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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 18–1233
_________________
ROMAG FASTENERS, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FOSSIL, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit
[April 23, 2020]
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the
Court.
When it comes to remedies for trademark
infringement, the Lanham Act authorizes many. A district court may
award a winning plaintiff injunctive relief, damages, or the
defendant’s ill-gotten profits. Without question, a defendant’s
state of mind may have a bearing on what relief a plaintiff should
receive. An innocent trademark violator often stands in very
different shoes than an intentional one. But some circuits have
gone further. These courts hold a plaintiff can win a profits
remedy, in particular, only after showing the defendant
willfully infringed its trademark. The question before us is
whether that categorical rule can be reconciled with the statute’s
plain language.
The question comes to us in a case involving
handbag fasteners. Romag sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in
leather goods. Fossil designs, markets, and distributes a wide
range of fashion accessories. Years ago, the pair signed an
agreement allowing Fossil to use Romag’s fasteners in Fossil’s
handbags and other products. Initially, both sides seemed content
with the arrangement. But in time Romag discovered that the
factories Fossil hired in China to make its products were using
counterfeit Romag fasteners—and that Fossil was doing little to
guard against the practice. Unable to resolve its concerns
amicably, Romag sued. The company alleged that Fossil had infringed
its trademark and falsely represented that its fasteners came from
Romag. After trial, a jury agreed with Romag, and found that Fossil
had acted “in callous disregard” of Romag’s rights. At the same
time, however, the jury rejected Romag’s accusation that Fossil had
acted willfully, as that term was defined by the district
court.
For our purposes, the last finding is the
important one. By way of relief for Fossil’s trademark violation,
Romag sought (among other things) an order requiring Fossil to hand
over the profits it had earned thanks to its trademark violation.
But the district court refused this request. The court pointed out
that controlling Second Circuit precedent requires a plaintiff
seeking a profits award to prove that the defendant’s violation was
willful. Not all circuits, however, agree with the Second Circuit’s
rule. We took this case to resolve that dispute over the law’s
demands. 588 U. S. ___ (2019).
Where does Fossil’s proposed willfulness rule
come from? The relevant section of the Lanham Act governing
remedies for trademark violations, §35, 60Stat. 439–440, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §1117(a), says this:
“When a violation of any right of the
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office,
a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a
willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have
been established . . . , the plaintiff shall be entitled,
subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title,
and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs of the action.”
Immediately, this language spells trouble for
Fossil and the circuit precedent on which it relies. The statute
does make a showing of willfulness a precondition to a profits
award when the plaintiff proceeds under §1125(c). That section,
added to the Lanham Act some years after its initial adoption,
creates a cause of action for trademark dilution—conduct that
lessens the association consumers have with a trademark. But Romag
alleged and proved a violation of §1125(a), a provision
establishing a cause of action for the false or misleading use of
trademarks. And in cases like that, the statutory language has
never required a showing of willfulness to win a defendant’s
profits. Yes, the law tells us that a profits award is subject to
limitations found in §§1111 and 1114. But no one suggests those
cross-referenced sections contain the rule Fossil seeks. Nor does
this Court usually read into statutes words that aren’t there. It’s
a temptation we are doubly careful to avoid when Congress has (as
here) included the term in question elsewhere in the very same
statutory provision.
A wider look at the statute’s structure gives us
even more reason for pause. The Lanham Act speaks often and
expressly about mental states. Section 1117(b) requires courts to
treble profits or damages and award attorney’s fees when a
defendant engages in certain acts
intentionally and with
specified
knowledge. Section 1117(c) increases the cap on
statutory damages from $200,000 to $2,000,000 for certain
willful violations. Section 1118 permits courts to order the
infringing items be destroyed if a plaintiff proves any violation
of §1125(a) or a
willful violation of §1125(c). Section 1114
makes certain
innocent infringers subject only to
injunctions. Elsewhere, the statute specifies certain
mens
rea standards needed to establish liability, before even
getting to the question of remedies. See,
e.g.,
§§1125(d)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (prohibiting certain conduct only if
undertaken with “bad faith intent” and listing nine factors
relevant to ascertaining bad faith intent). Without doubt, the
Lanham Act exhibits considerable care with
mens rea
standards. The absence of any such standard in the provision before
us, thus, seems all the more telling.
So how exactly does Fossil seek to conjure a
willfulness requirement out of §1117(a)? Lacking any more obvious
statutory hook, the company points to the language indicating that
a violation under §1125(a) can trigger an award of the defendant’s
profits “subject to the principles of equity.” In Fossil’s telling,
equity courts historically required a showing of willfulness before
authorizing a profits remedy in trademark disputes. Admittedly,
equity courts didn’t require so much in patent infringement cases
and other arguably analogous suits. See,
e.g., Dowagiac Mfg.
Co. v.
Minnesota Moline Plow Co.,
235 U.S.
641, 644, 650–651 (1915). But, Fossil says, trademark is
different. There alone, a willfulness requirement was so long and
universally recognized that today it rises to the level of a
“principle of equity” the Lanham Act carries forward.
It’s a curious suggestion. Fossil’s contention
that the term “principles of equity” includes a willfulness
requirement would not directly contradict the statute’s other,
express
mens rea provisions or render them wholly
superfluous. But it would require us to assume that Congress
intended to incorporate a willfulness requirement here obliquely
while it prescribed
mens rea conditions expressly elsewhere
throughout the Lanham Act. That might be possible, but on first
blush it isn’t exactly an obvious construction of the statute.
Nor do matters improve with a second look. The
phrase “principles of equity” doesn’t readily bring to mind a
substantive rule about
mens rea from a discrete domain like
trademark law. In the context of this statute, it more naturally
suggests fundamental rules that apply more systematically across
claims and practice areas. A principle is a “fundamental truth or
doctrine, as of law; a comprehensive rule or doctrine which
furnishes a basis or origin for others.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1417 (3d ed. 1933); Black’s Law Dictionary 1357 (4th ed. 1951). And
treatises and handbooks on the “principles of equity” generally
contain transsubstantive guidance on broad and fundamental
questions about matters like parties, modes of proof, defenses, and
remedies. See,
e.g., E. Merwin, Principles of Equity and
Equity Pleading (1895); J. Indermaur & C. Thwaites, Manual of
the Principles of Equity (7th ed. 1913); H. Smith, Practical
Exposition of the Principles of Equity (5th ed. 1914); R. Megarry,
Snell’s Principles of Equity (23d ed. 1947). Our precedent, too,
has used the term “principles of equity” to refer to just such
transsubstantive topics. See,
e.g., eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L. L. C.,
547 U.S.
388, 391, 393 (2006);
Holmberg v.
Armbrecht,
327 U.S.
392, 395 (1946). Congress itself has elsewhere used “equitable
principles” in just this way: An amendment to a different section
of the Lanham Act lists “laches, estoppel, and acquiescence” as
examples of “equitable principles.” 15 U. S. C. §1069.
Given all this, it seems a little unlikely Congress meant
“principles of equity” to direct us to a narrow rule about a
profits remedy within trademark law.
But even if we were to spot Fossil that first
essential premise of its argument, the next has problems too. From
the record the parties have put before us, it’s far from clear
whether trademark law historically required a showing of
willfulness before allowing a profits remedy. The Trademark Act of
1905—the Lanham Act’s statutory predecessor which many earlier
cases interpreted and applied—did not mention such a requirement.
It’s true, as Fossil notes, that some courts proceeding before the
1905 Act, and even some later cases following that Act, did treat
willfulness or something like it as a prerequisite for a profits
award and rarely authorized profits for purely good-faith
infringement. See,
e.g., Horlick’s Malted Milk Corp. v.
Horluck’s, Inc., 51 F.2d 357, 359 (WD Wash. 1931)
(explaining that the plaintiff “cannot recover defendant’s profits
unless it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was guilty of willful fraud in the use of the enjoined
trade-name”); see also
Saxlehner v.
Siegel-Cooper
Co.,
179 U.S.
42, 42–43 (1900) (holding that one defendant “should not be
required to account for gains and profits” when it “appear[ed] to
have acted in good faith”). But Romag cites other cases that
expressly rejected any such rule. See,
e.g., Oakes v.
Tonsmierre, 49 F. 447, 453 (CC SD Ala. 1883); see also
Stonebraker v.
Stonebraker, 33 Md. 252, 268 (1870);
Lawrence-Williams Co. v.
Societe Enfants Gombault et
Cie, 52 F.2d 774, 778 (CA6 1931).
The confusion doesn’t end there. Other
authorities advanced still different understandings about the
relationship between
mens rea and profits awards in
trademark cases. See,
e.g., H. Nims, Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks §424 (2d ed. 1917) (“An accounting will
not be ordered where the infringing party acted innocently and in
ignorance of the plaintiff’s rights”); N. Hesseltine, Digest of the
Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Trade 305 (1906) (contrasting a case
holding “[n]o account as to profits allowed except as to user after
knowledge of plaintiff’s right to trademark” and one
permitting profits “although defendant did not know of
infringement” (emphasis added)). And the vast majority of the cases
both Romag and Fossil cite simply failed to speak clearly to the
issue one way or another. See,
e.g., Hostetter v.
Vowinkle, 12 F. Cas. 546, 547 (No. 6,714) (CC Neb. 1871);
Graham v.
Plate, 40 Cal. 593, 597–599 (1871);
Hemmeter Cigar Co. v.
Congress Cigar Co., 118 F.2d
64, 71–72 (CA6 1941).
At the end of it all, the most we can say with
certainty is this.
Mens rea figured as an important
consideration in awarding profits in pre-Lanham Act cases. This
reflects the ordinary, transsubstantive principle that a
defendant’s mental state is relevant to assigning an appropriate
remedy. That principle arises not only in equity, but across many
legal contexts. See,
e.g., Smith v.
Wade,
461 U.S.
30, 38–51 (1983) ( 42 U. S. C. §1983);
Morissette v.
United States,
342
U.S. 246, 250–263 (1952) (criminal law);
Wooden-Ware Co.
v.
United States,
106 U.S.
432, 434–435 (1882) (common law trespass). It’s a principle
reflected in the Lanham Act’s text, too, which permits greater
statutory damages for certain willful violations than for other
violations. 15 U. S. C. §1117(c). And it is a principle
long reflected in equity practice where district courts have often
considered a defendant’s mental state, among other factors, when
exercising their discretion in choosing a fitting remedy. See,
e.g., L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v.
Wm. Wrigley, Jr.,
Co.,
277 U.S.
97, 99–100 (1928);
Lander v.
Lujan, 888 F.2d 153,
155–156 (CADC 1989);
United States v.
Klimek,
952 F. Supp. 1100, 1117 (ED Pa. 1997). Given these traditional
principles, we do not doubt that a trademark defendant’s mental
state is a highly important consideration in determining whether an
award of profits is appropriate. But acknowledging that much is a
far cry from insisting on the inflexible precondition to recovery
Fossil advances.
With little to work with in the statute’s
language, structure, and history, Fossil ultimately rests on an
appeal to policy. The company tells us that stouter restraints on
profits awards are needed to deter “baseless” trademark suits.
Meanwhile, Romag insists that its reading of the statute will
promote greater respect for trademarks in the “modern global
economy.” As these things go,
amici amplify both sides’
policy arguments. Maybe, too, each side has a point. But the place
for reconciling competing and incommensurable policy goals like
these is before policymakers. This Court’s limited role is to read
and apply the law those policymakers have ordained, and here our
task is clear. The judgment of the court of appeals is vacated, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.