Crowell v. Randell
Annotate this Case
35 U.S. 368 (1836)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. 10 Pet. 368 368 (1836)
Crowell v. Randell
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368
The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1780 confers appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court from final judgments and decrees in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had in three classes of cases: first, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States and the decision is against their validity; secondly, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any state on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States and the decision is in favor of such, their validity; thirdly, where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution or of a treaty or statute of or commission held under the United States and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission. The section then goes on to provide that no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid than such as appears upon the face of the record and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.
In the interpretation of this section of the act of 1789, it has been uniformly held that to give this Court appellate jurisdiction, two things should have occurred and be apparent in the record: first that someone of the questions stated in the section did arise in the court below, and secondly that a decision was actually made thereon by the same court in the manner required by the section. If both of these do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction fails. It is not sufficient to show that such a question might have occurred, or such a decision might have been made in the court below. It must be demonstrable that they did exist, and were made.
It has been decided that it is not indispensable that it should appear on the record in totidem verbis or by direct add positive statement, that the question was made and the decision given by the court below on the very point, but that it is sufficient if it is clear from the facts stated, by just and necessary inference, that the question was made and that the court below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to the very decision of that question as indispensable to that judgment.
A review of the cases of Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch 344, 2 Cond. 275; Smith v. State of Maryland, 6 Cranch 281, 2 Cond. 377; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 3 Cond. 575; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363, 4 Cond. 155; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 17 U. S. 315, 4 Cond. 465; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 25 U. S. 124, 6 Cond. 462; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Association, 2 Pet. 245, 27 U. S. 250; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292, 28 U. S. 302; Craig v. State of Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Fisher v. Cockerel, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 224.
In order to bring a case for a writ of error or an appeal to the Supreme Court from a court of the highest jurisdiction of any of the states within the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it must appear on the face of the record 1st, that some one of the questions stated in that section did arise in the state court; 2d, that the question was decided by the state court, as required in the same section; 3d, that it is not necessary that the question should appear on the record to have been raised, and the decision made in direct and positive terms, ipsissimis verbis, but that it is sufficient if it appears by clear and necessary intendment that the question must have been raised and must have been decided in order to have induced the judgments; 4th, that it is not sufficient to show that a question might have arisen or been applicable to the case unless it is farther shown on the record that it did arise and was applied by the state court to the case.
In 1829, John Randell, Junior, the defendant in error, instituted an action of covenant against the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, on certain articles of agreement entered into between him and the defendants relative to the making of a canal to unite the waters of the River Delaware with those of the Chesapeake Bay, and to pass through the States of Delaware and Maryland. The Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company were incorporated by laws passed by the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland, and the board of directors of the company was established in the City of Philadelphia.
The declaration alleged sundry breaches of covenant on the part of the defendants, and after various pleadings and demurrers, and issues of fact, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on some of the demurrers, and an inquisition of damages awarded. The parties went to trial on some of the issues of fact, which were found for the plaintiff, and on 26 January, 1834, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $229,535.79, upon which a judgment was entered by the court.
Upon this judgment, the plaintiff, on 6 June, 1834, issued a writ of attachment, under the laws of the State of Delaware, for the collection of part of the amount of the same, and of the costs, which was served on Thomas P. Crowell as the garnishee of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company. The same proceedings took place in the case of Richard Shoemaker.
The defendants respectively appeared, and pleaded that they had
no goods or effects, rights or credits of the company in their hands at the time of the attachments, or at any time after. The cases came on for trial on these pleas and issues, according to the laws of Delaware, and the parties agreed to a statement of facts.
In the suit against Thomas P. Crowell, the agreed facts were as follows:
"John Randell, Jr., recovered a verdict of a jury in the said court against the said company, on 25 January, 1834, and then and there obtained judgment in the said court against the said company for damages and costs of suit, amounting together to the sum of $229,535.79. The pleadings, record and proceedings in the said suit, from the declaration to the judgment inclusive, are referred to, and form a part of this case."
"A writ of attachment was issued upon said judgment for the collection of the damages and costs aforesaid, on 6 June, A.D. 1834, returnable to the November term of the same year. The said writ was served upon the said Thomas P. Crowell in the county aforesaid at the Delaware tide lock, who was summoned by the Sheriff of Newcastle County as garnishee of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, on 15 June, 1834. At the same time, the said Thomas P. Crowell was arrested by virtue of the above mentioned capias, being No. 34 to November term of said court, A.D. 1834, at which time and place the said defendant (the said Thomas P. Crowell, to-wit) having appeared and given bail, and being put to plead at the election of the said plaintiff under the said act of assembly, pleaded that he had no goods, chattels, rights, credits or effects of the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company in his hands, custody, or possession at the time of the attachment laid or at any time after. On this plea the plaintiff hath joined issue, and this is the question now submitted to the court for its decision."
"On 28 January, A.D. 1834, a resolution was passed by the board of directors of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company in the following words -- that is to say: "
"Resolved, that hereafter no tolls be collected on the line of the canal on any vessel, cargo or other article passing through the canal, until the said vessel, cargo or other article on which the said tolls may be levied or charged, shall have entered the basin at the western end of the canal, excepting only such vessels, cargo or other article as may not pass through the canal to the said basin. "
"This resolution has never been printed by the said company, nor hath any notice whatever thereof been given to the said John Randell, Jr., until this time. It is admitted that the said resolution was adopted for the purpose of preventing the said John Randell, Jr., from attaching the tolls of the said company by virtue of the said judgment, or otherwise availing himself of the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Delaware, for the collection of his said judgment."
"The defendant at the time of the service of the said writ of attachment and capias upon him was, hath ever since been, and still continues to be the master of the schooner Hiram, the said schooner being in his hands and possession during that time as the master of the same, and owner of the said schooner. The said vessel passed through the Chesapeake & Delaware canal, with a cargo from Philadelphia to Richmond, on 16 June, A.D. 1834. The amount of tolls on the several cargoes of the said schooner demanded for passage through the said canal between 16 June, and the return day of the said writ, was $96.28 cents, lawful money of the United States of America, and was paid in the City of Philadelphia, to S. Griffiths Fisher, an officer appointed by the said president and directors of the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, to receive and collect tolls at their office in the City of Philadelphia, by a certain Joseph Hand, the freighter of the said schooner; after service of said attachment and capias, and after the said vessel had passed through the canal as aforesaid, but before the return of the said writs."
"The said attachment and capias were served upon the said defendant in Newcastle county, at the time of his offering to pass through the said canal at the Delaware tide lock, with the said vessel and cargo, and previous to the vessel passing through the same, to-wit, on 15 June, A.D. 1834. The said tide lock was, when the said canal was opened for navigation on 17 October, A.D. 1829, established by the president and directors of the said company, as a place for the receipt of tolls in the said canal; and a collector of tolls has always been appointed to reside at that place; and a certain John Willson was, at the time of issuing said attachment, and has ever since been such collector at said tide lock."
"The printed paper hereunto annexed, marked with the letter A,
is a true copy of the regulations to be observed by vessels navigating the Chesapeake & Delaware canal, adopted by the board of directors of the said company, with the rates of toll for navigating the said canal, the same having been signed by the president and secretary of the said company, and published by order of the president and directors thereof, and it is agreed shall be taken as a part of the case, except so far as they had been altered by the resolution of 28 January above set forth."
[The material regulations in the paper A, established 4 February, 1833, were the following:
1. No vessel shall enter the canal without first coming to anchor or making fast to the piers at least one hundred feet from the outer locks.
2. Masters of vessels shall, before entering the first lock, present to the collector a manifest of cargo, so arranged as to enable him readily to calculate their tolls. And in order to guard against frauds, the collectors are authorized to require the cargo to be landed for examination, if they shall see cause to suspect the correctness of the manifest.
5. The tolls shall always be paid at the first lock passed by a vessel, and upon payment thereof, the master shall receive a pass bill, on which shall be noted the amount of tolls paid, and the precise time of entering.
7. If any vessel shall pass through the canal without fully and honestly paying the prescribed tolls, either of the collectors is authorized by law
"to seize such vessel, wherever found, and sell the same at auction for ready money; which, so far as is necessary, shall be applied towards paying said tolls, and all expenses of seizure and sale."
And to enforce the penalties.
21. The officers and agents of the company are fully authorized by law to enforce obedience to the foregoing regulations; and they are required so to do.
22. No person is allowed to interfere with the agents or officers of the company in the performance of their duties on the canal. Should reasonable ground of complaint occur against such officers or agents, either by unnecessary delays or improper conduct, it will be immediately redressed, on information being lodged at either of the offices of the company.]
"It is further agreed, that the sloop Robert and James, the defendant being then and there the master, and having the direction
thereof, passed through the Chesapeake & Delaware canal with a cargo from Port Deposit to Philadelphia, on 18 June, 1834, and three several times afterwards, to-wit, on 26 June, 1834, on 16 October, 1834, and on 5 November, 1834, between that day and the return day of the said writ of attachment. Copies of the pass bills given to the said defendant on these occasions, were annexed."
"The amount of tolls on the several cargoes of the said sloop, demanded for passage through the said canal by the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company at their lock at the western end of the canal in the State of Maryland and there paid by the said Thomas P. Crowell, master of the said sloop, between the said 18 June and the return day of said writ, was $74.44 cents lawful money of the United States of America."
"The acts of the Legislatures of Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania relative to the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, and the several supplements thereto are referred to, and made part of this statement of facts."
"It is agreed that in many cases since the resolution of 28 January, 1834, above set forth, tolls for the passage of vessels and their cargoes through the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, from the eastern end of said canal, in the State of Delaware, to the western end thereof, in the State of Maryland, were received by some agent appointed by the president and directors of the said company, at their office, in the City of Philadelphia, and were paid by the owners or captains, or by the agents of said owners or captains, to the officers or agents of said president and directors of said company at said office."
"It is further agreed, that independently of the tolls so attached, and all other tolls of the said company attached by the said John Randell, Jr., a sufficient amount of tolls was always left in their hands, not attached, to repair and keep in order the said canal, their locks, and other works necessary thereto, and to keep the same navigable; also to defray the expenses of the collection of tolls, including the salaries of all their officers."
"It is further agreed, that the said canal, the construction of which was commenced on 15 April, 1824, was completed and open for navigation on 17 October, 1829."
"It also further agreed that previous to the rendition of the judgment above named, obtained by John Randell, Jr., against the said
canal company, that the tolls were collected in the canal at the respective toll houses located at Delaware city and Chesapeake City, from the captains and masters of vessels passing through the said canal, but the counsel for the said defendant protests that said captains and masters were not personally liable to the said company for the said tolls so paid by them. If upon the foregoing statement of facts the court shall be of the opinion that John Randell, Jr., the above named plaintiff, is entitled to judgment against the defendant as garnishee of the said the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, upon the plea of nulla bona, then judgment to be rendered for the said plaintiff for the sum of $96.28, and if the court should be of the opinion that the said John Randell, Jr., is not entitled to judgment against the said defendant, on the aforesaid statement of facts, the judgment to be entered for the said defendant."
The following extracts from the laws of Maryland and Delaware were made part of the case:
Extract from Delaware law, passed February, 1832.
"Be it enacted, that in case any master, shipper or agent shall fraudulently present to the collector of tolls, or other agent of the canal company, a false manifest or account of cargo of any vessel or boat about passing through the canal, or give a false statement of the tolls thereon, or otherwise attempt to defraud in the said tolls, on conviction thereof before any justice of the peace for Newcastle County, he or they so convicted, after paying to the canal company the toll due, and the cost of ascertaining the same, shall forfeit and pay double the amount of tolls so charged, on which the fraud had been attempted; one moiety of said forfeiture shall inure to the person giving information and prosecuting the offense to conviction, the other moiety to inure to the State of Delaware."
Extract from Maryland law, passed December, 1831.
"Be it enacted, &c., that if any master or agent of any vessel or boat shall fraudulently present to the collector of tolls, or any other agent of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, a false manifest or account of cargo of any vessel or boat about passing through the canal, or give a false statement of the toll thereon, or otherwise attempt to defraud in the said tolls, on conviction thereof before any justice of the peace of this state, he shall incur the penalty of twenty dollars, to be recovered before some justice of the peace as small debts are recovered, one-half to the informer giving information
and prosecuting the offender to conviction, and the other half to the state."
On this agreed statement the case was certified to the court of errors and appeals for argument and decision; and in October, 1835, the court decided that the defendant had goods and chattels, effects and credits, &c., of the company in his hands, at the time of the attachment laid in his hands, and before the return thereof, amounting to $95, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
The record and proceedings were remanded to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, and the defendants prosecuted this writ of error.
The case of Richard Shoemaker differs from that of Thomas P. Crowell only in this, that in his case it was necessary for the court to decide, in order to render judgment for the plaintiff, that the voluntary payment of toll by the master of a vessel to a person appointed by the directors of the company to receive said toll in Philadelphia was, under the facts stated in this case, a fraud on the attachment laws of the State of Delaware and on the jurisdiction of its courts; and especially fraudulent, and therefore void, as against a judgment creditor of the company seeking satisfaction of his debt in that state, according to the attachment laws thereof, and the court so decided.