1. A judgment in favor of a bondholder upon certain municipal
bonds, part of a larger issue, against the town issuing them, is
conclusive on a question of the validity of the issue on a suit
brought by the same creditor against the same town on other bonds,
another part of the same issue, the parties being identical, and
all objections taken by the town in the second suit having been
open to be taken by it in the former one.
2. A legislative enactment created the City of Beloit, carving
it out of territory previously covered by the Town of Beloit only.
The statute enacted thus:
"All principal and interest upon all bonds which have heretofore
been issued by the Town of Beloit, for railroad stock or other
purposes shall be paid when the same or any portion of the same
shall fall due by the City and Town of Beloit in the same
proportions as if said town and city were not dissolved, such
proportions to be apportioned,"
&c.
Held that this made bonds issued by the town
valid, assuming that previously to the act they were not so.
The Legislature of Wisconsin, by act of 1853, authorized
Page 74 U. S. 620
the supervisors of the Town of Beloit to subscribe to the
capital stock of a certain railroad company and to pay for the same
in the bonds of the town, payable at the expiration of a term named
and with a rate of interest specified.
The supervisors, professing to execute the authority so
conferred, did subscribe to the stock of a certain railroad company
and issued bonds, of many of which one Morgan became the holder,
bona fide.
Whether the bonds were issued pursuant to the authority which
the statute gave to the supervisors soon became a matter of
controversy between the holders of them and the authorities of
Beloit. These last asserted that they were not so issued, but were
made without any legal authority, were in violation of the act of
the legislature, and constituted a corrupt and usurious contract.
They would accordingly pay nothing on the bonds.
In this state of things, the Legislature of Wisconsin in 1856
created the City of Beloit, carving it out of territory which
constituted the former Town of Beloit. The charter of the new city
provided thus:
"All principal and interest upon all bonds which have heretofore
been issued by the Town of Beloit for railroad stock or other
purposes, when the same or any portion thereof shall fall due,
SHALL be paid by the City and Town of Beloit in the same
proportions as if said town and city were not dissolved."
This provision was reenacted in 1857 in an act amending the
charter of the city.
With this act in force, Morgan brought suit at law for the
interest of some of his bonds against the Town of Beloit, and on
the 9th of January, 1861, obtained judgment against it.
He now also brought other suits against the town on other of the
bonds -- not the same specific instruments, of course, as those on
which he had obtained judgment, but part of the same issue, and a
suit on which involved the same questions as did the suit on those
on which he had already recovered.
Page 74 U. S. 621
Thereupon the Town of Beloit filed a bill, the bill below, in
the Circuit Court for Wisconsin to enjoin the proceedings at law
and to compel a surrender of the bonds. The answer set up
1. By way of estoppel, the judgment of 9th January, 1861, on
certain of the bonds, as conclusive of the validity of the whole
issue, and
2. The act of 1856 and its reenactment of 1857, and alleged that
it was the intention of the legislature to provide by those acts
that the bonds in question should be paid, and that they were a
legislative ratification of the bonds, with effect to cure any
irregularity or want of authority.
The court below dismissed the bill. Appeal accordingly.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bonds and coupons to which this litigation relates were
issued under the same statute of Wisconsin, and for the same
purpose, as those involved in the preceding case, just decided. The
object of the bill is to enjoin the appellee from proceeding in the
suits at law which he has instituted upon a part of the securities
in his hands and to have those and all others belonging to him
delivered up and cancelled. The court below heard and dismissed the
case. It is brought here by this appeal for reexamination.
Numerous objections have been made to the validity of the
bonds.
The argument on both sides has been learned and elaborate. The
view which we have taken of the case will render it necessary to
consider but two of the points to which our attention has been
called.
I. On the 9th of January, 1861, the appellee recovered a
judgment at law against the appellant upon another portion of these
securities -- though not the same with those in question in this
case. The parties were identical and the title involved was the
same. All the objections taken in this
Page 74 U. S. 622
case might have been taken in that. The judgment of the court
could have been invoked upon each of them, and if it were adverse
to the appellant, he might have brought the decision here by a writ
of error for review. The court had full jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject. Under such circumstances, a judgment is
conclusive not only as to the res of that case, but as to all
further litigation between same parties touching the same subject
matter, though the
res itself may be different.
An apt illustration of this principle is found in
Gardner v.
Buckbee. [
Footnote 1]
Gardner bought a vessel from Buckbee and gave two notes for the
purchase money. Buckbee sued him upon one of the notes in the
marine court. Gardner set up as a defense fraud in the sale and a
want of consideration. A verdict and judgment were rendered in his
favor. In a suit upon the other note in the Common Pleas of the
City of New York, the judgment in the marine court was held to be
an estoppel upon the subject of fraud in the sale.
Bouchaud v.
Dias, [
Footnote 2]
Doty v. Brown, [
Footnote
3] and
Babcock v. Camp [
Footnote 4] are to the same effect and equally cogent.
Such has been the rule of the common law from an early period of
its history down to the present time. [
Footnote 5] But the principle reaches further. It extends
not only to the questions of fact and of law which were decided in
the former suit, but also to the grounds of recovery or defense
which might have been, but were not, presented.
In
Henderson v. Henderson, [
Footnote 6] the vice-chancellor said:
"In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of the
court correctly, that where a given matter becomes the subject of
litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent
jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to bring forward their
whole case, and will not, except under special
Page 74 U. S. 623
circumstances, permit the same parties to open the same subject
of litigation in respect of a matter which might have been brought
forward as a part of the subject in contest, but which was not
brought forward only because they have, from negligence,
inadvertence, or even accident, omitted a part of their case. The
plea of
res judicata applies, except in special cases, not
only to the points upon which the court was required by the parties
to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point
which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the
parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought
forward at the time."
A party can no more split up defenses than indivisible demands,
and present them by piecemeal in successive suits growing out of
the same transaction. [
Footnote
7] The judgment at law established conclusively the original
validity of the securities described in the bill, and the liability
of the town to pay them. Nothing is disclosed in the case which
affects this condition of things.
II. The City of Beloit was chartered by the Legislature of
Wisconsin in 1856. It embraces a part of the territory which
previously belonged to the Town of Beloit. In the seventeenth
section of the charter it is enacted that
"All principal and interest upon all bonds which have heretofore
been issued by the Town of Beloit for railroad stock or other
purposes, when the same or any portion thereof shall fall due,
shall be paid by the City and Town of Beloit in the same
proportions as if said town and city were not dissolved,"
&c.
This provision was reenacted in 1857 in an act amending the
charter of the city. No bonds were issued in payment for railroad
stock but those to a part of which this controversy relates. The
language used by the legislature is clear and explicit. No gloss
can raise a doubt as to its meaning. It distinctly affirms, and the
affirmation is repeated, that the bonds shall be paid.
The only point to be considered is the effect of this
provision.
Page 74 U. S. 624
That is not an open question in this Court. Whenever it has been
presented, the ruling has been that in cases of bonds issued by
municipal corporations under a statute upon the subject,
ratification by the legislature is in all respects equivalent to
original authority and cures all defects of power, if such defects
existed, and all irregularities in its execution. [
Footnote 8] The same principle has been
applied in the courts of the states. [
Footnote 9] This Court has repeatedly recognized the
validity of private and curative statutes and given them full
effect where the interests of private individuals were alone
concerned and were largely involved and affected. [
Footnote 10] The earlier and more important
of these authorities are so well known to the profession and are so
often referred to that it would be waste of time to comment upon
them. We hold this objection also fatal to the appellant's
case.
Several other important propositions have been discussed by the
learned counsel for the appellee. They have not been considered,
and we express no opinion in regard to them.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
3 Cowen 120.
[
Footnote 2]
3 Denio 238.
[
Footnote 3]
4 Comstock 71.
[
Footnote 4]
12 Ohio St. 11.
[
Footnote 5]
Ferrer's Case, 6 Reports 8;
Hutchin v.
Campbell, 2 W. Blackstone 831;
Duchess of Kingston's
Case, 2 Smith's Leading Cases 656;
Aurora City v. West,
supra, 74 U. S. 82.
[
Footnote 6]
3 Hare 115.
See also Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Sandford's
Superior Court 135.
[
Footnote 7]
Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wendell 207.
[
Footnote 8]
Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 220;
Thomson v.
Lee County, 3 Wall. 327.
[
Footnote 9]
Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md.Ch.Dec. 66;
Shaw v.
Norfolk Co. R. Co., 5 Gray 180.
[
Footnote 10]
Satterlee v.
Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380;
Wilkinson
v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627;
Leland v.
Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294;
Watson v.
Mercer, 8 Pet. 88;
Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420;
Stanley v.
Colt, 5 Wall. 119;
Croxall v.
Shererd, 5 Wall. 268.
