, commenced his
action in the state court. In the complaint, it was alleged that
the plaintiff was the owner of the Annie Lodge mining claim, and
that defendants had at a certain date, entered upon and ever since
wrongfully held possession of a part of said claim, specifically
described, and that the action was in support of plaintiff's
adverse claim to such portion of the surface location. The question
presented on the trial of the controversy arose out of conflicting
and interfering locations, and the court gave and refused certain
requests to charge the jury, which appear at length in the report
of the case in this Court. The trial resulted in a verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. An appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of Colorado, which affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. The Supreme Court of Colorado rested its judgment upon the
general proposition that the trial court had correctly stated to
the jury the principal point in controversy, and had left it
properly to them to determine, as a matter of fact, what was the
course of the conflicting lodes. The case was then brought to this
Court, and was heard on a motion to dismiss the writ or affirm the
judgment.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in sustaining the motion to dismiss,
said:
"It is plainly manifest that neither the pleadings nor the
instructions given and refused present any federal question, and an
examination of the opinion of the supreme court affirming the
action of the trial court as to instructions given, as well as to
its refusal to give the instructions asked by the defendants below,
fails to disclose the presence of any federal question. It does not
appear from the record that any right, privilege, or immunity under
the Constitution or laws of the United States was specially set up
or claimed by the defendant
Page 175 U. S. 584
below, or that any such right was denied them, or was even
passed upon by the supreme court of the state, nor does it appear
from anything disclosed in the record that the necessary effect in
law of the judgment was the denial of any right claimed under the
laws of the United States."
"The decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado in no way brought
into question the validity or even construction of any federal
statute, and it certainly did not deny to the plaintiffs in error
any right arising out of the construction of the federal statutes.
It was said by the Chief Justice in
Cook County v. Calumet
& Chicago Canal Co., 138 U. S. 653:"
"The validity of a statute is not drawn in question every time
rights claimed under such statute are controverted, nor is the
validity of an authority every time an act done by such authority
is disputed."
Accordingly, the writ of error to the Supreme Court of Colorado
was dismissed.
The legal import of this decision plainly is that a controversy
between rival claimants under sections 2325 and 2326 of the Revised
Statutes may be properly determined by a state court, and that the
judgment of a state supreme court, in such a case, cannot be
reviewed by this Court simply because the parties were claiming
rights under the federal statute.
Colorado Central Consolidated Mining Co. v. Turck,
150 U. S. 138, was
brought to this Court on a writ of error to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. An action of ejectment by Turck
against the mining company for possession of a certain lode mining
claim had been tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Colorado, and determined in the plaintiff's favor.
The case was taken by writ of error to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the judgment was there
affirmed, and thereupon a writ of error was allowed to this Court.
The case was here heard on a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the suit was between citizens of different states, and that
therefore under the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, the judgment of
the circuit court of appeals was final. An attempt was made in
argument to sustain the right
Page 175 U. S. 585
of this Court to take jurisdiction because, although the suit
was between citizens of different states, yet that the solution of
the disputed ownership depended upon the construction and
application of section 2322 of the Revised Statutes, concerning the
dip and apex of lodes, and that hence the suit really and
substantially involved a controversy only to be determined by
reference to the federal statute. But this contention did not
prevail, and the writ of error was dismissed.
While it is true that the conclusion reached was mainly put upon
the ground that the record did not disclose affirmatively that any
distinctive federal question was involved, yet, as the record did
disclose a controversy between claimants arising under a federal
mining statute, it is a necessary implication of the decision that
that fact alone did not render the case one of which the circuit
court could take jurisdiction irrespective of citizenship, but that
other and apt allegations were required showing that the
controversy was determinable by one of two conflicting
constructions of the federal statute, and not one of mere fact in
which the validity of the statute was not drawn into question.
A similar principle was involved in
Gillis v.
Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658.
That was a suit brought in a state court of California, and
concerned the ownership of a mining claim. The case was brought to
this Court, and it was claimed that, as the question in dispute
could only be determined by an application of sections 2322 and
2336 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, such a state of
facts appearing by the record, there was disclosed a federal
question which, of itself, gave this Court jurisdiction to review
the judgment of the supreme court of the state. But a motion to
dismiss the writ of error was allowed. It is true that this Court
put its judgment on the ground that the judgment of the state
supreme court was based upon an estoppel, deemed by that court to
operate against the plaintiff in error upon general principles of
law, irrespective of any federal question. Still, the case is
authority for the proposition that controversies in respect to
titles derived under the mining laws of the United States may be
legitimately determined in the state courts, and that to enable
Page 175 U. S. 586
this court to review the judgment in such a case, it must appear
not only that the application of a federal statute was involved,
but that the controversy was determined by a construction put upon
the statute adverse to the contention of one of the parties.
In
Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U.
S. 408, it was held that the mere fact that the matter
in controversy in an action is a sum of money received by one of
the parties as an award under the treaty of the United States with
a foreign power, providing for the submission of claims against
that power to arbitration, does not in any way draw in question the
validity or construction of that treaty, so as to confer
jurisdiction on this Court to review the judgment of a circuit
court of the United States. In this case,
Gill
v. Oliver, 11 How. 545, was cited, in which a writ
of error to the court of appeals of Maryland was dismissed because,
although the matter in dispute was money derived under a treaty
with Mexico, yet such a dispute did not involve any question as to
the validity or construction of the treaty, Mr. Justice Grier
saying:
"Both parties claim money in court; and, in order to test the
value of their respective assignments, . . . introduce the history
of the claim from its origin. The treaty and award are facts in
that history. They were before the court but as facts, and not for
construction. If A hold land under a patent from the United States
or a Spanish grant ratified by treaty, and his heirs, devisees, or
assignees dispute as to which have the best title under him, this
does not make a case for the jurisdiction of this Court under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. If neither the validity
nor the construction of the patent or title under the treaty is
contested, if both parties claim under it, and the contest arises
from some question without or
dehors the patent or treaty,
it is plainly no case for our interference under this section. That
the title originated in such a patent or treaty is a fact in the
history of the case incidental to it, but the essential controversy
between the parties is without and beyond it."
It should not be overlooked that sections 2325 and 2326 form a
part of a general scheme in reference to the mineral
Page 175 U. S. 587
lands of the United States. That scheme is contained in chapter
6 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and includes
sections from 2318 to 2352. Some light is thrown upon the intention
of Congress, in the particular we are now considering, by other
provisions than those expressed in sections 2325 and 2326.
Thus, section 2319 enacts that
"all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United
States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be
free and open to exploration and purchase, . . . by citizens of the
United States and those who have declared their intention to become
such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the
local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts,
so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States."
Section 2324 provides that
"the miners of each mining district may make regulations not in
conflict with the laws of the United States, or with the laws of
the the state or territory in which the district is situated,
governing the location, manner of recording, amount of work
necessary to hold possession of a mining claim,"
etc.
Section 2322 enacts that where claimants
"have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the
time prescribed by the statute of limitations for mining claims of
the state or territory where the same may be situated, evidence of
such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be
sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this
chapter, in the absence of any adverse claim,"
etc.
Section 2339 provides that
"whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have
vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by
the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the
possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same,"
etc.
Without undertaking to say that no cases can arise under this
legislation which turn upon a disputed construction, and therefore
presenting a question essentially federal in its
Page 175 U. S. 588
nature, we hold that clearly where a patent is authorized to be
issued to the party in possession, the statutes refer the contest
to the ordinary tribunals, which are to determine the rights of the
parties without any controversy as to the construction of those
acts, but are to be guided by the laws, regulations, and customs of
the mining district in which the lands are situated. In a case,
therefore, like the present, where federal jurisdiction does not
arise because the parties are citizens of different states and
where no question is made as to the meaning and construction of the
statutes of the United States, the state courts are to be regarded,
within the letter and meaning of section 2326, as courts of
"competent jurisdiction to determine the right of possession." The
judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN did not sit in this case, and took no part in
its decision.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissents.