In the present case, where a bill was filed to set aside titles
for frauds alleged to have been committed in 1767, the bill does
not make out a sufficient case, and the evidence does not even
sustain the facts alleged. And the disability to sue arising from
coverture is not satisfactorily proved.
In case of alleged fraud, it is true that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.
But then the bill must be specific is stating the facts and
circumstances which constitute the fraud, and in the present case,
this is not done.
Where property was sold under an administrator's sale, the
presumption is in favor of its correctness, and after a long
possession under it, the burden of proof is upon the party who
impeaches the sale.
The bill was filed by Elizabeth Moore a citizen of the State of
New York, the great-grandchild of John Manton, of Rhode Island, who
died in 1767. It alleged a series of frauds, beginning in 1757,
when one of his sons-in-law prevailed upon him by fraud to make a
deed; then that his three sons-in-law conspired together to have
him declared
non compos mentis; then that they
fraudulently set aside his will; then that one of his sons-in-law
cheated his own children out of their share of the estate, and the
administrator became a party to the fraud; then that the town
council, conniving with the sons-in-law, adjudged the paper not to
be a lawful will, and that all the parties fraudulently prevented
an appeal. These charges of fraud were made to include many other
transactions which it is not necessary to specify. The claim of the
complainant was that she was entitled to a share of the lands held
by the defendants, and the prayer was that a partition might be
decreed.
Hawkins filed his answer, saying that he had purchased property
from Samuel W. King, who derived it from his father, Josiah King,
who inherited it from his father, William B. King, and that he and
the Kings had been in the uninterrupted
Page 60 U. S. 70
and quiet possession of the property for more than twenty years
before the filing of the bill, and therefore be pleaded the statute
of limitations. He also denied all knowledge of the important facts
stated in the bill.
Greene answered and explained the manner in which he had come
into possession of the property --
viz., from his father,
Samuel Greene who was a devisee of his father, Joshua Greene who
purchased it from Josiah King, administrator of John Manton, in
1770, since which time it had been in the possession of the family.
He also denied all knowledge of the alleged frauds, and pleaded the
statute of limitations.
After taking much testimony, the cause came up for hearing in
November, 1854, when the circuit court dismissed the bill with
costs. The complainant appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill was filed to set aside certain titles for frauds
alleged to have been committed in the year 1767 by a father against
his own children for the benefit of strangers. The frauds are
stated to have been investigated and sanctioned, directly or
indirectly, by the court of probate, by referees chosen by the
parties to determine their matters of controversy, and by the
highest courts of the state.
Page 60 U. S. 71
The legal history of the case commences in July, 1767, by the
execution of a deed by the administrator of John Manton to Waterman
and Pearce. From this period, a series of events are detailed,
genealogical and historical, sweeping over near a century. Acts are
stated in the bill, as it would seem, from mere vague reports, and
sometimes resting on conjectures. And many of the facts set forth,
if proved and were of modern occurrence, would not be sufficient to
avoid the titles enumerated; but the facts are denied generally by
the answers and not sufficiently proved by the evidence.
The lands when sold were comparatively of little value, but, by
the progress of time and the advance of improvements, they are now
covered with large manufacturing establishments and flourishing
villages. Generation after generation has risen up and passed away
of individuals connected with these titles who increased the value
of the property by their large expenditures, and the property, by
deed or will or by the law of descents, has been transmitted
through the generations that have passed without doubt as to the
legal ownership.
The bill was filed in 1851; its averments of facts, by which the
lapse of time and the statute of limitations are sought to be
avoided, are loose and unsatisfactory. The adverse entry is alleged
to have been made under the deed of the administrator of Manton in
1767, and it appears that Betty Waterman, the complainant's
grandmother, through whom the title is claimed to have descended,
was born in 1756. She was of age in 1777, and in ten years
afterward her right was barred by the statute. It is true, the date
of her coverture does not appear, but as she was only eleven years
of age in 1767, she could not then have been married, and if her
marriage occurred subsequently, it was a cumulative disability
which is not allowed by the statute of Rhode Island. The
complainant became of age, as it appears, in 1815, and her ten
years expired in 1825. Her disability of coverture -- and it was
cumulative -- expired in 1840, more than ten years before the bill
was filed.
The complainant avers that from the death of John Manton in 1767
to 1822-1823, and 1824, his estates were the subjects of legal
controversy and litigation in courts of law, and that ever since,
renewed and continued claims and demands, by the heirs of Lydia
Thornton and Betty Carpenter, for their proportion of said estates,
as his rightful heirs at law, upon the assignees of the Manton
estate and upon all persons deriving title under them, have been
continuously prosecuted. But prosecutions, to stop the operations
of the statute, must be successful and lead to a change in the
possession.
Page 60 U. S. 72
When fraud is alleged as a ground to set aside a title, the
statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, and
this is the ground on which the complainant asks relief. But in
such a case the bill must be specific in stating the facts and
circumstances which constitute the fraud, and also as to the time
it was discovered. This is necessary to enable the defendants to
meet the fraud and the alleged time of its discovery. In these
respects the bill is defective and the evidence is still more
so.
The complainant's counsel seem to suppose that as the defendants
in their answer admit the property, at least in part, was
originally acquired under a sale of Manton's administrator, they
are bound to show the proceedings were not only conformable to law,
but that they must go further and prove the debts for which it was
sold were due and owing by the deceased. So far from this being the
legal rule under the circumstances of this case, the presumptions
are in favor of the present occupants, and the complainants must
show the administrator's sale was illegal and void. After an
adverse possession of more than eighty years, when the facts have
passed from the memory and, as in this case, the papers are not to
be found in the probate court, no court can require of the
defendants proof in regard to such sale. The burden of proof falls
upon him who attempts to disturb a possession of ages transmitted
and enjoyed under the forms of law.
Whether we consider the great lapse of time and the change in
the value of the property or the statutes of limitation, the right
of the complainant is barred.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.
