1. The statute of July 13, 1861, and the subsequent proclamation
of President Lincoln under it, which made all commercial
intercourse between any part of a state where insurrection against
the United States existed and the citizens of the rest of the
United States "unlawful," so long as such condition of hostility
should continue, rendered void all purchases of cotton from the
rebel confederacy by citizens or corporations of New Orleans, after
the 6th of May, 1862, from which date the restoration of the
national authority had fixed upon them the same disabilities as to
commercial intercourse with the territory declared to be in
insurrection as it had previously fixed upon the inhabitants of the
loyal states.
2. Under the proviso of the above-mentioned statute which gave
the President power in his discretion to license commercial
intercourse, no one else could give licenses. Accordingly, any
given by the military authorities were nullities.
The
Reform, 3 Wall. 617, and
The Sea
Lion, 3 Wall. 642, affirmed.
3. The title of a purchaser from a citizen of New Orleans, who
had himself purchased from the rebel confederacy after the 6th of
May, 1862, was not made valid by the fact that such second
purchaser was a foreign neutral purchasing
bona fide for
value.
The case thus entitled was a matter of three appeals from the
Circuit Court of the United States for Illinois in a question of
395 bales of cotton which had been seized during the rebellion by a
flotilla of the United States. The matter was thus:
An act of Congress of July 1, 1861, passed soon after the
outbreak of the late rebellion, enacts (§ 5) that
"It may and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation,
to declare that the inhabitants of such state, or any section or
part thereof where such insurrection exists, are in a state of
insurrection against the United States, and
thereupon all
commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens
thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall
cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility
shall continue."
The act proceeds:
"And all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming
from said state or section into the other parts of the
United
Page 73 U. S. 522
States, and all proceeding to such state or section by land or
water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the
same, or conveying persons to or from such state or sections, be
forfeited to the United States."
The same section also contained this proviso:
"That the
President may, in
his discretion,
license and permit commercial intercourse with any such
part of said state or section, the inhabitants of which are so
declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such
time, and by such persons, as
he, in
his
discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest, and
such intercourse,
so far as by him licensed, shall be
conducted and carried on
in pursuance of rules and regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury."
On the 16th of August, 1861, the President issued a
proclamation, declaring
"that the inhabitants of Louisiana and some other states named
(except the inhabitants of that part of the state of Virginia lying
west of the Alleghany Mountains, and of such other parts of that
state and the other states hereinbefore mentioned as might maintain
a loyal adhesion to the Union and Constitution, or might be from
time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States
engaged in the dispersion of said insurgents), were in a state of
insurrection against the United States, and
that all commercial
intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with
the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other states, and
other parts of the United States,
is unlawful, and shall
remain unlawful until such insurrection shall cease or has been
suppressed."
With this statute and this proclamation in force, three distinct
parties, American citizens or subjects -- namely, Withenbury &
Doyle, The New Orleans Bank, and one Leon Queyrous -- purchased
during the rebellion,
but after New Orleans was restored, by
capture, May 6, 1862, to the federal jurisdiction, a quantity
of cotton from the late rebel confederation. The cotton had been
raised on the Ouachita, in Louisiana, and in 1862 sold by its
owners to the confederation, who left it stored on the plantation
where it was raised.
Page 73 U. S. 523
The circumstances under which the three parties above-named
purchased respectively from the Confederate government were
these:
1. Withenbury & Doyle were citizens of Ohio. The outbreak of
the rebellion found them in Louisiana owners and masters there of
two steamers running in lawful commerce between New Orleans and
Upper Louisiana. Before very long, the boats were in the service of
the rebel confederacy -- wholly by compulsion,
as was asserted
by Withenbury & Doyle, and against every loyal effort on
their part to keep their boats from it. The Confederacy, as in time
of war, had seized them, it was alleged, meaning to pay what it
deemed a fair price. Being thus indebted to Withenbury & Doyle
for the use of the boats, these persons took the cotton (still on
the plantation where it was raised) in payment, making the
negotiation by which they became owners, with one McKee, an agent
of the Confederate government. Such was their title to the cotton
bought by them.
2. The title of the Bank was thus:
On the capture of New Orleans by the forces of the United
States, the Louisiana state Bank, a moneyed corporation in that
city, found itself with a large amount of Confederate currency on
hand, which, as was said, it had been compelled by the rebel
confederacy to receive on deposit. It being valueless at New
Orleans after the capture, and its effect -- if it could be put
into circulation in the regions yet under rebel control -- being
likely to be the yet further discrediting of the rebel credit --
while if cotton could be got for it and brought into loyal regions
--
that would add to the resources of these last,
the
commander of the United States forces in New Orleans, in
December, 1862, authorized the bank at its desire to dispose of
this currency in the purchase of cotton within the rebel lines.
Under this permission, an agent of the bank passed through the
United States lines into Upper Louisiana and purchased the cotton
in question (or some other which to facilitate transfer he
exchanged for it) of a sub-agent of McKee, the agent already named,
in August, 1863.
3. Queyrous' purchase was thus:
He was a
naturalized
Page 73 U. S. 524
citizen of the United States residing in New Orleans,
and, in March, 1864, purchased the cotton of Buckner, an agent of
the Confederate states.
Soon after all this, to-wit, in April, 1864, a flotilla of
gunboats of the United States sailed up the Ouachita River, found
the cotton still upon the plantation, where it had been raised and
which was in a part of Louisiana then, as from the origin of the
rebellion it had been, subject to the power of the rebel
confederacy -- and seizing 935 bales of it, transported it to
Cairo, where it was libeled in the district court there, as prize
of war.
Withenbury & Doyle intervened as claimants, on sale of it,
to its proceeds, under their title as stated, for the whole 935
bales. A firm named Grieff & Zunts, who had purchased from the
bank, came in as succeeding to its title for the same total amount;
while a French firm,
foreigners, resident in France, Le
More & Co., who had purchased 830 bales from Queyrous,
intervened for that proportion of the capture.
By order of the court, the claims were consolidated, and having
been considered, were dismissed on the ground that the transactions
of the original parties, Withenbury & Doyle, the Bank and
Queyrous, were "void," the inhabitants of the loyal and disloyal
districts having been rendered incapable of any dealing with each
other so long as the rebellion continued, prohibition being the
rule and license the exception, and the license in this case not
having been by the President, who alone was capable of giving one.
None of the original parties, therefore, who dealt with the rebels,
had any title, and neither Grieff & Zunts nor the house of Le
More in France, who stood in the shoes of two of them, could get
through them one that should be different.
The claims of all three intervenors were accordingly dismissed,
and
without the question between the captors and the United
States having been disposed of, the correctness of this decree
of dismissal was made by this appeal the question now before the
court.
Page 73 U. S. 527
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These three cases relate to the same cotton. The several
appellants are conflicting claimants, and it will conduce to
brevity and clearness in the expression of our views as to the
merits of their respective claims to dispose of all the cases
together.
The cotton was seized on the bank of the Ouachita River in the
State of Louisiana by the naval forces of the United States in
April, 1864. It was sent to Cairo and libeled as prize of war in
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of Illinois. The court, by an interlocutory decree, directed the
cotton to be sold and the proceeds to be held subject to its order.
The decree was executed, and the proceeds are so held. The
appellants intervened in that court by filing their petitions. The
claim of Withenbury & Doyle and that of Grieff & Zunts each
covers all the cotton. Le More & Co. claim 830 bales.
The court below decreed against all the claimants and ordered
their petitions, respectively, to be dismissed. From these decrees
the several parties appealed, and the cases are now before this
Court for final decision.
The original case is still pending in the district court. No
further step in it has been taken. It is there awaiting
adjudication. It is not in this Court, and we can do nothing which
will affect it further than to dispose of the cases before us.
Neither the captors nor the United States have yet been heard in
the main case. All questions between them relating to it are still
in abeyance. If this Court should decree in favor of either of the
two larger claims in the cases before us, there would be nothing
left for the original parties to contend for. The entire
res of the controversy would be lost to both. If we should
sustain the smaller claim and exclude the others, the proceeds of
105 bales of the cotton will remain undisposed of. But if the
decrees below shall
Page 73 U. S. 528
be affirmed, the effect will be only to remove from the original
case the grafts which have been placed upon it by the parties
before us, and thereby to leave it in all respects as it was before
they intervened.
The place where the cotton was seized was, at the time of the
seizure, and had been from the commencement of the war, insurgent
territory. It was raised near the place of seizure upon the
plantation of Simmons & Tatem, and was sold by Simmons -- who
had become the sole owner -- to the rebel government in the fall of
1862. Payment was made in Confederate bonds.
Withenbury & Doyle were citizens of the State of Ohio, but
were in Louisiana at the breaking out of the rebellion. They owned
two steamboats, and were engaged in running them upon the waters of
that state. They remained there and their boats were largely
employed in the rebel service. They claim to have been thoroughly
loyal to the United States all the time, and that such use of their
boats was, on their part, the result of fear and compulsion, and
was inevitable.
They bought the cotton in controversy of McKee, the cotton agent
of the rebel government, in August, 1863. The consideration of the
purchase was the indebtedness of that government for the service of
the boats. Withenbury says in his deposition:
"The so-called Confederate government owed me largely for the
services of my steamboat, and I received from their agent, A. W.
McKee, cotton in preference to Confederate money. This cotton was
situated on the Ouachita and Red Rivers, about equally divided. The
largest quantity in any one place was nine hundred and thirty-five
bales (935), which was stored on the plantation of Dr. John T.
Simmons on the Ouachita River below Monroe."
The testimony of McKee, the rebel agent, is to the same effect.
He says:
"The services of their boats ended in 1863, in the month of
April. I then agreed to pay them in cotton if money was not soon
forthcoming. . . . I paid them in the Simmons crop of cotton on the
Ouachita River. . . . There was no contract or bargain made how
they
Page 73 U. S. 529
were to be paid or how much they were to be paid. The boats were
required to do the work with the understanding that they would be
paid the customary prices. . . . On settlement in the spring of
1863, there was a balance due them, for services rendered under my
direction, of between eighty and ninety thousand dollars."
Doyle procured permission from the proper military authorities
of the United States to bring to New Orleans, upon government
transports from Upper Louisiana, 2,500 bales of cotton then lying
there which he claimed belonged to him. The cotton in controversy
was a part of it. Before this could be done, the cotton in question
was seized, removed to Cairo, and libeled as before stated.
Le More & Co. are a commercial house of Havre, in France.
They claim 830 bales of the cotton. They purchased through their
agent, Jules Le More, on the 1st of March, 1864. The purchase was
made of Leon Queyrous, a naturalized citizen residing in New
Orleans. He bought of Buckner, an agent of the rebel government, in
the preceding month of February. Possession was delivered by
Buckner to Queyrous and by Queyrous to the agent of Le More &
Co.
Grieff & Zunts claim through the Bank of the State of
Louisiana. In the fall of 1862, after the capture of New Orleans by
the land and naval forces of the United States, the bank, having on
hand upwards of a million dollars of Confederate money, applied to
the military authorities there for permission to send it within the
rebel lines and invest it in cotton. Permission was accordingly
given, and an agent was sent to Upper Louisiana with the money. He
made large purchases in the country upon the Red River. Finding it
impossible to remove the cotton, he exchanged it with the rebel
authorities for cotton in the Ouachita District, including, as is
alleged, the cotton in controversy. This arrangement was made in
1863. The bank sold to Grieff & Zunts in March, 1864. It is
strenuously insisted by the counsel for the other claimants that
the proof shows that the contract of exchange did not include the
cotton in controversy, that it was conditional and was subsequently
rescinded
Page 73 U. S. 530
by the parties, and that the bank took no title under it.
However these things may be, they are immaterial in the view which
we have taken of the case. We have therefore not found it necessary
fully to examine the testimony relating to them. For the purposes
of this opinion it is assumed that the facts are as they are
claimed to be by the counsel of Grieff & Zunts.
The fifth section of the Act of July 13, 1861, authorized the
President, under the circumstances mentioned, to declare any state
or part of a state to be "in a state of insurrection against the
United States," and it enacts that thereupon,
"all commercial intercourse by and between the same, and the
citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the United States
shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility
shall continue, . . .
provided, however, that the
President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial
intercourse with any such part of such state, the inhabitants
whereof are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such
articles and for such time and by such persons as he in his
discretion may think most conducive to the public interest, and
such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and
carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury."
On the 16th of August, 1861, the President issued a proclamation
declaring the rebel states, including Louisiana, to be in a state
of insurrection. It excepted several localities from its operation.
Among them were such parts of the states mentioned "as may be from
time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States
engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents." By another
proclamation of the 2d of April, 1863, the President declared the
same States to be in insurrection and revoked all the exceptions
contained in the former proclamation, but again made certain local
exceptions, of which "the port of New Orleans" was one. This
proclamation declares
"That all commercial intercourse, not licensed and conducted as
is provided in said act, between the said states and the
inhabitants thereof, with
Page 73 U. S. 531
the exceptions aforesaid, is unlawful and will remain unlawful
until such insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed, and
notice thereof has been given by proclamation."
The date of this proclamation was prior to either of the
purchases of the cotton from the rebel agents to which the
claimants respectively trace their titles.
The subjugation of New Orleans and the restoration of the
national authority there are regarded as having become complete on
the 6th of May, 1862. From that time, its citizens were clothed
with the same rights of property, and were subject to the same
inhibitions and disabilities as to commercial intercourse with the
territory declared to be in insurrection, as the inhabitants of the
loyal states. Such is the result of the application of well settled
principles of public law. The proclamation of the 2d of April,
1863, recognized but did not change the existing condition of
things. It was the same afterwards as before. The effect of the
proclamation was cumulative. [
Footnote 1]
The language of the act of 1861 and of the proclamation of 1863
is clear and explicit. There is no room for doubt as to their
meaning, nor as to their effect in these cases. Commercial
intercourse between the inhabitants of territory in insurrection
and those of territory not in insurrection, except under the
license of the President and according to regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, was entirely prohibited. As was well
remarked in the able opinion of the court below, "Prohibition was
the rule, and license the exception." No such license was given by
the President to either of the parties by whom the purchases of the
cotton were made from the agents of the rebel government. Those
given by the military authorities were nullities. They conferred no
rights whatever. No one could give them but the President. From any
other source they were void. The lawmaking power, in its wisdom and
caution, confided this important authority, so liable to be abused,
to the Chief Magistrate alone. [
Footnote 2]
Page 73 U. S. 532
Withenbury & Doyle being citizens and residents of Ohio,
Queyrous being a citizen of Louisiana, and a resident of New
Orleans, and the Bank of the State of Louisiana being a local
institution of that city when they purchased, their purchases were
all illegal and void, and passed no title to the vendees.
Withenbury & Doyle therefore never had any title. Queyrous took
none, and therefore could convey none to Le More & Co. The bank
acquired none, and nothing passed by the sale to Grieff &
Zunts.
All the parties in this litigation stand before us without any
right or interest in the cotton which this Court can recognize.
Other questions of fact and of law have been argued with great
ability, but as we have found the statute and the proclamation
conclusive in every aspect of the cases which can be presented, we
have deemed it unnecessary further to examine the subject.
We have found no error in the record.
This conclusion is not in conflict with the ruling in the case
of
Mrs. Alexander's Cotton. [
Footnote 3] Upon that subject it is sufficient to remark
that there, the whole case was not, as here, before us.
The several decrees of the district court are
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The Venice, 2
Wall. 258.
[
Footnote 2]
The Reform, 3
Wall. 617;
The Sea
Lion, 5 Wall. 642.
[
Footnote 3]
69 U. S. 2 Wall.
404.
