Gillis v. Stinchfield,
Annotate this Case
159 U.S. 658 (1895)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U.S. 658 (1895)
Gillis v. Stinchfield
Submitted November 11, 1895
Decided November 25, 1895
159 U.S. 658
The decision by the highest court of a state that the grantor of a portion of the ground of a mining claim is estopped, on general principles of law and by the statutes of the state, from claiming priority of title to a space of vein-intersection within the granted premises, by reason of his locating the portion retained by himself before a location of the granted portion by his grantee, presents no federal question.
This was an action brought by Stinchfield against Gillis and others in the Superior Court of Tuolumne County, California, to recover the value of certain gold alleged to have been taken by defendants from the mining claim of plaintiff. Gillis for many years had held and asserted ownership of a mining claim known as the "Carrington," and had sold and conveyed by deed of grant, bargain, and sale a portion of the ground to Stinchfield. Immediately after executing the deed to Stinchfield, Gillis located that portion of the claim which he retained, and denominated his location the "Carrington," and afterwards Stinchfield located the ground he had purchased and denominated it the "Pine Tree" claim. Thereafter Gillis,
or those under him, entered upon the ground he had sold to Stinchfield at the intersection of two veins, one of which had its apex in the portion of the original claim which Gillis had retained and the other had its apex in the ground sold to Stinchfield, and dug out and appropriated a large amount of gold, the space of vein intersection from which the gold was taken being entirely in Stinchfield's ground.
The trial court gave judgment for Stinchfield, and Gillis appealed to the Supreme Court of California, by which the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 40 P. 98. The supreme court was of opinion that Gillis was estopped, under the law of California, by his deed to Stinchfield, from claiming priority of title of the space of vein intersection by reason of the location which he had made after the execution of the deed, but before the location by Stinchfield of the ground conveyed to him. The same conclusion had been reached and announced on a former appeal. 96 Cal. 33.
A writ of error from this Court having been allowed, a motion to dismiss was submitted.