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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 19–546
_________________
DOUGLAS BROWNBACK, et al., PETITIONERS
v. JAMES KING
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[February 25, 2021]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows a
plaintiff to bring certain state-law tort suits against the Federal
Government. 28 U. S. C. §2674; see also §1346(b). It also
includes a provision, known as the judgment bar, which precludes
“any action by the [plaintiff], by reason of the same subject
matter, against the employee of the government whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim” if a court enters “[t]he judgment
in an action under section 1346(b).” §2676. The Sixth Circuit held
that the District Court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s FTCA
claims did not trigger the judgment bar because the plaintiff’s
failure to establish all elements of his FTCA claims had deprived
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We disagree and hold that
the District Court’s order also went to the merits of the claim and
thus could trigger the judgment bar.
I
A
The FTCA streamlined litigation for parties
injured by federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment. Before 1946, a plaintiff could sue a federal employee
directly for damages, but sovereign immunity barred suits against
the United States, even if a similarly situated private employer
would be liable under principles of vicarious liability. Pfander
& Aggarwal,
Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of
Dynamic Textualism, 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 417, 424–425
(2011); see also
Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson,
223 U.S.
605, 619–620 (1912). Despite that immunity, the Government
often would provide counsel to defendant employees or indemnify
them. Pfander, 8 U. St. Thomas L. J., at 425. In
addition, Congress passed private bills that awarded compensation
to persons injured by Government employees.
Id., at 424, n.
39. But by the 1940s, Congress was considering hundreds of such
private bills each year.
Ibid.[
1] “Critics worried about the speed and fairness with
which Congress disposed of these claims.”
Id., at 426.
“In 1946, Congress passed the FTCA, which waived
the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts
committed by federal employees” acting within the scope of their
employment.
FDIC v.
Meyer,
510
U.S. 471, 475–476 (1994). The Act in effect ended the private
bill system by transferring most tort claims to the federal courts.
See Pfander, 8 U. St. Thomas. L. J.
, at 424, n.
39. Plaintiffs were (and are) required to bring claims under the
FTCA in federal district court. Federal courts have jurisdiction
over these claims if they are “actionable under §1346(b).”
Meyer, 510 U. S., at 477. A claim is actionable if it
alleges the six elements of §1346(b), which are that the claim
be:
“[1] against the United States, [2] for
money damages, . . . [3] for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government [5] while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, [6] under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.”
Ibid. (quoting
§1346(b)).
While waiving sovereign immunity so parties can
sue the United States directly for harms caused by its employees,
the FTCA made it more difficult to sue the employees themselves by
adding a judgment bar provision. That provision states: “The
judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason
of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” §2676. “[O]nce a
plaintiff receives a judgment (favorable or not) in an FTCA suit,”
the bar is triggered, and “he generally cannot proceed with a suit
against an individual employee based on the same underlying facts.”
Simmons v.
Himmelreich, 578 U.S. 621, 625 (2016). The
Act thus opened a new path to relief (suits against the United
States) while narrowing the earlier one (suits against
employees).
B
This case involves a violent encounter between
respondent James King and officers Todd Allen and Douglas
Brownback, members of a federal task force, who mistook King for a
fugitive. King sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging that
the officers committed six torts under Michigan law. He also sued
the officers individually under the implied cause of action
recognized by
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents,
403 U.S.
388 (1971), alleging four violations of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In the
alternative, they moved for summary judgment.
The District Court dismissed King’s claims. As
to his FTCA claims, the court granted the Government’s summary
judgment motion.[
2] It found
that the undisputed facts showed that the officers did not act with
malice. The officers thus would have been entitled to state
qualified immunity had Michigan tort claims been brought against
them. See
Odom v.
Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459,
473–474, 760 N.W.2d 217, 224–225 (2008). The court, following its
own precedent, ruled that the Government was immune because it
retains the benefit of state-law immunities available to its
employees. The court also ruled in the alternative that King’s FTCA
claims failed under Rule 12(b)(6) because his complaint did not
present enough facts to state a plausible claim to relief for any
of his six tort claims. The court dismissed King’s
Bivens
claims as well, ruling that the defendants were entitled to federal
qualified immunity. King appealed only the dismissal of his
Bivens claims.
As a threshold question, the Sixth Circuit
assessed whether the dismissal of King’s FTCA claims triggered the
judgment bar and thus blocked the parallel
Bivens claims.
See
King v.
United States, 917 F.3d 409, 418–421
(2019). It did not, according to the Sixth Circuit, because “the
district court dismissed [King]’s FTCA claim[s] for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction” when it determined that he had not
stated a viable claim and thus “did not reach the merits.”
Id., at 419; but see
Unus v.
Kane, 565 F.3d
103, 121–122 (CA4 2009) (holding that summary judgment on the
plaintiffs’ FTCA claims triggered judgment bar with respect to
Bivens claims). The Sixth Circuit then held that the
defendant officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and
reversed the District Court.
We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___
(2020), and now reverse.
II
A
The judgment bar provides that “[t]he judgment
in an action under section 1346(b)” shall bar “any action by the
claimant” involving the same subject matter against the employee of
the Federal Government whose act gave rise to the claim. §2676.
Here, the District Court entered a “Judgment . . . in
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.” ECF Doc. 92. The
parties agree that, at a minimum, this judgment must have been a
final judgment on the merits to trigger the bar, given that the
“provision functions in much the same way as [the common-law
doctrine of claim preclusion].”
Simmons, 578 U. S., at
630, n. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).[
3] We agree.[
4]
B
This Court has explained that the judgment bar
was drafted against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata. See
ibid.[
5] To
“trigge[r ] the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion”
a judgment must be “ ‘on the merits.’ ”
Semtek Int’l
Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531
U.S. 497, 502 (2001). Under that doctrine as it existed in
1946, a judgment is “on the merits” if the underlying decision
“actually passes directly on the substance of a particular claim
before the court.”
Id., at 501–502 (cleaned up).[
6] Thus, to determine if the District
Court’s decision is claim preclusive, we must determine if it
passed directly on the substance of King’s FTCA claims. We conclude
that it did.
The District Court’s summary judgment ruling
hinged on a quintessential merits decision: whether the undisputed
facts established all the elements of King’s FTCA claims. See
Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp.,
546
U.S. 500, 510–511 (2006). The court noted that one element of
an FTCA claim is that the plaintiff establish that the Government
employee would be liable under state law. The court then explained
that Michigan law provides qualified immunity for Government
employees who commit intentional torts but act in subjective good
faith. See
Odom, 482 Mich., at 461, 481–482, 760 N. W.
2d, at 218, 229. And it concluded that, because the undisputed
facts here showed that the officers would have been entitled to
immunity from King’s tort claims, the United States, by extension,
was not liable under the FTCA.[
7]
The court’s alternative Rule 12(b)(6) holding
also passed on the substance of King’s FTCA claims. The District
Court ruled that the FTCA count in King’s complaint did not state a
claim, because even assuming the complaint’s veracity, the officers
used reasonable force, had probable cause to detain King, and
otherwise acted within their authority. “If the judgment determines
that the plaintiff has no cause of action” based “on rules of
substantive law,” then “it is on the merits.” Restatement of
Judgments §49, Comment
a, p. 193 (1942). A ruling under Rule
12(b)(6) concerns the merits. Cf.
Arbaugh, 546 U. S.,
at 506–507. The District Court evaluated King’s six FTCA claims
under Rule 12(b)(6) and ruled that they failed for reasons of
substantive law.
C
The one complication in this case is that it
involves overlapping questions about sovereign immunity and
subject-matter jurisdiction. In such cases, the “merits and
jurisdiction will sometimes come intertwined,” and a court can
decide “all . . . of the merits issues” in resolving a
jurisdictional question, or vice versa.
Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela v.
Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling
Co., 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 7). That
occurred here. The District Court passed on the substance of King’s
FTCA claims and found them implausible. In doing so, the District
Court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction. But an
on-the-merits judgment can still trigger the judgment bar, even if
that determination necessarily deprives the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
The District Court did lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over King’s FTCA claims. In most cases, a plaintiff’s
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does not deprive a
federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Steel Co.
v.
Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U.S.
83, 89 (1998). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction . . . is proper only when the claim is so
. . . ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy.’ ”
Ibid. However, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege all jurisdictional elements. See,
e.g.,
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v.
Owens,
574 U.S.
81, 89 (2014). And in the unique context of the FTCA, all
elements of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional.
Meyer, 510 U. S., at 477. So even though a plaintiff
need not
prove a §1346(b)(1) jurisdictional element for a
court to maintain subject-matter jurisdiction over his claim, see
ibid., a plaintiff must plausibly allege all six FTCA
elements not only to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
but also for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claim. That means a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant” under state law both to survive a merits determination
under Rule 12(b)(6) and to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.
§1346(b)(1). Because King’s tort claims failed to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the United States necessarily retained
sovereign immunity, also depriving the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, a court cannot issue a ruling on the
merits “when it has no jurisdiction” because “to do so is, by very
definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”
Steel Co., 523
U. S., at 101–102. But where, as here, pleading a claim and
pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment
on the merits that triggers the judgment bar.[
8] A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is still a
“judgment.” See Restatement of Judgments §49, Comment
a, at
193–194 (discussing “judgment . . . based on the lack of
jurisdiction”). And even though the District Court’s ruling in
effect deprived the court of jurisdiction, the District Court
necessarily passed on the substance of King’s FTCA claims. See Part
II–B,
supra. Under the common law, judgments were preclusive
with respect to issues decided as long as the court had the power
to decide the issue. See Restatement of Judgments §49, Comment
b, at 195–196. Because “a federal court always has
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,”
United
States v.
Ruiz,
536 U.S.
622, 628 (2002), a federal court can decide an element of an
FTCA claim on the merits if that element is also jurisdictional.
The District Court did just that with its Rule 12(b)(6)
decision.[
9]
* * *
We conclude that the District Court’s order
was a judgment on the merits of the FTCA claims that can trigger
the judgment bar. The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.