SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Denise A. Badgerow, PETITIONER v.
Greg Walters, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
[March 31, 2022]
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
When interpreting a statute, it is often helpful to consider not simply the statute’s literal words, but also the statute’s purposes and the likely consequences of our interpretation. Otherwise, we risk adopting an interpretation that, even if consistent with text, creates unnecessary complexity and confusion. That, I fear, is what the majority’s interpretation here will do. I consequently dissent.
The question presented arises in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.
The question is technical and jurisdictional: How does a federal court determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award? The FAA contains several sections that seem to empower a federal court to take certain specified actions related to arbitration proceedings. These include Section 4, which gives “any United States district court” the power to “order” parties to a written arbitration agreement to “proceed” to arbitration; Section 5, which gives “the court” the power to “designate and appoint an arbitrator”; Section 7, which gives “the United States district court for the district” in which an arbitrator is sitting the power to “compel the attendance” of witnesses whom the arbitrator has “summoned”; Section 9, which gives “the United States court in and for the district within which” an arbitration award “was made” the power to enter an “order confirming the award”; Section 10, which gives “the United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration] award was made” the power to “make an order vacating the award”; and Section 11, which gives “the United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration] award was made” the power to “modif[y] or correc[t] the award.” 9 U. S. C. §§4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11. (Here, as throughout, I have simplified the descriptions of the FAA’s sections; the Appendix, infra
, contains the full relevant statutory language.) This case directly concerns jurisdiction under Sections 9 and 10, but the Court’s reasoning applies to all the sections just mentioned.
At first blush, one might wonder why there is any
question about whether a federal court has jurisdiction to consider requests that it act pursuant to these sections. The sections’ language seems explicitly to give federal courts the power to take such actions. Why does that language itself not also grant jurisdiction to act? The answer, as the Court notes, is that we have held that the FAA’s “authorization of a petition does not itself create jurisdiction.” Ante
, at 1. “Rather, the federal court must have what we have called an ‘independent jurisdictional basis’ to resolve the matter.” Ibid.
(quoting Hall Street Associates
, L. L. C.
552 U.S. 576
, 582 (2008)).
We made clear how this works in Vaden
v. Discover Bank
556 U.S. 49
(2009), a case involving Section 4. As just noted, Section 4 gives a district court the power to order parties (who have entered into a written arbitration agreement) to submit to arbitration. We held “that a federal court should determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a §4 petition to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy.” Id
., at 62. The court asks whether it would have jurisdiction over that
controversy, namely, whether that underlying substantive controversy involves a federal question or diversity (a dispute between parties from different States with a value of more than $75,000). See 28 U. S. C. §§1331, 1332. If so, then the federal court has jurisdiction over a Section 4 petition asking the court to order the parties to resolve that controversy in arbitration.
Court gave two reasons for adopting this “look-through” approach. The first, as the majority today emphasizes, was textual. See 556 U. S., at 62. Section 4 says that a party seeking arbitration may petition for an order compelling arbitration from
“any United States district court which, save for [the arbitration] agreement
, would have jurisdiction . . . in a civil action . . . of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.” (Emphasis added.)
The words “save for [the arbitration] agreement,” we reasoned, tell a court not to find jurisdiction by looking to the petition to enforce the agreement itself, but instead to the underlying controversy between the parties. See id
., at 62–63.
The second reason, which the majority today neglects, was practical. Id.
, at 65. To find jurisdiction only where the petition to enforce an arbitration agreement itself established federal jurisdiction, we explained, would result in “curious practical consequences,” including unduly limiting the scope of Section 4 and hinging jurisdiction upon distinctions that were “ ‘totally artificial.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting 1 I. MacNeil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law §22.214.171.124, p. 9:21 (1995) (hereinafter MacNeil)).
Today, the majority holds that this look-through approach does not apply to Section 9 or 10 because those sections lack Section 4’s “save for” language. Ante
, at 2. This reasoning necessarily extends to Sections 5, 7, and 11 as well, for those sections, too, lack Sections 4’s “save for” language. Ibid.
(“Without [Section 4’s] statutory instruction, a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction”). Although this result may be consistent with the statute’s text, it creates what Vaden
feared—curious consequences and artificial distinctions. See 556 U. S., at 65. It also creates what I fear will be consequences that are overly complex and impractical.
I would use the look-through approach to determine jurisdiction under each of the FAA’s related provisions—Sections 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Doing so would avoid the same kinds of “curious practical consequences” that drove the Vaden
Court to adopt the look-through approach in the first place. Ibid.
; see also Cortez Byrd Chips
v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.
529 U.S. 193
, 202 (2000) (rejecting interpretation of the FAA that “would create anomalous results”). Most notably, this approach would provide a harmonious and comparatively simple jurisdiction-determining rule—advantages that the majority’s jurisdictional scheme seems to lack. Cf. Hertz Corp.
559 U.S. 77
, 94 (2010) (rejecting “[c]omplex jurisdictional tests” in favor of “straightforward” and “[s]imple jurisdictional rules”).
Consider some of the likely consequences of the majority’s reading, which applies the look-through approach only to Section 4 (where the “save for” language appears), but not to the FAA’s other sections (where it does not appear).
, consider Section 5. That section says that, upon application of one of the parties to an arbitration agreement, “the
court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator.”
9 U. S. C. §5 (emphasis added). What happens when the look-through approach shows that the underlying controversy raises a federal question, but the application to appoint an arbitrator raises no federal question and does not establish diversity? A party could ask a federal judge to order
arbitration under Section 4, but they could not then ask that same (or any other) federal judge to appoint
an arbitrator for that very same arbitration under Section 5. That does not seem to be what Congress had in mind for these neighboring provisions—provisions that appear to assume that a judge can appoint an arbitrator in tandem with ordering parties to arbitration. Moreover, how is a federal court to determine, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the amount at stake in a motion to appoint an arbitrator without a look-through approach? Surely not by assessing the value of the arbitrator’s request for pay.
, consider Section 7. It says that “upon petition the United States district court for the district in which” an arbitrator is sitting “may compel the attendance” of persons whom the arbitrator has “summoned.” §7. Suppose that the underlying substantive controversy does not qualify for federal jurisdiction, meaning that a federal court would not have jurisdiction to order arbitration under Section 4. If arbitration proceeds by other means, can a federal judge nonetheless compel the attendance of a witness at that arbitration, based on diversity jurisdiction, if a request to do so shows that the summoned witness lives out of State? If there are two witnesses, one in State and one out of State, can the federal judge compel the attendance of the second, but not the first? Why would Congress have wanted parties to toggle between federal and state court when seeking judicial enforcement of summons issued during a single arbitration?
And at a more basic level, who
are the relevant parties to a Section 7 request when determining, for diversity purposes, whether the Section 7 dispute is between citizens of different States? The arbitrator and summoned witness? The parties in arbitration? Only the “summoning” party and the witness? Compare Washington National Insurance Co.
v. OBEX Group LLC
, 958 F.3d 126, 134 (CA2 2020) (evaluating diversity based on summoning party and witness), with Amgen
v. Kidney Center of Del. Cty. Ltd.
, 95 F.3d 562
, 567–568 (CA7 1996) (evaluating diversity based on parties in arbitration). And assume that a federal court finds it does have jurisdiction over a Section 7 request, even though the underlying controversy involves neither a federal question nor diversity. “Why would Congress have wanted federal courts to intervene to enforce a subpoena issued in an arbitration proceeding involving a controversy that itself is not important enough, from a federalism standpoint, to warrant federal-court oversight?” Maine Community Health Options
v. Albertsons Cos.
993 F.3d 720, 726 (CA9 2021) (Watford, J., concurring).
Moreover, diversity jurisdiction requires not only that the relevant parties be from different States but also that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See
28 U. S. C. §1332(a). How does a federal judge determine whether summoning a witness is itself worth $75,000? By examining the value of what the witness might say? By accounting for travel expenses? See Maine Community Health
, 993 F. 3d, at 723–724. As courts have recognized, there is “very little case law to guide [them] in determining whether enforcement of an arbitration subpoena against a third party will enable someone to recover more than $75,000 in an arbitration dispute with a different party.” Id.
, at 726 (Watford, J., concurring). These and other jurisdiction-related questions do not arise if a federal judge can simply follow Vaden
’s principle for all FAA motions: Look through the motions and determine whether there is federal jurisdiction over the underlying substantive controversy. See 556 U. S., at 62–63.
, consider now Sections 9 and 10, the FAA sections directly before us, along with Section 11. Section 9 gives “the United States court in and for the district within which [an arbitration] award was made” the power to issue “an order confirming the award.” Section 10 gives the same court the power to “vacat[e]” the award for certain specified reasons. And Section 11 gives that court the power to “modif[y] or correc[t] the award.” Where the parties’ underlying dispute involves a federal question (but the parties are not diverse), the majority holds that a party can ask a federal court to order arbitration under Section 4, but it cannot ask that same court to confirm, vacate, or modify the order resulting from that arbitration under Section 9, 10, or 11. But why prohibit a federal court from considering the results of the very arbitration it has ordered and is likely familiar with? Why force the parties to obtain relief—concerning arbitration of an underlying federal
-question dispute—from a state court unfamiliar with the matter?
Or suppose that a party asks a federal court to vacate an arbitration award under Section 10 because the arbitrator “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” §10(a)(3). To determine at least one important aspect of diversity jurisdiction—the amount in controversy—must the court not look to the underlying dispute? The same question arises with respect to a Section 11 motion to modify an arbitral award on the ground that it “is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” §11(c).
The majority says that these and other problems require only that the parties bring their FAA requests to state courts. Ante
, at 15–16. But we cannot be sure that state courts have the same powers under the FAA that federal courts have. The FAA says nothing about state courts; it only explicitly mentions federal courts. See §7 (“United States district court”); §9 (“the United States court”); §10 (same); §11 (same). We have never held that the FAA provisions I have discussed apply in state courts, and at least one Member of this Court has concluded that they do not apply there. See, e.g.
577 U.S. 47, 59 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). State courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.
, Cable Connection
, 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1351, 190 P.3d 586, 597 (2008) (holding that §§4, 10, and 11 apply only in federal court); In re Beck’s Superior Hybrids
, 940 N.E.2d 352, 362–363 (Ind. App. 2011) (same for §7); Henderson
v. Summerville Ford-Mercury Inc.
, 405 S. C. 440, 450, 748 S.E.2d 221, 226 (2013) (same for §9).
Relatedly, the majority also notes, correctly, that Section 9, 10, and 11 disputes about the enforceability of arbitral awards “typically involve only state law.” Ante
, at 6. It thus makes sense, the majority says, that these disputes would belong primarily in state court. See ante
, at 15. But the same can be said for Section 4 disputes about the enforceability of arbitration agreements. These, too, typically involve only questions of state law. That the dispute does not implicate federal questions thus does not explain why Congress would have wanted more federal court involvement at the Section 4 stage than during the later stages.
It may be possible to eliminate some of these problems by using a federal-question lawsuit or Section 4 motion as a jurisdictional anchor. If a party to an arbitration agreement files a lawsuit in federal court but then is ordered to resolve the claims in arbitration, the federal court may stay the suit and possibly retain jurisdiction over related FAA motions. See §3; Vaden
, 556 U. S., at 65. Similarly, some courts have held that if a federal court adjudicates a Section 4 motion to order arbitration, the court retains jurisdiction over any subsequent, related FAA motions. See Maine Community Health
, 993 F. 3d, at 725 (Watford, J., concurring); see also McCormick
v. America Online
, 909 F.3d 677, 684 (CA4 2018). But, as Vaden
points out, to turn jurisdiction over these later motions on the presence or absence of a federal lawsuit or Section 4 motion is to turn jurisdiction on a “ ‘totally artificial distinction’ ”—particularly when the very purpose of arbitration is to avoid litigation. 556 U. S., at 65 (quoting 1 MacNeil §126.96.36.199, at 9:21).
I relate these practical difficulties in part to illustrate a more fundamental point. The majority has tried to split what is, or should be, a single jurisdictional atom—a single statute with connected parts, which parts give federal judges the power to facilitate a single arbitration proceeding from start to finish: to order arbitration; appoint an arbitrator; summon witnesses; and confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award. The need for simplicity, comprehension, workability, and fairness all suggest that these interrelated provisions should follow the same basic jurisdictional approach, namely, as Vaden
explains, the look-through approach.
The majority’s interpretation is also at odds with what this Court has said about the purposes underlying the FAA. We have recognized that the statute reflects a clear “ ‘policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements.’ ” Cortez Byrd Chips
, 529 U. S., at 201 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Constr. Corp.
460 U.S. 1
, 23 (1983)); see also id.
, at 22 (“Congress’ clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible”).
We have thus interpreted the FAA to avoid “unnecessarily complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
513 U.S. 265
, 275 (1995). “Why,” we asked, “would Congress intend a test that risks the very kind of costs and delay through litigation . . . that Congress wrote the Act to help the parties avoid?” Id.
, at 278. In other words, the FAA is
a “sphere” in which “uniformity in and of itself provides [a] real advantage.” Ante
, at 14.
The majority’s main point is straightforward: The text of the statute compels the result. As the majority rightly points out, we cannot disregard the statutory text or “overcome a clear statutory directive.” Ante
, at 13 (quoting Brief for Respondents 44). A statute that says it applies only to “fish” does not apply to turnips. The majority also rightly points out that the “save for” language setting forth the look-through approach appears only in Section 4, and does not appear in any of the later sections.
That fact, however, does not produce the “clear statutory directive” upon which the majority relies. Nothing in the text prohibits us from applying Section 4’s look-through approach to the succeeding sections. The statute does not say that Section 4’s jurisdictional rule applies only
to Section 4, or that the same look-through approach does not
apply elsewhere. Nor does any other section provide its own jurisdictional rule that would suggest Section 4’s rule should not apply there.
Moreover, when we consider Section 4’s text setting forth the look-through approach, we “consider not only the bare meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Bailey
v. United States
516 U.S. 137
, 145 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Welch
v. United States
578 U.S. 120, 133 (2016). Various aspects of the FAA’s text and structure suggest that Section 4’s jurisdictional rule should apply throughout. Section 5, for example, which grants the power to appoint an arbitrator, simply refers to “the court.” Those words, most naturally read, refer to the same court to which the immediately preceding section—Section 4—refers: a “United States district court” with jurisdiction as determined by the look-through approach. Requests under the FAA’s various sections are also generally described in the text as “applications” or “motions.” See §4 (“application”); §5 (same); §9 (same); §10 (same); §11 (same); see also §6; §12 (“motion to vacate, modify, or correct”); §13 (“application to confirm, modify, or correct”). This implies that the requests are all constituent parts of one broader enforcement proceeding, not standalone disputes meriting individual jurisdictional inquiries. See, e.g.
, In re Wild
, 994 F.3d 1244, 1257 (CA11 2021) (en banc) (“the term ‘motion’ has never
been commonly understood to denote a vehicle for initiating a new and freestanding lawsuit”); A Modern Dictionary of the English Language 446 (1911) (“motion in court” means “an application to a court . . . to have a rule or order made which is necessary to the progress of the action”).
And, more importantly, all the sections describe connected components of a single matter: a federal court’s arbitration-related enforcement power. One can read these sections as a single whole, with each section providing one enforcement tool, and one section—Section 4—providing both an enforcement tool and a jurisdictional rule applicable to the entire toolbox. Read this way, the FAA provides one set of complementary mechanisms through which a federal court might facilitate a single arbitration—but only when the underlying substantive controversy is one that, jurisdictionally speaking, could be brought in a federal court had the parties not agreed to arbitrate. There is no language in any of the sections that states, or suggests, that we cannot interpret the Act in this way.
In brief, the text does not prevent us from reading the statute in a way that better reflects the statute’s structure and better fulfills the statute’s basic purposes. See Allied Bruce
, 513 U. S., at 279 (adopting interpretation of FAA that “the statute’s language permits” and that is more consistent with “[t]he Act’s history”); Pierce
487 U.S. 552
, 563 (1988) (adopting outcome “that the text of the statute permits, and sound judicial administration counsels”).
The FAA’s legislative history reinforces the view of the statute that I have just described. The Senate Report on the bill that became the FAA refers to the FAA’s general purposes. It makes clear Congress’ hope to avoid procedural complexity. It refers to parties’ “desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation.” S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). Proponents of the bill thought it would successfully serve that purpose because it would provide “very simple machinery”; “simplify legal matters”; offer “speedy” and “plain justice”; and allow “no opportunity for technical procedure.” Joint Hearings on S. 1005 et al. before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 16, 26, 27, 36 (1924) (hereinafter Joint Hearings). These general purposes support a simplified jurisdictional rule.
The language of the House Report suggests more. It suggests that the bill created a single
jurisdictional procedure, not a set of different procedures with distinct jurisdictional rules. The Report says that the bill “provides a procedure
in the Federal courts for” enforcement of arbitration agreements. H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924) (emphasis added). “The procedure
,” the Report continues, “is very simple, . . . reducing technicality, delay, and expense . . . .” Ibid.
(emphasis added). That singular procedure, the Report explains, encompasses not only the initial request for a federal court to order arbitration under Section 4, but subsequent requests to vacate or modify an arbitration award under Sections 10 and 11 as well. See ibid.
The principal drafter of the bill made the same point yet more explicitly. He testified that under the FAA, “Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce [arbitration] agreements whenever
. . . they would normally have jurisdiction of a controversy between the parties
.” Joint Hearings 34 (statement of Julius H. Cohen) (emphasis added). Immediately following, he said that “such enforcement” includes the power to appoint arbitrators under Section 5, which, of course, lacks Section 4’s “save for” language. Ibid.
And he then proceeded to discuss the FAA’s other sections, all without suggesting that their jurisdictional requirements were any different. Ibid.
; see also id.
, at 35–36.
Together, this history reinforces the interpretation of the statute that I would adopt. It suggests that Congress intended a single approach for determining jurisdiction of the FAA’s interrelated enforcement mechanisms, not one approach for the mechanism provided in Section 4 and a different approach for the mechanisms provided in all other sections.
* * *
In this dissent I hope to have provided an example of what it means to say that we do not interpret a statute’s words “in a vacuum.” Abramski
v. United States
573 U.S. 169
, 179 (2014). Rather, we should interpret those words “with reference to the statutory context, structure, history and purpose[,] . . . not to mention common sense.” Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, these considerations all favor a uniform look-through approach. And the statute’s language permits that approach. Interpretation of a statute must, of course, be consistent with its text. But looking solely to the text, and with a single-minded focus on individual words in the text, will sometimes lead to an interpretation at odds with the statute as a whole. And I fear that is what has happened in this case.
I suggest that by considering not only the text, but context, structure, history, purpose, and common sense, we would read the statute here in a different way. That way would connect the statute more directly with the area of law, and of human life, that it concerns. And it would allow the statute, and the law, to work better and more simply for those whom it is meant to serve. With respect, I dissent.
9 U. S. C. §§4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11
“§4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court having jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing and determination
“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days’ notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.”
“§5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire
“If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.”
“§7. Witnesses before arbitrators; fees; compelling attendance
“The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the United States courts. Said summons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States.”
“§9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure
“If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in like manner as other process of the court.”
“§10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
“(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
“(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
“(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
“(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
“(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
“(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
“(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.”
“§11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
“In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
“(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
“(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
“(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.”