United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. ___ (2022)
Following an unsuccessful robbery during which his accomplice shot a man, Taylor was charged under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and with committing a “crime of violence” under section 924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. Section 924(c) authorizes enhanced punishments for using a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) or 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause). Taylor's sentence was based on his admission that he had committed both conspiracy to commit and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In habeas proceedings, Taylor argued neither offense qualified as a “crime of violence” following the Supreme Court's holding that 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s 924(c) conviction.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 924(c)(3)(A). Under the “categorical approach” for determining whether a federal felony may serve as a predicate under the elements clause, the question is whether that felony “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” The relevant inquiry is not how any particular defendant may commit the crime but whether that felony always requires the government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end; it need not prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property.
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 20–1459. Argued December 7, 2021—Decided June 21, 2022
For his participation in an unsuccessful robbery during which his accomplice shot a man, respondent Justin Taylor faced charges of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), and of committing a “crime of violence” under §924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. §1951(a). Section 924(c) authorizes enhanced punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” as defined in either §924(c)(3)(A)—known as the elements clause—or §924(c)(3)(B)—known as the residual clause. Before the District Court, the government argued that Taylor’s Hobbs Act offense qualified as a “crime of violence” under §924(c). Taylor ultimately pleaded guilty to one count each of violating the Hobbs Act and §924(c). The District Court sentenced Taylor to 30 years in federal prison—a decade more than the maximum sentence for his Hobbs Act conviction alone. Taylor later filed a federal habeas petition focused on his §924(c) conviction, which was predicated on his admission that he had committed both conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor argued neither Hobbes Act offense qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of §924(c) after United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ___. In Davis, this Court held that §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at ___–___. In his habeas proceeding, Taylor asked the court to apply Davis retroactively and vacate his §924(c) conviction and sentence. The government maintained that Taylor’s §924(c) conviction and sentence remained sound because his crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause. The Fourth Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A). The Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s §924(c) conviction and remanded the case for resentencing. In reaching its judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that other courts have held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause.
Held: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Pp. 3–13.
(a) The Court applies a “categorical approach” to determine whether a federal felony may serve as a predicate for a conviction and sentence under the elements clause, which poses the question whether the federal felony in question “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” §924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The relevant inquiry is not how any particular defendant may commit the crime but whether the federal felony at issue always requires the government to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. This Court has long understood similarly worded statutes to demand similarly categorical inquiries. See, e.g., Borden v. United States, 593 U. S. ___, ___.
An attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end. See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107. An intention is just that, no more. And whatever a substantial step requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property—even if the facts would allow the government to do so in many cases. As the Model Penal Code explains with respect to the Hobbs Act’s common-law robbery analogue, “there will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, where the actor does not actually harm anyone or even threaten harm.” ALI, Model Penal Code §222.1, p. 114. But no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The government’s countervailing arguments fail. Pp. 6–13.
(1) The government first argues that the elements clause encompasses not only any offense that qualifies as a “crime of violence” but also any attempt to commit such a crime. But the elements clause only asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence as defined by the statute. Pp. 6–7.
(2) The government next argues that the “substantial step” element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery categorically requires it to prove that a defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. But while many who commit the crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do use, attempt to use, or threaten to use force, the government’s problem is that no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires the government to prove such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The government maintains that anyone who takes a substantial step toward completing Hobbs Act robbery always or categorically poses a “threatened use” of force because the word “threat” can be used to speak of an abstract risk. The government submits that the elements clause uses the term to require only an objective, if uncommunicated, threat to community peace and order. But when Congress uses the word “threat” in such an abstract and predictive (rather than communicative) sense, it usually makes its point plain. The textual clues in the statute point in the opposite direction of the government’s reading. Moreover, the government’s view of the elements clause would have it effectively replicate the work formerly performed by the residual clause. Under usual rules of statutory interpretation, the Court does not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 839, n. 14. Pp. 7–10.
(3) The government’s final theory accepts that a conviction under the elements clause requires a communicated threat of force and contends that most attempted Hobbs Act robbery prosecutions involve exactly that. But whatever this argument proves, the theory cannot be squared with the statute’s terms. Congress in the elements clause did not mandate an empirical inquiry into how crimes are usually committed, let alone impose a burden on the defendant to present proof about the government’s own prosecutorial habits. Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically require proof of the elements § 924(c)(3)(A) demands. That ends the inquiry, and nothing in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, suggests otherwise. Pp. 10–13.
979 F.3d 203, affirmed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions.
Adjudged to be AFFIRMED. Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions. |
Argued. For petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D. C. |
Reply of United States submitted. |
Reply of petitioner United States filed. (Distributed) |
Amicus brief of First Amendment Clinic submitted. |
CIRCULATED |
Amicus brief of John Pangelinan submitted. |
Amicus brief of Neal Goldfarb submitted. |
Amicus brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and FAMM submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and FAMM filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of First Amendment Clinic filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of John Pangelinan filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of Neal Goldfarb filed. (Distributed) |
Amicus brief of National Association of Federal Defenders submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Federal Defenders filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of Justin Eugene Taylor submitted. |
Brief of respondent Justin Eugene Taylor filed. |
Record received from the U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Virginia is electronic and located on Pacer. Some transcripts and Sealed documents has been received (One Envelope) |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 4th Circuit. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, December 7, 2021. |
Brief of United States submitted. |
Brief of petitioner United States filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including September 7, 20201. The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including October 22, 2021. |
Motion of United States to dispense with joint appendix submitted. |
Motion for an extension of time to file the briefs on the merits filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner United States. |
Motion of United States for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent GRANTED. |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 7/1/2021. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/24/2021. |
Reply of petitioner United States filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondent Justin Eugene Taylor in opposition filed. |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent Justin Eugene Taylor. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including May 21, 2021. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from May 17, 2021 to May 21, 2021, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due May 17, 2021) |