In order to give jurisdiction to this Court, under the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it must appear by the record
that one of the questions stated in the section did arise and was
decided in the state court, and it is not sufficient that it might
have arisen or been applicable; it must appear that it did arise,
and was applied.
This rule was established in the case of
Crowell v.
Randall, 10 Pet. 368, and has been since adhered
to.
Hence an allegation that
"the charge of the court, the verdict of the jury, and the
judgment below are each against, and in conflict with, the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore
erroneous,"
is too general and indefinite to come within the provisions of
the act of Congress or the decisions of this Court.
The clause in the Constitution and the law of Congress should
have been specified by the plaintiffs in error in the state court
in order that this Court might see what was the right claimed by
them and whether it was denied to them by the decision of the state
court.
The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the Court.
Page 59 U. S. 512
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The facts in the case, so far as they are material to the
decision of this Court, are as follows:
The steamboat
Globe was built in the State of Michigan,
and by the laws of that state the persons who furnish materials for
her construction had a lien upon her, and had a right to enforce
their claims by a proceeding
in rem against the vessel.
Before these claims were discharged, she was removed to Cleveland,
in the State of Ohio, where she received her machinery and was
fitted out, and for the debts thus incurred the Ohio creditors,
like those in Michigan, had a lien on the vessel and were
authorized to proceed against her by attachment and seizure.
Afterwards, when the steamboat was in the port of Cleveland, the
Ohio creditors obtained process against her and she was seized,
condemned, and sold according to the laws of that state to satisfy
these liens. A certain E. S. Sterling became the purchaser at this
sale, and afterwards sold her to Maxwell, one of the plaintiffs in
error.
After these proceedings, the steamboat returned to Michigan and
was there seized by virtue of the prior lien created by the laws of
that state, as above mentioned. The party at whose instance and for
whose benefit the proceeding was instituted under the Michigan lien
had filed his claim in the previous proceedings in Ohio, but was
permitted by the court to withdraw it without prejudice.
The plaintiffs in error, who were the owners or had an interest
in the steamboat, appeared in the Michigan court to defend her
against this claim. And the principal ground of defense appears to
have been that the sale in Ohio was not made subject to the prior
liens in Michigan; that it was an absolute and unconditional sale,
made by competent judicial authority and vested the property in the
purchaser, free and discharged from all previous liens and
encumbrances.
The record contains the pleadings, evidence, and admissions of
the parties in relation to these transactions, and the proceedings
in the state courts. But it is unnecessary to state them at large,
as the above summary is sufficient to show the matter in
controversy in the state courts, and how the questions raised in
the state courts were brought before them.
At the trial in the Circuit Court of Michigan, the
defendants
Page 59 U. S. 513
in error, who were plaintiffs in that court, prayed the court to
give the following instructions to the jury:
"1. That if the jury should find from the evidence adduced in
this cause that the steamboat
Globe, mentioned in the
declaration, has been constructed and built in this state and was
used in navigating the waters thereof, and that the debt, claim, or
demand, for which she was attached by the plaintiff has been
contracted in this state by the owners, joint owner, or agent
thereof on account of supplies furnished by said plaintiff for the
use of said boat or on account of work done or materials furnished
by said plaintiffs in or about the building, fitting, furnishing,
or equipping of said boat in said state, that then said plaintiff
acquired and had a lien on said boat for said debt, claim, or
demand, under and by virtue of the law of this state."
"2. That if the jury should be of the opinion from said evidence
that said claim or demand of said plaintiff constituted a lien on
said boat, which had been acquired as aforesaid, and that the
contracting parties were then citizens of this state, then that
such lien had not been displaced or affected by the legal
proceedings resorted to in the court of Ohio, exemplifications of
which were introduced in evidence by the defendants; that if any
title was acquired under the same or the laws of Ohio, such title
is subordinate to the lien acquired by the plaintiff in this state
by virtue of the laws thereof, that such proceedings do not
constitute a valid defense to this action, and that said boat, on
coming within the jurisdiction of this Court, was subject to be
attached for said claim."
And the plaintiffs in error asked for the following instructions
on their part:
"1. That the facts contained in the notice of defendants, and
which are admitted as true by the plaintiffs, constitute in law a
defense to the plaintiffs' action. 2. That the sale under the laws
of Ohio, if fair and
bona fide, constitutes a defense to a
purchaser under such laws to a prosecution by a creditor under the
laws of this state, such as the plaintiffs in this case have shown
themselves to be. 3. That defendant Maxwell's title is good against
the lien or claim of the plaintiff Wight in this cause, even if
that of Sterling was not. 4. That the filing of the plaintiff's
claim in the Ohio court precludes him from raising the objection
that such court had no jurisdiction of his rights so as to devest
his lien by a sale in that state. 5. That a lien under the statutes
of this state, though valid in its inception, cannot be enforced
against a purchaser in good faith under a sale under the laws of
the State of Ohio, so given in evidence."
Whereupon the court gave the instructions asked for by the
Page 59 U. S. 514
defendants in error and refused those requested by the
plaintiffs, who thereupon excepted to these opinions, and the
verdict and judgment in that court being against them, they removed
the case to the supreme court of the state and assigned there the
following errors, for which they prayed that the judgment of the
circuit court might be reversed:
"1. The court erred in charging the jury, as requested by the
plaintiffs below, and upon the points and to the effect stated more
fully in the bill of exceptions filed herein, and to which
reference is hereby had."
"2. The court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested
by the defendants below, upon the points and to the effect stated
in the bill of exceptions filed herein, and to which, for fuller
particularity, reference is hereby had."
"3. The charge of the court, the verdict of the jury, and the
judgment below are each against and in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore
erroneous."
"4. By the record aforesaid, it appears that the judgment was
given against the plaintiffs in error, whereas, by the law of the
land, the said judgment should have been in favor of the plaintiffs
in error and against the defendants in error."
But the supreme court, it appears, concurred in opinion with the
circuit court, and affirmed its judgment, and the plaintiffs in
error have now brought the case before this Court by writ of error,
and have assigned here the following errors:
"1. By the record aforesaid it appears that judgment was given
against the plaintiffs in error, whereas, by the law of the land
and under the evidence appearing in the bill of exceptions, the
judgment should have been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in
error."
"2. There was drawn in question in this suit, as appears by the
said record, a statute of the United States, and the decision and
judgment of the said supreme court of the State of Michigan was
against the validity of such statute."
"3. The said Supreme Court of the State of Michigan erred in
deciding that the said proceedings, judgment, and sale had in the
State of Ohio was not a bar to the claim prosecuted in this
suit."
"4. The said supreme court erred in that it did not give to the
said records of judicial proceedings and sale of the steamboat
Globe, had in the State of Ohio, the same faith and credit
as they have by law in the said State of Ohio."
Upon these proceedings, as they appear in the record before us,
the first question to be considered is whether any point appears to
have been decided in the supreme court of the state which will
authorize this Court to affirm or reverse its judgment
Page 59 U. S. 515
under the 25th section of the act of Congress of 1789. The error
alleged here is that it did not give to the records of the judicial
proceedings and sale of the steamboat, had in Ohio, the same faith
and credit that they have by law in that state. But to bring that
question for decision in this Court, it is not sufficient to raise
the objection here and to show that it was involved in the
controversy in the state court and might and ought to have been
considered by it when making its decision. It must appear on the
face of the record that it was in fact raised, that the judicial
mind of the court was exercised upon it, and their decision against
the right claimed under it.
It is true that in some of the earlier cases, when writs of
error to state courts were comparatively new in this Court, a
broader and more comprehensive rule was sometimes recognized. And
in the case of
Miller v.
Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, it was said to be
sufficient to give jurisdiction that an act of Congress was
applicable to the case. But experience showed that this rule was
not a safe one and that it might sometimes happen that although in
one view of the subject an act of Congress or a clause of the
Constitution might be applicable to a case, yet the state court,
upon a different view of the case, might have decided upon
principles of state law altogether independent of any provision in
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and in nowise in
conflict with either. And if this Court reversed the judgment upon
the assumption that a right claimed under the Constitution or laws
of the United States and to which the party was entitled had been
denied to him, the reversal would sometimes be for a supposed error
which the state court had not committed and upon a point which the
state court had not decided. Other cases might be referred to in
which expressions are used in the opinion of the Court that might
seem in some measure to sanction the doctrine in
Miller v.
Nicholls, but the general current of the decisions from the
earliest period of the Court will be found to maintain the rule
which we have hereinbefore stated. And as this want of harmony in
the decisions and language of the court was calculated to mislead
and embarrass counsel in the prosecution of writs of error to state
courts, this Court, at the January term of 1836, when the subject
was again brought before it in the case of
Crowell v.
Randall, 10 Pet. 368, determined to give the
subject a careful and deliberate examination in order to remove any
doubts which might have arisen from previous decisions.
Accordingly, all of the preceding cases are reviewed and commented
on in the opinion delivered by the Court in that case, and the
doctrine clearly announced that in order to give jurisdiction to
this Court, it must appear by the record that one of
Page 59 U. S. 516
the questions stated in the 25th section of the act of 1789 did
arise and was decided in the state court, and that it was not
sufficient that it might have arisen or been applicable -- it must
appear that it did arise and was applied. This rule has been
uniformly adhered to since the decision of that case. We think it
the true one and the only one consistent with the spirit and
language of the section referred to, which so carefully and plainly
limits the authority which it confers upon this Court over the
judgments of state tribunals.
Applying this principle to the case before us, the writ of error
cannot be maintained. The questions raised and decided in the state
circuit court point altogether for their solution to the laws of
the state, and make no reference whatever to the Constitution or
laws of the United States. Undoubtedly this did not preclude the
plaintiffs in error from raising the point in the supreme court of
the state if it was involved in the case as presented to that
court. And whether a writ of error from this Court will lie or not
depends upon the questions raised and decided in that court. But
neither of the questions made there by the errors assigned refers
in any manner to the Constitution or laws of the United States
except the third, and the language of that is too general and
indefinite to come within the provisions of the act of Congress or
the decisions of this Court. It alleges that the charge of the
court was against and in conflict with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. But what right did he claim under the
Constitution of the United States which was denied him by the state
court? Under what clause of the Constitution did he make his claim?
And what right did he claim under an act of Congress? And under
what act in the wide range of our statutes did he claim it? The
record does not show -- nor can this Court undertake to determine
that the question as to the faith and credit due to the record and
judicial proceedings in Ohio was made or determined in the state
court, or that that court ever gave any opinion on the question.
For aught that appears in the record, some other clause in the
Constitution or some law of Congress may have been relied on, and
the mind of the court never called to the clause of the
Constitution now assigned as error in this Court.
This case cannot be distinguished from the case of
Lawler v.
Walker, 14 How. 149. In that case, the state court
certified that there was drawn in question the validity of statutes
of the State of Ohio &c., without saying what statutes. And in
the opinion of this Court dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction, it said:
"The statutes complained of in this case should have been
stated; without that, the court cannot apply them to the subject
matter of litigation to determine whether or
Page 59 U. S. 517
not they violated the Constitution of the United States."
So in the case before us, the clause in the Constitution and the
law of Congress should have been specified by the plaintiffs in
error in the state court, in order that this Court might see what
was the right claimed by them, and whether it was denied to them by
the decision of the state court.
Upon these grounds, we think this writ of error cannot be
maintained, and therefore
Dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.