1. A decree dismissing a bill in an equity suit in the circuit
court of the United States, which is absolute in its terms, unless
made upon some ground which does not go to the merits, is a final
determination of the controversy, and constitutes a bar to any
further litigation of the same subject between the same
parties.
2. Where words of qualification, such as "without prejudice" or
other terms indicating a right or privilege to take further legal
proceedings on the subject, do not accompany the decree, it is
presumed to be rendered on the merits.
3. Where the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States
are equally divided in opinion upon the questions of law or fact
involved in a case before the court on appeal or writ of error, the
judgment of affirmance, which is the judgment rendered in such a
case, is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the
parties as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon
every question involved in the case.
The Constitution vests appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme
Page 74 U. S. 108
Court under such regulations as Congress shall make, and
Congress, by the Act of March 3, 1803, authorizing appeals,
provides that "the said Supreme Court shall be, and hereby is,
authorized and required to receive, hear, and
determine
such appeals."
With these provisions in force, Durant filed a bill in October,
1847, against the Essex Company seeking to hold it liable for
certain real estate. The bill was finally "dismissed." An appeal
was taken to this Court, where, after hearing the case, the judges
were equally divided in opinion, and in conformity with the
practice of the Court in such cases, it ordered that the decree of
the court "be affirmed with costs."
The complainant, conceiving that as the judgment in this Court
was by a bench equally divided, there had been no decision of his
case by the court of last resort, filed another bill -- the bill in
the court below -- for the same relief in the same matter as he had
filed the one before.
The defendant pleaded that the former suit and decree in this
Court -- which the plea averred were made after testimony was taken
on both sides, and the case heard on its merits and argued by
counsel -- were a bar to the present bill. This was determined by
the court below to be so, and the mandate of this Court being
filed, the complainant moved for leave to discontinue the suit or
that the bill be dismissed without prejudice. But the court refused
leave and dismissed the bill, no words being put in the decree that
showed that the dismissal was other than an absolute one. Appeal
here accordingly.
The questions which the appellant now sought to raise were:
1. Whether the decree of dismissal simply was a bar to a new
suit?
2. What was the effect of an affirmance by an equally divided
court?
Page 74 U. S. 109
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decree dismissing the bill in the former suit in the circuit
court of the United States being absolute in its terms, was an
adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and constitutes a
bar to any further litigation of the same subject between the same
parties. A decree of that kind, unless made because of some defect
in the pleadings, or for want of jurisdiction, or because the
complainant has an adequate remedy at law, or upon some other
ground which does not go to the merits, is a final determination.
Where words of qualification, such as "without prejudice," or the
terms indicating a right or privilege to take further legal
proceedings on the subject, do not accompany the decree, it is
presumed to be rendered on the merits. [
Footnote 1]
Accordingly, it is the general practice in this country and in
England, when a bill in equity is dismissed without a consideration
of the merits, for the court to express in its decree
Page 74 U. S. 110
that the dismissal is without prejudice. The omission of the
qualification in a proper case will be corrected by this Court on
appeal. [
Footnote 2]
In the case in the circuit court, we are not left to
conjectures, or to presumptions, as to what was intended by the
decree. The plea of the defendants avers, that testimony was taken
on both sides, and that the case was heard on its merits, and
argued by counsel. And when the mandate of this Court was filed,
the complainant moved for leave to discontinue the suit, or that
the bill be dismissed without prejudice; but the motion was denied
and the decree was affirmed.
There is nothing in the fact that the judges of this Court were
divided in opinion upon the question whether the decree should be
reversed or not, and, therefore, ordered an affirmance of the
decree of the court below. The judgment of affirmance was the
judgment of the entire court. The division of opinion between the
judges was the reason for the entry of that judgment; but the
reason is no part of the judgment itself.
It has long been the doctrine in this country and in England,
where courts consist of several members, that no affirmative action
can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in
opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made. If
affirmative action is necessary for the further progress of the
cause, the division operates as a stay of proceedings. If the
affirmative action sought is to set aside or modify an existing
judgment or order, the division operates as a denial of the
application, and the judgment, or order, stands in full force, to
be carried into effect by the ordinary means.
Thus, in
Inveson v. Moore, [
Footnote 3] a verdict was rendered for the
Page 74 U. S. 111
plaintiff, and according to the practice prevailing in the
English courts, a rule was entered for judgment
nisi.
Afterwards a rule was obtained that the judgment should be arrested
nisi -- that is, unless cause be shown against the arrest.
On motion to discharge this latter rule, the judges were equally
divided, and no order could be made. But the court said, if
"It had been divided on the first motion [that is, the motion
against the judgment under the general rule], the plaintiff might
have entered judgment; but now this rule [in arrest] must stand or
be discharged, and discharged it cannot be, for the court is
equally divided."
The inability of the court, from the division, to take
affirmative action, would have allowed the plaintiff to enter his
judgment under the general rule if no order in arrest has been
made; but that being made, the position of the parties was
charged.
In
Chapman v. Lamphire, [
Footnote 4] the plaintiff obtained a verdict, upon which
the usual rule was entered for judgment nisi, in accordance with
the established practice. A motion was then made for the arrest of
the judgment, and it is reported that
"the judges were divided in opinion, two against two, and so the
plaintiff had his judgment, there being no rule made to stay it, so
that he had his judgment upon his general rule for judgment; but if
it had been upon a demurrer or special verdict, then it would have
been adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber."
By a law of England, passed as long ago as 14 Edward III, if the
judges of the King's Bench or Common Pleas are equally divided, the
case is to be adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber, and be there
argued before all the justices of England. If these are equally
divided, it is to be determined at the next Parliament by a
prelate, two earls, and two barons, with the advice of the lords
chancellor, and treasurer, the judges, and other of the King's
council. [
Footnote 5]
In the case of the special verdict, affirmative action would be
required to enter judgment, which would be impossible
Page 74 U. S. 112
from the division of the judges. But in the case of the
demurrer, the effect of a division would depend, we think, upon the
rules of practice established in such cases, for in the absence of
a settled practice or general rule of court upon the subject, the
judges disagreeing as to the demurrer might disagree also as to the
effect of their inability to decide it, as was the fact in this
Court in the case between the Commonwealth of Virginia and West
Virginia, argued upon demurrer to the bill at the last term.
In cases of appeal or writ of error in this Court, the appellant
or plaintiff in error is always the moving party. It is affirmative
action which he asks. The question presented is, shall the
judgment, or decree, be reversed? If the judges are divided, the
reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment of
the court below therefore stands in full force. It is indeed the
settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of affirmance;
but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact
that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action
of the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its
judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal or writ
of error were dismissed.
The Antelope, [
Footnote
6] and
Etting v. Bank of the United States [
Footnote 7] are cases where the
decisions of the court below, or some part of them, were affirmed
upon a division of the judges, and a term seldom passes in which
there are not several cases disposed of in this way. In
Brown
v. Aspden, [
Footnote 8]
Chief Justice Taney observed that there was no difference between a
decree in chancery and a judgment at law as to its affirmance on a
division of the Court. "In both cases," he said, "the motion is to
reverse, and if that fails, the judgment or decree necessarily
stands."
It is also the practice of the Exchequer Chamber in England to
affirm the judgment of the court below, brought before it on a writ
of error, when the judges are equally divided. Where a case is
adjourned to that court, under the
Page 74 U. S. 113
statute of 14 Edward III, upon a division of the judges of the
court below, the practice, as we have stated, is different. But on
writs of error it is similar to that followed by this Court. Such
also is the practice of the House of Lords when sitting as a court
of appeals. It is said that this practice depends upon the manner
in which the Lords put the question, which is always in this form:
shall this judgment, or decree, be reversed? But that is the
question in all appellate courts, and the particular manner in
which the question is stated, cannot change the rule of law on the
subject. [
Footnote 9]
The statement which always accompanies a judgment in such case,
that it is rendered by a divided court, is only intended to show
that there was a division among the judges upon the questions of
law or fact involved, not that there was any disagreement as to the
judgment to be entered upon such division. It serves to explain the
absence of any opinion in the cause, and prevents the decision from
becoming an authority for other cases of like character. But the
judgment is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the
parties as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon
every question involved in the case.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Walden v.
Bodley, 14 Pet. 156;
Hughes v.
United States, 4 Wall. 237;
Bigelow v.
Winsor, 1 Gray 301;
Foote v. Gibbs, ibid., 412.
[
Footnote 2]
Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Schoales & Lefroy 10;
Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Vesey 222;
Stevens v. Guppy,
3 Russell 185;
Sewall v. Eastern R. Co., 9 Cushing 13;
Miles v.
Caldwell, 2 Wall. 45;
Carneal v.
Banks, 10 Wheat. 192;
Dandridge v.
Washington, 2 Pet. 378;
Piersoll v.
Elliott, 6
id. 100;
Gaylords v.
Kelshaw, 1 Wall. 83;
Barney
v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 289;
Hobson
v. McArthur, 16 Pet. 195.
[
Footnote 3]
1 Salked, 15;
S.C., 1 Lord Raymond 495.
[
Footnote 4]
3 Modern 155.
[
Footnote 5]
Company's Digest, title Court, D. 5; Coke Litt. 71, 2.
[
Footnote 6]
23 U. S. 10 Wheat.
66.
[
Footnote 7]
24 U. S. 11
Wheat. 59.
[
Footnote 8]
55 U. S. 14 How.
28.
[
Footnote 9]
See Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wendell 372.