Where the decree of the district court, in a case of admiralty
jurisdiction, was not a final decree, the circuit court, to which
it was carried by appeal, had no power to act upon the case, nor
could it consent to an amendment of the record by an insertion of a
final decree by an agreement of the counsel in the case; nor can
this Court consent to such an amendment.
The district court having ordered a report to be made, the case
must be sent back from here to the circuit court, and from there to
the district court, in order that a report may be made according to
the reference.
This was a libel filed on the 6th of April, 1854, in the
District Court of South Carolina by Mordecai & Co., against the
schooner
Mary Eddy and all persons intervening.
A very brief narrative will be sufficient to show the condition
in which the case was when it left the district court, and this is
all that is required under the present opinion of this Court.
In March, 1854, the
Mary Eddy was in New Orleans, about
to sail for Charleston. One hundred and two hogsheads of sugar were
shipped on board of her, which were to be delivered to Mordecai
& Co. The libel was for the nondelivery of these articles.
The answer admitted the shipment and arrival of the vessel in
Charleston, and then averred the delivery of three hogsheads of the
sugar, together with some barrels of syrup, the freight of which
Mordecai & Co. refused to pay. The answer then alleged that the
libellants, having refused to pay freight until the sugars were
received by them at their store, or until possession had passed to
them, the master unloaded the residue
Page 60 U. S. 200
of the sugars, and, when landed on the wharf, gave notice to
Mordecai & Co. that he would deliver the articles to them upon
payment of the freight; that Mordecai & Co. having refused to
do this, the master retained the custody of the sugars in order to
preserve his lien for the freight. A correspondence took place
between the parties, which it is not necessary to state for the
purposes of this report.
The district judge decreed in favor of the libellants, with
costs, and then added:
"Mr. Gray the commissioner and clerk of this Court will
ascertain the charges to be made against the respective parties to
this suit and state the account between them. For this purpose he
is authorized to use the testimony already reported and such
further evidence as may be brought before him in relation to this
point."
Without any further proceedings being had in the case, the
claimants appealed to the circuit court, and the record was
accordingly transmitted.
When the cause came up for hearing before the circuit judge, he
reversed the decree of the district court and dismissed the libel
with costs, whereupon the libellants appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon the hearing of this cause in this Court, it was suggested
that the court had not jurisdiction of the case on the ground that
the district court, which had original jurisdiction of it, had not
given a final decree in favor of the libellants before the cause
was taken by appeal to the circuit court, from the decision of
which, reversing the decision of the district judge and dismissing
the libel, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. No such
decree of the district court is set out in the record, but the
court, supposing it might be a clerical omission, gave to the
counsel concerned in the cause time to ascertain the fact in order
that it might be made, either by consent of parties or by
certiorari, a part of the record, that there might be no delay in
the final disposition of the case by this Court. The counsel having
made the necessary inquiries
Page 60 U. S. 201
from the clerk of the district and circuit courts, and having
reported to this Court that no final decree had been extended or
passed in favor of the libellants by the district judge, and that
the case had been taken by appeal to the circuit court upon such
imperfect record, and decided in that court, without any notice of
the omission having been brought to its view either from the record
or in the argument of the case, the counsel have applied to this
Court to permit them to amend the record by consent, by inserting
in it what might be agreed upon by them to be a final decree,
urging, as the merits of the case between the parties had been
fully discussed here, that the court could proceed upon such
amendment to decide the case.
We have examined the proposal of counsel in connection with the
laws of Congress regulating appeals from the district court to the
circuit court and from the latter to this Court, and also the
decisions of this Court upon those laws, and we do not find, upon
any interpretation which has been or could in our view be given to
them, that it is in our power to grant the application of counsel
for the amendment of the record as they propose it should be
done.
The right of appeal is "conferred, defined, and regulated," by
the second section of the Act of March 2, 1803, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
244. Its language is:
"That from all final judgments or decrees in any of the district
courts of the United States, an appeal, where the matter in
dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of fifty
dollars, shall be allowed to the circuit court next to be holden in
the district where such judgment or judgments, decree or decrees,
may be rendered, and the circuit court or courts are hereby
authorized and required to receive, hear, and determine such
appeal. And that from all final judgments or decrees rendered in
any circuit court or in any district court acting as a circuit
court in cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction,
and of prize or no prize, an appeal, where the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of two thousand
dollars, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that upon such appeal a transcript of the libel, bill,
answer, depositions, and all other proceedings of what kind soever
in the cause, shall be transmitted to the said Supreme Court."
It is, then, only upon final judgments and decrees that appeals
can be taken from either of the courts to the other courts. Without
such a decree, neither the circuit nor the supreme courts can have
jurisdiction to determine a cause upon its merits, as was done in
this case by the circuit court, from which decision it has been
brought by appeal to this Court. The circuit court had nothing
before it to make
Page 60 U. S. 202
its decision available for the appellants, if its view of the
merits of the case had coincided with the opinion of the district
judge or upon which its process could have been issued to carry out
the judgment given by it in favor of the respondents. Nor could it
have permitted an amendment of the record of appeal by the
insertion of what the parties might have agreed to be a final
judgment as to amount, without its having first received the
judicial sanction of the district judge. And this Court is as
powerless in this respect as the circuit court was, as its
jurisdiction depends upon that court's having a proper legislative
jurisdiction of the case. It cannot overlook the fact upon which
its jurisdiction depends,
by any action in the case in the
circuit court upon an irregular appeal. The case in that court
was
coram non judice, and is so here. The appellants have
the right to the execution of the order given by the district judge
to the commissioner and clerk of the court, to ascertain the
charges to be made against the respective parties to the suit, and
to state an account between them, for which purpose he was
authorized to use the testimony already reported and such further
testimony as might be brought before him in relation to that point.
That the circuit court cannot direct to be done, nor can
this Court do so. All that we can do in the case as it stands here
is to reverse the decree of the circuit court dismissing the
appellants' libel, to send the case back to the circuit court that
the appeal in it may be dismissed by it for want of its
jurisdiction, leaving the case in its condition before the appeal
to that court, that the parties may carry out the case in the
district court to a final decree, upon such a report as the
commissioner and clerk may make, according to the order which was
given by the judge. The judgment of the circuit court is
Reversed accordingly.
