1. The state and national courts being independent of each
other, neither can impede or arrest any action the other may take,
within the limits of its jurisdiction, for the satisfaction of its
judgments and decrees.
Riggs v. Johnson
County, 6 Wall. 265, affirmed.
2. Where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be
done by a public officer and he neglects or refuses to do such act,
he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the
injury arising from such nonfeasance or malfeasance. A mistake as
to what his duty is and honest intentions will not excuse him.
Amy having obtained a judgment for money against Desmoines
County, Iowa, in the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa, and
not being paid, procured from the same court a mandamus against
Burkholder, and several others, the supervisors of the county, to
compel the levy of a tax. The mandamus not being obeyed, he sued
them personally. They set up certain defenses, to which he
demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, and he brought the case
here.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE stated the case particularly, and delivered
the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Iowa.
The plaintiff in error was the plaintiff in the court below. The
declaration contains two counts. The first count alleges
substantially that the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the
County of Desmoines in the said circuit court; that afterwards such
proceedings were had that a peremptory writ of mandamus was issued
from the court and duly served upon the defendants as supervisors
of said county whereby they were commanded to levy a tax sufficient
to pay the judgment and costs; that in September, 1868, it was
their duty to levy such a tax, and that they neglected to do
Page 78 U. S. 137
so, whereby the plaintiff sustained damage to the amount of
$12,108 3/100.
The second count sets forth substantially the same facts, and
further the provisions of the code of Iowa prescribing the duty of
the defendants, as supervisors, under such circumstances, and
declaring that a failure on their part to perform the duty
enjoined, should render them personally responsible for the debt.
It is further averred in this count that the judgment is in full
force and unsatisfied and that the defendants have levied no tax
and made no provision for its payment, and that the plaintiff is
thereby damaged in the sum stated in the first count.
The defendants, by their answer, set up three defenses:
(1) Nil debet.
(2) That the District Court of Desmoines County had enjoined
them from levying a tax to pay the judgment; that they were
nevertheless proceeding to levy such tax when they were attached by
order of the court for contempt of its process, and compelled to
give bonds to answer said charge of contempt and to obey the
injunction, and that those bonds were still in force and obligatory
upon them.
(3) That before the peremptory writ of mandamus was issued, the
Legislature of Iowa repealed the statutory provision, whereby they
were made individually liable for the delinquency charged against
them, and that, by reason of such repeal, they are not so
liable.
The plaintiff demurred to the answer. The court overruled the
demurrer and gave judgment for the defendants.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error has filed an able and
elaborate brief. None has been submitted in behalf of the
defendants. A few remarks will be sufficient to dispose of the
case.
The circuit court had authority to issue the writ of mandamus.
It was the process resorted to by the plaintiff to procure
satisfaction of his judgment. The state court was powerless to
prevent its execution. Insofar as concerned the process in
question, the injunction was a nullity. In such
Page 78 U. S. 138
cases the two sets of tribunals -- state and national -- are as
independent as they are separate. Neither can impede or arrest any
action the other may take, within the limits of its jurisdiction,
for the satisfaction of its judgments and decrees. Where either is
in possession of the
res sought to be reached, the process
of the other must pause until that possession has terminated. But
this rule has no application in the case before us. These
principles are a part of the checks and balances of our dual and
combined polity, and are indispensable to the harmonious and
beneficial working of the system. If the ground assumed by the
state court in this case can be maintained, the Constitution of the
United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof as regards
their judicial administration, instead of being the supreme law of
the land, would be subordinated to the authority of the courts of
every state in the Union. If this writ may be paralyzed by the
injunction relied upon, a writ of
fieri facias and a writ
of
levari facias may be defeated in the same way. In point
of principle, there is no distinction between them. Every judgment
of a court of the United States may thus be rendered fruitless of
any beneficial result. These views are conclusively maintained by
Riggs v. Johnson * and the principle
involved has since been reaffirmed in the cases which followed, and
were controlled by that judgment.
It is not necessary to consider the effect of the repeal of the
provision of the code which enacted that the delinquent parties
shall be personally liable. There is a common law liability which
was not affected by the repeal. The statute was only cumulative on
the subject.
The rule is well settled that where the law requires absolutely
a ministerial act to be done by a public officer and he neglects or
refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages
to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. There is an
unbroken current of authorities to this effect. A mistake as to his
duty and honest intentions will not excuse the offender. The
question of the rule
Page 78 U. S. 139
by which the measure of damages is to be ascertained is not
before us, and we do not feel called upon to express any opinion
upon the subject.
The defenses set up in the answer of the defendants are clearly
bad. The demurrer should have been sustained.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause
will be remanded with instructions to that court to proceed in
conformity to this opinion.
*
73 U. S. 6 Wall.
166.