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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10–1472
_________________
KOUICHI TANIGUCHI, PETITIONER
v. KAN
PACIFIC SAIPAN, stocktickerLTD., dba MARIANAS RESORT stocktickerAND
stocktickerSPA
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 21, 2012]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The costs that may be awarded to prevailing
parties in lawsuits brought in federal court are set forth in 28
U. S. C. §1920. The Court Interpreters Act amended
that statute to include “compensation of interpreters.”
§1920(6); see also §7, 92Stat. 2044. The question pre-
sented in this case is whether “compensation of
interpreters” covers the cost of translating documents.
Because the ordinary meaning of the word “interpreter”
is a person who translates orally from one language to another, we
hold that “compensation of interpreters” is limited to
the cost of oral translation and does not include the cost of
document translation.
I
This case arises from a personal injury action
brought by petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball
player in Japan, against respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the
owner of a resort in the Northern Mariana Islands. Petitioner was
injured when his leg broke through a wooden deck during a tour of
respondent’s resort prop- erty. Initially, petitioner said
that he needed no medical attention, but two weeks later, he
informed respondent that he had suffered cuts, bruises, and torn
ligaments from the accident. Due to these alleged injuries, he
claimed damages for medical expenses and for lost income from
contracts he was unable to honor. After discovery concluded, both
parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District
Court for the Northern Ma- riana Islands granted respondent’s
motion on the ground that petitioner offered no evidence that
respondent knew of the defective deck or otherwise failed to
exercise reasonable care.
In preparing its defense, respondent paid to
have various documents translated from Japanese to English. After
the District Court granted summary judgment in respondent’s
favor, respondent submitted a bill for those costs. Over
petitioner’s objection, the District Court awarded the costs
to respondent as “compensation of interpreters” under
§1920(6). Explaining that interpreter services “can- not
be separated into ‘translation’ and
‘interpretation,’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert.
25a, the court held that costs for document translation
“fal[l] within the meaning of ‘compensation of an
interpreter,’ ”
ibid. Finding that it was
necessary for respondent to have the documents translated in order
to depose petitioner, the court con- cluded that the translation
services were properly taxed as costs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed both the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment and its award of costs. The court rejected
petitioner’s argument that the cost of document translation
services is not recoverable as “compensation of
interpreters.” The court explained that “the word
‘interpreter’ can reasonably encompass a
‘translator,’ both according to the dictionary
definition and common usage of these terms, which does not always
draw precise distinctions between foreign language interpretations
involving live speech versus written documents.” 633 F.3d
1218, 1221 (2011). “More importantly,” the court
stressed, this construction of the statute “is more
compatible with Rule 54 of the Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure,
which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to the
prevailing party.”
Ibid. The court thus concluded that
“the prevailing party should be awarded costs for services
required to interpret either live speech or written documents into
a familiar language, so long as interpretation of the items is
necessary to the litigation.”
Id., at
1221–1222.
Because there is a split among the Courts of
Appeals on this issue,[
1] we
granted certiorari. 564 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
A
Although the taxation of costs was not allowed
at common law, it was the practice of federal courts in the early
years to award costs in the same manner as the courts of the
relevant forum State.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,
421 U.S.
240, 247–248 (1975). In 1793, Congress enacted a statute
that authorized the awarding of certain costs to prevailing parties
based on state law:
“That there be allowed and taxed in
the supreme, circuit and district courts of the United States, in
favour of the parties obtaining judgments therein, such
compensation for their travel and attendance, and for attornies and
counsellors’ fees . . . as are allowed in the
supreme or superior courts of the respective states.” Act of
Mar. 1, 1793, §4, 1Stat. 333.
Although twice reenacted, this provision expired
in 1799.
Alyeska Pipeline,
supra, at 248, n. 19;
Crawford Fitting Co. v.
J. T. Gibbons,
Inc.,
482 U.S.
437, 439 (1987). Yet even in the absence of express legislative
authorization, the practice of referring to state rules for the
taxation of costs persisted. See
Alyeska Pipeline, 421
U. S., at 250.
Not until 1853 did Congress enact legislation
specifying the costs allowable in federal court.
Id., at
251. The impetus for a uniform federal rule was largely the
consequence of two developments. First, a “great diversity in
practice among the courts” had emerged.
Ibid. Second,
“losing litigants were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant
fees for the victor’s attorney.”
Ibid. Against
this backdrop, Congress passed the 1853 Fee Act, which we have
described as a “far-reaching Act specifying in detail the
nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal
courts.”
Id., at 251–252. The substance of this
Act was transmitted through the Revised Statutes of 1874 and the
Judicial Code of 1911 to the Revised Code of 1948, where it was
codified, “without any apparent intent to change the
controlling rules,” as 28 U. S. C. §1920. 421
U. S., at 255.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) gives
courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing parties. That
Rule provides in relevant part: “Unless a federal statute,
these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other
than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” Rule 54(d)(1). We have held that
“§1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in
Rule 54(d).”
Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 441.
In so doing, we rejected the view that “the discretion
granted by Rule 54(d) is a separate source of power to tax as costs
expenses not enumerated in §1920.”
Ibid.
As originally configured, §1920 contained
five categories of taxable costs: (1) “[f]ees of the clerk
and marshal”; (2) “[f]ees of the court reporter for all
or any part of the steno- graphic transcript necessarily obtained
for use in the case”; (3) “[f]ees and disbursements for
printing and witnesses”; (4) “[f]ees for
exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use
in the case”; and (5) “[d]ocket fees under section 1923
of this title.” 62Stat. 955. In 1978, Congress enacted the
Court Interpreters Act, which amended §1920 to add a sixth
category: “Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and
costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this
title.” 28 U. S. C. §1920(6); see also
§7, 92Stat. 2044. We are concerned here with this sixth
category, specifically the item of tax- able costs identified as
“compensation of interpreters.”
B
To determine whether the item
“compensation of interpreters” includes costs for
document translation, we must look to the meaning of
“interpreter.” That term is not defined in the Court
Interpreters Act or in any other relevant statutory provision. When
a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary
meaning.
Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer,
513 U.S.
179, 187 (1995). The question here is: What is the ordinary
meaning of “interpreter”?
Many dictionaries in use when Congress enacted
the Court Interpreters Act in 1978 defined
“interpreter” as one who translates spoken, as opposed
to written, language. The American Heritage Dictionary, for
instance, defined the term as “[o]ne who translates orally
from one language into another.” American Heritage Dictionary
685 (1978). The Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary defined the
related word “interpret” as “to translate
orally.” Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary 476 (1977).
Similarly, the Random House Dictionary defined the intransitive
form of “interpret” as “to translate what is
said in a foreign language.” Random House Dictionary
of the English Language 744 (1973) (emphasis added). And, notably,
the Oxford English Dictionary defined “interpreter” as
“[o]ne who translates languages,” but then divided that
definition into two senses: “a. [a] translator of books or
writings,” which it designated as obsolete, and “b.
[o]ne who translates the communications of persons speaking
different languages;
spec. one whose office it is to do so
orally in the presence of the persons; a dragoman.” 5 Oxford
English Dictionary 416 (1933); see also Concise Oxford Dictionary
of Current English 566 (6th ed. 1976) (“One who interprets;
one whose office it is to translate the words of persons speaking
different languages, esp. orally in their presence”);
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 686 (1973) (“one who
translates orally for the benefit of two or more parties speaking
different languages: . . . a translator
(
obs.)”).
Pre-1978 legal dictionaries also generally
defined the words “interpreter” and
“interpret” in terms of oral translation. The
then-current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, for example,
defined “interpreter” as “[a] person sworn at a
trial to interpret the evidence of a foreigner . . . to
the court,” and it defined “interpret” in
relevant part as “to translate orally from one tongue to
another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 954, 953 (rev. 4th ed.
1968); see also W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 565 (1888)
(“One who translates the testimony of witnesses speaking a
foreign tongue, for the benefit of the court and jury”); 1 B.
Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English
Jurisprudence 639 (1878) (“one who restates the testimony of
a witness testifying in a foreign tongue, to the court and jury, in
their language”). But see Ballentine’s Law Dictionary
655, 654 (3d ed. 1969) (defining “interpreter” as
“[o]ne who interprets, particularly one who interprets words
written or spoken in a foreign language,” and
“interpret” as “to translate from a foreign
language”).
Against these authorities, respondent relies
almost exclusively on Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (hereinafter Webster’s Third). The version of that
dictionary in print when Congress enacted the Court Interpreters
Act defined “interpreter” as “one that
translates;
esp: a person who translates orally for parties
conversing in different tongues.” Webster’s Third 1182
(1976).[
2] The sense divider
esp (for especially) indicates that the most common meaning
of the term is one “who translates orally,” but that
meaning is subsumed within the more general definition “one
that translates.” See 12,000 Words: A Supplement to
Webster’s Third 15a (1986) (explaining that
esp
“is used to introduce the most common meaning included in the
more general preceding definition”). For respondent, the
general definition suf- fices to establish that the term
“interpreter” ordinarily includes persons who translate
the written word. Explaining that “the word
‘interpreter’ can reasonably encompass a
‘translator,’ ” the Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion. 633 F. 3d, at 1221. We disagree.
That a definition is broad enough to encompass
one sense of a word does not establish that the word is
ordinarily understood in that sense. See
Mallard v.
United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa,
490 U.S.
296, 301 (1989) (relying on the “most common
meaning” and the “ordinary and natural
signification” of the word “request,” even though
it may sometimes “double for ‘demand’ or
‘command’ ”). The fact that the definition
of “interpreter” in Webster’s Third has a sense
divider denoting the most common usage suggests that other usages,
although acceptable, might not be common or ordinary. It is telling
that all the dictionaries cited above defined
“interpreter” at the time of the statute’s
enactment as including persons who translate orally, but only a
handful defined the word broadly enough to encompass translators of
written material. See
supra, at 5–7. Although the
Oxford English Dictionary, one of the most authoritative on the
English language, recognized that “interpreter”
can mean one who translates writings, it expressly
designated that meaning as obsolete. See
supra, at 6. Were
the meaning of “interpreter” that respondent advocates
truly common or ordinary, we would expect to see more support for
that meaning. We certainly would not expect to see it designated as
obsolete in the Oxford English Dictionary. Any definition of a word
that is absent from many dictionaries and is deemed obsolete in
others is hardly a common or ordinary meaning.
Based on our survey of the relevant
dictionaries, we conclude that the ordinary or common meaning of
“interpreter” does not include those who translate
writings. Instead, we find that an interpreter is normally
understood as one who translates orally from one language to
another. This sense of the word is far more natural. As the Seventh
Circuit put it: “Robert Fagles made famous translations into
English of the
Iliad, the
Odyssey, and the
Aeneid, but no one would refer to him as an English-language
‘interpreter’ of these works.”
Extra
Equipamentos E Exportação Ltda. v.
Case
Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 727 (2008).
To be sure, the word “interpreter”
can encompass persons who translate documents, but because that is
not the ordinary meaning of the word, it does not control unless
the context in which the word appears indicates that it does.
Nothing in the Court Interpreters Act or in §1920, however,
even hints that Congress intended to go beyond the ordinary meaning
of “interpreter” and to embrace the broadest possible
meaning that the definition of the word can bear.
If anything, the statutory context suggests the
opposite: that the word “interpreter” applies only to
those who translate orally. As previously mentioned, Congress en-
acted §1920(6) as part of the Court Interpreters Act. The main
provision of that Act is §2(a), codified in 28
U. S. C. §§1827 and 1828. See 92Stat.
2040–2042. Particularly relevant here is §1827. As it
now reads, that statute provides for the establishment of “a
program to facilitate the use of certified and otherwise qualified
interpreters in judicial proceedings instituted by the United
States.” §1827(a). Subsection (d) directs courts to use
an interpreter in any criminal or civil action instituted by the
United States if a party or witness “speaks only or primarily
a language other than the English language” or “suffers
from a hearing impairment” “so as to inhibit such
party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication
with counsel or the presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit
such witness’ comprehension of questions and the presentation
of such testimony.” §1827(d)(1).[
3] As originally enacted, subsection (k) mandated that
the “interpretation provided by certified interpreters
. . . shall be in the consecutive mode except that the
presiding judicial officer . . . may authorize a
simultaneous or summary interpretation.” §1827(k) (1976
ed., Supp. II); see also 92Stat. 2042. In its current form,
subsection (k) provides that interpretation “shall be in the
simultaneous mode for any party . . . and in the
consecutive mode for witnesses,” unless the court directs
otherwise. The simultaneous, consecutive, and summary modes are all
methods of oral interpretation and have nothing to do with the
translation of writings.[
4]
Taken together, these provisions are a strong contextual clue that
Congress was dealing only with oral translation in the Court
Interpreters Act and that it intended to use the term
“interpreter” throughout the Act in its ordinary sense
as someone who translates the spoken word. As we have said before,
it is a “ ‘normal rule of statutory
construction’ that ‘identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning.’ ”
Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S.
561, 570 (1995) (quoting
Department of Revenue of Ore.
v.
ACF Industries, Inc.,
510 U.S.
332, 342 (1994)).[
5]
The references to technical terminology in the
Court Interpreters Act further suggest that Congress used
“interpreter” in a technical sense, and it is therefore
significant that relevant professional literature draws a line
between “interpreters,” who “are used for oral
conversations,” and “translators,” who “are
used for written communications.” Zazueta,
supra
n. 4, at 477; see also M. Frankenthaler, Skills for Bilingual
Legal Personnel 67 (1982) (“While the translator deals with
the written word, the interpreter is concerned with the spoken
language”); Brislin, Introduction, in Translation:
Applications and Research 1 (R. Brislin ed. 1976) (explaining that
when both terms are used together, translation “refers to the
processing [of] written input, and interpretation to the processing
of oral input” (emphasis deleted)); J. Herbert,
Interpreter’s Handbook 1 (2d ed. 1952) (“In the
present-day jargon of international organisations, the words
translate, translations, translator are used when the immediate
result of the work is a written text; and the words interpret,
interpreter, interpretation when it is a speech delivered
orally”). That Congress specified “interpreters”
but not “translators” is yet another signal that it
intended to limit §1920(6) to the costs of oral, instead of
written, translation.[
6]
In sum, both the ordinary and technical meanings
of “interpreter,” as well as the statutory context in
which the word is found, lead to the conclusion that §1920(6)
does not apply to translators of written materials.[
7]
C
No other rule of construction compels us to
depart from the ordinary meaning of “interpreter.” The
Court of Appeals reasoned that a broader meaning is “more
compat- ible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to the
prevailing party.” 633 F. 3d, at 1221. But we have never
held that Rule 54(d) creates a presumption of statutory
construction in favor of the broadest possible reading of the costs
enumerated in §1920. To the contrary, we have made clear that
the “discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is not a power to
evade” the specific categories of costs set forth by
Congress.
Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 442.
“Rather,” we have said, “it is solely a power to
decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in
§1920.”
Ibid. Rule 54(d) thus provides no sound
basis for casting aside the ordinary meaning of the various items
enumerated in the costs statute, including the ordinary meaning of
“interpreter.”
Our decision is in keeping with the narrow scope
of taxable costs. “Although ‘costs’ has an
everyday meaning synonymous with ‘expenses,’ the
concept of taxable costs under Rule 54(d) is more limited and
represents those expenses, including, for example, court fees, that
a court will assess against a litigant.” 10 C. Wright, A.
Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2666,
pp. 202–203 (3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter Wright & Miller).
Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses
as is evident from §1920, which lists such items as clerk
fees, court reporter fees, expenses for printing and witnesses,
expenses for exemplification and copies, docket fees, and
compensation of court-appointed experts. Indeed, “the
assessment of costs most often is merely a clerical matter that can
be done by the court clerk.”
Hairline Creations, Inc.
v.
Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 656 (CA7 1981). Taxable costs are
a fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by litigants for
attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators. It comes as
little surprise, therefore, that “costs almost always amount
to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in
connection with a lawsuit.” 10 Wright & Miller
§2666, at 203. Because taxable costs are limited by statute
and are modest in scope, we see no compelling reason to stretch the
ordinary meaning of the cost items Congress authorized in
§1920.
As for respondent’s extratextual
arguments, they are more properly directed at Congress. Respondent
contends that documentary evidence is no less important than
testimonial evidence and that it would be anomalous to require the
losing party to cover translation costs for spoken words but not
for written words. Brief for Respondent 20. Respondent also
observes that some translation tasks are not entirely oral or
entirely written.
Id., at 20–24. One task, called
“ ‘sight translation,’ ” involves
the oral translation of a document.
Id., at 21. Another task
involves the written translation of speech.
Ibid. And a
third task, called “ ‘document
comparison,’ ” involves comparing documents in the
source and target language to verify that the two are identical.
Id., at 21–22. Respondent argues that a narrow
definition cannot account for these variations and that a
bright-line definition of “interpreter” as someone who
translates spoken and written words would avoid complication and
provide a simple, administrable rule for district courts.
Neither of these arguments convinces us that
Congress must have intended to dispense with the ordinary meaning
of “interpreter” in §1920(6). First, Congress
might have distinguished between oral and written translation out
of a concern that requiring losing parties to bear the potentially
sizable costs of translating discovery docu- ments, as opposed to
the more limited costs of oral tes- timony, could be too burdensome
and possibly unfair, especially for litigants with limited means.
Cf.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing
Co.,
386 U.S.
714, 718 (1967) (noting the argument “that since
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might
be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents’ counsel”). Congress might also have
concluded that a document translator is more akin to an expert or
consultant retained by a party to decipher documentary
evidence—like, for instance, a forensic accountant—than
to an interpreter whose real-time oral translation services are
necessary for communication between litigants, witnesses, and the
court.[
8]
Second, respondent has not shown that any of the
hybrid translation/interpretation tasks to which it points actually
arise with overwhelming frequency or that the problem of drawing
the line between taxable and nontax- able costs in such cases will
vex the trial courts. It certainly has not shown that any such
problems will be more troublesome than the task of sifting through
translated discovery documents to ascertain which can be taxed as
necessary to the litigation. In any event, the present case does
not present a hybrid situation; it involves purely written
translation, which falls outside the tasks performed by an
“interpreter” as that term is ordinarily
understood.
* * *
Because the ordinary meaning of
“interpreter” is someone who translates orally from one
language to another, we hold that the category “compensation
of interpreters” in §1920(6) does not include costs for
document translation. We therefore vacate the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.