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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20–472
_________________
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC,
et al., PETITIONERS
v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION,
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the tenth circuit
[June 25, 2021]
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Congress requires most domestic refineries to
blend a certain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into
the transportation fuels they produce. But when it first adopted
these mandates, Congress temporarily exempted small refineries
across the board. Looking beyond that initial period, Congress
authorized individual small refineries to apply for additional
hardship “extensions” from the federal government
“at any time.” The question before us is whether a
small refinery that manages to comply with renewable fuel mandates
in one year is forever forbidden from applying for an
“extension” in any future year.
I
In 2005 and 2007, Congress created the
renewable fuel program (RFP). §§201, 202(a)(1), 121Stat.
1519, 42 U. S. C. §7545(
o)(1)(J),
(
o)(1)(L), (
o)(2)(A)(i). For 2006, Congress ordained
the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in the
Nation’s fuel supply. §7545(
o)(2)(B)(i)(I). By
2022, the number will climb to 36 billion gallons.
Ibid. For
years after that, Congress has largely left it to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set the applicable volumes.
§7545(
o)(2)(B)(ii).
From the start, EPA has apportioned the
nationwide volume mandates into individualized ones for each
refinery. §7545(
o)(3)(B); 40 CFR §80.1407(a)
(2020). The Agency polices these mandates with a system of credits.
Each credit represents the blending of a certain quantity of
renewable fuel. 42 U. S. C.
§7545(
o)(5)(A)(i); 40 CFR §§80.1415, 80.1429.
A refinery that blends renewables may either “retire”
the credits it has earned (
i.e., use them) to satisfy its
own RFP volume obligation—or sell those credits to a
different producer that needs them. 42 U. S. C.
§7545(
o)(5)(B); 40 CFR
§§80.1425–80.1427. Any given refinery may therefore
comply with the law thanks to its own blending efforts, the
purchase of credits from someone else, or a combination of
both.
Congress tempered its mandates in other ways
too. For example, if a refinery is unable to generate or purchase
sufficient credits in a given year, it may “carry
forward” any deficit to the following year. 42
U. S. C. §7545(
o)(5)(D). But this reprieve
has a snowball effect. The next year, the refinery must offset the
deficit it carried forward. §7545(
o)(5)(D)(ii).
Elsewhere, Congress authorized more sweeping relief: EPA may waive
RFP obligations in a particular State or region if it determines
they “would severely harm the economy or environment”
or if “there is an inadequate domestic supply.”
§7545(
o)(7)(A). That waiver lasts for only one year,
“but [it] may be renewed.”
§7545(
o)(7)(C).
Most important for our case, however, is a
different, if related, set of tempering features. Evidently,
Congress was concerned that escalating RFP obligations could work
special burdens on small refineries that lack the “inherent
scale advantages of large refineries,”
Sinclair Wyoming
Refining Co. v.
EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (CA10 2017), and
sometimes supply a major source of jobs in rural communities, Brief
for State of Wyoming et al. as
Amici Curiae
19–25. To protect small refineries that produce (on average)
fewer than 75,000 barrels a day “for a calendar year,”
§7545(
o)(1)(K), Congress created a blanket exemption
from RFP obligations “until calendar year 2011,”
§7545(
o)(9)(A)(i). Congress also directed EPA to
“extend the exemption under clause (i)” for at least
two years if the Secretary of Energy determined RFP obligations
would impose “a disproportionate economic hardship” on
a given small refinery. §7545(
o)(9)(A)(ii).
Accordingly, subparagraph (A) anticipated temporary relief until
2011 or at least 2013. In the next subparagraph, the one most
squarely at issue before us, Congress offered the possibility of
still further relief in future years: “A small refinery may
at any time petition the Administrator for an extension of the
exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of disproportionate
economic hardship.” §7545(
o)(9)(B)(i).
Here’s how things played out for small
refineries once the law went into effect. Under subparagraph
(A)(i), all small refineries were exempt through 2010. See Dept. of
Energy, Office of Policy and International Affairs, D. Vashishat
et al., Small Refinery Exemption Study 25 (Mar. 2011). In
2011, EPA extended that exemption for 13 small refineries under
subparagraph (A)(ii)—and it extended the exemption for an
additional 11 small refineries under subparagraph (B)(i).
Id., at 37. As time went on, and as economic conditions
fluctuated, EPA extended more exemptions under subparagraph (B)(i)
in some years than in others. For example, EPA granted 8 extensions
in 2013, but expanded that number to 31 in 2018. EPA, RFS Small
Refinery Exemptions, (May 20, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/fuels-
registration-reporting-and-compliance-help / rfs-small-refinery-exemptions.
This case concerns three small refineries that
initially received an exemption, saw it lapse for a period, and
then petitioned for an exemption again under subparagraph (B)(i).
HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining LLC received only the blanket
exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) through 2010. See
Renewable
Fuels Assn. v.
EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1228 (CA10 2020).
Wynnewood Refining Company received the blanket exemption under
subparagraph (A)(i) and a 2-year extension under subparagraph
(A)(ii) through 2012.
Id., at 1229. HollyFrontier Cheyenne
Refining LLC received subparagraph (A)(i)’s blanket
exemption, subparagraph (A)(ii)’s 2-year extension, and then
subparagraph (B)(i)’s hardship exemption in 2015.
Id.,
at 1227. After a lull, all three refineries petitioned for a
hardship exemption under subparagraph (B)(i) in 2017 or 2018. EPA
granted all three.
A group of renewable fuel producers objected.
They petitioned for review of EPA’s decisions in the Tenth
Circuit, arguing the Agency acted “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” by granting the
petitions. 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(C). The court vacated
EPA’s decisions. It concluded the refineries were ineligible
for an “extension” of their exemptions because all
three had allowed their exemptions to lapse at some point in the
past. 948 F. 3d, at 1249. We granted review to consider the
question for ourselves. 592 U. S. ___ (2021).
II
A
Where Congress does not furnish a definition
of its own, we generally seek to afford a statutory term “its
ordinary or natural meaning.”
FDIC v.
Meyer,
510 U.S.
471, 476 (1994). Before us, the parties agree on one thing: The
key word here—“extension”—is nowhere
defined in the statute and it can mean different things depending
on context.
Sometimes, as the renewable fuel producers
observe and the court of appeals held, an “extension”
can refer to an increase in time. See,
e.g., 5 Oxford
English Dictionary 597 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) (“Enlargement in
duration”); 7 U. S. C. §940f(a)
(“extension of the final maturity” of a federal loan).
In other settings, as the small refineries emphasize, an
“extension” can mean the offering or making something
available to someone, such as the granting of a benefit. See,
e.g., 5 OED 595 (“[t]o hold out, accord,
grant”); 15 U. S. C. §1141e(a)
(“extension of [intellectual property] protection”).
These definitional differences matter too. If Congress used the
term in the second sense, everyone before us seems to accept the
court of appeals erred: Just because a small refinery’s first
exemption lapsed, nothing would foreclose the government from
extending—in the sense of granting or conferring—a
second exemption later.
Ultimately, however, we agree with the renewable
fuel producers and the court of appeals that subparagraph (B)(i)
uses “extension” in its temporal sense—referring
to the lengthening of a period of time. We find three textual clues
telling. First, the initial exemption described in subparagraph
(A)(i) is described temporally (as lasting “until calendar
year 2011”). 42 U. S. C.
§7545(
o)(9)(A)(i). Second, the next exemption described
in subparagraph (A)(ii) speaks temporally too, and it does so using
a variation of the very term in dispute—authorizing EPA to
“
extend the exemption under clause (i) for the small
refinery for a period of not less than 2 years.”
§7545(
o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). Finally,
subparagraph (A)(ii) and subparagraph (B)(i) share an identical
title—“Extension of exemption”—underscoring
the likelihood that the two neighboring provisions use the term
“extension” in one consistent sense. Nor do we see any
persuasive countervailing evidence that Congress meant to adopt one
meaning of the term in subparagraph (A)(ii) and a different one
next door in subparagraph (B)(i). See
Henson v.
Santander
Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at
5) (absent contrary evidence, this Court normally presumes
consistent usage).
B
Resolving that much, however, does not resolve
this case. Really, it only takes us to the heart of the dispute.
The Tenth Circuit didn’t just hold that an extension means an
increase in time—it imposed a continuity requirement. On that
court’s view, a small refinery becomes permanently ineligible
for a further extension of time once its exemption lapses. Even
accepting that subparagraph (B)(i) uses the term
“extension” in its temporal sense, the small refineries
submit this was error. On their view, small refineries whose
exemptions have lapsed in one year may still seek an
“extension” in a following year. Indeed, the small
refineries candidly characterize this as their stronger argument
for reversal.
We agree. It is entirely natural—and
consistent with ordinary usage—to seek an
“extension” of time even after some lapse. Think of the
forgetful student who asks for an “extension” for a
term paper after the deadline has passed, the tenant who does the
same after overstaying his lease, or parties who negotiate an
“extension” of a contract after its expiration. Perhaps
for reasons like these, the respondents and court of appeals are
unable to point to a single dictionary definition of the term
“extension” requiring unbroken continuity. To be sure,
some definitions speak of an extension as a
“continuation.” See,
e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary 703 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “extension” as
“[t]he
continuation of the same contract for a
specified period” (emphasis added)). And the dissent urges us
to read “extension” to mean “continuation.”
Post, at 2 (opinion of Barrett, J.). But even
that
term can denote a resumption after some interrupting lapse. See,
e.g., 3 OED 828 (defining “continuation” as
“the resumption of any interrupted action or course”);
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 180 (1946) (defining
“continuation” as the “[a]ct of continuing; esp.
a resumption”); B. Garner, Modern English Usage 214 (4th ed.
2016).
Much federal law proceeds on this same
understanding. Under certain circumstances, a court “may
. . . extend” a party’s “time for
appeal” even “after the expiration of the time
otherwise set for bringing appeal.” 28 U. S. C.
§2107(c). In other words, the timer can start, run, finish,
and then
restart—because a court has the power to
“extend” the time allotted even after a lapse.
Likewise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe all sorts
of rules about “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a
specified time” in trial court proceedings. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 6(b)(1). And for almost all rules prescribing a
deadline, a district court may “extend the time” even
“after the time has expired.”
Ibid.; cf. Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2). More than a few lawyers and clients have
taken advantage of “extensions” of just these
sorts.
Still other examples exist. Maybe most notably,
just last year Congress twice passed laws providing for the
“extension” of public benefits that had lapsed or been
interrupted. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L.
116–260, §203, 134Stat. 1182 (providing an
“extension” of unemployment compensation starting on
December 26, 2020, after lapsing on July 31, 2020); Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–136,
§2114, 134Stat. 281 (providing an “extension” of
unemployment benefits starting in 2020, after lapsing in 2013). The
dissent gives these particular examples short shrift because they
appear in statutes “passed in an emergency context” a
decade after the statute at issue here.
Post, at 7. We do
not doubt that meaning may change with time, but unless the dissent
thinks the ordinary meaning of “extension” changed in
just 10 years, it’s hard to understand why these enactments
don’t shed at least some light on today’s question. If
anything, the emergency context in which these laws were
passed—forcing legislators to use a term on short
notice—would seem to provide useful evidence of ordinary
meaning.
Beyond that, the dissent counters by attempting
to recast all these varied examples of temporal extensions after
interruption. It imagines, for example, that when a teacher extends
a paper deadline after a lapse, that act of grace always operates
like a
nunc pro tunc judicial decree—retroactively
deeming the time originally allotted as now extending continuously
to some new and future due date. But no one thinks extensions
always work this way. As the COVID-19 statutes illustrate, a
previously lapsed benefit can and sometimes is
“extended” for a new period without any retroactive
effect. Likewise, if a student misses the 4 p.m. deadline on
Friday, his teacher may extend the deadline by authorizing him to
hand in his paper the following Monday between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.
Besides, even looking to the
nunc pro tunc analogy, what
does it prove? It cannot change the fact that, absent time travel,
a lapse or interruption has occurred. The student cannot go back in
time and turn in his paper when it was originally due on Friday
afternoon. His lapse may be forgiven or overlooked, maybe even with
a Latin term invoked in the process, but none of that means a break
in continuity, a lapse, or an interruption never happened. See
infra, at 10, n. 2 (discussing treatment of a lapse
under subparagraph (A)).
We do not mean to suggest that every use of the
word “extension” must be read the same way. On
occasion, for example, Congress requires “extensions”
to be “consecutive” or “successive.”
E.g., 8 U. S. C. §1184(g)(8)(D); 10
U. S. C. §2304a(f ); 19 U. S. C.
§2432(d)(1); 28 U. S. C. §594(b)(3)(A).
Modifiers like those may well suggest a continuity requirement.
See,
e.g., Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, at 846
(defining “successive” as “following each other
without interruption”). Other contextual clues in a given
statute may yield a similar conclusion. But none of that means the
bare term “extension” obviously and always includes a
strict continuity requirement. If anything, the absence of any
parallel modifying language in the statute before us supplies one
clue that continuity is not required here.
Further statutory clues confirm this
understanding. Recall that subparagraph (B)(i) authorizes small
refineries to seek hardship exemptions “at any time.”
42 U. S. C. §7545(
o)(9)(B)(i). Far from
indicating that a refinery may apply for an exemption in a future
year only if it has always received one in the past, this language
suggests a much more “expansive meaning.”
United
States v.
Gonzales,
520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997). “At any time” does not connote a
demand for some rigid continuity so much as its
opposite—including the possibility that small refineries
might apply for exemptions in different years in light of market
fluctuations and changing hardship conditions, whether
consecutively or otherwise.[
1]
We find another feature telling too. Next door,
subparagraph (A) uses the term “extension”
without a continuity requirement. To see how subparagraph
(A) was designed, imagine a small refinery avails itself of the
blanket exemption in 2008 and 2009 under subparagraph (A)(i). Then
in 2010, because of an increase in production capacity, the
refinery loses “small refinery” status under
§7545(
o)(1)(K) and with it the blanket exemption that
“appl[ies] to small refineries.”
§7545(
o)(9)(A)(i). One year later, production capacity
falls and the refinery moves back into small refinery status for
2011. If that refinery applies for an “extension” under
subparagraph (A)(ii), the statute provides that EPA “shall
extend the exemption under clause (i),” so long as the
Secretary of Energy found the refinery would suffer a
disproportionate hardship. The result? A refinery may receive an
“extension” despite its exemption having lapsed. And if
that’s how the term is used in subparagraph (A), we would
once again expect subparagraph (B) to follow a consistent pattern
of usage. See
Henson, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
5).[
2]
The refineries suggest we need to place still
another point in their column. They direct our attention to a
regulation EPA adopted in 2014 to clarify the bounds of
“small refinery” status. When EPA first sought public
comment, some suggested a refinery should be eligible for exemption
only if it
constantly remained “small” from 2006
onward—and EPA expressly rejected that view in favor of
revisiting annually whether a refinery falls above or below the
“small refinery” threshold. 40 CFR
§80.1441(e)(2)(iii). Before the Tenth Circuit, the Agency
insisted this regulation sheds light on the meaning of
“extension” and underscores that it does not include a
continuity requirement. Indeed, EPA asked the court of appeals to
defer to its understanding under
Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,
467 U.S.
837 (1984). Although the refineries repeat that ask here, the
government does not. With the recent change in administrations,
“the government is not invoking
Chevron.” Brief
for Federal Respondent 46–47. We therefore decline to
consider whether any deference might be due its regulation.
Against the petitioners’ evidence of
statutory meaning, the respondents ask us to consider one of their
own. They point to the fact that subparagraph (A) is titled
“temporary exemption,” that it was permitted to expire
in 2013, and that subparagraph (B)(i) speaks of extending
“the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Together,
respondents say, these statutory features suggest that the whole
scheme of exemptions was meant to end rapidly, that subparagraph
(B)(i) was designed as a narrow exception to a 2013 sunset rule,
and that any further exemptions it allows should therefore be
construed narrowly to end as quickly as possible.
But this much we do not see. In the first place,
we do not construe subparagraph (B) as part of some sunset scheme.
To be sure, subparagraph (A)’s exemptions were permitted to
expire in 2013, but did not have to do so. In theory, EPA could
have granted a small refinery exemption under subparagraph (A)(ii)
that lasted many years or indefinitely. See 42 U. S. C.
7545(
o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). In any case, subparagraph (B)(i)
expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013—“at any
time” hardship conditions are satisfied. If Congress really
had wanted all exemptions to cease after a temporary period, that
was surely an odd way to achieve it. Odder still in light of the
fact that Congress had before it (but eschewed) many readymade
models for a sunset statute if that’s what it wished here.
See,
e.g., §247d–7f(b) (providing that statutory
provisions authorizing a “limited antitrust exemption”
“shall expire at the end of [a] 17-year period” after
the Act was passed). And maybe odder yet given that subparagraph
(B)(i) exemptions are hardly destined to sunset quickly even on the
respondents’ account, for they do not dispute that small
refineries with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the
RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever. See Brief
for Federal Respondent 43, n. 7; Brief for Industry
Respondents 39.
Additionally, even assuming (without granting)
that subparagraph (B) really did represent only some sort of
exception to a general 2013 deadline, we still don’t see how
that would help. The respondents urge us to construe statutory
exceptions narrowly. But this Court has made clear that statutory
exceptions are to be read fairly, not narrowly, for they “are
no less part of Congress’s work than its rules and
standards—and all are worthy of a court’s
respect.”
BP p.l.c. v.
Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore,
ante, at 6. And fairly read, the key phrase
at issue before us—“A small refinery may at any time
petition the Administrator for an extension of the exemption under
subparagraph (A) for the reason of disproportionate economic
hardship”—simply does not contain the continuity
requirement the court of appeals supposed. Instead, more naturally,
it means exactly what it says: A small refinery can apply for (if
not always receive) a hardship extension “at any
time.”[
3]
III
Everything else the respondents offer in
defense of the court of appeals’ judgment involves surmise
about legislative purpose and arguments from public policy. Like
the Tenth Circuit, they emphasize that, by the time the petitioners
sought new exemptions in 2017 and 2018, small refineries already
“had many years to ponder . . . whether it made
sense to enter into or remain in the market.” 948 F. 3d,
at 1247. The respondents argue that subparagraph (B) was adopted
for the purpose of “funnel[ing] small refineries toward
compliance over time.”
Id., at 1246. And they submit
that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance congressional
goals such as increasing “biofuel production, energy
independence, and environmental protection.”
Ibid.
The dissent seemingly agrees. It acknowledges
that Congress provided
other ameliorating provisions to
address various challenges to the fuel market.
Post, at
8–10. For example and as we have already seen,
§7545(
o)(7)(A) grants EPA authority to waive RFP
obligations at any time across an entire State or region to address
severe hardships or shortages. Section 7545(
o)(7)(E)(ii)
provides a more limited waiver with respect to biomass-based diesel
fuels. And §7545(
o)(8)(D)(i) provided a waiver
authority to address hardships for consumers “in calendar
year 2006.” But on the dissent’s view, everything else
in the statute aims to “[f]unnel[ ] refineries toward
compliance.”
Post, at 9. Indeed, the dissent finds it
“odd” that our reading would permit hardship relief
only to small refineries in existence in 2008 and not to new ones,
post, at 13—and that our reading “will require
EPA to examine the 2008 study” when reviewing extension
applications “decades from now,”
post, at 9.
But, as usual, the other side presents a
plausible competing narrative. On the petitioners’ account,
the statute seeks to increase production of renewable fuel while
also offering a “safety valve” each year for small
refineries that might otherwise face extinction. According to the
small refineries, the respondents’ competing
“funnel” metaphor makes little sense because a small
refinery’s compliance in one year is in no way dispositive of
its ability to comply in a future year. Instead, compliance depends
on numerous factors unique to each year and circumstances over
which small refineries often have no control. Brief for Petitioners
42–44. In particular, most small refineries cannot comply
with RFP mandates but must purchase credits from those that can.
Each year more credits are required. And the price for those
credits reflect the famously volatile nature of the fuel
market—in one recent year, prices shot up by as much as 100%.
See
id., at 45. Aware of these market realities, the small
refineries say, a rational Congress could have created (and did
create) a means for small refineries to seek a hardship exemption
“at any time” rather than be forced to exit the
market.
The petitioners say their “safety
valve” analogy fits better for other reasons too. As the
dissent acknowledges, Congress included many other “safety
valve” provisions to address various challenges to the market
that may arise at any time, including regional shortages and
economic hardships.
Post, at 8–10. Surely, Congress
could have chosen to provide similar relief targeted to small
refineries. Nor is there anything odd about the fact that Congress
chose only to protect existing small refineries rather than new
entrants. Often Congress chooses to protect existing market
participants from shifts in the law while applying new restrictions
fully to future entrants. Maybe, too, the petitioners suggest,
Congress wasn’t particularly concerned with new entrants in
2008 because, until last year, there had not been a new refinery of
any size in this country for almost 50 years. See Blackmon, First
Major U. S. Oil Refinery Since 1977 Targets Bakken Shale Crude,
Forbes (July 25, 2020),
https: // www.forbes.com / sites / davidblackmon / 2020 / 07 / 25/
first - new - us -oil-refinery-since-1977-targets-bakken-shale-crude/.
The petitioners stress as well that, even on the
respondents’ account, Congress did create a “safety
valve” rather than a “funnel” for
some
small refineries: Those with an unbroken record of failing to
comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions
forever without being “funneled” toward compliance.
Supra, at 11–12. Yet the respondents never explain why
the least compliant refineries should be the most favored in this
way. Nor do they confront the fact that their rule would have the
strange effect of disincentivizing small refineries from ever
trying to comply. Brief for Petitioners 22; Brief for State of
Wyoming et al. as
Amici Curiae 13–14. And even on
the respondents’ account, EPA will have to consult its 2008
study in future years for these permanently noncompliant
refineries.
Beyond that, the petitioners note, if
subparagraph (B)(i) really did create a “miss one and
done” rule for small refineries able to comply with RFP
mandates in a single year the statute could wind up reducing
overall domestic fuel supply—all without adding a single
additional gallon of renewable fuel to the mix. See 42
U. S. C. §7545(
o)(5)(B); 40 CFR
§80.1427. Permanently shuttering existing small refineries in
the process could, as well, increase the Nation’s future
reliance on imported fuels. Brief for Petitioners 41. All of which
sits uneasily with even the respondents’ account of the
statute’s purposes.
We mention all this not because we pick sides.
Neither the statute’s text, structure, nor history afford us
sufficient guidance to be able to choose with confidence between
the parties’ competing narratives and metaphors. We mention
this only to observe that
both sides can offer plausible
accounts of legislative purpose and sound public policy—and
that it would therefore be a mistake to rely on appeals to some
abstract intuition that the number of small refineries receiving
exemptions “
should have tapered down” over time.
948 F. 3d, at 1246 (emphasis added). Instead, our analysis can
be guided only by the statute’s text—and that nowhere
commands a continuity requirement.
*
The respondents have not shown that
EPA’s approval of the petitioners’ extension requests
was in excess of the Agency’s statutory authority. 5
U. S. C. §706(2)(C). To the extent the court of
appeals vacated EPA’s orders on this ground, the judgment
is
Reversed.