The courts of the United States are courts of limited, but not
of inferior, jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction be not alleged in
the proceedings, their judgments and decrees may be reversed for
that cause on a writ of error and appeal, but until reversed, they
are conclusive evidence between parties and privies.
The title and disposition of real property is governed by the
lex loci rei sitae.
The title to lands can only pass by devise according to the laws
of the state or country where the lands lie. The probate in one
state or country is of no validity as affecting the title to lands
in another.
The appellants filed their bill in equity in the court below
setting forth that William Crawford,
Page 23 U. S. 193
deceased, the father of the female appellants, being in his
lifetime a Colonel in the Virginia Line on continental
establishment, and as such entitled to the quantity of 6,666 and
2/3 acres of land, to be laid off between the Scioto and Little
Miami Rivers, on the northwest side of the River Ohio, departed
this life, having first duly made and published his last will and
testament bearing date 16 June, 1782, whereby he devised all his
estate not otherwise disposed of by said will to be equally divided
between his three children, John Crawford, and the female
complainants, and their heirs forever. That this will was proved
and recorded in Westmoreland county, in the State of Pennsylvania,
on 10 September in the same year. That a warrant for the above
quantity of land was afterwards issued in the name of the said John
Crawford, as heir at law of his father, under which the following
entries were made -- one for 800 acres, which was surveyed and
patented to Lucas Sullivant, of which quantity 400 acres are
claimed by Bernard Thompson; another for 955 2/3 acres, which was
surveyed and patented to John Armat, but then claimed by William
Winship; another for 956 acres, patented to some person unknown,
but claimed by Samuel Finley; another for 955 acres, patented to
some person unknown, but believed to be claimed and possessed by
Lucas Sullivant.
The bill then proceeds to interrogate the above parties, who are
made defendants, severally, as to their knowledge of the above
will, and of the
Page 23 U. S. 194
title of the female complainants, and requires of them to set
forth and describe the lands severally claimed by them, from whom
they purchased, at what time, and for what price the same were
purchased, and when the purchase money was paid. The prayer is for
a conveyance by each defendant of two-thirds of the land claimed by
them respectively, and for possession.
The answer of the heirs of Winship states that the land to which
they claim title was purchased, for a valuable consideration, of
Thomas Armat, by their father, to whom a conveyance was made in the
year 1807. That a bill was filed by the present complainants,
against the said Thomas Armat, in the District Court of Ohio,
exercising the powers and jurisdiction of a circuit court, for the
land now in controversy, to which the said Armat filed his answer,
asserting himself to be a
bona fide purchaser of the land,
for a valuable consideration, and without notice, and that, the
cause coming on to be heard, the bill was dismissed without costs,
after which decree, the purchase was made of Armat by the
defendant's father. They insist upon and pray to be protected by
the said decree.
Finley answers and alleges himself to be a
bona fide
purchaser for a valuable consideration of 500 acres, part of the
956 acres mentioned in the bill, from one Beauchamp, who claimed as
assignee of Dyal, who was assignee of John Crawford, for which he
paid, and received a patent, before notice of the claim of the
plaintiffs, or of the will of William Crawford.
Page 23 U. S. 195
The heirs of Thompson filed a plea in bar alleging that the
complainants, in the year 1804, filed their bill in the District
Court of Ohio, exercising the powers and jurisdiction of a circuit
court, against B. Thompson, their ancestor, under whom they claim,
setting forth the same title, and substantially the same matters as
in their present bill, to which the said Thompson answered, and the
complainants replied, and upon a hearing of the cause the bill was
dismissed with costs, which decree is in full force, &c.
Sullivant filed a similar plea, and the bill was dismissed as to
him by agreement.
A general replication was put in to the answers of Finley and
Winship's heirs, and a special replication to the plea in bar
setting forth the record in the former suit, and alleging, that the
proceedings in that suit were
coram non judice, the record
not showing that the complainants and defendant in that suit were
citizens of different states.
Upon the hearing, the bill was dismissed, and an appeal taken to
this Court.
Page 23 U. S. 198
MR. JUSTICE WASHINGTON delivered the opinion of the Court, and
after stating the case proceeded as follows:
Page 23 U. S. 199
The question which the plea of Thompson's heirs and the answer
of Winship's heirs presents is whether the general decree of
dismission of the bill in equity, filed by the present plaintiffs
in the Federal District Court of Ohio against the ancestor of these
defendants, under whom they respectively claim title, is a bar of
the remedy which is sought to be enforced by the present suit. The
reason assigned by the replication why that decree cannot operate
as a bar is that the proceedings in that suit do not show that the
parties to it, plaintiffs and defendants, were citizens of
different states, and that consequently the suit was
coram non
judice, and the decree void.
But this reason proceeds upon an incorrect view of the character
and jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. They
are all of limited jurisdiction, but they are not on that account
inferior courts in the technical sense of those words, whose
judgments, taken alone, are to be disregarded. If the jurisdiction
be not alleged in the proceedings, their judgments and decrees are
erroneous and may, upon a writ of error, or appeal, be reversed for
that cause. But they are not absolute nullities. This opinion was
strongly intimated, if not decided, by this Court in the case of
Kempe's Lessee v.
Kennedy, 5 Cranch 185, and was afterwards confirmed
by the decision made in the case of
Skillern's
Executors v. May's Executors, 6 Cranch 267. That
suit came before this Court upon a writ of error, where the
decree
Page 23 U. S. 200
of the court below was reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings to be had therein. After this, it was
discovered by that court that the jurisdiction was not stated in
the proceedings, and the question was made, whether that court
could dismiss the suit for that reason? This point, on which the
judges were divided, was certified to the Supreme Court, where it
was decided that the merits of the cause having been finally
decided in this Court, and its mandate only requiring the execution
of its decree, the court below was bound to carry that decree into
execution, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of that court was not
alleged in the pleadings. Now it is very clear that if the decree
had been considered as a nullity on the ground that jurisdiction
was not stated in the proceedings, this Court could not have
required it to be executed by the inferior court.
We are therefore of opinion that the decree of dismission relied
upon in this case, whilst it remains unreversed, is a valid bar of
the present suit as to the above defendants.
The next question is presented by the answer of Finley. At the
death of William Crawford in the year 1782, he was entitled to a
certain quantity of land to be laid off between the Rivers Scioto
and Little Miami under a promise contained in an act of the
Legislature of Virginia. His interest in this land was purely an
equitable one. After his death, a warrant to survey the same was
granted to John Crawford, his only son and heir at law, who
assigned to one Dyal a certain tract
Page 23 U. S. 201
which had been surveyed under the warrant, and the defendant
claims a part of the tract so surveyed under Beauchamp, who
purchased from Dyal. He alleges in his answer that he made the
purchase
bona fide, paid the purchase money, and obtained
a grant for the land before he had notice of the will of William
Crawford or of the claim of his daughters under it.
Crawford's will, under which the female complainants claim
title, was proved in some court in the County of Westmoreland in
the State of Pennsylvania, and was there admitted to record, but it
does not appear nor is it even alleged to have been at any time
proved in the State of Virginia or in the State of Ohio, where the
lands in controversy lie.
At the time of the death of William Crawford, lands lying in
Virginia were transmissible by last will and testament in writing,
the same being signed by the testator or by some person in his
presence and by his direction, and if not wholly written by
himself, being attested by two or more credible witnesses in his
presence. But to give validity and effect to such will it was
necessary that it should be duly proved and admitted to record in
the court of the county where the testator had his residence at the
time of his decease, or, if he had no place of residence in that
state, then in the court of the county where the land devised lay,
or it might be proved in the general court where the land was of a
certain value. Subsequent to the death of William Crawford, an act
of assembly was passed which permitted
Page 23 U. S. 202
authenticated copies of wills proved in any other state of the
Union or abroad to be offered for probate in the general court or
in the circuit, county, or corporation court where the whole of the
estate lies.
By the law of the State of Ohio, lands lying in that state may
be devised by last will and testament or writing, but before such
will can be considered as valid in law, it must be presented to the
court of common pleas of the county where the land lies for
probate, and be proved by at least two of the subscribing
witnesses. If the will be proved and recorded in another state
according to the laws of that state, an authenticated copy of the
will may be offered for probate in the court of the county where
the land lies, without proof by the witnesses, but it is liable to
be contested by the heir at law, as the original might have
been.
It is an acknowledged principle of law that the title and
disposition of real property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country where it is situated, which can alone prescribe the
mode by which a title to it can pass from one person to another.
For the establishment of this doctrine it will be sufficient to
cite the cases of the
United States v.
Crosby, 7 Cranch 115, and
Kerr v.
Moon, 9 Wheat. 565. It follows, therefore, that no
estate could pass to the daughters of William Crawford under his
will until the same should be duly proved according to the laws of
Virginia, where the land to which he was entitled lay at the time
of his death, or
Page 23 U. S. 203
of the Territory of Ohio after the cession by Virginia to the
United States under the ordinance of Congress of 13 July, 1787, or
according to the law of that state which has already been recited.
The probate of the will in the State of Pennsylvania gave it no
validity whatever in respect to these lands, as to which this Court
is bound to consider Crawford as having died intestate, and
consequently that they descended to John Crawford, his only son and
heir at law, according to the law of Virginia, as it stood in the
year 1782. The court below, then, could do no less than dismiss the
bill as against this defendant upon the ground that the
complainants had shown no title whatever, legal or equitable, to
the land in controversy.
This Court might be induced to yield to the application of the
counsel for the appellants that, in case of an affirmance, it
should be without prejudice, if we could perceive from the record
that the complainants could, in another suit, present their case
under a more favorable aspect. But this the answer of Finley will
not permit us to anticipate, for even if an authenticated copy of
Crawford's will should hereafter be offered for probate and
admitted to record in the State of Ohio, still the title to be
derived under it could not be permitted to overreach the legal
title of this defendant, founded as it is upon an equitable title
acquired
bona fide, and for a valuable consideration paid,
which purchase, payment, and acquisition of legal title were made
before he had either legal or constructive notice of the
Page 23 U. S. 204
will or of the claim of the daughters, for we are all of opinion
that the probate of the will in Pennsylvania cannot be considered
as constructive notice to any person of the devise of the lands in
controversy. The decree of the court below must therefore be
Affirmed generally with costs.
