NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–123
_________________
MARVIN D. HORNE, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 10, 2013]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 (AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing
Order or Order) promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, raisin
growers are frequently required to turn over a percentage of their
crop to the Federal Government. The AMAA and the Marketing Order
were adopted to stabilize prices by limiting the supply of raisins
on the market. Petitioners are California raisin growers who
believe that this regulatory scheme violates the Fifth Amendment.
After petitioners refused to surrender the requisite portion of
their raisins, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
began administrative pro-ceedings against petitioners that led to
the imposition of more than $650,000 in fines and civil penalties.
Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the monetary
sanctions were an unconstitutional taking of private property
without just compensation. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners
were required to bring their takings claim in the Court of Federal
Claims and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to review
petitioners’ claim. We disagree. Petitioners’ takings
claim, raised as an affirmative defense to the agency’s
enforcement action, was properly before the court because the AMAA
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act
jurisdiction over takings claims brought by raisin handlers.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Ninth Circuit.
I
A
Congress enacted the AMAA during the Great
Depression in an effort to insulate farmers from competitive market
forces that it believed caused “unreasonable fluctuations in
supplies and prices.” Ch. 296, 50Stat. 246, as amended, 7
U. S. C. §602(4). To achieve this goal, Congress
declared a national policy of stabilizing prices for agricultural
commodities.
Ibid. The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate marketing or-ders that regulate the sale
and delivery of agricultural goods. §608c(1); see also
Block v.
Community Nutrition Institute,
467 U.S.
340, 346 (1984) (“The Act contemplates a cooperative
venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers the principal
purposes of which are to raise the price of agricultural products
and to establish an orderly system for marketing them”). The
Secretary may delegate to industry committees the authority to
administer marketing orders. §608c(7)(C).
The AMAA does not directly regulate the
“producer[s]” who grow agricultural commodities,
§608c(13)(B); it only regulates “handlers,” which
the AMAA defines as “processors, associations of producers,
and others engaged in the handling” of covered agricultural
commodities. §608c(1). Handlers who violate the
Secretary’s marketing orders may be subject to civil and
criminal penalties. §§608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14).
The Secretary promulgated a marketing order for
California raisins in 1949.[
1]
See 14 Fed. Reg. 5136 (codified, as amended, at 7 CFR pt. 989
(2013)). In particular, “[t]he Raisin Marketing Order, like
other fruit and vegetable orders adopted under the AMAA, [sought]
to stabilize producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins
sold by handlers in the domestic competitive market.”
Lion
Raisins, Inc. v.
United States,
416 F.3d 1356, 1359 (CA Fed. 2005). The Marketing Order defines
a raisin “handler” as “(a) [a]ny processor or
packer; (b) [a]ny person who places . . . raisins in the current of
commerce from within [California] to any point outside thereof; (c)
[a]ny person who delivers off-grade raisins . . . into any eligible
non-normal outlet; or (d) [a]ny person who blends raisins [subject
to certain exceptions].” 7 CFR §989.15.
The Marketing Order also established the Raisin
Administrative Committee (RAC), which consists of 47 members, with
35 representing producers, ten representing handlers, one
representing the cooperative bargaining associations, and one
member of the public. See §989.26. The Marketing Order
authorizes the RAC to recommend setting up annual reserve pools of
raisins that are not to be sold on the open domestic market. See 7
U. S. C. §608c(6)(E); 7 CFR §§989.54(d)
and 989.65. Each year, the RAC reviews crop yield, inventories, and
shipments and makes recommendations to the Secretary whether or not
there should be a reserve pool. §989.54. If the RAC recommends
a reserve pool, it also recommends what portion of that
year’s production should be included in the pool
(“reserve-tonnage”). The rest of that year’s
production remains available for sale on the open market
(“free-tonnage”). §§989.54(d), (a). The
Secretary approves the recommendation if he determines that the
recommen-dation would “effectuate the declared policy of the
Act.” §989.55. The reserve-tonnage, calculated as a
percentage of a producer’s crop, varies from year to
year.[
2]
Under the Marketing Order’s reserve
requirements, a producer is only paid for the free-tonnage raisins.
§989.65. The reserve-tonnage raisins, on the other hand, must
be held by the handler in segregated bins “for the
account” of the RAC. §989.66(f ). The RAC may then
sell the reserve-tonnage raisins to handlers for resale in overseas
markets, or may alternatively direct that they be sold or given at
no cost to secondary, noncompetitive domestic markets, such as
school lunch programs. §989.67(b). The reserve pool sales
proceeds are used to finance the RAC’s administrative costs.
§989.53(a). In the event that there are any remaining funds,
the producers receive a pro rata share. 7 U. S. C.
§608c(6)(E); 7 CFR §989.66(h). As a result, even though
producers do not receive payment for reserve-tonnage raisins at the
time of delivery to a handler, they retain a limited interest in
the net proceeds of the RAC’s disposition of the reserve
pool.
Handlers have other duties beyond managing the
RAC’s reserve pool. The Marketing Order requires them to file
certain reports with the RAC, such as reports concerning the
quantity of raisins that they hold or acquire. §989.73. They
are also required to allow the RAC access to their premises,
raisins, and business records to verify the ac-curacy of the
handlers’ reports, §989.77, to obtain inspections of
raisins acquired, §989.58(d), and to pay certain assessments,
§989.80, which help cover the RAC’s administrative
costs. A handler who violates any provision of the Order or its
implementing regulations is subject to a civil penalty of up to
$1,100 per day. 7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B); 7 CFR
§3.91(b)(1)(vii). A handler who does not comply with the
reserve requirement must “compensate the [RAC] for the amount
of the loss resulting from his failure to . . . deliver” the
requisite raisins. §989.166(c).
B
Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne have been
producing raisins in two California counties (Fresno and Madera)
since 1969. The Hornes do business as Raisin Valley Farms, a
general partnership. For more than 30 years, the Hornes operated
only as raisin producers. But, af- ter becoming disillusioned with
the AMAA regulatory scheme,[
3]
they began looking for ways to avoid the mandatory reserve program.
Since the AMAA applies only to handlers, the Hornes devised a plan
to bring their raisins to market without going through a
traditional handler. To this end, the Hornes entered into a
partnership with Mrs. Horne’s parents called Lassen
Vineyards. In addition to its grape-growing activities, Lassen
Vineyards purchased equipment to clean, stem, sort, and package the
raisins from Raisin Valley Farms and Lassen Vineyards. It also
contracted with more than 60 other raisin growers to clean, stem,
sort, and, in some cases, box and stack their raisins for a fee.
The Hornes’ facilities processed more than 3 million pounds
of raisins
in toto during the 2002–2003 and
2003–2004 crop years. During these two crop years, the Hornes
produced 27.4% and 12.3% of the raisins they processed,
respectively.
Although the USDA informed the Hornes in 2001
that their proposed operations made them “handlers”
under the AMAA, the Hornes paid no assessments to the RAC during
the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. Nor did they
set aside reserve-tonnage raisins from those produced and owned by
the more than 60 other farmers who contracted with Lassen Vineyards
for packing services. They also declined to arrange for RAC
inspection of the rai- sins they received for processing, denied
the RAC access to their records, and held none of their own raisins
in reserve.
On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the
Agriculture Marketing Service (Administrator) initiated an
enforcement action against the Hornes, Raisin Valley Farms, and
Lassen Vineyards (petitioners). The complaint alleged that
petitioners were “handlers” of California raisins
during the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. It also
alleged that petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order
by submitting inaccurate forms to the RAC and failing to hold
inspections of incoming raisins, retain raisins in reserve, pay
assessments, and allow access to their records. Petitioners denied
the allegations, countering that they were not
“handlers” and asserting that they did not acquire
physical possession of the other producers’ raisins within
the meaning of the regulations. Petition- ers also raised several
affirmative defenses, including a claim that the Marketing Order
violated the Fifth Amend-ment’s prohibition against taking
property without just compensation.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded in
2006 that petitioners were handlers of raisins and thus subject to
the Marketing Order. The ALJ also concluded that petitioners
violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order and rejected
petitioners’ takings defense based on its view that
“handlers no longer have a property right that permits them
to market their crop free of regulatory control.” App. 39
(citing
Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
United States, 30 Fed.
Cl. 244, 246–247 (1994)).
Petitioners appealed to a judicial officer who,
like the ALJ, also found that petitioners were handlers and that
they had violated the Marketing Order. The judicial of-ficer
imposed $202,600 in civil penalties under 7 U. S. C.
§608c(14)(B); $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop years
under 7 CFR §989.80(a); and $483,843.53 for the value of the
California raisins that petitioners failed to hold in reserve for
the two crop years under §989.166(c). The judicial officer
believed that he lacked “authority to judge the
constitutionality of the various statutes administered by the
[USDA],” App. 73, and declined to adjudicate
petitioners’ takings claim.
Petitioners filed a complaint in Federal
District Court seeking judicial review of the USDA’s
decision. See 7 U. S. C. §608c(14)(B). The District
Court granted summary judgment to the USDA. The court held that
substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination
that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the
Marketing Order, and rejected petitioners’ argument that they
were exempt from the Marketing Order due to their status as
“producers” under §608c(13)(B). No.
CV–F–08–1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, *15 (ED
Cal., Dec. 11, 2009). Petitioners renewed their Fifth Amendment
argument, asserting that the reserve-tonnage requirement
consti-tuted a physical taking. Though the District Court found
that the RAC takes title to a significant portion of a California
raisin producer’s crop through the reserve requirement, the
court held that the transfer of title to the RAC did not constitute
a physical taking. See
id., at *26 (“ ‘[I]n
essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or
toll—admittedly a steep one—for marketing raisins. The
Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market
the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow and market
raisins, then passing title to their “reserve tonnage”
raisins to the RAC is the admissions ticket’ ”
(quot-ing
Evans v.
United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554,
563–564 (2006))).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed
that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the
Marketing Or-der’s provisions, and rejected
petitioners’ argument that they were producers, and, thus
exempt from regulation. 673 F.3d 1071, 1078 (2012). The court did
not resolve petitioners’ takings claim, however, because it
concluded that that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. The court
explained that “a takings claim against the federal
government must be brought [in the Court of Federal Claims] in the
first instance, ‘unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act
grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.’ ”
Id., at 1079 (quoting
Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,
524 U.S.
498, 520 (1998) (plurality opinion)). The court recognized that
7 U. S. C. §608c(15) provides an administrative
remedy to handlers wishing to challenge marketing orders under the
AMAA, and it agreed that “when a handler, or a
producer-handler in its capacity as a handler, challenges a
marketing order on takings grounds, Court of Federal Claims Tucker
Act jurisdiction gives way to section [60]8c(15)’s
comprehensive procedural scheme and administrative exhaustion
requirements.” 673 F. 3d, at 1079. But, the Ninth Circuit
determined, petitioners brought the takings claim in their capacity
as producers, not handlers.
Id., at 1080. Consequently, the
court was of the view that “[n]othing in the AMAA precludes
the Hornes from alleging in the Court of Federal Claims that the
reserve program injures them in their capacity as producers by
subjecting them to a taking requiring compensation.”
Ibid. This availability of a Federal Claims Court action
thus rendered petitioners’ takings claim un-ripe for
adjudication.
Ibid.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the
Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review petitioners’ takings
claim. 568 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
A
The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional
ruling flowed from its determination that petitioners brought their
takings claim as producers rather than handlers. This determination
is not correct. Although petitioners argued that they were
producers—and thus not subject to the AMAA or Marketing Order
at all—both the USDA and the District Court concluded that
petitioners were “handlers.” Accordingly, the civil
penalty, assessment, and reimbursement for fail-ure to reserve
raisins were all levied on petitioners in their capacity as
“handlers.” If petitioners’ argument that they
were producers had prevailed, they would not have been subject to
any of the monetary sanctions imposed on them. See 7
U. S. C. §608c(13)(B) (“No order issued under
this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as
a producer”).
It is undisputed that the Marketing Order
imposes duties on petitioners only in their capacity as handlers.
As a result, any defense raised against those duties is necessarily
raised in that same capacity. Petitioners ar-gue that it would be
unconstitutional for the Government to come on their land and
confiscate raisins, or to con-fiscate the proceeds of raisin sales,
without paying just com-pensation; and, that it is therefore
unconstitutional to fine petitioners for not complying with the
unconstitutional requirement.[
4] See Brief for Petitioners 54. Given that fines can only
be levied on handlers, petitioners’ takings claim makes sense
only as a defense to penalties imposed upon them in their capacity
as handlers. The Ninth Circuit confused petitioners’
statutory argument (
i.e., “we are producers, not
handlers”) with their constitutional argument (
i.e.,
“assuming we are handlers, fining us for refusing to turn
over reserve-tonnage raisins violates the Fifth
Amendment”).[
5]
The relevant question, then, is whether a
federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense
raised by a handler seeking review of a final agency order.
B
The Government argues that petitioners’
takings-based defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds.
Brief for Respondent 21–22. According to the Government,
be-cause a takings claim can be pursued later in the Court of
Federal Claims, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to adjudicate
petitioners’ takings defense. In support of its position, the
Government relies largely on
Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm’n v
. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S.
172 (1985). Brief for Respondent 21–22 (“Just
compensation need not ‘be paid in advance of, or
contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is re-quired is that a
‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation’ exist at the time of the
taking’ ” (quoting
Williamson County, 473
U. S., at 194)). In that case, the plaintiff filed suit
against the Regional Planning Commission, claiming that a zoning
decision by the Commission effected a taking of property without
just compensation.
Id., at 182. We found that the
plaintiff’s claim was not “ripe” for two reasons,
neither of which supports the Government’s position.
First, we explained that the plaintiff’s
takings claim in
Williamson County failed because the
plaintiff could not show that it had been injured by the
Government’s action. Specifically, the plaintiff “ha[d]
not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the
zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its
property.”
Id., at 186. Here, by contrast, petitioners
were subject to a final agency order imposing concrete fines and
penalties at the time they sought judicial review under
§608c(14)(B). This was clearly sufficient “injury”
for federal jurisdiction.
Second, the
Williamson County
plaintiff’s takings claim was not yet ripe because the
plaintiff had not sought “compensation through the procedures
the State ha[d] provided for doing so.”
Id., at 194.
We explained that “[i]f the government has provided an
adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that
process yields just compensation, then the property owner has no
claim against the Government for a taking.”
Id., at
194–195 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Stated differently, a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it
is clear that the Government has both taken property
and
denied just compensation. Although we often refer to this
consideration as “prudential
‘ripeness,’ ”
Lucas v.
South
Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S.
1003, 1013 (1992), we have recognized that it is not, strictly
speaking, jurisdictional.[
6]
See
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept.
of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. ___, ___, and
n. 10 (2010) (slip op., at 24, and n. 10).
Here, the Government argues that
petitioners’ takings claim is premature because the Tucker
Act affords “the requisite reasonable, certain, and adequate
provision for obtaining just compensation that a property owner
must pursue.” Brief for Respondent 22. In the
Government’s view, “[p]etitioners should have complied
with the order, and, after a portion of their raisins were placed
in reserve to be disposed of as directed by the RAC, . . . sought
compensation as producers in the Court of Federal Claims for the
alleged taking.”
Id., at 24–25. We disagree with
the Government’s argument, however, because the AMAA provides
a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act
jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim. As a result,
there is no alternative “reasonable, certain, and
adequate” remedial scheme through which petitioners (as
handlers) must proceed before obtaining review of their claim under
the AMAA.[
7]
The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over Tucker Act claims “founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
de-partment.” 28 U. S. C. §1491(a)(1).
“[A] claim for just compensation under the Takings Clause
must be brought to the Court of Federal Claims in the first
instance, unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of
jurisdiction in the relevant statute.”
Eastern
Enterprises, 524 U. S., at 520 (plurality opinion); see
also
United States v.
Bormes, 568 U. S. ___, ___
(2012) (slip op., at 5) (where “a statute contains its own
self-executing remedial scheme,” a court “look[s] only
to that statute”). To determine whether a statutory scheme
displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction, a court must “examin[e]
the purpose of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the
structure of review that it establishes.”
United
States v.
Fausto,
484 U.S.
439, 444 (1988).
Under the AMAA’s comprehensive remedial
scheme, handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and
en-forcement of marketing orders. Pursuant to §§608c(15)
(A)–(B), a handler may file with the Secretary a direct
challenge to a marketing order and its applicability to him. We
have held that “any handler” subject to a mar-keting
order must raise any challenges to the order, including
constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings. See
United States v.
Ruzicka,
329
U.S. 287, 294 (1946). Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the
federal district court where the “handler is an inhabitant,
or has his principal place of business” is “vested with
jurisdiction . . . to review [the]
ruling.”[
8]
§608c(15)(B). These statutory provisions afford handlers a
ready avenue to bring takings claim against the USDA. We thus
conclude that the AMAA withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over
petitioners’ takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have no
alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not
“premature” when presented to the Ninth Circuit.
C
Although petitioners’ claim was not
“premature” for Tucker Act purposes, the question
remains whether a takings-based defense may be raised by a handler
in the context of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA
under §608c(14). We hold that it may. The AMAA provides that
the handler may not be subjected to an adverse order until he has
been given “notice and an opportunity for an agency hearing
on the record.” §608c(14)(B). The text of
§608c(14)(B) does not bar handlers from raising constitutional
defenses to the USDA’s enforcement action. Allowing handlers
to raise constitutional challenges in the course of enforcement
proceedings would not diminish the incentive to file direct
challenges to marketing orders under §608c(15)(A) because a
handler who refuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for
an enforcement action will be liable for significant monetary
penalties if his constitutional challenge fails.
In the case of an administrative enforcement
proceeding, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an
assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to
pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for
recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See
Eastern
Enterprises,
supra, at 520. We see no indication that
Congress intended this result for handlers subject to enforcement
proceedings under the AMAA. Petitioners were therefore free to
raise their takings-based defense before the USDA. And, because
§608c(14)(B) allows a handler to seek judicial review of an
adverse order, the district court and Ninth Circuit were not
precluded from reviewing petitioners’ constitutional
challenge. The grant of jurisdiction necessarily includes the power
to review any constitutional challenges properly presented to and
rejected by the agency. We are therefore satisfied that the
petitioners raised a cognizable takings defense and that the Ninth
Circuit erred in declining to adjudicate it.
III
The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide
whether the USDA’s imposition of fines and civil penalties on
petitioners, in their capacity as handlers, violated the Fifth
Amendment. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
