SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PEYMAN PAKDEL, et ux.
v. CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 20–1212. Decided June 28, 2021
Per Curiam.
When a plaintiff alleges a regulatory taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, a federal court should not
consider the claim before the government has reached a “final”
decision.
Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
520 U.S.
725, 737 (1997). After all, until the government makes up its
mind, a court will be hard pressed to determine whether the
plaintiff has suffered a constitutional violation.
See id.,
at 734;
Horne v.
Department of Agriculture,
569 U.S.
513, 525 (2013). In the decision below, however, the Ninth
Circuit required petitioners to show not only that the San
Francisco Department of Public Works had firmly rejected their
request for a property-law exemption (which they did show), but
also that they had complied with the agency’s administrative
procedures for seeking relief. Because the latter requirement is at
odds with “the settled rule . . . that exhaustion of
state remedies is
not a prerequisite to an action under 42
U. S. C. §1983, ”
Knick v.
Township of
Scott, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 2)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), we vacate and
remand.
I
Petitioners are a married couple who partially
own a multiunit residential building in San Francisco. When
petitioners purchased their interest in the property, the building
was organized as a tenancy-in-common. Under that kind of
arrangement, all owners technically have the right to possess and
use the entire property, but in practice often contract among
themselves to divide the premises into individual residences.
Owners also frequently seek to convert tenancy-in-common interests
into modern condominium-style arrangements, which allow individual
ownership of certain parts of the building. When petitioners
purchased their interest in the property, for example, they signed
a contract with the other owners to take all available steps to
pursue such a conversion.
Until 2013, the odds of conversion were slim
because San Francisco employed a lottery system that accepted only
200 applications per year. When that approach resulted in a
predictable backlog, however, the city adopted a new program that
allowed owners to seek conversion subject to a filing fee and
several conditions. One of these was that nonoccupant owners who
rented out their units had to offer their tenants a lifetime
lease.
Although petitioners had a renter living in
their unit, they and their co-owners sought conversion. As part of
the process, they agreed that they would offer a lifetime lease to
their tenant. The city then approved the conversion. But, a few
months later, petitioners requested that the city either excuse
them from executing the lifetime lease or compensate them for the
lease. The city refused both requests, informing petitioners that
“failure to execute the lifetime lease violated the [program] and
could result in an enforcement action.” Brief for Respondents
9.
Petitioners sued in federal court under §1983.
Among other things, they alleged that the lifetime-lease
requirement was an unconstitutional regulatory taking. But the
District Court rejected this claim without reaching the merits.
2017 WL 6403074, *2–*4 (ND Cal, Nov. 20, 2017). Instead, it relied
on this Court’s since-disavowed prudential rule that certain
takings actions are not “ripe” for federal resolution until the
plaintiff “seek[s] compensation through the procedures the State
has provided for doing so.”
Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S.
172, 194 (1985). Because petitioners had not first brought “a
state court inverse condemnation proceeding,” the District Court
dismissed their claims. 2017 WL 6403074, *4.
While petitioners’ appeal was pending before the
Ninth Circuit, this Court repudiated
Williamson County’s
requirement that a plaintiff must seek compensation in state court.
See
Knick, 588 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–23).
We explained that “[t]he Fifth Amendment right to full compensation
arises at the time of the taking” and that “[t]he availability of
any particular compensation remedy, such as an inverse condemnation
claim under state law, cannot infringe or restrict the property
owner’s federal constitutional claim.”
Id., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 7–8). Any other approach, we reasoned, would conflict with
“[t]he general rule . . . that plaintiffs may bring
constitutional claims under §1983 without first bringing any sort
of state lawsuit.”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Rather than remand petitioners’ claims in light
of
Knick, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit simply
affirmed. Noting that
Knick left untouched
Williamson
County’s alternative holding that plaintiffs may challenge
only “final” government decisions,
Knick, 588 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 5), the panel concluded that petitioners’
regulatory “takings claim remain[ed] unripe because they never
obtained a final decision regarding the application of the Lifetime
Lease Requirement to their Unit.” 952 F.3d 1157, 1163
(2020).[
1] Although the city
had twice denied their requests for the exemption—and in fact the
“relevant agency c[ould] no longer grant” relief—the panel reasoned
that this decision was not truly “final” because petitioners had
made a belated request for an exemption at the end of the
administrative process instead of timely seeking one “through the
prescribed procedures.”
Id., at 1166–1167 (explaining that
petitioners waited “six months after [they] had obtained final
approval of their conversion . . . and seven months after
they had committed to offering a lifetime lease”). In other words,
a conclusive decision is not really “final” if the plaintiff did
not give the agency the “opportunity to exercise its ‘flexibility
or discretion’ ” in reaching the decision.
Id., at
1167–1168.
Judge Bea dissented, explaining that the
“ ‘finality’ ” requirement looks only to whether
“ ‘the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive
position on the issue.’ ”
Id., at 1170. In his view, an
additional demand that plaintiffs “follo[w ] the
decisionmaker’s administrative procedures” would “ris[k ]
‘establish[ing] an exhaustion requirement for §1983 takings
claims,’ something the law does not allow.”
Ibid. And when
the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, Judge
Collins dissented along the same lines. He expressed concern that
“the panel’s unprecedented decision sharply depart[ed] from settled
law and directly contravene[d] . . .
Knick” by
“impos[ing] an impermissible exhaustion requirement.” 977 F.3d 928,
929, 934 (2020).
II
We, too, think that the Ninth Circuit’s view
of finality is incorrect. The finality requirement is relatively
modest. All a plaintiff must show is that “there [is] no question
. . . about how the ‘regulations at issue apply to the
particular land in question.’ ”
Suitum, 520 U. S.,
at 739 (brackets omitted).
In this case, there is no question about the
city’s position: Petitioners must “execute the lifetime lease” or
face an “enforcement action.” Brief for Respondents 9. And there is
no question that the government’s “definitive position on the issue
[has] inflict[ed] an actual, concrete injury” of requiring
petitioners to choose between surrendering possession of their
property or facing the wrath of the government.
Williamson
County, 473 U. S., at 193.
The rationales for the finality requirement
underscore that nothing more than
de facto finality is
necessary. This requirement ensures that a plaintiff has actually
“been injured by the Government’s action” and is not prematurely
suing over a hypothetical harm.
Horne, 569 U. S., at
525. Along the same lines, because a plaintiff who asserts a
regulatory taking must prove that the government “regulation has
gone ‘too far,’ ” the court must first “kno[w ] how far
the regulation goes.”
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County,
477 U.S.
340, 348 (1986). Once the government is committed to a
position, however, these potential ambiguities evaporate and the
dispute is ripe for judicial resolution.
The Ninth Circuit’s contrary approach—that a
conclusive decision is not “final” unless the plaintiff
also
complied with administrative processes in obtaining that
decision—is inconsistent with the ordinary operation of
civil-rights suits. Petitioners brought their takings claim under
§1983, which “guarantees ‘a federal forum for claims of
unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.’ ”
Knick, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). That
guarantee includes “the settled rule” that “exhaustion of state
remedies is
not a prerequisite to an action under
. . . §1983.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). In fact, one of the reasons
Knick gave for
rejecting
Williamson County’s state-compensation requirement
is that this rule had “effectively established an exhaustion
requirement for §1983 takings claims.”
Knick, 588
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
The Ninth Circuit’s demand that a plaintiff seek
“an exemption through the prescribed [state] procedures,” 952
F. 3d, at 1167, plainly requires exhaustion. In fact, this
rule mirrors our administrative-exhaustion doctrine, which
“provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed
or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted.”
Woodford v.
Ngo,
548 U.S.
81, 88–89 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have
often explained, this doctrine requires “
proper
exhaustion”—that is, “compliance with an agency’s deadlines and
other critical procedural rules.”
Id., at 90 (emphasis
added). Otherwise, parties who would “prefer to proceed directly to
federal court” might fail to raise their grievances in a timely
fashion and thus deprive “the agency [of] a fair and full
opportunity to adjudicate their claims.”
Id., at 89–90. Or,
in the words of the Ninth Circuit below, parties might “make an end
run . . . by sitting on their hands until every
applicable deadline has expired before lodging a token exemption
request that they know the relevant agency can no longer grant.”
952 F. 3d, at 1166.
Whatever policy virtues this doctrine might
have, administrative “exhaustion of state remedies” is not a
prerequisite for a takings claim when the government has reached a
conclusive position.
Knick, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 2). To be sure, we have indicated that a plaintiff ’s
failure to properly pursue administrative procedures may render a
claim unripe
if avenues still remain for the government to
clarify or change its decision. See,
e.g., Williamson
County, 473 U. S., at 192–194 (“The Commission’s refusal
to approve the preliminary plat . . . leaves open the
possibility that [the plaintiff] may develop the subdivision
according to the plat after obtaining the variances”);
Knick, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (“[T]he
developer [in
Williamson County] still had an opportunity to
seek a variance from the appeals board”); cf.
Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,
533 U.S.
606, 624–625 (2001) (dismissing accusations that the plaintiff
was “employing a hide the ball strategy” when “submission of [a]
proposal would not have clarified the extent of development
permitted . . . , which is the inquiry required under our
ripeness decisions”). But, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s view,
administrative missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government
has adopted its final position. See
Williamson County, 473
U. S., at 192–193 (distinguishing its “finality requirement”
from traditional administrative “exhaust[ion]”). It may very well
be, as Judge Bea observed, that misconduct during the
administrative process is relevant to “evaluating the
merits
of the . . . clai[m ]” or the measure of damages.
952 F. 3d, at 1170, n. 2 (dissenting opinion); cf.
Palazzolo, 533 U. S., at 625. For the limited purpose
of ripeness, however, ordinary finality is sufficient.
Of course, Congress always has the option of
imposing a strict administrative-exhaustion requirement—just as it
has done for certain civil-rights claims filed by prisoners. See 42
U. S. C. §1997e(a);
Ngo, 548 U. S., at 84–85
(“Before 1980, prisoners asserting constitutional claims had no
obligation to exhaust administrative remedies”). But it has not
done so for takings plaintiffs. Given that the Fifth Amendment
enjoys “full-fledged constitutional status,” the Ninth Circuit had
no basis to relegate petitioners’ claim “ ‘to the status of a
poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”
Knick, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.