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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 19–71
_________________
FNU TANZIN, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
MUHAMMAD TANVIR, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[December 10, 2020]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substantial
burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling interest pursued
through the least restrictive means. 107Stat. 1488, 42
U. S. C. §2000bb
et seq. It also gives a
person whose religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the
right to seek “appropriate relief.” The question here is whether
“appropriate relief ” includes claims for money damages
against Government officials in their individual capacities. We
hold that it does.
I
A
RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to
free exercise under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy
to redress violations of that right. Congress passed the Act in the
wake of this Court’s decision in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v.
Smith,
494
U.S. 872, 885–890 (1990), which held that the First Amendment
tolerates neutral, generally applicable laws that burden or
prohibit religious acts even when the laws are unsupported by a
narrowly tailored, compelling governmental interest. See
§2000bb(a). RFRA sought to counter the effect of that holding and
restore the pre-
Smith “compelling interest test” by
“provid[ing] a claim . . . to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.”
§§2000bb(b)(1)–(2). That right of action enables a person to
“obtain appropriate relief against a government.” §2000bb–1(c). A
“ ‘government’ ” is defined to include “a branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person
acting under color of law) of the United States.” §2000bb–2(1).
B
Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah,
and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the No Fly List in
retaliation for their refusal to act as informants against their
religious communities. Respondents sued various agents in their
official capacities, seeking removal from the No Fly List. They
also sued the agents in their individual capacities for money
damages. According to respondents, the retaliation cost them
substantial sums of money: airline tickets wasted and income from
job opportunities lost.
More than a year after respondents sued, the
Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now
fly, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief. The District
Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money
damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief.
The Second Circuit reversed. 894 F.3d 449
(2018). It determined that RFRA’s express remedies provision,
combined with the statutory definition of “Government,” authorizes
claims against federal officials in their individual capacities.
Relying on our precedent and RFRA’s broad protections for religious
liberty, the court concluded that the open-ended phrase
“appropriate relief ” encompasses money damages against
officials. We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and
now affirm.
II
As usual, we start with the statutory text.
E.g., Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v.
Tempnology, LLC, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op.,
at 8). A person whose exercise of religion has been unlawfully
burdened may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42
U. S. C. §2000bb–1(c).
A
We first have to determine if injured parties
can sue Government officials in their personal capacities. RFRA’s
text provides a clear answer: They can. Persons may sue and obtain
relief “against a government,” §2000bb–1(c), which is defined to
include “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and
official (
or other person acting under color of law)
of the United States.” §2000bb–2(1) (emphasis added).
The Government urges us to limit lawsuits
against officials to suits against them in their official, not
personal, capacities. A lawsuit seeking damages from employees in
their individual capacities, the Government argues, is not really
“against a government” because relief “can be executed only against
the official’s personal assets.”
Kentucky v.
Graham,
473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985).
The problem with this otherwise plausible
argument is that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of
“government” with a different, express definition. “ ‘When a
statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that
definition,’ even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.”
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers, 583 U. S.
___, ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting
Burgess v.
United
States,
553 U.S.
124, 130 (2008)). For example, if a statute defines a “State”
to include territories and districts, that addition to the plain
meaning controls. See,
e.g., 15 U. S. C. §267. So
too here. A “government,” under RFRA, extends beyond the term’s
plain meaning to include officials. And the term “official” does
not refer solely to an office, but rather to the actual person “who
is invested with an office.” 10 Oxford English Dictionary 733 (2d
ed. 1989). Under RFRA’s definition, relief that can be executed
against an “official . . . of the United States”
is “relief against a government.” 42 U. S. C.
§§2000bb–1(c), 2000bb–2(1).
Not only does the term “government” encompass
officials, it also authorizes suits against “other person[s] acting
under color of law.” §2000bb–2(1). The right to obtain relief
against “a person” cannot be squared with the Government’s reading
that relief must always run against the United States.
Moreover
, the use of the phrase “official (
or
other person . . . )” underscores that
“official[s]” are treated like “person[s].”
Ibid. (emphasis
added). In other words, the parenthetical clarifies that “a
government” includes both individuals who are officials acting
under color of law
and other, additional individuals who are
nonofficials acting under color of law. Here, respondents sued the
former.
The legal “backdrop against which Congress
enacted” RFRA confirms the propriety of individual-capacity suits.
Stewart v.
Dutra Constr. Co.,
543
U.S. 481, 487 (2005). The phrase “persons acting under color of
law” draws on one of the most well-known civil rights statutes: 42
U. S. C. §1983. That statute applies to “person[s]
. . . under color of any statute,” and this Court has
long interpreted it to permit suits against officials in their
individual capacities. See,
e.g., Memphis Community
School Dist. v.
Stachura,
477 U.S.
299, 305–306, and n. 8 (1986). Because RFRA uses the same
terminology as §1983 in the very same field of civil rights law,
“it is reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a
consistent meaning.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 323 (2012). A suit against an
official in his personal capacity is a suit against a person acting
under color of law. And a suit against a person acting under color
of law is a suit against “a government,” as defined under RFRA.
§2000bb–1(c).
B
The question then becomes what “appropriate
relief ” entails. Without a statutory definition, we turn to
the phrase’s plain meaning at the time of enactment. See
FCC
v.
AT&T Inc.,
562 U.S.
397, 403 (2011). “Appropriate” means “[s]pecially fitted or
suitable, proper.” 1 Oxford English Dictionary, at 586; see also
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 57 (10th ed. 1996)
(“especially suitable or compatible”). Because this language is
“open-ended” on its face, what relief is
“ ‘appropriate’ ” is “inherently context dependent.”
Sossamon v.
Texas,
563 U.S.
277, 286 (2011) (interpreting identical language).
In the context of suits against Government
officials, damages have long been awarded as appropriate relief. In
the early Republic, “an array of writs . . . allowed
individuals to test the legality of government conduct by filing
suit against government officials” for money damages “payable by
the officer.” Pfander & Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnification and Govt Accountability in the Early Republic, 85
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1862, 1871–1875 (2010); see
id., at 1875, n. 52 (collecting cases). These common-law
causes of action remained available through the 19th century and
into the 20th. See,
e.g.,
Little v.
Barreme, 2
Cranch 170 (1804);
Elliott v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137
(1836);
Mitchell v.
Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852);
Buck v.
Colbath, 3 Wall. 334 (1866);
Belknap
v.
Schild,
161 U.S.
10 (1896);
Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson,
223 U.S.
605, 619–620 (1912) (“The exemption of the United States from
suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to
persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully
invaded”).
Though more limited, damages against federal
officials remain an appropriate form of relief today. In 1988 the
Westfall Act foreclosed common-law claims for damages against
federal officials, 28 U. S. C. §2679, but it left open
claims for constitutional violations and certain statutory
violations. §§2679(b)(2)(A)–(B). Indeed, the Act expressly
contemplates that a statute could authorize an action for damages
against Government employees. §2679(b)(2)(B) (explaining that the
displacement of remedies “does not extend or apply to a civil
action against an employee of the Government . . . which
is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under
which such action against an individual is otherwise
authorized”).
Damages are also commonly available against
state and local government officials. In 1871, for example,
Congress passed the precursor to §1983, imposing liability on any
person who, under color of state law, deprived another of a
constitutional right. 17Stat. 13; see also
Myers v.
Anderson,
238 U.S.
368, 379, 383 (1915) (affirming award of damages against state
election officials). By the time Congress enacted RFRA, this Court
had interpreted the modern version of §1983 to permit monetary
recovery against officials who violated “clearly established”
federal law.
E.g., Procunier v.
Navarette,
434 U.S.
555, 561–562 (1978);
Siegert v.
Gilley,
500 U.S.
226, 231 (1991).
This availability of damages under §1983 is
particularly salient in light of RFRA’s origins. When first
enacted, RFRA defined “ ‘government’ ” to include an
“official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United
States,
a State, or a subdivision of a State.” 107Stat. 1489
(emphasis added). It made no distinction between state and federal
officials. After this Court held that RFRA could not be enforced
against the States, see
City of Boerne v.
Flores,
521 U.S.
507, 511 (1997), Congress narrowly amended the definition “by
striking ‘a State, or a subdivision of a State.’ ” 114Stat.
806. That context is important because RFRA made clear that it was
reinstating both the pre-
Smith substantive protections of
the First Amendment
and the right to vindicate those
protections by a claim. §2000bb(b). There is no doubt that damages
claims have always been available under §1983 for clearly
established violations of the First Amendment. See,
e.g.,
Sause v.
Bauer, 585 U. S. ___ (2018)
(
per curiam) (reversing grant of qualified immunity in
a case seeking damages under §1983 based on alleged violations of
free exercise rights and Fourth Amendment rights);
Murphy v.
Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252, 1259 (CA8
1987) (remanding to enter judgment for plaintiffs on a §1983 free
speech and free exercise claims and to determine and order
“appropriate relief, which . . . may, if appropriate,
include an award” of damages). Given that RFRA reinstated
pre-
Smith protections and rights, parties suing under RFRA
must have at least the same avenues for relief against officials
that they would have had before
Smith. That means RFRA
provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to seek damages against
Government employees.
A damages remedy is not just “appropriate”
relief as viewed through the lens of suits against Government
employees. It is also the
only form of relief that can
remedy some RFRA violations. For certain injuries, such as
respondents’ wasted plane tickets, effective relief consists of
damages, not an injunction. See,
e.g.,
DeMarco v.
Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 390 (CA5 2019) (destruction of
religious property);
Yang v.
Sturner,
728 F. Supp. 845 (RI 1990), opinion withdrawn
750 F. Supp. 558 (RI 1990) (autopsy of son that violated Hmong
beliefs). Given the textual cues just noted, it would be odd to
construe RFRA in a manner that prevents courts from awarding such
relief. Had Congress wished to limit the remedy to that degree, it
knew how to do so. See,
e.g., 29 U. S. C.
§1132(a)(3) (providing for “appropriate equitable relief ”);
42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(g)(1) (providing for “equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate”); 15 U. S. C.
§78u(d)(5) (providing for “any equitable relief that may be
appropriate or necessary”).[
1]*
Our opinion in
Sossamon does not change
this analysis.
Sossamon held that a State’s acceptance of
federal funding did not waive sovereign immunity to suits for
damages under a related statute—the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000—which also permits
“ ‘appropriate relief.’ ” 563 U. S., at 280, 282.
The obvious difference is that this case features a suit against
individuals, who do not enjoy sovereign immunity.
The Government also posits that we should be
wary of damages against government officials because these awards
could raise separation-of-powers concerns. But this exact remedy
has coexisted with our constitutional system since the dawn of the
Republic. To be sure, there may be policy reasons why Congress may
wish to shield Government employees from personal liability, and
Congress is free to do so. But there are no constitutional reasons
why we must do so in its stead.
To the extent the Government asks us to create a
new policy-based presumption against damages against individual
officials, we are not at liberty to do so. Congress is best suited
to create such a policy. Our task is simply to interpret the law as
an ordinary person would. Although background presumptions can
inform the understanding of a word or phrase, those presumptions
must exist at the time of enactment. We cannot manufacture a new
presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that
acted 27 years ago.
* * *
We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies
provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money
damages against federal officials in their individual capacities.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
