SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 19–1257 and 19–1258
_________________
MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ARIZONA, et al., PETITIONERS
19–1257
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
et al.
ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, et al.,
PETITIONERS
19–1258
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[July 1, 2021]
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and
Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
If a single statute represents the best of
America, it is the Voting Rights Act. It marries two great ideals:
democracy and racial equality. And it dedicates our country to
carrying them out. Section 2, the provision at issue here,
guarantees that members of every racial group will have equal
voting opportunities. Citizens of every race will have the same
shot to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. They will all own our democracy
together—no one more and no one less than any other.
If a single statute reminds us of the worst of
America, it is the Voting Rights Act. Because it was—and remains—so
necessary. Because a century after the Civil War was fought, at the
time of the Act’s passage, the promise of political equality
remained a distant dream for African American citizens. Because
States and localities continually “contriv[ed] new rules,” mostly
neutral on their face but discriminatory in operation, to keep
minority voters from the polls.
South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,
383 U.S.
301, 335 (1966). Because “Congress had reason to suppose” that
States would “try similar maneuvers in the future”—“pour[ing] old
poison into new bottles” to suppress minority votes.
Ibid.;
Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Bd.,
528 U.S.
320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Because Congress has been proved right.
The Voting Rights Act is ambitious, in both goal
and scope. When President Lyndon Johnson sent the bill to Congress,
ten days after John Lewis led marchers across the Edmund Pettus
Bridge, he explained that it was “carefully drafted to meet its
objective—the end of discrimination in voting in America.”
H. R. Doc. No. 120, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2 (1965). He was
right about how the Act’s drafting reflected its aim. “The end of
discrimination in voting” is a far-reaching goal. And the Voting
Rights Act’s text is just as far-reaching. A later amendment,
adding the provision at issue here, became necessary when this
Court construed the statute too narrowly. And in the last decade,
this Court assailed the Act again, undoing its vital Section 5. See
Shelby County v.
Holder,
570
U.S. 529 (2013). But Section 2 of the Act remains, as written,
as expansive as ever—demanding that every citizen of this country
possess a right at once grand and obvious: the right to an equal
opportunity to vote.
Today, the Court undermines Section 2 and the
right it provides. The majority fears that the statute Congress
wrote is too “radical”—that it will invalidate too many state
voting laws. See
ante, at 21, 25. So the majority writes its
own set of rules, limiting Section 2 from multiple directions. See
ante, at 16–19. Wherever it can, the majority gives a
cramped reading to broad language. And then it uses that reading to
uphold two election laws from Arizona that discriminate against
minority voters. I could say—and will in the following pages—that
this is not how the Court is supposed to interpret and apply
statutes. But that ordinary critique woefully undersells the
problem. What is tragic here is that the Court has (yet again)
rewritten—in order to weaken—a statute that stands as a monument to
America’s greatness, and protects against its basest impulses. What
is tragic is that the Court has damaged a statute designed to bring
about “the end of discrimination in voting.” I respectfully
dissent.
I
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is an
extraordinary law. Rarely has a statute required so much sacrifice
to ensure its passage. Never has a statute done more to advance the
Nation’s highest ideals. And few laws are more vital in the current
moment. Yet in the last decade, this Court has treated no statute
worse. To take the measure of today’s harm, a look to the Act’s
past must come first. The idea is not to recount, as the majority
hurriedly does, some bygone era of voting discrimination. See
ante, at 2–3. It is instead to describe the electoral
practices that the Act targets—and to show the high stakes of the
present controversy.
A
Democratic ideals in America got off to a
glorious start; democratic practice not so much. The Declaration of
Independence made an awe-inspiring promise: to institute a
government “deriving [its] just powers from the consent of the
governed.” But for most of the Nation’s first century, that pledge
ran to white men only. The earliest state election laws excluded
from the franchise African Americans, Native Americans, women, and
those without property. See A. Keyssar, The Right To Vote: The
Contested History of Democracy in the United States 8–21, 54–60
(2000). In 1855, on the precipice of the Civil War, only five
States permitted African Americans to vote.
Id., at 55. And
at the federal level, our Court’s most deplorable holding made sure
that no black people could enter the voting booth. See
Dred
Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
But the “American ideal of political equality
. . . could not forever tolerate the limitation of the
right to vote” to whites only.
Mobile v.
Bolden,
446 U.S.
55, 103–104 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). And a civil war,
dedicated to ensuring “government of the people, by the people, for
the people,” brought constitutional change. In 1870, after a
hard-fought battle over ratification, the Fifteenth Amendment
carried the Nation closer to its founding aspirations. “The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” Those words promised to
enfranchise millions of black citizens who only a decade earlier
had been slaves. Frederick Douglass held that the Amendment “means
that we are placed upon an equal footing with all other men”—that
with the vote, “liberty is to be the right of all.” 4 The Frederick
Douglass Papers 270–271 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds.
1991). President Grant had seen much blood spilled in the Civil
War; now he spoke of the fruits of that sacrifice. In a
self-described “unusual” message to Congress, he heralded the
Fifteenth Amendment as “a measure of grander importance than any
other one act of the kind from the foundation of our free
Government”—as “the most important event that has occurred since
the nation came into life.” Ulysses S. Grant, Message to the Senate
and House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1870), in 7 Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, pp. 55–56
(J. Richardson ed. 1898).
Momentous as the Fifteenth Amendment was,
celebration of its achievements soon proved premature. The
Amendment’s guarantees “quickly became dead letters in much of the
country.” Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 108 Yale L. J. 2003, 2007 (1999). African
Americans daring to go to the polls often “met with coordinated
intimidation and violence.”
Northwest Austin Municipal Util.
Dist.
No.
One v.
Holder,
557 U.S.
193, 218–219 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). And almost immediately, legislators
discovered that bloodless actions could also suffice to limit the
electorate to white citizens. Many States, especially in the South,
suppressed the black vote through a dizzying array of methods:
literacy tests, poll taxes, registration requirements, and property
qualifications. See
Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310–312.
Most of those laws, though facially neutral, gave enough discretion
to election officials to prevent significant effects on poor or
uneducated whites. The idea, as one Virginia representative put it,
was “to disfranchise every negro that [he] could disfranchise,” and
“as few white people as possible.” Keyssar 113. Decade after decade
after decade, election rules blocked African Americans—and in some
States, Hispanics and Native Americans too—from making use of the
ballot. See
Oregon v.
Mitchell,
400 U.S.
112, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (discussing treatment of
non-black groups). By 1965, only 27% of black Georgians, 19% of
black Alabamians, and 7%—yes, 7%—of black Mississippians were
registered to vote. See C. Bullock, R. Gaddie, & J. Wert, The
Rise and Fall of the Voting Rights Act 23 (2016).
The civil rights movement, and the events of a
single Bloody Sunday, created pressure for change. Selma was the
heart of an Alabama county whose 15,000 black citizens included, in
1961, only 156 on the voting rolls. See D. Garrow, Protest at Selma
31 (1978). In the first days of 1965, the city became the epicenter
of demonstrations meant to force Southern election officials to
register African American voters. As weeks went by without results,
organizers announced a march from Selma to Birmingham. On March 7,
some 600 protesters, led by future Congressman John Lewis, sought
to cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge. State troopers in riot gear
responded brutally: “Turning their nightsticks horizontally, they
rushed into the crowd, knocking people over like bowling pins.” G.
May, Bending Toward Justice 87 (2013). Then came men on horseback,
“swinging their clubs and ropes like cowboys driving cattle to
market.”
Ibid. The protestors were beaten, knocked
unconscious, and bloodied. Lewis’s skull was fractured. “I thought
I was going to die on this bridge,” he later recalled. Rojas, Selma
Helped Define John Lewis’s Life, N. Y. Times, July 28,
2020.
A galvanized country responded. Ten days after
the Selma march, President Johnson wrote to Congress proposing
legislation to “help rid the Nation of racial discrimination in
every aspect of the electoral process and thereby insure the right
of all to vote.” H. R. Doc. No. 120, at 1. (To his attorney
general, Johnson was still more emphatic: “I want you to write the
goddamnedest toughest voting rights act that you can devise.” H.
Raines, My Soul Is Rested 337 (1983).) And in August 1965, after
the bill’s supporters overcame a Senate filibuster, Johnson signed
the Voting Rights Act into law. Echoing Grant’s description of the
Fifteenth Amendment, Johnson called the statute “one of the most
monumental laws in the entire history of American freedom.” Public
Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Aug. 6, 1965,
p. 841 (1966) (Johnson Papers).
“After a century’s failure to fulfill the
promise” of the Fifteenth Amendment, “passage of the VRA finally
led to signal improvement.”
Shelby County, 570 U. S.,
at 562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In the five years after the
statute’s passage, almost as many African Americans registered to
vote in six Southern States as in the entire century before 1965.
See Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
Controversies in Minority Voting 21 (B. Grofman & C. Davidson
eds. 1992). The crudest attempts to block voting access, like
literacy tests and poll taxes, disappeared. Legislatures often
replaced those vote denial schemes with new measures—mostly to do
with districting—designed to dilute the impact of minority votes.
But the Voting Rights Act, operating for decades at full strength,
stopped many of those measures too. See,
e.
g.,
Chisom v.
Roemer,
501 U.S.
380 (1991);
Allen v.
State Bd.
of
Elections,
393 U.S.
544 (1969). As a famed dissent assessed the situation about a
half-century after the statute’s enactment: The Voting Rights Act
had become “one of the most consequential, efficacious, and amply
justified exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s
history.”
Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 562 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).[
1]
B
Yet efforts to suppress the minority vote
continue. No one would know this from reading the majority opinion.
It hails the “good news” that legislative efforts had mostly
shifted by the 1980s from vote denial to vote dilution.
Ante, at 7. And then it moves on to other matters, as though
the Voting Rights Act no longer has a problem to address—as though
once literacy tests and poll taxes disappeared, so too did efforts
to curb minority voting. But as this Court recognized about a
decade ago, “racial discrimination and racially polarized voting
are not ancient history.”
Bartlett v.
Strickland,
556 U.S.
1, 25 (2009). Indeed, the problem of voting discrimination has
become worse since that time—in part because of what this Court did
in
Shelby County. Weaken the Voting Rights Act, and
predictable consequences follow: yet a further generation of voter
suppression laws.
Much of the Voting Rights Act’s success lay in
its capacity to meet ever-new forms of discrimination. Experience
showed that “[w]henever one form of voting discrimination was
identified and prohibited, others sprang up in its place.”
Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 560 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Combating those efforts was like “battling the
Hydra”—or to use a less cultured reference, like playing a game of
whack-a-mole.
Ibid. So Congress, in Section 5 of the Act,
gave the Department of Justice authority to review all new rules
devised by jurisdictions with a history of voter suppression—and to
block any that would have discriminatory effects. See 52
U. S. C. §§10304(a)–(b). In that way, the Act would
prevent the use of new, more nuanced methods to restrict the voting
opportunities of non-white citizens.
And for decades, Section 5 operated as intended.
Between 1965 and 2006, the Department stopped almost 1200 voting
laws in covered areas from taking effect. See
Shelby County,
570 U. S., at 571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Some of those
laws used districting to dilute minority voting strength—making
sure that the votes of minority citizens would carry less weight
than the votes of whites in electing candidates. Other laws, even
if facially neutral, disproportionately curbed the ability of
non-white citizens to cast a ballot at all. So, for example, a
jurisdiction might require forms of identification that those
voters were less likely to have; or it might limit voting places
and times convenient for those voters; or it might purge its voter
rolls through mechanisms especially likely to ensnare them. See
id., at 574–575. In reviewing mountains of such evidence in
2006, Congress saw a continuing need for Section 5. Although
“discrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used
in 1965,” Congress found, it still produces “the same [effects],
namely a diminishing of the minority community’s ability to fully
participate in the electoral process.” H. R. Rep. No. 109–478,
p. 6 (2006). Congress thus reauthorized the preclearance
scheme for 25 years.
But this Court took a different view. Finding
that “[o]ur country has changed,” the Court saw only limited
instances of voting discrimination—and so no further need for
preclearance.
Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 547–549,
557. Displacing Congress’s contrary judgment, the Court struck down
the coverage formula essential to the statute’s operation. The
legal analysis offered was perplexing: The Court based its decision
on a “principle of equal [state] sovereignty” that a prior decision
of ours had rejected—and that has not made an appearance since.
Id., at 544 (majority opinion); see
id., at 587–588
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Worse yet was the Court’s blithe
confidence in assessing what was needed and what was not. “[T]hings
have changed dramatically,” the Court reiterated,
id., at
547: The statute that was once a necessity had become an
imposition. But how did the majority know there was nothing more
for Section 5 to do—that the (undoubted) changes in the country
went so far as to make the provision unnecessary? It didn’t, as
Justice Ginsburg explained in dissent. The majority’s faith that
discrimination was almost gone derived, at least in part, from the
success of Section 5—from its record of blocking discriminatory
voting schemes. Discarding Section 5 because those schemes had
diminished was “like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm
because you are not getting wet.”
Id., at 590.
The rashness of the act soon became evident.
Once Section 5’s strictures came off, States and localities put in
place new restrictive voting laws, with foreseeably adverse effects
on minority voters. On the very day
Shelby County issued,
Texas announced that it would implement a strict
voter-identification requirement that had failed to clear Section
5. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After
Shelby County, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
2143, 2145–2146 (2015). Other States—Alabama, Virginia,
Mississippi—fell like dominoes, adopting measures similarly
vulnerable to preclearance review. See
ibid. The North
Carolina Legislature, starting work the day after
Shelby
County, enacted a sweeping election bill eliminating same-day
registration, forbidding out-of-precinct voting, and reducing early
voting, including souls-to-the-polls Sundays. (That law went too
far even without Section 5: A court struck it down because the
State’s legislators had a racially discriminatory purpose.
North
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
McCrory, 831 F.3d
204 (CA4 2016).) States and localities redistricted—drawing new
boundary lines or replacing neighborhood-based seats with at-large
seats—in ways guaranteed to reduce minority representation. See
Elmendorf, 115 Colum. L. Rev., at 2146. And jurisdictions closed
polling places in mostly minority areas, enhancing an already
pronounced problem. See Brief for Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights et al. as
Amici Curiae 14–15 (listing
closure schemes); Pettigrew, The Racial Gap in Wait Times, 132 Pol.
Sci. Q. 527, 527 (2017) (finding that lines in minority precincts
are twice as long as in white ones, and that a minority voter is
six times more likely to wait more than an hour).[
2]
And that was just the first wave of
post-
Shelby County laws. In recent months, State after State
has taken up or enacted legislation erecting new barriers to
voting. See Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Laws Roundup: May
2021 (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov) (compiling
legislation). Those laws shorten the time polls are open, both on
Election Day and before. They impose new prerequisites to voting by
mail, and shorten the windows to apply for and return mail ballots.
They make it harder to register to vote, and easier to purge voters
from the rolls. Two laws even ban handing out food or water to
voters standing in line. Some of those restrictions may be lawful
under the Voting Rights Act. But chances are that some have the
kind of impact the Act was designed to prevent—that they make the
political process less open to minority voters than to others.
So the Court decides this Voting Rights Act case
at a perilous moment for the Nation’s commitment to equal
citizenship. It decides this case in an era of voting-rights
retrenchment—when too many States and localities are restricting
access to voting in ways that will predictably deprive members of
minority groups of equal access to the ballot box. If “any racial
discrimination in voting is too much,” as the
Shelby County
Court recited, then the Act still has much to do. 570 U. S.,
at 557. Or more precisely, the fraction of the Act remaining—the
Act as diminished by the Court’s hand. Congress never meant for
Section 2 to bear all of the weight of the Act’s commitments. That
provision looks to courts, not to the Executive Branch, to restrain
discriminatory voting practices. And litigation is an
after-the-fact remedy, incapable of providing relief until an
election—usually, more than one election—has come and gone. See
id., at 572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). So Section 2 was
supposed to be a back-up, for all its sweep and power. But after
Shelby County, the vitality of Section 2—a “permanent,
nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting”—matters more
than ever.
Id., at 557 (majority opinion). For after
Shelby County, Section 2 is what voters have left.
II
Section 2, as drafted, is well-equipped to
meet the challenge. Congress meant to eliminate all “discriminatory
election systems or practices which operate, designedly or
otherwise, to minimize or cancel out the voting strength and
political effectiveness of minority groups.” S. Rep. No. 97–417,
p. 28 (1982) (S. Rep.). And that broad intent is manifest
in the provision’s broad text. As always, this Court’s task is to
read that language as Congress wrote it—to give the section all the
scope and potency Congress drafted it to have. So I start by
showing how Section 2’s text requires courts to eradicate voting
practices that make it harder for members of some races than of
others to cast a vote, unless such a practice is necessary to
support a strong state interest. I then show how far from that text
the majority strays. Its analysis permits exactly the kind of vote
suppression that Section 2, by its terms, rules out of bounds.
A
Section 2, as relevant here, has two
interlocking parts. Subsection (a) states the law’s basic
prohibition:
“No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52
U. S. C. §10301(a).
Subsection (b) then tells courts how to apply
that bar—or otherwise said, when to find that an infringement of
the voting right has occurred:
“A violation of subsection (a) is
established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of [a given race] in that [those] members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice.” §10301(b).[
3]
Those provisions have a great many words, and I
address them further below. But their essential import is plain:
Courts are to strike down voting rules that contribute to a racial
disparity in the opportunity to vote, taking all the relevant
circumstances into account.
The first thing to note about Section 2 is how
far its prohibitory language sweeps. The provision bars any “voting
qualification,” any “prerequisite to voting,” or any “standard,
practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of
the right” to “vote on account of race.” The overlapping list of
covered state actions makes clear that Section 2 extends to every
kind of voting or election rule. Congress carved out nothing
pertaining to “voter qualifications or the manner in which
elections are conducted.”
Holder v.
Hall,
512 U.S.
874, 922 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). So, for
example, the provision “covers all manner of registration
requirements, the practices surrounding registration,” the
“locations of polling places, the times polls are open, the use of
paper ballots as opposed to voting machines, and other similar
aspects of the voting process that might be manipulated to deny any
citizen the right to cast a ballot and have it properly counted.”
Ibid. All those rules and more come within the statute—so
long as they result in a race-based “denial or abridgement” of the
voting right. And the “denial or abridgement” phrase speaks broadly
too. “[A]bridgment necessarily means something more subtle and less
drastic than the complete denial of the right to cast a ballot,
denial being separately forbidden.”
Bossier, 528 U. S.,
at 359 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It
means to “curtail,” rather than take away, the voting right.
American Heritage Dictionary 4 (1969).
The “results in” language, connecting the
covered voting rules to the prohibited voting abridgement, tells
courts that they are to focus on the law’s effects. Rather than
hinge liability on state officials’ motives, Congress made it ride
on their actions’ consequences. That decision was as considered as
considered comes. This Court, as the majority notes, had construed
the original Section 2 to apply to facially neutral voting
practices “only if [they were] motivated by a discriminatory
purpose.”
Bolden, 446 U. S., at 62; see
ante, at
5. Congress enacted the current Section 2 to reverse that
outcome—to make clear that “results” alone could lead to liability.
An intent test, the Senate Report explained, “asks the wrong
question.” S. Rep., at 36. If minority citizens “are denied a fair
opportunity to participate,” then “the system should be changed,
regardless of ” what “motives were in an official’s mind.”
Ibid. Congress also saw an intent test as imposing “an
inordinately difficult burden for plaintiffs.”
Ibid. Even if
state actors had purposefully discriminated, they would likely be
“ab[le] to offer a non-racial rationalization,” supported by “a
false trail” of “official resolutions” and “other legislative
history eschewing any racial motive.”
Id., at 37. So only a
results-focused statute could prevent States from finding ways to
abridge minority citizens’ voting rights.
But when to conclude—looking to effects, not
purposes—that a denial or abridgment has occurred? Again, answering
that question is subsection (b)’s function. See
supra, at
12–13. It teaches that a violation is established when, “based on
the totality of circumstances,” a State’s electoral system is “not
equally open” to members of a racial group. And then the subsection
tells us what that means. A system is not equally open if members
of one race have “less opportunity” than others to cast votes, to
participate in politics, or to elect representatives. The key
demand, then, is for equal political opportunity across races.
That equal “opportunity” is absent when a law or
practice makes it harder for members of one racial group, than for
others, to cast ballots. When Congress amended Section 2, the word
“opportunity” meant what it also does today: “a favorable or
advantageous combination of circumstances” for some action. See
American Heritage Dictionary, at 922. In using that word, Congress
made clear that the Voting Rights Act does not demand equal
outcomes. If members of different races have the same opportunity
to vote, but go to the ballot box at different rates, then so be
it—that is their preference, and Section 2 has nothing to say. But
if a law produces different voting opportunities across races—if it
establishes rules and conditions of political participation that
are less favorable (or advantageous) for one racial group than for
others—then Section 2 kicks in. It applies, in short, whenever the
law makes it harder for citizens of one race than of others to cast
a vote.[
4]
And that is so even if (as is usually true) the
law does not single out any race, but instead is facially neutral.
Suppose, as Justice Scalia once did, that a county has a law
limiting “voter registration [to] only three hours one day a week.”
Chisom, 501 U. S., at 408 (dissenting opinion). And
suppose that policy makes it “more difficult for blacks to register
than whites”—say, because the jobs African Americans
disproportionately hold make it harder to take time off in that
window.
Ibid. Those citizens, Justice Scalia concluded,
would then “have less opportunity ‘to participate in the political
process’ than whites, and §2 would therefore be violated.”
Ibid. (emphasis deleted). In enacting Section 2, Congress
documented many similar (if less extreme) facially neutral
rules—“registration requirements,” “voting and registration hours,”
voter “purging” policies, and so forth—that create disparities in
voting opportunities. S. Rep., at 10, n. 22; H. R. Rep.
No. 97–227, pp. 11–17 (1981) (H. R. Rep.). Those laws,
Congress thought, would violate Section 2, though they were not
facially discriminatory, because they gave voters of different
races unequal access to the political process.
Congress also made plain, in calling for a
totality-of- circumstances inquiry, that equal voting opportunity
is a function of both law and background conditions—in other words,
that a voting rule’s validity depends on how the rule operates in
conjunction with facts on the ground. “[T]otality review,” this
Court has explained, stems from Congress’s recognition of “the
demonstrated ingenuity of state and local governments in hobbling
minority voting power.”
Johnson v.
De Grandy,
512 U.S.
997, 1018 (1994). Sometimes, of course, state actions overtly
target a single race: For example, Congress was acutely aware, in
amending Section 2, of the elimination of polling places in African
American neighborhoods. See S. Rep., at 10, 11, and
n. 22; H. R. Rep., at 17, 35. But sometimes government
officials enact facially neutral laws that leverage—and become
discriminatory by dint of—pre-existing social and economic
conditions. The classic historical cases are literacy tests and
poll taxes. A more modern example is the one Justice Scalia gave,
of limited registration hours. Congress knew how those laws worked:
It saw that “inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and
low incomes”—all conditions often correlated with race—could turn
even an ordinary-seeming election rule into an effective barrier to
minority voting in certain circumstances.
Thornburg v.
Gingles,
478 U.S.
30, 69 (1986) (plurality opinion). So Congress demanded, as
this Court has recognized, “an intensely local appraisal” of a
rule’s impact—“a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and
present reality.’ ”
Id., at 79;
De Grandy, 512
U. S., at 1018 (quoting S. Rep., at 30). “The essence of
a §2 claim,” we have said, is that an election law “interacts with
social and historical conditions” in a particular place to cause
race-based inequality in voting opportunity.
Gingles, 478
U. S., at 47 (majority opinion). That interaction is what the
totality inquiry is mostly designed to discover.
At the same time, the totality inquiry enables
courts to take into account strong state interests supporting an
election rule. An all-things-considered inquiry, we have explained,
is by its nature flexible. See
De Grandy, 512 U. S., at
1018. On the one hand, it allows no “safe harbor[s]” for election
rules resulting in discrimination.
Ibid. On the other hand,
it precludes automatic condemnation of those rules. Among the
“balance of considerations” a court is to weigh is a State’s need
for the challenged policy.
Houston Lawyers’ Assn. v.
Attorney General of Tex.,
501 U.S.
419, 427 (1991). But in making that assessment of state
interests, a court must keep in mind—just as Congress did—the ease
of “offer[ing] a non-racial rationalization” for even blatantly
discriminatory laws. S. Rep., at 37; see
supra, at 14. State
interests do not get accepted on faith. And even a genuine and
strong interest will not suffice if a plaintiff can prove that it
can be accomplished in a less discriminatory way. As we have put
the point before: When a less racially biased law would not
“significantly impair[ ] the State’s interest,” the
discriminatory election rule must fall.
Houston Lawyers’
Assn., 501 U. S., at 428.[
5]
So the text of Section 2, as applied in our
precedents, tells us the following, every part of which speaks to
the ambition of Congress’s action. Section 2 applies to any voting
rule, of any kind. The provision prohibits not just the denial but
also the abridgment of a citizen’s voting rights on account of
race. The inquiry is focused on effects: It asks not about why
state officials enacted a rule, but about whether that rule results
in racial discrimination. The discrimination that is of concern is
inequality of voting opportunity. That kind of discrimination can
arise from facially neutral (not just targeted) rules. There is a
Section 2 problem when an election rule, operating against the
backdrop of historical, social, and economic conditions, makes it
harder for minority citizens than for others to cast ballots. And
strong state interests may save an otherwise discriminatory rule,
but only if that rule is needed to achieve them—that is, only if a
less discriminatory rule will not attain the State’s goal.
That is a lot of law to apply in a Section 2
case. Real law—the kind created by Congress. (A strange thing, to
hear about it all only in a dissent.)[
6] None of this law threatens to “take down,” as the
majority charges, the mass of state and local election rules.
Ante, at 25. Here is the flipside of what I have said above,
now from the plaintiff ’s perspective: Section 2 demands proof
of a statistically significant racial disparity in electoral
opportunities (not outcomes) resulting from a law not needed to
achieve a government’s legitimate goals. That showing is hardly
insubstantial; and as a result, Section 2 vote denial suits do not
often succeed (even with lower courts applying the law as written,
not the majority’s new, concocted version). See Brief for State and
Local Election Officials as
Amici Curiae 15 (finding only
nine winning cases since
Shelby County, each involving “an
intensely local appraisal” of a “controversial polic[y] in specific
places”). But Section 2 was indeed meant to do something
important—crucial to the operation of our democracy. The provision
tells courts—however “radical” the majority might find the idea,
ante, at 25—to eliminate facially neutral (as well as
targeted) electoral rules that unnecessarily create inequalities of
access to the political process. That is the very project of the
statute, as conceived and as written—and now as damaged by this
Court.
B
The majority’s opinion mostly inhabits a
law-free zone. It congratulates itself in advance for giving
Section 2’s text “careful consideration.”
Ante, at 14. And
then it leaves that language almost wholly behind. See
ante,
at 14–21. (Every once in a while, when its lawmaking threatens to
leap off the page, it thinks to sprinkle in a few random statutory
words.) So too the majority barely mentions this Court’s precedents
construing Section 2’s text. On both those counts, you can see why.
As just described, Section 2’s language is broad. See
supra,
at 12–20. To read it fairly, then, is to read it broadly. And to
read it broadly is to do much that the majority is determined to
avoid. So the majority ignores the sweep of Section 2’s prohibitory
language. It fails to note Section 2’s application to every
conceivable kind of voting rule. It neglects to address the
provision’s concern with how those rules may “abridge[ ],” not
just deny, minority citizens’ voting rights. It declines to
consider Congress’s use of an effects test, rather than a purpose
test, to assess the rules’ legality. Nor does the majority
acknowledge the force of Section 2’s implementing provision. The
majority says as little as possible about what it means for voting
to be “equally open,” or for voters to have an equal “opportunity”
to cast a ballot. See
ante, at 14–15. It only grudgingly
accepts—and then apparently forgets—that the provision applies to
facially neutral laws with discriminatory consequences. Compare
ante, at 22, with
ante, at 25. And it hints that as
long as a voting system is sufficiently “open,” it need not be
equally so. See
ante, at 16, 18. In sum, the majority skates
over the strong words Congress drafted to accomplish its equally
strong purpose: ensuring that minority citizens can access the
electoral system as easily as whites.[
7]
The majority instead founds its decision on a
list of mostly made-up factors, at odds with Section 2 itself. To
excuse this unusual free-form exercise, the majority notes that
Section 2 authorizes courts to conduct a “totality of
circumstances” analysis.
Ante, at 16. But as described
above, Congress mainly added that language so that Section 2 could
protect against “the demonstrated ingenuity of state and local
governments in hobbling minority voting power.”
De Grandy,
512 U. S., at 1018; see
supra, at 16–17. The totality
inquiry requires courts to explore how ordinary-seeming laws can
interact with local conditions—economic, social, historical—to
produce race-based voting inequalities. That inquiry hardly gives a
court the license to devise whatever limitations on Section 2’s
reach it would have liked Congress to enact. But that is the
license the majority takes. The “important circumstances” it
invents all cut in one direction—toward limiting liability for
race-based voting inequalities.
Ante, at 16. (Indeed, the
majority gratuitously dismisses several factors that point the
opposite way. See
ante, at 19–21.) Think of the majority’s
list as a set of extra-textual restrictions on Section 2—methods of
counteracting the law Congress actually drafted to achieve the
purposes
Congress thought “important.” The list—not a test,
the majority hastens to assure us, with delusions of modesty—stacks
the deck against minority citizens’ voting rights. Never mind that
Congress drafted a statute to protect those rights—to prohibit any
number of schemes the majority’s non-test test makes it possible to
save.
Start with the majority’s first idea: a “[m]ere
inconvenience[ ]” exception to Section 2.
Ante, at 16.
Voting, the majority says, imposes a set of “usual burdens”: Some
time, some travel, some rule compliance.
Ibid. And all of
that is beneath the notice of Section 2—even if those burdens fall
highly unequally on members of different races. See
ibid.
But that categorical exclusion, for seemingly small (or “[un]usual”
or “[un]serious”) burdens, is nowhere in the provision’s text. To
the contrary (and as this Court has recognized before), Section 2
allows no “safe harbor[s]” for election rules resulting in
disparate voting opportunities.
De Grandy, 512 U. S.,
at 1018; see
supra, at 17. The section applies to
any
discriminatory “voting qualification,” “prerequisite to voting,” or
“standard, practice, or procedure”—even the kind creating only
(what the majority thinks of as) an ordinary burden. And the
section cares about
any race-based “abridgments” of voting,
not just measures that come near to preventing that activity.
Congress, recall, was intent on eradicating the “subtle, as well as
the obvious,” ways of suppressing minority voting.
Allen,
393 U. S., at 565; see
supra, at 14. One of those more
subtle ways is to impose “inconveniences,” especially a collection
of them, differentially affecting members of one race. The certain
result—because every inconvenience makes voting both somewhat more
difficult and somewhat less likely—will be to deter minority votes.
In countenancing such an election system, the majority departs from
Congress’s vision, set down in text, of ensuring equal voting
opportunity. It chooses equality-lite.
And what is a “mere inconvenience” or “usual
burden” anyway? The drafters of the Voting Rights Act understood
that “social and historical conditions,” including disparities in
education, wealth, and employment, often affect opportunities to
vote.
Gingles, 478 U. S., at 47; see
supra, at
16–17. What does not prevent one citizen from casting a vote might
prevent another. How is a judge supposed to draw an “inconvenience”
line in some reasonable place, taking those differences into
account? Consider a law banning the handing out of water to voters.
No more than—or not even—an inconvenience when lines are short; but
what of when they are, as in some neighborhoods, hours-long? The
point here is that judges lack an objective way to decide which
voting obstacles are “mere” and which are not, for all voters at
all times. And so Section 2 does not ask the question.
The majority’s “multiple ways to vote” factor is
similarly flawed.
Ante, at 18. True enough, a State with
three ways to vote (say, on Election Day; early in person; or by
mail) may be more “open” than a State with only one (on Election
Day). And some other statute might care about that. But Section 2
does not. What it cares about is that a State’s “political
processes” are “
equally open” to voters of all races. And a
State’s electoral process is not equally open if, for example, the
State “only” makes Election Day voting by members of one race
peculiarly difficult. The House Report on Section 2 addresses that
issue. It explains that an election system would violate Section 2
if minority citizens had a lesser opportunity than white citizens
to use absentee ballots. See H. R. Rep., at 31, n. 106.
Even if the minority citizens could just as easily vote in person,
the scheme would “result in unequal access to the political
process.”
Id., at 31. That is not some piece of contestable
legislative history. It is the only reading of Section 2 possible,
given the statute’s focus on equality. Maybe the majority does not
mean to contest that proposition; its discussion of this supposed
factor is short and cryptic. But if the majority does intend to
excuse so much discrimination, it is wrong. Making one method of
voting less available to minority citizens than to whites
necessarily means giving the former “less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process.”
§10301(b).
The majority’s history-and-commonality factor
also pushes the inquiry away from what the statute demands. The
oddest part of the majority’s analysis is the idea that “what was
standard practice when §2 was amended in 1982 is a relevant
consideration.”
Ante, at 16. The 1982 state of the world is
no part of the Section 2 test. An election rule prevalent at that
time may make voting harder for minority than for white citizens;
Section 2 then covers such a rule, as it covers any other. And
contrary to the majority’s unsupported speculation, Congress
“intended” exactly that.
Ante, at 17; see H. R. Rep.,
at 14 (explaining that the Act aimed to eradicate the
“numerous practices and procedures which act as continued barriers
to registration and voting”).[
8] Section 2 was meant to disrupt the status quo, not to
preserve it—to eradicate then-current discriminatory practices, not
to set them in amber. See
Bossier, 528 U. S., at 334
(under Section 2, “[i]f the
status quo” abridges the right
to vote “relative to what the right to vote
ought to be, the
status quo itself must be changed”).[
9] And as to election rules common now, the majority
oversimplifies. Even if those rules are unlikely to violate Section
2 everywhere, they may easily do so somewhere. That is because the
demographics and political geography of States vary widely and
Section 2’s application depends on place-specific facts. As we have
recognized, the statute calls for “an intensely local appraisal,”
not a count-up-the-States exercise.
Gingles, 478 U. S.,
at 79; see
supra, at 17. This case, as I’ll later discuss,
offers a perfect illustration of how the difference between those
two approaches can matter. See
infra, at 29–40.
That leaves only the majority’s discussion of
state interests, which is again skewed so as to limit Section 2
liability. No doubt that under our precedent, a state interest in
an election rule “is a legitimate factor to be considered.”
Houston Lawyers’ Assn., 501 U. S., at 426. But the
majority wrongly dismisses the need for the closest possible fit
between means and end—that is, between the terms of the rule and
the State’s asserted interest.
Ante, at 21. In the past,
this Court has stated that a discriminatory election rule must
fall, no matter how weighty the interest claimed, if a less biased
law would not “significantly impair[ that] interest.”
Houston
Lawyers’ Assn., 501 U. S., at 428; see
supra, at
17–18, and n. 5. And as the majority concedes, we apply that kind
of means-end standard in every other context—employment, housing,
banking—where the law addresses racially discriminatory effects:
There, the rule must be “strict[ly] necess[ary]” to the interest.
Ante, at 21; see,
e.
g.,
Albemarle Paper
Co. v.
Moody,
422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975) (holding that an employment policy cannot stand
if another policy, “without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest”). The majority
argues that “[t]he text of [those] provisions” differs from Section
2’s.
Ante, at 20. But if anything, Section 2 gives less
weight to competing interests: Unlike in most discrimination laws,
they enter the inquiry only through the provision’s reference to
the “totality of circumstances”—through, then, a statutory
backdoor. So the majority falls back on the idea that “[d]emanding
such a tight fit would have the effect of invalidating a great many
neutral voting regulations.”
Ante, at 21; see
ante,
at 25. But a state interest becomes relevant only when a voting
rule, even if neutral on its face, is found
not neutral in
operation—only, that is, when the rule provides unequal access to
the political process. Apparently, the majority does not want to
“invalidate [too] many” of those actually discriminatory rules. But
Congress had a different goal in enacting Section 2.
The majority’s approach, which would ask only
whether a discriminatory law “
reasonably pursue[s] important
state interests,” gives election officials too easy an escape from
Section 2.
Ante, at 25 (emphasis added). Of course
preventing voter intimidation is an important state interest. And
of course preventing election fraud is the same. But those
interests are also easy to assert groundlessly or pretextually in
voting discrimination cases. Congress knew that when it passed
Section 2. Election officials can all too often, the Senate Report
noted, “offer a non-racial rationalization” for even laws that
“purposely discriminate[ ].” S. Rep., at 37; see
supra, at 14, 17–18, and n. 5. A necessity test filters out
those offerings. See,
e.
g.,
Albemarle, 422
U. S., at 425. It thereby prevents election officials from
flouting, circumventing, or discounting Section 2’s command not to
discriminate.
In that regard, the past offers a lesson to the
present. Throughout American history, election officials have
asserted anti-fraud interests in using voter suppression laws. Poll
taxes, the classic mechanism to keep black people from voting, were
often justified as “preserv[ing] the purity of the ballot box [and]
facilitat[ing] honest elections.” J. Kousser, The Shaping of
Southern Politics 111, n. 9 (1974). A raft of election
regulations—including “elaborate registration procedures” and
“early poll closings”—similarly excluded white immigrants (Irish,
Italians, and so on) from the polls on the ground of “prevent[ing]
fraud and corruption.” Keyssar 159; see
ibid. (noting that
in those times “claims of widespread corruption” were backed
“almost entirely” by “anecdotes [with] little systematic
investigation or evidence”). Take even the majority’s example of a
policy advancing an “important state interest”: “the use of private
voting booths,” in which voters marked their own ballots.
Ante, at 19. In the majority’s high-minded account, that
innovation—then known as the Australian voting system, for the
country that introduced it—served entirely to prevent undue
influence. But when adopted, it also prevented many illiterate
citizens—especially African Americans—from voting. And indeed, that
was partly the point. As an 1892 Arkansas song went:
The Australian Ballot works like a charm,
It makes them think and scratch,
And when a Negro gets a ballot
He has certainly got his match.
Kousser 54. Across the South, the Australian
ballot decreased voter participation among whites by anywhere from
8% to 28% but among African Americans by anywhere from 15% to 45%.
See
id., at 56. Does that mean secret ballot laws violate
Section 2 today? Of course not. But should the majority’s own
example give us all a bit of pause? Yes, it should. It serves as a
reminder that States have always found it natural to wrap
discriminatory policies in election-integrity garb.
Congress enacted Section 2 to prevent those
maneuvers from working. It knew that States and localities had over
time enacted measure after measure imposing discriminatory voting
burdens. And it knew that governments were proficient in justifying
those measures on non-racial grounds. So Congress called a halt. It
enacted a statute that would strike down all unnecessary laws,
including facially neutral ones, that result in members of a racial
group having unequal access to the political process.
But the majority is out of sympathy with that
measure. The majority thinks a statute that would remove those laws
is not, as Justice Ginsburg once called it, “consequential,
efficacious, and amply justified.”
Shelby County, 570
U. S., at 562 (dissenting opinion). Instead, the majority
thinks it too “radical” to stomach.
Ante, at 21, 25. The
majority objects to an excessive “transfer of the authority to set
voting rules from the States to the federal courts.”
Ante,
at 25. It even sees that transfer as “[un]democratic.”
Ibid.
But maybe the majority should pay more attention to the “historical
background” that it insists “does not tell us how to decide this
case.”
Ante, at 21. That history makes clear the
incongruity, in interpreting this statute, of the majority’s paean
to state authority—and conversely, its denigration of federal
responsibility for ensuring non-discriminatory voting rules. The
Voting Rights Act was meant to replace state and local election
rules that needlessly make voting harder for members of one race
than for others. The text of the Act perfectly reflects that
objective. The “democratic” principle it upholds is not one of
States’ rights as against federal courts. The democratic principle
it upholds is the right of every American, of every race, to have
equal access to the ballot box. The majority today undermines that
principle as it refuses to apply the terms of the statute. By
declaring some racially discriminatory burdens inconsequential, and
by refusing to subject asserted state interests to serious
means-end scrutiny, the majority enables voting discrimination.
III
Just look at Arizona. Two of that State’s
policies disproportionately affect minority citizens’ opportunity
to vote. The first—the out-of-precinct policy—results in Hispanic
and African American voters’ ballots being thrown out at a
statistically higher rate than those of whites. And whatever the
majority might say about the ordinariness of such a rule, Arizona
applies it in extra-ordinary fashion: Arizona is
the
national outlier in dealing with out-of-precinct votes, with the
next-worst offender nowhere in sight. The second rule—the
ballot-collection ban—makes voting meaningfully more difficult for
Native American citizens than for others. And nothing about how
that ban is applied is “usual” either—this time because of how many
of the State’s Native American citizens need to travel long
distances to use the mail. Both policies violate Section 2, on a
straightforward application of its text. Considering the “totality
of circumstances,” both “result in” members of some races having
“less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect a representative
of their choice.” §10301(b). The majority reaches the opposite
conclusion because it closes its eyes to the facts on the
ground.[
10]
A
Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy requires
discarding any Election Day ballot cast elsewhere than in a voter’s
assigned precinct. Under the policy, officials throw out every
choice in every race—including national or statewide races
(
e.
g., for President or Governor) that appear
identically on every precinct’s ballot. The question is whether
that policy unequally affects minority citizens’ opportunity to
cast a vote.
Although the majority portrays Arizona’s use of
the rule as “unremarkable,”
ante, at 26, the State is in
fact a national aberration when it comes to discarding out-of-
precinct ballots. In 2012, about 35,000 ballots across the country
were thrown out because they were cast at the wrong precinct. See
U. S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election
Administration and Voting Survey 53 (2013). Nearly one in three of
those discarded votes—10,979—was cast in Arizona.
Id., at
52. As the Court of Appeals concluded, and the chart below
indicates, Arizona threw away ballots in that year at 11 times the
rate of the second-place discarder (Washington State).
Democratic Nat.
Committee v.
Hobbs, 948 F.3d
989, 1001 (CA9 2020); see App. 72. Somehow the majority labels that
difference “marginal[ ],”
ante, at 27, but it is
anything but. More recently, the number of discarded ballots in the
State has gotten smaller: Arizona counties have increasingly
abandoned precinct-based voting (in favor of county-wide “vote
centers”), so the out-of-precinct rule has fewer votes to operate
on. And the majority primarily relies on those latest (2016)
numbers. But across the five elections at issue in this litigation
(2008–2016), Arizona threw away far more out-of-precinct
votes—almost 40,000—than did any other State in the country.
Votes in such numbers can matter—enough for
Section 2 to apply. The majority obliquely suggests not, comparing
the smallish number of thrown-out votes (minority and non-minority
alike) to the far larger number of votes cast and counted. See
ante, at 27. But elections are often fought and won at the
margins—certainly in Arizona. Consider the number of votes
separating the two presidential candidates in the most recent
election: 10,457. That is fewer votes than Arizona discarded under
the out-of-precinct policy in two of the prior three presidential
elections. This Court previously rejected the idea—the “erroneous
assumption”—“that a small group of voters can never influence the
outcome of an election.”
Chisom, 501 U. S., at 397,
n. 24. For that reason, we held that even “a small minority”
group can claim Section 2 protection. See
ibid. Similarly
here, the out-of-precinct policy—which discards thousands upon
thousands of ballots in every election—affects more than sufficient
votes to implicate Section 2’s guarantee of equal electoral
opportunity.
And the out-of-precinct policy operates
unequally: Ballots cast by minorities are more likely to be
discarded. In 2016, Hispanics, African Americans, and Native
Americans were about twice as likely—or said another way, 100% more
likely—to have their ballots discarded than whites. See App. 122.
And it is possible to break that down a bit. Sixty percent of the
voting in Arizona is from Maricopa County. There, Hispanics were
110% more likely, African Americans 86% more likely, and Native
Americans 73% more likely to have their ballots tossed. See
id., at 153. Pima County, the next largest county, provides
another 15% of the statewide vote. There, Hispanics were 148% more
likely, African Americans 80% more likely, and Native Americans 74%
more likely to lose their votes. See
id., at 157. The record
does not contain statewide figures for 2012. But in Maricopa and
Pima Counties, the percentages were about the same as in 2016. See
id., at 87, 91. Assessing those disparities, the plaintiffs’
expert found, and the District Court accepted, that the
discriminatory impact of the out-of-precinct policy was
statistically significant—meaning, again, that it was highly
unlikely to occur by chance. See
Democratic Nat.
Committee v.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 871
(Ariz. 2018);
supra, at 15, n. 4.
The majority is wrong to assert that those
statistics are “highly misleading.”
Ante, at 28. In the
majority’s view, they can be dismissed because the great mass of
voters are unaffected by the out-of-precinct policy. See
ibid. But Section 2 is less interested in “absolute terms”
(as the majority calls them) than in relative ones.
Ante, at
27; see
supra, at 14–15. Arizona’s policy creates a
statistically significant disparity between minority and white
voters: Because of the policy, members of different racial groups
do not in fact have an equal likelihood of having their ballots
counted. Suppose a State decided to throw out 1% of the Hispanic
vote each election. Presumably, the majority would not approve the
action just because 99% of the Hispanic vote is unaffected. Nor
would the majority say that Hispanics in that system have an equal
shot of casting an effective ballot. Here, the policy is not so
overt; but under Section 2, that difference does not matter.
Because the policy “results in” statistically significant
inequality, it implicates Section 2. And the kind of inequality
that the policy produces is not the kind only a statistician could
see. A rule that throws out, each and every election, thousands of
votes cast by minority citizens is a rule that can affect election
outcomes. If you were a minority vote suppressor in Arizona or
elsewhere, you would want that rule in your bag of tricks. You
would not think it remotely irrelevant.
And the case against Arizona’s policy grows only
stronger the deeper one digs. The majority fails to conduct the
“searching practical evaluation” of “past and present reality” that
Section 2’s “totality of circumstances” inquiry demands.
De
Grandy, 512 U. S., at 1018. Had the majority done so, it
would have discovered why Arizona’s out-of- precinct policy has
such a racially disparate impact on voting opportunity. Much of the
story has to do with the siting and shifting of polling places.
Arizona moves polling places at a startling rate. Maricopa County
(recall, Arizona’s largest by far) changed 40% or more of polling
places before both the 2008 and the 2012 elections. See 329
F. Supp. 3d, at 858 (noting also that changes “continued to
occur in 2016”). In 2012 (the election with the best data), voters
affected by those changes had an out-of-precinct voting rate that
was 40% higher than other voters did. See
ibid. And,
critically, Maricopa’s relocations hit minority voters harder than
others. In 2012, the county moved polling stations in African
American and Hispanic neighborhoods 30% more often than in white
ones. See App. 110–111. The odds of those changes leading to
mistakes increased yet further because the affected areas are home
to citizens with relatively low education and income levels. See
id., at 170–171. And even putting relocations aside, the
siting of polling stations in minority areas caused significant
out-of-precinct voting. Hispanic and Native American voters had to
travel further than white voters did to their assigned polling
places. See
id., at 109. And all minority voters were
disproportionately likely to be assigned to polling places other
than the ones closest to where they lived. See
id., at 109,
and n. 30, 175–176. Small wonder, given such siting decisions,
that minority voters found it harder to identify and get to their
correct precincts. But the majority does not address these
matters.[
11]
Facts also undermine the State’s asserted
interests, which the majority hangs its hat on. A government
interest, as even the majority recognizes, is “merely one factor to
be considered” in Section 2’s totality analysis.
Houston
Lawyers’ Assn., 501 U. S., at 427; see
ante, at 19.
Here, the State contends that it needs the out-of-precinct policy
to support a precinct-based voting system. But 20 other States
combine precinct-based systems with mechanisms for partially
counting out-of-precinct ballots (that is, counting the votes for
offices like President or Governor). And the District Court found
that it would be “administratively feasible” for Arizona to join
that group. 329 F. Supp. 3d, at 860. Arizona—echoed by the
majority—objects that adopting a partial-counting approach would
decrease compliance with the vote-in-your-precinct rule (by
reducing the penalty for a voter’s going elsewhere). But there is
more than a little paradox in that response. We know from the
extraordinary number of ballots Arizona discards that its current
system fails utterly to “induce[ ] compliance.”
Ante,
at 28–29; see
supra, at 30–31. Presumably, that is because
the system—most notably, its placement and shifting of polling
places—sows an unparalleled level of voter confusion. A State that
makes compliance with an election rule so unusually hard is in no
position to claim that its interest in “induc[ing] compliance”
outweighs the need to remedy the race-based discrimination that
rule has caused.
B
Arizona’s law mostly banning third-party
ballot collection also results in a significant race-based
disparity in voting opportunities. The problem with that law again
lies in facts nearly unique to Arizona—here, the presence of rural
Native American communities that lack ready access to mail service.
Given that circumstance, the Arizona statute discriminates in just
the way Section 2 proscribes. The majority once more comes to a
different conclusion only by ignoring the local conditions with
which Arizona’s law interacts.
The critical facts for evaluating the
ballot-collection rule have to do with mail service. Most Arizonans
vote by mail. But many rural Native American voters lack access to
mail service, to a degree hard for most of us to fathom. Only 18%
of Native voters in rural counties receive home mail delivery,
compared to 86% of white voters living in those counties. See 329
F. Supp. 3d, at 836. And for many or most, there is no nearby
post office. Native Americans in rural Arizona “often must travel
45 minutes to 2 hours just to get to a mailbox.” 948 F. 3d, at
1006; see 329 F. Supp. 3d, at 869 (“Ready access to reliable
and secure mail service is nonexistent” in some Native American
communities). And between a quarter to a half of households in
these Native communities do not have a car. See
ibid. So
getting ballots by mail and sending them back poses a serious
challenge for Arizona’s rural Native Americans.[
12]
For that reason, an unusually high rate of
Native Americans used to “return their early ballots with the
assistance of third parties.”
Id., at 870.[
13] As the District Court found: “[F]or
many Native Americans living in rural locations,” voting “is an
activity that requires the active assistance of friends and
neighbors.”
Ibid. So in some Native communities, third-party
collection of ballots—mostly by fellow clan members—became
“standard practice.”
Ibid. And stopping it, as one tribal
election official testified, “would be a huge devastation.”
Ibid.; see Brief for Navajo Nation as
Amicus Curiae
19–20 (explaining that ballot collection is how Navajo voters “have
historically handled their mail-in ballots”).
Arizona has always regulated these activities to
prevent fraud. State law makes it a felony offense for a ballot
collector to fail to deliver a ballot. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§16–1005 (Cum. Supp. 2020). It is also a felony for a ballot
collector to tamper with a ballot in any manner. See
ibid.
And as the District Court found, “tamper evident envelopes and a
rigorous voter signature verification procedure” protect against
any such attempts. 329 F. Supp. 3d, at 854. For those reasons
and others, no fraud involving ballot collection has ever come to
light in the State.
Id., at 852.
Still, Arizona enacted—with full knowledge of
the likely discriminatory consequences—the near-blanket
ballot-collection ban challenged here. The first version of the
law—much less stringent than the current one—passed the Arizona
Legislature in 2011. But the Department of Justice, in its Section
5 review, expressed skepticism about the statute’s compliance with
the Voting Rights Act, and the legislature decided to repeal the
law rather than see it blocked (and thereby incur statutory
penalties). See 329 F. Supp. 3d, at 880; 52 U. S. C.
§10303(a)(1)(E) (providing that if a state law fails Section 5
review, the State may not escape the preclearance process for
another 10 years). Then, this Court decided
Shelby County.
With Section 5 gone, the State Legislature felt free to proceed
with a new ballot-collection ban, despite the potentially
discriminatory effects that the preclearance process had revealed.
The enacted law contains limited exceptions for family members and
caregivers. But it includes no similar exceptions for clan members
or others with Native kinship ties. They and anyone else who picks
up a neighbor’s ballot and takes it to a post office, or delivers
it to an election site, is punishable as a felon. See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. §16–1005(H).
Put all of that together, and Arizona’s
ballot-collection ban violates Section 2. The ban interacts with
conditions on the ground—most crucially, disparate access to mail
service—to create unequal voting opportunities for Native
Americans. Recall that only 18% of rural Native Americans in the
State have home delivery; that travel times of an hour or more to
the nearest post office are common; that many members of the
community do not have cars. See
supra, at 36. Given those
facts, the law prevents many Native Americans from making effective
use of one of the principal means of voting in Arizona.[
14] What is an inconsequential
burden for others is for these citizens a severe hardship. And the
State has shown no need for the law to go so far. Arizona, as noted
above, already has statutes in place to deter fraudulent collection
practices. See
supra, at 37. Those laws give every sign of
working. Arizona has not offered any evidence of fraud in ballot
collection, or even an account of a harm threatening to happen. See
329 F. Supp. 3d, at 852 (“[T]here has never been a case of
voter fraud associated with ballot collection charged in Arizona”).
And anyway, Arizona did not have to entirely forego a
ballot-collection restriction to comply with Section 2. It could,
for example, have added an exception to the statute for Native clan
or kinship ties, to accommodate the special, “intensely local”
situation of the rural Native American community.
Gingles,
478 U. S., at 79. That Arizona did not do so shows, at best,
selective indifference to the voting opportunities of its Native
American citizens.
The majority’s opinion fails to acknowledge any
of these facts. It quotes extensively from the District Court’s
finding that the ballot-collection ban does not interfere with the
voting opportunities of minority groups generally. See
ante,
at 31, n. 19. But it never addresses the court’s separate
finding that the ban poses a unique burden for Native Americans.
See
supra, at 36–37. Except in a pair of footnotes
responding to this dissent, the term “Native American” appears once
(count it, once) in the majority’s five-page discussion of
Arizona’s ballot-collection ban. So of course that community’s
strikingly limited access to mail service is not
addressed.[
15] In the
majority’s alternate world, the collection ban is just a “usual
burden[ ] of voting” for everyone.
Ante, at 30. And in
that world, “[f]raud is a real risk” of ballot collection—as to
every community, in every circumstance—just because the State in
litigation asserts that it is.
Ante, at 33. The State need
not even show that the discriminatory rule it enacted is necessary
to prevent the fraud it purports to fear. So the State has no duty
to substitute a non-discriminatory rule that would adequately serve
its professed goal. Like the rest of today’s opinion, the
majority’s treatment of the collection ban thus flouts what Section
2 commands: the eradication of election rules resulting in unequal
opportunities for minority voters.
IV
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to
address a deep fault of our democracy—the historical and continuing
attempt to withhold from a race of citizens their fair share of
influence on the political process. For a century, African
Americans had struggled and sacrificed to wrest their voting rights
from a resistant Nation. The statute they and their allies at long
last attained made a promise to all Americans. From then on,
Congress demanded, the political process would be equally open to
every citizen, regardless of race.
One does not hear much in the majority opinion
about that promise. One does not hear much about what brought
Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act, what Congress hoped for it
to achieve, and what obstacles to that vision remain today. One
would never guess that the Act is, as the President who signed it
wrote, “monumental.” Johnson Papers 841. For all the opinion
reveals, the majority might be considering any old piece of
legislation—say, the Lanham Act or ERISA.
But then, at least, the majority should treat
the Voting Rights Act as if it were ordinary legislation. The Court
always says that it must interpret a statute according to its
text—that it has no warrant to override congressional choices. But
the majority today flouts those choices with abandon. The language
of Section 2 is as broad as broad can be. It applies to any policy
that “results in” disparate voting opportunities for minority
citizens. It prohibits, without any need to show bad motive, even
facially neutral laws that make voting harder for members of one
race than of another, given their differing life circumstances.
That is the expansive statute Congress wrote, and that our prior
decisions have recognized. But the majority today lessens the
law—cuts Section 2 down to its own preferred size. The majority
creates a set of extra-textual exceptions and considerations to sap
the Act’s strength, and to save laws like Arizona’s. No matter what
Congress wanted, the majority has other ideas.
This Court has no right to remake Section 2.
Maybe some think that vote suppression is a relic of history—and so
the need for a potent Section 2 has come and gone. Cf.
Shelby
County, 570 U. S., at 547 (“[T]hings have changed
dramatically”). But Congress gets to make that call. Because it has
not done so, this Court’s duty is to apply the law as it is
written. The law that confronted one of this country’s most
enduring wrongs; pledged to give every American, of every race, an
equal chance to participate in our democracy; and now stands as the
crucial tool to achieve that goal. That law, of all laws, deserves
the sweep and power Congress gave it. That law, of all laws, should
not be diminished by this Court.