On the 31st day of August, 18?6, the Seneca Nation by treaty and
conveyance conveyed away the lands sued for in this action for a
valuable consideration, the receipt of which was acknowledged, but
the treaty was not ratified by the Senate or proclaimed by the
President. On the 13th of October, 1885, this action was commenced
in the Supreme Court of New York to recover a portion of the lands
so conveyed. It was brought under the provisions of the Act of May
8, 1845, c. 150, of the Laws of New York for that year, entitled
"An act for the protection and improvement of the Seneca Indians,"
etc. The trial court gave judgment for defendant, which judgment
was sustained by the Court of Appeals of the state on two grounds:
(1) that the grant of August, 1826, was a valid transaction, not in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States, or of the
Indian Intercourse Act of 1802, and, (2) that
Page 162 U. S. 284
the right of recovery under the New York Act of 1845 was barred
by the statute of limitations.
Held that as the judgment
could be maintained upon the second ground, which involved no
federal question, this Court, under the well established rule, must
be held to be without jurisdiction, and the writ of error must be
dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action of ejectment brought by the Seneca Nation of
Indians against Harrison B. Christy in the Supreme Court, Erie
County, New York, to recover possession of
"all that certain piece or parcel of land situate, lying, and
being in the Town of Brant, County of Erie, and State of New York,
and known and distinguished as being lot number twenty-five (25) in
the tract of land known as being the three thousand eight hundred
and forty acre tract taken from the Cattaraugus Indian reservation,
as surveyed by James Read, surveyor, and commonly known as the
'Mile Strip' in the said Town of Brant, and containing one hundred
acres,"
and for damages.
The complaint was verified December 1, 1885, and the answer,
January 11, 1886. The answer consisted of a general denial, the
plea of the statute of limitations of twenty years, and that the
plaintiff had not the legal right, title, capacity, or authority to
maintain the action. The case was tried upon facts stipulated, and
documentary evidence.
The premises in question were part of a large tract of land in
the western part of the State of New York, the title to which was
in controversy between the states of New York and Massachusetts
prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, which
controversy was settled by a compact between those states, December
16, 1786. By that compact, the State of New York ceded, granted,
released, and confirmed
Page 162 U. S. 285
to the State of Massachusetts and its grantees, their heirs and
assigns, forever, the right of preemption of the soil from the
native Indians, and all other estate, right, title, and property
therein belonging to the State of New York; but New York retained
the right of government, sovereignty, and jurisdiction.
Massachusetts was empowered to hold treaties and conferences with
the native Indians to extinguish the Indian title, and it was
provided that that commonwealth might grant the right of preemption
of the whole or any part of said lands and territories to any
person or persons who, by virtue of such grant, should have a good
right to extinguish by purchase the claims of the native Indians,
provided that such purchase should be made in the presence of a
superintendent appointed by Massachusetts, and be approved by the
commonwealth. This compact was duly ratified by the United States
after the adoption of the federal Constitution.
By a treaty between the Six Nations of Indians, which included
the Senecas, and the United States, dated November 11, 1794 at
Canandaigua, New York -- Timothy Pickering acting as commissioner
on behalf of the United States, 7 Stat. 44 -- it was agreed that
the lands of the Senecas situated in the western part of the State
of New York, described in the treaty (embracing the land in
controversy) "shall remain theirs until they choose to sell to the
people of the United States who have the right to purchase."
Prior to August 31, 1826, all the right of preemption and title
of Massachusetts in a large part of these lands had been conveyed
by sundry mesne conveyances to Robert Troup, Thomas L. Ogden, and
Benjamin W. Rogers. By a treaty and conveyance on that day, the
Seneca Nation, by its sachems, chiefs, and warriors, in the
presence of a superintendent on behalf of the State of
Massachusetts and a commissioner appointed by the United States,
conveyed a tract of 87,000 acres of the lands, including that in
suit, to Troup, Ogden, and Rogers for the consideration of $48,216,
acknowledged by the deed to have been in hand paid. This conveyance
was approved and confirmed by the State of Massachusetts, but the
treaty was not ratified by
Page 162 U. S. 286
the Senate of the United States, or proclaimed by the
President.
Soon after the making of said treaty or conveyance, Troup,
Ogden, and Rogers entered into full and exclusive possession of the
lands described therein. They were divided into parcels, sold, and
conveyed, extensive and valuable improvements were made thereon,
and for more than fifty years they have been in the possession of
the grantees and purchasers under them, claiming title under the
grant, and without protest on the part of the United States, the
state, or the Seneca Nation. Defendant held title from Troup,
Ogden, and Rogers and their grantees, and at the beginning of this
action was in possession, claiming under and by virtue thereof.
In 1827, the sum of $43,050 of the consideration set forth in
the conveyance of August 31, 1826, was deposited in the Ontario
Bank at Canandaigua, New York, and afterwards, and in the year
1855, that sum was, pursuant to § 3 of an Act of Congress of June
27, 1846, 9 Stat. 20, 35, c. 34, paid into the Treasury of the
United States. The interest thereon from 1827 has been annually
paid to and received by plaintiff in error.
Plaintiff in error contended that no valid purchase was made by
the treaty of August 31, 1826, because that treaty was not formally
ratified by the Senate of the United States and proclaimed as such
by the President of the United States, and further that the
purchase was invalid because in contravention of the twelfth
section of the Act of Congress of March 30, 1802, "to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes." 2 Stat. 139.
This action was brought by the Seneca Nation under an Act of the
State of New York of May 8, 1845, entitled "An act for the
protection and improvement of the Seneca Indians residing on the
Cattaraugus and Allegany reservations in this state." Laws New
York, 1845, p. 146, c. 150; N.Y.Rev.Stat. (7th ed.) 295. The first
section of this act reads as follows:
"§ 1. The Seneca Indians residing on the Allegany and
Cattaraugus reservations in this state, shall be deemed to
Page 162 U. S. 287
hold and possess the said reservations as a distinct community,
and in and by the name of 'The Seneca Nation of Indians,' may
prosecute and maintain in all courts of law and equity in this
state any action, suit or proceeding which may be necessary or
proper to protect the rights and interests of the said Indians and
of the said nation, in and to the said reservations, and in and to
the reservation called the 'Oil Spring Reservation,' and every part
thereof, and especially may maintain any action of ejectment to
recover the possession of any part of the said reservations
unlawfully withheld from them, and any action of trespass or on the
case, for any injury to the soil of the said reservations, or for
cutting down or removing or converting any timber or wood growing
or being thereon, or any action of replevin for any timber or wood
removed therefrom, and may maintain any action or suit as aforesaid
for the recovery of any damage for any injury to the common
property or rights of the said Indians or for the recovery of any
sum of money, property or effects, due or to become due, or
belonging, or in any way appertaining to the said Indians in
common, or to the said Seneca Nation, and where such injury has
been heretofore sustained or any such damages have heretofore been
suffered by the said Indians in common, or as a nation, actions
therefor, and to recover damages for such wrongs may likewise be
brought and maintained as herein provided in the same manner and
within the same time as if brought by citizens of this state in
relation to their private individual property and rights, and in
every such suit, action, or proceeding in relation to lands or real
estate situated within the said reservations, the said Seneca
Nation may allege a seisin in fee, and every recovery in such
action shall be as and for and in reference to a fee; but neither
such recovery or anything herein contained shall enlarge or in any
way affect the right, title, or interest of the said Seneca Nation
or of the said Indians in and to the said reservations, as between
them and the grantees or assignees of the preemption right of the
said reservations under the grants of the State of Massachusetts. .
. ."
The trial court directed a verdict for defendant and
rendered
Page 162 U. S. 288
judgment thereon, and this judgment was affirmed by the general
term on appeal. 49 Hun. 524. The case was carried to the Court of
Appeals of New York, and the judgment affirmed. 126 N.Y. 122, 127.
This writ of error was then brought.
The Court of Appeals considered the case fully on the merits,
and was of opinion
"that the grant of August 31, 1826, was a valid transaction, and
was not in contravention of the provisions of the federal
Constitution or of the Indian intercourse act of 1802, and vested
in the purchasers a good title in fee simple absolute to the lands
granted, free from any claim of the Seneca Nation,"
and also that, conceding
"the invalidity of the grant of August 31, 1826, under the
Indian Intercourse Act of 1802, nevertheless the title was
subsequently confirmed and made good by the act of Congress of
1846, authorizing the President to receive from the Ontario Bank,
and deposit in the Treasury of the United States, the money and
securities representing the purchase money of the lands, followed
by the transfer of the fund to the United States in 1855."
The court further held:
"We are also of opinion that, as the right of the plaintiff to
sue was given by and is dependent upon the statute, chapter 150 of
the Laws of 1845 (
see Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige, 607),
the statute of limitations is a bar to the action. By the act of
1845, the actions thereby authorized are to be brought and
maintained 'in the same time' as if brought by citizens of the
state. The question is not whether an Indian title can be barred by
adverse possession or by state statutes of limitation. The point is
that the plaintiff cannot invoke a special remedy given by the
statute without being bound by the conditions on which it is
given."
In
Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige 607, it was held by
Chancellor Walworth that the Indians in New York had
"an unquestionable right to the use, possession, and occupancy
of the lands of their respective reservations, which they have not
voluntarily ceded to the state, nor granted to individuals by its
permission, and the ultimate fee of such reservations is vested in
the state, or in its grantees, subject to such right of use and
occupancy by the Indians, until they shall voluntarily
Page 162 U. S. 289
relinquish the same,"
that the right of the Seneca Nation to the use and possession of
the Cattaraugus reservation was in all the individuals composing
the Nation, residing on such reservation in their collective
capacity, and that, they having no corporate name, no provision was
made by law for bringing an ejectment suit to recover the
possession of such lands for their benefit, nor could they maintain
an action at law in the name of their tribe to recover damages
sustained by them by reason of trespasses committed on their
reservations or to recover compensation for the use of their lands
when unlawfully intruded upon, although a bill might be filed by
one or more of them, in behalf of themselves and other Indians
interested, to project their rights and to obtain compensation.
And see 21 U. S.
McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543;
Mitchel v. United
States, 9 Pet. 711,
34 U. S. 745;
Cayuga Indians v. State, 99 N.Y. 235.
This decision appears to have been rendered May 6, 1845, and on
the 8th of May, the act was passed, the first section of which has
been quoted above.
The proper construction of this Enabling Act and the time within
which an action might be brought and maintained thereunder it was
the province of the state courts to determine.
De Saussure v.
Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216;
Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647.
The Seneca Nation availed itself of the act in bringing this
action, which was subject to the provision, as held by the Court of
Appeals, that it could only be brought and maintained "in the same
manner and within the same time as if brought by citizens of this
state in relation to their private individual property and rights."
Under the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff was an Indian
tribe cannot make federal questions of the correct construction of
the act and the bar of the statute of limitations.
As it appears that the decision of the Court of Appeals was
rested, in addition to other grounds, upon a distinct and
independent ground not involving any federal question and
sufficient in itself to maintain the judgment, the writ of error
falls within the well settled rule on that subject, and cannot
be
Page 162 U. S. 290
maintained.
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.
S. 361;
Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U.
S. 658.
Writ of error dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the
argument, and took no part in the consideration and decision of
this case.