1. A "clean" bill of lading -- that is to say a bill of lading
which is silent as to the place of stowage -- imports a contract
that the goods are to be stowed under deck.
2. This being so, parol evidence of an agreement that they were
to be stowed on deck is inadmissible.
The Oregon Iron Company, on the 8th of May, 1868, shipped on
board the bark Delaware, then at Portland, Oregon, 76 tons of pig
iron, to be carried to San Francisco, at a freight of $4.50 a ton.
The bill of lading was in these words:
"Shipped, in good order and condition, by Oregon Iron Company,
on board the good bark
Delaware, Shillaber, master, now
lying in the port of Portland, and bound to San Francisco, to say
seventy-five tons pig iron, more or less (contents, quality, and
weight unknown), being marked as in the margin, and are to be
delivered in like good order and condition at the aforesaid port of
San Francisco, at ship's tackles (the dangers of the seas, fire,
and collision excepted) unto _____, or assigns, he or they paying
freight for the said goods in United States gold coin (before
delivery, if required), as per margin, with 5 percent primage and
average accustomed."
"In witness whereof the master or agent of said vessel hath
affirmed to three bills of lading, all of this tenor and date; one
of which being accomplished, the others to stand void. Vessel not
accountable for breakage, leakage, or rust."
"C. E. SHILLABER"
"For the captain"
"PORTLAND, May 8, 1868"
The iron was not delivered at San Francisco, and on a libel
filed by the Iron Company, the defense set up was that by a verbal
agreement made between the Iron Company and the master of the ship
before the shipment or the signing of the bill of lading, the iron
was stowed on deck, and that the
Page 81 U. S. 580
whole of it, with the exception of 6 tons and 90 lbs., had been
jettisoned in a storm.
On the trial, the owners of the vessel offered proof of this
parol agreement. The libellants objected, and the court excluded
the evidence on the ground that parol proof was inadmissible to
vary the bill of lading; and decreed in favor of the libellants for
the iron that was thrown overboard. On appeal the case was disposed
of in the same way in the circuit court. It was now here, the
question being, as in the two courts below, whether in a suit upon
a bill of lading like the one here, for nondelivery of goods stowed
on deck, and jettisoned at sea, it is competent, in the absence of
a custom to stow such goods on deck, to prove by parol a verbal
agreement for such a stowage.
The district court, in its opinion, among other things, said as
follows:
"It is not disputed that the ordinary bill of lading
imports
that the goods are to be safely stowed under deck. It must
also be admitted that, if they are stowed on deck with the consent
of the shipper, or in accordance with a well established and
generally recognized usage, either of the particular trade or in
respect of a particular kind of goods, the ship will not be liable.
The point presented is, whether the consent of the shipper can be
proved by parol."
"The case of
Creery v. Holly, [
Footnote 1] is directly in point. In that case Mr.
Justice Nelson says:"
" It is true that in this case nothing is said in the bill of
lading as to the manner of stowing the goods, whether on deck or
under deck; but the case concedes that the legal import of the
contract, as well as the understanding and usage of merchants,
impose upon the master the duty of putting them under deck, unless
otherwise stipulated; and if such is the judgment of the law upon
the face of the instrument, parol evidence is as inadmissible to
alter it as if the duty was stated in express terms. It was part of
the contract. It seems to me it would be extremely dangerous, and
subject to the full force of every objection that excludes the
admission of this species of evidence, to permit any stipulation,
express or implied, in these instruments, to be thus varied. . . .
If the implied obligation of the master in this case,
Page 81 U. S. 581
arising out of the conceded construction of the bill of lading,
may be varied by parol evidence, I do not see how any other
stipulation included in it could be sustained upon an offer to
impeach it in the same way."
"In
Niles v. Culver, [
Footnote 2] the same principle was applied to a
memorandum, which imported a contract."
"In
White v. Van Kirk, [
Footnote 3] parol proof offered by a shipper of goods to
show that the master agreed to take a particular route was held to
be inadmissible."
"In
The Waldo, [
Footnote 4] the language of Mr. Justice Ware is nearly
identical with that of Mr. Justice Nelson, above quoted:"
" It is true that the bill of lading does not say in express
terms that the goods shall be stowed under deck, but
this is a
condition tacitly annexed to the contract by operation of law,
and it is equally binding on the master, and the shipper is equally
entitled to its benefit, although it was stated in express terms.
The parol evidence, then, is offered to control the legal operation
of the bill of lading, and it is as inadmissible as though it were
to contradict its words."
"In
Garrison v. Memphis Insurance Company, [
Footnote 5] it was held that, where the
bill of lading mentioned that the carrier was not to be responsible
for injuries caused by the 'perils of the river,' parol evidence
was inadmissible to show that by usage 'fire' was included among
those perils."
"
* * * *"
"Where a promissory note mentions no time of payment, the law
adjudges it to be due immediately, and parol evidence is not
admissible to show a different time of payment agreed upon by the
parties at the time it was executed. [
Footnote 6]"
These and other cases were relied on by the court, and in
addition to them
Barber v. Brace, in the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, [
Footnote 7] was
cited by counsel, to show that "a parol agreement anterior to a
written contract is inadmissible."
The question, as the reader familiar with the decisions on the
subject will see, is one upon which opinions not consistent with
some of those thus above quoted have been
Page 81 U. S. 582
given in certain courts. In this Court the question had never
been specifically passed upon. On that account and for the
importance of the question, the argument against the view in the
courts below, is presented with more than ordinary fullness.
Page 81 U. S. 596
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Shipowners, as carriers of merchandise, contract for the safe
custody, due transport and right delivery of the goods; and the
shipper, consignee, or owner of the cargo contracts to pay the
freight and charges; and by the maritime law, as expounded by the
decisions of this Court, the obligations of the shipowner and the
shipper are reciprocal, and it is equally well settled that the
maritime law creates reciprocal liens for the enforcement of those
obligations, unless the lien is waived by some express stipulation,
or is displaced by some inconsistent and irreconcilable provision
in the charter party or bill of lading. [
Footnote 8] Shippers should in all cases require a bill
of lading, which is to be signed by the master, whether the
contract of affreightment is by charter party or without any such
customary written instrument. Where the goods of a consignment are
not all sent on board at the same time, it is usual for the master,
mate, or other person in charge of the deck, and acting for the
carrier, to give a receipt for the parcels as they are received,
and when the whole consignment is delivered, the master, upon those
receipts being given up, will sign two or three, or, if requested,
even four bills of lading in the usual form, one being for the ship
and the others for the shipper. More than one is required by the
shipper, as he usually sends one by mail to the consignee or
vendee, and if four are signed he sends one to his agent or factor,
and he should always retain one for his own use. Such an instrument
acknowledges the bailment of the goods, and is evidence of a
contract for the safe custody, due transport, and right delivery of
the same, upon the terms, as to freight, therein described, the
extent of the obligation being specified in the instrument. Where
no exceptions are made in the bill of lading, and in the absence of
any legislative provisions prescribing a different rule, the
carrier is bound to keep and transport the goods safely, and to
make right delivery of the same at the port of destination,
Page 81 U. S. 597
unless he can prove that the loss happened from the act of God
or the public enemy, or by the act of the shipper or owner of the
goods. Stipulations in the nature of exceptions may be made
limiting the extent of the obligation of the carrier, and in that
event the bill of lading is evidence of the ordinary contract of
affreightment, subject, of course, to the exceptions specified in
the instrument; and in view of that fact the better description of
the obligation of such a carrier is that, in the absence of any
Congressional legislation upon the subject, he is in the nature of
an insurer, and liable in all events and for every loss or damage,
however occasioned, unless it happened by the act of God or the
public enemy, or by some other cause or accident, without any fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier, and expressly excepted in
the bill of lading. [
Footnote
9]
Seventy-five tons of pig iron were shipped by the libellants, on
the eighth of May, 1868, on board the bark
Delaware, then
lying in the port of Portland, Oregon, to be transported from that
port to the port of San Francisco, for the freight of four dollars
and fifty cents per ton, to be delivered to the shippers or their
assigns at the port of destination, they paying freight as therein
stipulated, before delivery if required, with five percent primage
and average accustomed. Dangers of the seas, fire, and collision
were excepted in the bill of lading, and the statement at the close
of the instrument was, "vessel not accountable for breakage,
leakage, or rust."
Process was served and the claimant appeared and filed an
answer, in which he admits the shipment of the iron and the
execution of the bill of lading exhibited in the record. Sufficient
also appears in the record to show that the voyage was performed
and that but a small portion of the iron shipped, to-wit, some
thirteen or fourteen thousand pounds, was ever delivered to the
consignees, and that all the residue of the shipment was thrown
overboard as a jettison
Page 81 U. S. 598
during the voyage, which became necessary by a peril of the sea,
for the safety of the other associated interests and for the
preservation of the lives of those on board. Sacrificed as all that
portion of the shipment was as a jettison in consequence of a peril
of the sea, excepted in the bill of lading, the claimant insists
that the libellants have no claim against the ship, and that the
libellants as the shippers of the iron must bear their own
loss.
Evidence was exhibited by the claimant sufficient to show that
the allegations of the answer that the iron, not delivered, was
sacrificed during the voyage as a jettison in consequence of a
peril of the sea are true, but the libellants allege that the iron
was improperly stowed upon the deck of the vessel, and that the
necessity of sacrificing it as a jettison arose solely from that
fact, and that no such necessity would have arisen if it had been
properly stowed under deck, as it should have been by the terms of
the contract specified in the bill of lading. That the iron not
delivered was stowed on deck is admitted, and it is also conceded
that where goods are stowed in that way without the consent of the
shipper the carrier is liable in all events if the goods are not
delivered, unless he can show that the goods were of that
description, which, by the usage of the particular trade, are
properly stowed in that way, or that the delivery was prevented by
the act of God or the public enemy, or by some other cause or
accident, without any fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier and expressly excepted in the bill of lading.
Goods, though lost by perils of the sea, if they were stowed on
deck without the consent of the shipper, are not regarded as goods
lost by the act of God within the meaning of the maritime law, nor
are such losses regarded as losses by perils of the sea which will
excuse the carrier from delivering the goods shipped to the
consignee unless it appears that the manner in which the goods were
stowed is sanctioned by commercial usage, or unless it
affirmatively appears that the manner of stowage did not, in any
degree, contribute to the disaster; that the loss happened
without
Page 81 U. S. 599
any fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, and that it
could not have been prevented by human skill and prudence, even if
the goods had been stowed under deck, as required by the general
rules of the maritime law. [
Footnote 10]
Enough appears in the record to show that all the iron not
delivered to the consignees was stowed on deck, and there is no
proof in the case to show that the usage of the trade sanctioned
such a stowage in this case, or that the manner in which it was
stowed did not contribute both to the disaster and to the loss of
the goods. [
Footnote 11]
None of these principles are controverted by the claimant, but
he insists that the iron not delivered was stowed on deck by the
consent of the shippers and in pursuance of an oral agreement
between the carrier and the shippers consummated before the iron
was sent on board, and before the bill of lading was executed by
the master. Pursuant to that theory testimony was offered in the
district court showing that certain conversations took place
between the consignee of the bark and the agent of the shippers
tending to prove that the shippers consented that the iron in
question should be stowed on the deck of the vessel. Whether any
express exception to the admissibility of the evidence was taken or
not does not distinctly appear, but it does appear that the
question whether the evidence was or not admissible was the
principal question examined by the district court, and the one upon
which the decision in the case chiefly turned. Apparently it was
also the main point examined in the circuit court, and it is
certain that it has been treated by both sides in this Court as the
principal issue involved in the record, and in view of all the
circumstances the Court here decides that it must be considered
that the question as to the admissibility of the evidence is now
open for revision, as the decree for the libellant was equivalent
to a ruling rejecting the evidence offered in defense or to a
ruling granting a motion to strike it out after it had been
admitted, which is a course
Page 81 U. S. 600
often pursued by courts in cases where the question deserves
examination. What the claimant offered to prove was that the iron
was stowed on deck with the consent of the shippers, but the
libellants objected to the evidence as repugnant to the contract
set forth in the bill of lading, and the decree was for the
libellants, which was equivalent to a decision that the evidence
offered was incompetent. Dissatisfied with that decree the
respondent appealed to the circuit court, where the decree of the
district court was affirmed, and the same party appealed from that
decree and removed the cause into this Court for reexamination.
Even without any further explanation it is obvious that the only
question of any importance in the case is whether the evidence
offered to show that the iron in question was stowed on deck with
the consent of the shippers was or was not properly rejected, as it
is clear if it was, that the decree must be affirmed, and it is
equally clear, if it should have been admitted, that the decree
must be reversed. [
Footnote
12]
Different definitions of the commercial instrument, called the
bill of lading, have been given by different courts and jurists,
but the correct one appears to be that it is a written
acknowledgment, signed by the master, that he has received the
goods therein described from the shipper, to be transported on the
terms therein expressed, to the described place of destination, and
there to be delivered to the consignee or parties therein
designated. [
Footnote 13]
Regularly the goods ought to be on board before the bill of lading
is signed, but if the bill of lading, through inadvertence or
otherwise, is signed before the goods are actually shipped, as if
they are received on the wharf or sent to the warehouse of the
carrier, or are delivered into the custody of the master or other
agent of the owner or charterer of the vessel and are afterwards
placed on board, as and for the goods embraced in the bill
Page 81 U. S. 601
of lading, it is clear that the bill of lading will operate on
those goods as between the shipper and the carrier by way of
relation and estoppel, and that the rights and obligations of all
concerned are the same as if the goods had been actually shipped
before the bill of lading had been signed. [
Footnote 14] Such an instrument is twofold in
its character -- that is, it is a receipt as to the quantity and
description of the goods shipped, and a contract to transport and
deliver the goods to the consignee or other person therein
designated, and upon the terms specified in the same instrument.
[
Footnote 15] Beyond all
doubt, a bill of lading, in the usual form, is a receipt for the
quantity of goods shipped and a promise to transport and deliver
the same as therein stipulated. [
Footnote 16] Receipts may be either a mere acknowledgment
of payment or delivery or they may also contain a contract to do
something in relation to the thing delivered. In the former case
and so far as the receipt goes only to acknowledge payment or
delivery, it, the receipt, is merely
prima facie evidence
of the fact, and not conclusive, and therefore the fact which it
recites may be contradicted by oral testimony, but insofar as it is
evidence of a contract between the parties, it stands on the
footing of all other contracts in writing, and cannot be
contradicted or varied by parol evidence. [
Footnote 17] Text writers mention the bill of
lading as an example of an instrument which partakes of a twofold
character, and such commentators agree that the instrument may, as
between the carrier and the shipper, be contradicted and explained
in its recital that the goods were in good order and well
conditioned, by showing that their internal state and condition was
bad or not such as is represented in the instrument, and in like
manner, in respect to any other fact which it erroneously
Page 81 U. S. 602
recites, but in all other respects it is to be treated like
other written contracts. [
Footnote 18]
Bills of lading when signed by the master, duly executed in the
usual course of business, bind the owners of the vessel if the
goods were laden on board or were actually delivered into the
custody of the master, but it is well settled law that the owners
are not liable, if the party to whom the bill of lading was given
had no goods, or the goods described in the bill of lading were
never put on board or delivered into the custody of the carrier or
his agent. [
Footnote 19]
Proof of fraud is certainly a good defense to an action claiming
damages for the nondelivery of the goods, but it is settled law in
this Court that a clean bill of lading imports that the goods are
to be safely and properly stowed under deck, and that it is the
duty of the master to see that the cargo is so stowed and arranged
that the different goods may not be injured by each other or by the
motion or leakage of the vessel, unless by agreement that service
is to be performed by the shipper. [
Footnote 20] Express contracts may be made in writing
which will define the obligations and duties of the parties, but
where those obligations and duties are evidenced by a clean bill of
lading, that is, if the bill of lading is silent as to the mode of
stowing the goods, and it contains no exceptions as to the
liability of the master, except the usual one of the dangers of the
sea, the law provides that the goods are to be carried under deck,
unless it be shown that the usage of the particular trade takes the
case out of the general rule applied in such controversies.
[
Footnote 21] Evidence of
usage is admissible in
Page 81 U. S. 603
mercantile contracts to prove that the words in which the
contract is expressed, in the particular trade to which the
contract refers, are used in a particular sense and different from
the sense which they ordinarily import, and it is also admissible
in certain cases, for the purpose of annexing incidents to the
contract in matters upon which the contract is silent, but it is
never admitted to make a contract or to add a new element to the
terms of a contract previously made by the parties. Such evidence
may be introduced to explain what is ambiguous, but it is never
admissible to vary or contradict what is plain. Evidence of the
kind may be admitted for the purpose of defining what is uncertain,
but it is never properly admitted to alter a general rule of law,
nor to make the legal rights or liabilities of the parties other or
different from what they are by the common law. [
Footnote 22] Cases may arise where such
evidence may be admissible and material, but as none such was
offered in this case it is not necessary to pursue that inquiry.
Exceptions also exist to the rule that parol evidence is not
admissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument
where it appears that the instrument was not within the statute of
frauds nor under seal, as where the evidence offered tends to prove
a subsequent agreement upon a new consideration. Subsequent oral
agreements in respect to a prior written agreement, not falling
within the statute of frauds, may have the effect to enlarge the
time of performance, or may vary any other of its terms, or, if
founded upon a new consideration, may waive and discharge it
altogether. [
Footnote 23]
Verbal agreements, however, between the parties to a written
contract, made before or at the time of the execution of the
contract, are in general inadmissible to contradict or vary its
terms
Page 81 U. S. 604
or to affect its construction, as all such verbal agreements are
considered as merged in the written contract. [
Footnote 24]
Apply that rule to the case before the Court and it is clear
that the ruling of the court below was correct, as all the evidence
offered consisted of conversations between the shippers and the
master before or at the time the bill of lading was executed.
Unless the bill of lading contains a special stipulation to that
effect, the master is not authorized to stow the goods sent on
board as cargo on deck, as when he signs the bill of lading, if in
common form, he contracts to convey the merchandise safely, in the
usual mode of conveyance, which, in the absence of proof of a
contrary usage in the particular trade, requires that the goods
shall be safely stowed under deck, and when the master departs from
that rule and stows them on deck, he cannot exempt either himself
or the vessel from liability in case of loss by virtue of the
exception, of dangers of the seas unless the dangers were such as
would have occasioned the loss even if the goods had been stowed as
required by the contract of affreightment. [
Footnote 25] Contracts of the master, within the
scope of his authority as such, bind the vessel and give the
creditor a lien upon it for his security, except for repairs and
supplies purchased in the home port, and the master is responsible
for the safe stowage of the cargo under deck, and if he fails to
fulfill that duty, he is responsible for the safety of the goods,
and if they are sacrificed for the common safety, the goods stowed
under deck do not contribute to the loss. [
Footnote 26] Shipowners in a contract by a bill
of lading for the transportation of merchandise take upon
themselves the responsibilities of common carriers, and the master,
as the agent of such owners, is bound to have the cargo safely
secured under deck, unless he is authorized to carry the goods
on
Page 81 U. S. 605
deck by the usage of the particular trade or by the consent of
the shipper, and if he would rely upon the latter he must take care
to require that the consent shall be expressed in a form to be
available as evidence under the general rules of law. [
Footnote 27]
Where goods are stowed under deck, the carrier is bound to prove
the casualty or
vis major which occasioned the loss or
deterioration of the property which he undertook to transport and
deliver in good condition to the consignee, and if he fails to do
so, the shipper or consignee, as a general rule, is entitled to his
remedy for the nondelivery of the goods. No such consequences,
however, follow if the goods were stowed on deck by the consent of
the shipper, as in that event neither the master nor the owner is
liable for any damage done to the goods by the perils of the sea or
from the necessary exposure of the property, but the burden to
prove such consent is upon the carrier, and he must take care that
he has competent evidence to prove the fact. [
Footnote 28] Parol evidence, said Mr. Justice
Nelson, in the case of
Creery v. Holly, [
Footnote 29] is inadmissible to vary the
terms or legal import of a bill of lading free of ambiguity, and it
was accordingly held in that case that a clean bill of lading
imports that the goods are stowed under deck, and that parol
evidence that the vendor agreed that the goods should be stowed on
deck could not legally be received even in an action by the vendor
against the purchaser for the price of the goods which were lost in
consequence of the stowage of the goods in that manner by the
carrier. Even where it appeared that the shipper or his agent who
delivered the goods to the carrier repeatedly saw them as they were
stowed in that way and made no objection to their being so stowed,
the Supreme Court of Maine held that the evidence of those facts
was not admissible to vary the legal import of the contract of
shipment; that the bill of lading being what is called a clean bill
of lading, it bound the owners of the vessel to carry the goods
Page 81 U. S. 606
under deck, but the court admitted that where there is a well
known usage in reference to a particular trade to carry the goods
as convenience may require, either upon or under deck, the bill of
lading may import no more than that the cargo shall be carried in
the usual manner. [
Footnote
30] Testimony to prove a verbal agreement that the goods might
be stowed on deck was offered by the defense in the case of
Barber v. Brace, [
Footnote 31] but the court rejected the testimony,
holding that the whole conversation, both before and at the time
the writing was given, was merged in the written instrument, which
undoubtedly is the correct rule upon the subject. Written
instruments cannot be contradicted or varied by evidence of oral
conversations between the parties which took place before or at the
time the written instrument was executed; but in the case of a bill
of lading or a charter party, evidence of usage in a particular
trade is admissible to show that certain goods in that trade may be
stowed on deck, as was distinctly decided in that case. [
Footnote 32] But evidence of usage
cannot be admitted to control or vary the positive stipulations of
a bill of lading, or to substitute for the express terms of the
instrument an implied agreement or usage that the carrier shall not
be bound to keep, transport, and deliver the goods in good order
and condition. [
Footnote
33]
Remarks, it must be admitted, are found in the opinion of the
court, in the case of
Vernard v. Hudson, [
Footnote 34] and also in the case of
Sayward v. Stevens, [
Footnote 35] which favor the views of the appellant, but
the weight of authority and all the analogies of the rules of
evidence support the conclusion of the court below, and the Court
here adopts that conclusion as the correct rule of law, subject to
the qualifications herein expressed.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
14 Wendell 26.
[
Footnote 2]
8 Barbour 205.
[
Footnote 3]
25
id. 17.
[
Footnote 4]
Davies 61.
[
Footnote 5]
60 U. S. 19 How.
312.
[
Footnote 6]
Niles v. Culber, 8 Barbour 209;
Thompson v.
Ketchum, 8 Johnson 109;
Hunt v. Adams, 7 Mass. 518;
S.C., 6
id. 519;
Pattison v. Hull, 9
Cowen 747.
[
Footnote 7]
3 Conn. 9.
[
Footnote 8]
The Eddy,
5 Wall. 494;
The Bird of
Paradise, 5 Wall. 555;
Bags
of Linseed, 1 Black 112.
[
Footnote 9]
The Cordes,
21 How. 23;
Clark v.
Branwell, 12 How. 272;
Elliott v. Rossell,
10 Johnson 7.
[
Footnote 10]
Lawrence v.
Minturn, 17 How. 114;
The Peytona, 2
Curtis 23.
[
Footnote 11]
Gould v. Oliver, 4 Bingham's New Cases 142; Story on
Bailment § 531.
[
Footnote 12]
Angell on Carriers § 212; Redfield on Carriers §§ 247 to 269;
The St. Cloud, Brown & Lushington Adm. 4.
[
Footnote 13]
Abbott on Shipping, 7th Am. ed. 323;
O'Brien v.
Gilchrist, 34 Me. 558; 1 Parsons on Shipping 186; Machlachlan
on Shipping 338; Emerigon on Ins. 251.
[
Footnote 14]
Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pickering 307;
The
Eddy, 5 Wall. 495.
[
Footnote 15]
Machlachlan on Shipping 338-339; Smith's Mercantile Law, 6th ed.
308.
[
Footnote 16]
Bates v. Todd, 1 Moody & Robinson 106;
Barkley
v. Watling, 7 Adolphus & Ellis 29;
Wayland v.
Mosely, 5 Ala. 430;
Brown v. Byrne, 3 Ellis &
Blackburne 714;
Blaikie v. Stembridge, 6 C.B.N.S. 907.
[
Footnote 17]
1 Greenleaf on Evidence, 12th ed., § 305;
Bradley v.
Dunipace, 1 Hurlstone & Colt 525.
[
Footnote 18]
Hastings v. Pepper, 11 Pickering 42;
Clark v.
Barnwell, 12 How. 272;
Ellis v. Willard, 5
Selden 529;
May v. Babcock, 4 Ohio 346;
Adams v.
Packet Co., 5 C.B.N.S. 492;
Sack v. Ford, 13 C.B.N.S.
100.
[
Footnote 19]
The Schooner
Freeman, 18 How. 187; Maude & Pollock on
Shipping 233;
Grant v. Norway, 10 C.B. 665;
Zipsy v.
Hill Foster & Finelly, 573;
Meyer v. Dresser, 16
C.B.N.S. 657.
[
Footnote 20]
The Cordes,
21 How. 23;
Sandeman v. Scurr, Law Reports 2 Q.B. 98;
Swainston v. Garrick, 2 Law Journal, N.S. Exchequer 355;
African Co. v. Lamzed, Law Reports 1 C.P. 229;
Alston
v. Hering, 11 Exchequer 822.
[
Footnote 21]
Abbott on Shipping (7th Am. ed.) 345;
Smith v. Wright,
1 Cain 43;
Gould v. Oliver, 2 Manning & Granger 208;
Waring v. Morse, 7 Ala. 343;
Falkner v. Earle, 3
Best & Smith 363.
[
Footnote 22]
Oelricks v.
Ford, 23 How. 63;
Barnard v.
Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383;
Simmons v. Law, 3
Keyes 219;
Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C.B. 222.
[
Footnote 23]
Emerson v.
Slater, 22 How. 41;
Gross v. Nugent, 5
Barnewall & Adolphus 65;
Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metcalf
402; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence 303;
Harvey v. Grabham, 5
Adolphus & Ellis 61.
[
Footnote 24]
Ruse v. Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 519;
Wheelton v.
Hardisty, 8 Ellis & Blackburn 296; 2 Smith's Leading Cases
758; Angell on Carriers, 4th ed., § 229.
[
Footnote 25]
The Rebecca, Ware 210;
Dodge v. Bartol, 5
Greenleaf 286;
Walcott v. Ins. Co., 4 Pickering 429;
Copper Co. v. Ins. Co., 22
id. 108;
Adams v.
Ins. Co., ib., 163.
[
Footnote 26]
The Paragon, Ware 329, 331; 2 Phillips on Insurance, §
704;
Brooks v. Insurance Co., 7 Pickering 259.
[
Footnote 27]
The Waldo, Davies, 162;
Blackett v. Exchange
Co., 2 Crompton & Jervis 250; 1 Arnould on Insurance 69;
Lenox v. Insurance Co., 3 Johnson's Cases 178.
[
Footnote 28]
Shackleford v. Wilcox, 9 La. 38.
[
Footnote 29]
14 Wendell 28.
[
Footnote 30]
Sproat v. Donnell, 26 Me. 187; 2 Taylor on Evidence §§
1062, 1067;
Hope v. State Bank, 4 La. 212; 1 Arnould on
Insurance 70;
Lapham v. Insurance Co., 24 Pickering 1.
[
Footnote 31]
3 Conn. 14.
[
Footnote 32]
Barber v. Brace, 3 Pickering 13; 1 Smith's Leading
Cases, 6th American edition, 837.
[
Footnote 33]
The Reeside, 2 Sumner 570; 1 Duer on Insurance §
17.
[
Footnote 34]
3 Sumner 406.
[
Footnote 35]
3 Gray 101.