SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 18–15
_________________
james l. kisor, PETITIONER
v. ROBERT
WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit
[June 26, 2019]
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas
joins, with whom Justice Kavanaugh joins as to Parts I, II, III,
IV, and V, and with whom Justice Alito joins as to Parts I, II, and
III, concurring in the judgment.
It should have been easy for the Court to say
goodbye to
Auer v.
Robbins.[
1] In disputes involving the relationship between the
government and the people,
Auer requires judges to accept an
executive agency’s interpretation of its own regulations even when
that interpretation doesn’t represent the best and fairest reading.
This rule creates a “systematic judicial bias in favor of the
federal government, the most powerful of parties, and against
everyone else.”[
2] Nor is
Auer’s biased rule the product of some congressional mandate
we are powerless to correct: This Court invented it, almost by
accident and without any meaningful effort to reconcile it with the
Administrative Procedure Act or the Constitution. A legion of
academics, lower court judges, and Members of this Court—even
Auer’s author—has called on us to abandon
Auer. Yet
today a bare majority flinches, and
Auer lives on.
Still, today’s decision is more a stay of
execution than a pardon. The Court cannot muster even five votes to
say that
Auer is lawful or wise. Instead, a majority retains
Auer only because of
stare decisis. And yet, far from
standing by that precedent, the majority proceeds to impose so many
new and nebulous qualifications and limitations on
Auer that
The Chief Justice claims to see little practical difference between
keeping it on life support in this way and overruling it entirely.
So the doctrine emerges maimed and enfeebled—in truth,
zombified.
Respectfully, we owe our colleagues on the lower
courts more candid and useful guidance than this. And judges owe
the people who come before them nothing less than a fair contest,
where every party has an equal chance to persuade the court of its
interpretation of the law’s demands. One can hope that The Chief
Justice is right, and that whether we formally overrule
Auer
or merely neuter it, the results in most cases will prove the same.
But means, not just ends, matter, and retaining even this
debilitated version of
Auer threatens to force litigants and
lower courts to jump through needless and perplexing new hoops and
in the process deny the people the independent judicial decisions
they deserve. All to what end? So that we may
pretend to
abide
stare decisis?
Consider this case. Mr. Kisor is a Marine who
lost out on benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder when the
court of appeals deferred to a regulatory interpretation advanced
by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The court of appeals was
guilty of nothing more than faithfully following
Auer. But
the majority today invokes
stare decisis, of all things, to
vacate that judgment and tell the court of appeals to try again
using its newly retooled, multi-factored, and far less determinate
version of
Auer. Respectfully, I would stop this business of
making up excuses for judges to abdicate their job of interpreting
the law, and simply allow the court of appeals to afford Mr. Kisor
its best independent judgment of the law’s meaning.
The Court’s failure to be done with
Auer,
and its decision to adorn
Auer with so many new and
ambiguous limitations, all but guarantees we will have to pass this
way again. When that day comes, I hope this Court will find the
nerve it lacks today and inter
Auer at last. Until then, I
hope that our judicial colleagues on other courts will take courage
from today’s ruling and realize that it has transformed
Auer
into a paper tiger.
I. How We Got Here
Where did
Auer come from? Not from the
Constitution, some ancient common law tradition, or even a modern
statute. Instead, it began as an unexplained aside in a decision
about emergency price controls at the height of the Second World
War. Even then, the dictum sat on the shelf, little noticed, for
years. Only in the last few decades of the 20th century did lawyers
and courts really begin to dust it off and shape it into the
reflexive rule of deference to regulatory agencies we know today.
And they did so without ever pausing to consider whether a rule
like that could be legally justified or even made sense.
Auer is really little more than an accident.
A
Before the mid-20th century, few federal
agencies engaged in extensive rulemaking, and those that did rarely
sought deference for their regulatory interpretations.[
3] But when the question arose, this
Court did not hesitate to say that judges reviewing administrative
action should decide all questions of law, including questions
concerning the meaning of regulations. As Justice Brandeis put it,
“[t]he inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures is
. . . that there will be opportunity for a court to
determine whether the applicable rules of law . . . were
observed.”[
4] Unsurprisingly,
the government’s early, longstanding, and consistent interpretation
of a statute, regulation, or other legal instrument could count as
powerful
evidence of its original public meaning.[
5] But courts respected executive
interpretations only because and to the extent “they embodied
understandings made roughly contemporaneously with . . .
enactment and stably maintained and practiced since that time,” not
“because they were executive as such.”[
6]
Writing for four Members of the Court, Justice
Kagan suggests that
Auer’s very different approach to the
interpretation of agency regulations was foreshadowed as early as
this Court’s 1898 decision in
United States v.
Eaton.[
7]
Ante,
at 7. But this is mistaken. The question in that case was whether
Mr. Eaton’s appointment as temporary vice-consul to Siam was
consistent with State Department regulations. After several pages
of careful and independent legal analysis, the Court held that the
regulations did authorize the appointment. That conclusion, the
Court explained, was “rendered necessary by a consideration of the
text.”[
8] Only
after
reaching this conclusion did the Court observe that the State
Department had previously adopted the same construction, noting
along the way that the Department’s views were “entitled to the
greatest weight” and that the Court saw “no reason in this case to
doubt [their] correctness.”[
9]
Eaton thus simply followed the well-worn path of
acknowledging that an agency’s interpretation of a regulation can
supply
evidence of its meaning.[
10] Nowhere did the Court even hint that it would have
deferred to the State Department’s views about the meaning of the
law if its own independent textual analysis had not led it to the
same conclusion.
All this is borne out by the Court’s later
teachings in
Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. in
1944.[
11] The question there
was whether the time overnight employees spent waiting to respond
to fire alarms could amount to compensable overtime under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The lower courts had held as a matter of law
that it could not. In an opinion by Justice Jackson, this Court
reversed. The Court first held, based on its own independent
analysis, that “no principle of law found either in the statute or
in Court decisions precludes waiting time from also being working
time.”[
12] Only then did the
Court consider “what, if any, deference courts should pay” to the
views of the Administrator of the Labor Department’s Wage and Hour
Division.[
13] And on that
question the Court reaffirmed the traditional rule that an agency’s
interpretation of the law is “not controlling upon the courts” and
is entitled only to a weight proportional to “the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade.”[
14] At the time, the influential administrative law
scholar Kenneth Culp Davis considered this “[a]n entirely reliable
statement” of the law.[
15]
B
In truth, the seeds of the
Auer
doctrine were first planted only in 1945, in
Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.[
16] That case involved regulations issued by the Office
of Price Administration (OPA), which Congress had tasked with
stabilizing the national economy during the Second World War
through the use of emergency price controls. It was in that context
that the Court declared—for the first time and without citing any
authority—that “if the meaning of [the regulation were] in doubt,”
the agency’s interpretation would merit “controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”[
17]
Yet even then it was far from clear how much
weight the Court really placed on the agency’s interpretation. As
it had in
Eaton, the Court in
Seminole Rock began
with an extended discussion of “the plain words of the regulation,”
which led it to conclude that the text “clearly” supported the
government’s position.[
18]
Only after reaching that conclusion based on its own independent
analysis did the Court proceed to add that “[a]ny doubts
. . . are removed by reference to the administrative
construction.”[
19]
So confused was all this that readers at the
time didn’t perceive
Seminole Rock’s dictum as changing
anything. Professor Davis observed that the Court’s discussion
about giving “controlling weight” to the agency’s interpretation
was an unexplained aside that made no difference to the case’s
outcome.[
20] The dictum,
too, was readily explained as reflecting the unusual factual
context in which the case arose, involving an emergency government
program created to deal with “unique circumstances of war and
economic depression.”[
21]
And the Court decided
Seminole Rock the same Term it issued
Skidmore, where it reaffirmed the traditional rule that an
agency’s views about the law may
persuade a court but can
never
control its judgment. In fact, the Court in
Seminole Rock was careful to note that the OPA
interpretation before it bore many of the characteristics
Skidmore would have recognized as increasing its persuasive
force: It had been announced concurrently with the regulation,
disseminated widely to the regulated community, and adhered to
consistently by the agency.[
22]
No wonder, then, that for many years after the
decision, courts “connected
Seminole Rock more closely with
the deference framework . . . under
Skidmore” and
generally engaged in a
Skidmore-type analysis, accepting the
agency’s interpretation “only after independently examining the
regulation and concluding that the agency interpretation was
sound.”[
23] If
Seminole
Rock’s “controlling weight” dictum was afforded any force, it
was usually only in the price control context; even then it was
ordinarily extended only to “official” agency interpretations that
were published contemporaneously with the regulation and widely
distributed.[
24] The Fourth
Circuit exemplified the early understanding of
Seminole Rock
when it observed—citing both
Seminole Rock and
Skidmore—that “under settled principles” an official agency
interpretation in an opinion letter was entitled only to
“respectful consideration.”[
25] The letter, the court stressed, did not “have the
effect of law,” and “[i]t would be absurd to hold that the courts
must subordinate their judgment as to the meaning of a
. . . regulation to the mere unsupported opinion of an
associate counsel in an administrative department.”[
26]
C
This Court did not cite
Seminole Rock’s
“controlling weight” dictum again until 1965, in
Udall v.
Tallman.[
27] And
though
Tallman “did very little to advance the
jurisprudential understanding of
Seminole Rock,” it
certainly helped fuel the expansion of so-called “
Seminole
Rock deference.”[
28]
From the 1960s on, this Court and lower courts began to cite the
Seminole Rock dictum with increasing frequency and in a
wider variety of circumstances, but still without much explanation.
They also increasingly divorced
Seminole Rock from
Skidmore.[
29]
Auer represents the apotheosis of this
line of cases. In the name of what some now call the
Auer
doctrine, courts have in recent years “mechanically applied and
reflexively treated”
Seminole Rock’s dictum “as a constraint
upon the careful inquiry that one might ordinarily expect of courts
engaged in textual analysis.”[
30] Under
Auer, judges are forced to subordinate
their own views about what the law means to those of a political
actor, one who may even be a party to the litigation before the
court. After all, if the court agrees that the agency’s reading is
the best one,
Auer does no real work; the doctrine matters
only when a court would conclude that the agency’s interpretation
is
not the best or fairest reading of the regulation.
To be sure, Justice Kagan paints a very
different picture of
Auer, asking us to imagine it riding to
the rescue only in cases where the scales of justice are evenly
balanced between two equally persuasive readings. But that’s a
fantasy: “If nature knows of such equipoise in legal arguments, the
courts at least do not.”[
31]
In the real world the judge uses his traditional interpretive
toolkit, full of canons and tiebreaking rules, to reach a decision
about the best and fairest reading of the law. Of course, there are
close cases and reasonable judges will sometimes disagree. But
every day, in courts throughout this country, judges manage with
these traditional tools to reach conclusions about the meaning of
statutes, rules of procedure, contracts, and the Constitution. Yet
when it comes to interpreting federal regulations,
Auer
displaces this process and requires judges instead to treat the
agency’s interpretation as controlling even when it is “not
. . . the best one.”[
32]
If that were not troubling enough,
Auer
has also become “a doctrine of uncertain scope and
application.”[
33] This Court
has never offered meaningful guidance on how to decide whether the
agency’s reading is “reasonable” enough to demand judicial
deference—and lower courts have drawn that line in wildly different
places.[
34] Deepening the
confusion, this Court and lower courts have, over time, tried to
soften
Auer’s rigidity by declaring that it “might” not
apply in some ill-defined circumstances, such as when the agency’s
interpretation “conflicts with a prior interpretation” or reflects
a “convenient litigating position” or a “
post hoc
rationalization” for past agency action.[
35] All this has resulted in “widespread confusion”
about when and how to apply
Auer deference.[
36]
In light of
Auer’s many problems, it
should come as no surprise that several Members of this
Court,[
37] along with a
great many lower court judges[
38] and members of the legal academy,[
39] have questioned
Auer’s validity
and pleaded with this Court to reconsider it.
D
That’s where things stood when James Kisor
asked the Department of Veterans Affairs to reopen his disability
benefits claim. Mr. Kisor served as a United States Marine from
1962 through 1966 and saw combat in Vietnam. In the early 1980s, a
VA counselor observed that Mr. Kisor was battling depression and
suicidal thoughts and suggested he might be suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder. In light of this, Mr. Kisor filed a
claim for disability benefits in 1982. But, in the end, the VA
denied the claim.
In 2006, Mr. Kisor sought to reopen the matter.
In connection with that request, he presented new evidence,
including a psychiatrist’s report diagnosing him with PTSD and
additional records documenting his service in Vietnam. The VA
reopened Mr. Kisor’s claim and granted him disability benefits
effective June 5, 2006, the date he had submitted his new request.
Mr. Kisor argued that a VA regulation entitled him to an earlier
effective date for disability benefits, one tracing back to his
original submission in 1982. But the Board of Veterans Appeals
concluded that the applicable regulation didn’t authorize that
relief.
Mr. Kisor appealed the Board’s ruling all the
way to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board had
misinterpreted the relevant regulation. The Federal Circuit
affirmed. Relying on the
Auer doctrine, the court held that
it had no choice but to treat the Board’s interpretation as
“ ‘controlling’ ” unless that interpretation was
“ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulatio[n].’ ”[
40]
Without even trying to determine who had the better reading of the
regulation, the Board or Mr. Kisor, the court declared that “[t]he
Board’s interpretation does not strike us as either plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory
framework.”[
41] Case
closed.
Mr. Kisor sought and was denied rehearing en
banc. Three judges dissented and joined those who have questioned
“the logic behind continued adherence to the [
Auer]
doctrine”; they argued that, without
Auer deference, Mr.
Kisor’s reading of the regulation would likely prevail.[
42] Mr. Kisor then asked us to grant
certiorari to reconsider
Auer. Thinking it past time to do
so, we granted the petition.[
43]
II. The Administrative Procedure Act
When this Court speaks about the rules
governing judicial review of federal agency action, we are not (or
shouldn’t be) writing on a blank slate or exercising some
common-law-making power. We are supposed to be applying the
Administrative Procedure Act. The APA is a “seminal” statute that
Congress wrote to define the relationship between courts and
agencies.[
44] Some have even
described it as a kind of constitution for our “administrative
state.” Yet, remarkably, until today this Court has never made any
serious effort to square the
Auer doctrine with the APA.
Even now, only four Justices make the attempt. And for at least two
reasons, their arguments are wholly unpersuasive.
A
The first problem lies in §706. That provision
instructs reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of
law” and “set aside agency action . . . found to be
. . . not in accordance with law.”[
45] Determining the meaning of a statute or
regulation, of course, presents a classic legal question. But in
case these directives were not clear enough, the APA further
directs courts to “determine the meaning” of any relevant “agency
action,” including any rule issued by the agency.[
46] The APA thus requires a reviewing court
to resolve for itself any dispute over the proper interpretation of
an agency regulation. A court that, in deference to an agency,
adopts something other than the best reading of a regulation isn’t
“decid[ing]” the relevant “questio[n] of law” or “determin[ing] the
meaning” of the regulation. Instead, it’s allowing the agency to
dictate the answer to that question. In doing so, the court is
abdicating the duty Congress assigned to it in the APA.[
47]
Justice Kagan seeks to address the glaring
inconsistency between our judge-made rule and the controlling
statute this way. On her account, the APA tells a reviewing court
to “determine the meaning” of regulations, but it does not tell the
court “
how” to do that. Thus, we are told, reading the
regulation for itself and deferring to the agency’s reading are
just two equally valid ways for a court to fulfill its statutory
duty to “determine the meaning” of the regulation.
Ante, at
20–21.
But the APA isn’t as anemic as that. Its
unqualified command requires the court to determine legal
questions—including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its
own lights, not by those of political appointees or bureaucrats who
may even be self-interested litigants in the case at hand. Nor can
there be any doubt that, when Congress wrote the APA, it knew
perfectly well how to require judicial deference to an agency when
it wished—in fact, Congress repeatedly specified deferential
standards for judicial review
elsewhere in the
statute.[
48] But when it
comes to the business of interpreting regulations, no such command
exists; instead, Congress told courts to “determine” those matters
for themselves. Though one hardly needs to be an academic to
recognize the point, “commentators in administrative law have
‘generally acknowledged’ that Section 706 seems to require
de novo review on questions of law.”[
49]
What the statutory language suggests, experience
confirms. If
Auer deference were really just another way for
courts to “determine the meaning” of regulations under §706, you
might expect that a final judicial “determination” would at least
settle, as a matter of precedent, the question of what the
regulation “means.” Of course, even after one court has spoken on a
regulation’s meaning, that court or another might properly give
weight to a new agency interpretation as part of the court’s own
decision-making process. See
supra, at 6. But in light of
National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v.
Brand X
Internet Services,[
50]
courts have interpreted
Auer as forbidding a court from ever
“determin[ing] the meaning” of a regulation with the force that
normally attaches to precedent, because an agency is always free to
adopt a different view and insist on judicial deference to its new
judgment.[
51] And if an
agency can not only control the court’s initial decision but also
revoke that decision at any time, how can anyone honestly say the
court, rather than the agency, ever really “determine[s]” what the
regulation means?
To test the point further, consider a statute
that tells a court to “determin[e]” an appropriate sentence in a
criminal case.[
52] If the
judge said he was sending a defendant to prison for longer than he
believed appropriate only in deference to the government’s
“reasonable” sentencing recommendation, would anyone really think
that complied with the law? Or take a statute that instructs a
court to “determine” whether a consent judgment proposed by the
government in a civil antitrust case “is in the public
interest.”[
53] If a court
thought the proposed judgment harmful to the public but decided to
defer to the government’s “reasonable” contrary view anyway, would
anyone suggest the court had complied with Congress’s
instruction?
Nor does Justice Kagan’s reading of §706 offer
any logical stopping point. If courts can “determine the meaning”
of a regulation by deferring to any “reasonable” agency reading,
then why not by deferring to
any agency reading? If it were
really true that the APA has nothing to say about
how courts
decide what regulations mean, then it would follow that the APA
tolerates a rule that “the agency is always right.” And if you find
yourself in a place as absurd as that, you might want to consider
whether you’ve taken a wrong turn along the way.
B
The problems don’t end there.
Auer is
also incompatible with the APA’s instructions in §553. That
provision requires agencies to follow notice-and-comment procedures
when issuing or amending legally binding regulations (what the APA
calls “substantive rules”), but not when offering mere
interpretations of those regulations.[
54] An agency wishing to adopt or amend a binding
regulation thus must publish a proposal in the Federal Register,
give interested members of the public an opportunity to submit
written comments on the proposal, and consider those comments
before issuing the final regulation. Under the APA, that regulation
then carries the force of law unless and until it is amended or
repealed.[
55] By contrast,
an agency can announce an interpretation of an existing substantive
regulation without advance warning and in pretty much whatever form
it chooses.
Auer effectively nullifies the
distinction Congress drew here. Under
Auer, courts must
treat as “controlling” not only an agency’s duly promulgated rules
but also its mere interpretations—even ones that appear only in a
legal brief, press release, or guidance document issued without
affording the public advance notice or a chance to comment. For all
practical purposes, “the new interpretation might as well be a new
regulation.”[
56]
Auer
thus oblit- erates a distinction Congress thought vital and
supplies agencies with a shortcut around the APA’s required
procedures for issuing and amending substantive rules that bind the
public with the full force and effect of law.[
57]
Think of it this way. We’ve held that the
Constitution’s specification of a “single, finely wrought”
procedure for the enactment of statutes (bicameralism and
presentment) necessarily implies that Congress cannot amend an
enacted statute without following that procedure—say, by allowing a
single House to change what the law requires.[
58] By the same logic, Congress’s specification
in the APA of procedures for the creation of new substantive rules
(like notice and comment) necessarily implies that an agency cannot
amend a substantive rule without following those procedures. To
hold otherwise, as
Auer demands, subverts the APA’s
design.
Certain
amici contend this argument is
“out of place” in this particular case because the VA happened to
issue the interpretation challenged here in an adjudicative
proceeding.[
59] But the
premise on which they proceed—that the APA permits agencies to
issue “controlling” amendments to their regulations in adjudicative
proceedings—is not correct. Once an agency issues a substantive
rule through notice and comment, it can amend that rule only by
following the same notice-and-comment procedures.[
60] Whether an agency issues its
interpretation in a press release or something it chooses to call
an “adjudication,” all we have is the agency’s opinion about what
an existing rule means, something that the APA tells us is
not binding in a court of law or on the American people.
If that won’t work, Justice Kagan tries an
alternative argument from nearly the opposite direction. She
replies that affording
Auer deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own rules never offends the APA because the
agency’s interpretation lacks “the force of law” associated with
substantive rules. Agency interpretations lack this force, we are
told, because a court always retains the power to decide at least
whether the interpretation is entitled to deference.
Ante,
at 22–23. But this argument rests on an implausibly narrow
understanding of what it means for an agency action to bear the
force of law. Under Justice Kagan’s logic, even a binding
substantive rule would lack the force of law because a court
retains the power to decide whether the rule is arbitrary and
capricious and thus invalid under the APA. But no one believes
that. While an agency interpretation, just like a substantive rule,
“must meet certain conditions before it gets deference,” “once it
does so [
Auer makes it] every bit as binding as a
substantive rule.”[
61] To
suggest that
Auer does not make an agency’s interpretive
guidance “binding o[n] anyone,”
ante, at 23, is linguistic
hocus-pocus.
C
If
Auer cannot be squared with the text
of the APA, Justice Kagan suggests it at least conforms to a
reason- able “presumption about congressional intent.”
Ante,
at 7. The theory seems to be that whenever Congress grants an
agency “rulemaking power,” it
also implicitly gives the
agency “ ‘the power authoritatively to interpret’ ”
whatever rules the agency chooses to adopt.
Ante, at 8. But
against the clear statutory commands Congress gave us in the APA,
what sense does it make to “presume” that Congress really,
secretly, wanted courts to treat agency interpretations as binding?
Normally, this Court does not allow hidden legislative intentions
to “muddy” such plainly expressed statutory directives.[
62]
Even on its own terms, too, this argument proves
pretty muddy. It goes something like this: The drafters of the APA
did not intend to “ ‘significantly alter’ ” established
law governing judicial review of agency action as of 1946; the
Auer doctrine was part of that established law; therefore,
the APA implicitly requires courts to afford agencies
Auer
deference.
Ante, at 21–22. But neither of this syllogism’s
essential premises stands on solid ground.
Take the major premise—that those who adopted
the APA intended to work no change in the established law of
judicial review of agency action. Justice Kagan is right, of
course, that Attorney General Clark claimed as much shortly after
the APA’s passage.
Ante, at 21. But his view, which
reflected the interests of the executive branch, was far from
universally shared. Others, including many members of Congress,
thought the APA would clarify, if not expand, the scope of judicial
review. For example, Senator McCarran, the Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, wrote that it would be “hard . . .
for anyone to argue that this Act did anything other than cut down
the ‘cult of discretion’ so far as federal law is
concerned.”[
63] And both the
House and Senate reports on the APA said it was intended to
“provid[e] that questions of law are for courts rather than
agencies to decide in the last analysis.”[
64]
Just five years after the APA’s passage, this
Court seemed to side with those who thought the APA was intended to
do more than just summarize existing law. In an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, the Court opined that the APA required courts to
assume “
more responsibility” for reviewing agency decisions
“than some courts ha[d] shown in the past.”[
65] One early commentator likewise observed that
the APA seemed designed to eliminate all doubt that questions of
law “shall be decided by the reviewing Court for itself, and in the
exercise of its own independent judgment”; “[m]ore explicit words
to impose this mandate,” he thought, “could hardly be
found.”[
66]
Justice Kagan’s syllogism runs into even more
trouble with its minor premise—that the
Auer doctrine was a
well-established part of the common law background when Congress
enacted the APA in 1946. As we’ve seen, this Court planted the
seeds of
Auer deference for the first time in dictum in
Seminole Rock, just a year before Congress passed the APA.
See Part I–B,
supra. And that dictum did not somehow
immediately become an entrenched part of the common law: For years
following
Seminole Rock, courts and “commentators largely
ignored” it,[
67] and those
who took notice weren’t sure what to make of it. Professor Davis,
for example, doubted that the dictum could be “taken at face value”
given that it seemed “irreconcilable” with the Court’s approach in
other cases.[
68] In truth,
when Congress passed the APA the law of judicial review of agency
action was in a confused state. During the congressional hearings
on the bill, one witness’s suggestion that Congress should leave
the scope of judicial review “as it now is” drew this fair reply
from Representative Walter, chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and author of the House Report on the APA: “You
say ‘as it now is.’ Frankly, I do not know what it now is
. . . . [T]he Supreme Court apparently changes its
mind daily.”[
69]
III. The Constitution
Not only is
Auer incompatible with the
APA; it also sits uneasily with the Constitution. Article III, §1
provides that the “judicial Power of the United States” is vested
exclusively in this Court and the lower federal courts. A core
component of that judicial power is “ ‘the duty of
interpreting [the laws] and applying them in cases properly brought
before the courts.’ ”[
70] As Chief Justice Marshall put it, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”[
71]
And never, this Court has warned, should the “judicial power
. . . be shared with [the] Executive Branch.”[
72] Yet that seems to be exactly
what
Auer requires.
A
Our Nation’s founders were painfully aware of
the dangers of executive and legislative intrusion on judicial
decision-making. One of the abuses of royal power that led to the
American Revolution was King George’s attempt to gain influence
over colonial judges.[
73]
Colonial legislatures, too, had interfered with the courts’
independence “at the behest of private interests and
factions.”[
74] These
experiences had taught the founders that “ ‘there is no
liberty if the power of judgment be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.’ ”[
75] They knew that when political actors are left free
not only to adopt and enforce written laws, but also to control the
interpretation of those laws, the legal rights of “litigants with
unpopular or minority causes or . . . who belong to
despised or suspect classes” count for little.[
76] Maybe the powerful, well-heeled, popular,
and connected can wheedle favorable outcomes from a system like
that—but what about everyone else? They are left always a little
unsure what the law is, at the mercy of political actors and the
shifting winds of popular opinion, and without the chance for a
fair hearing before a neutral judge. The rule of law begins to
bleed into the rule of men.
Experiencing all this in their own time, the
founders sought to ensure that those who came after them would not.
Believing that “[n]o maxim was better established” than “that the
power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding,
the laws,”[
77] they designed
a judiciary that would be able to interpret the laws “free from
potential domination by other branches of government.”[
78] To that end, they resisted
proposals that would have subjected judicial decisions to review by
political actors.[
79] And
they rejected the British tradition of using the upper house of the
legislature as a court of last resort, out of fear that a body with
“even a partial agency in passing bad laws” would operate under the
“same spirit” in “interpreting them.”[
80] Instead, they gave federal judges life tenure,
subject only to removal by impeachment; and they guaranteed that
the other branches could not reduce judges’ compensation so long as
they remained in office.
The founders afforded these extraordinary powers
and protections not for the comfort of judges, but so that an
independent judiciary could better guard the people from the
arbitrary use of governmental power. And sitting atop the judicial
branch, this Court has always carried a special duty to “jealously
guar[d]” the Constitution’s promise of judicial
independence.[
81] So we have
long resisted any effort by the other branches to “ ‘usurp a
court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the circumstances
before it.’ ”[
82] The
judicial power to interpret the law, this Court has held, “can no
more be shared with another branch than the Chief Executive, for
example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the
Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
Presidential veto.”[
83]
Auer represents no trivial threat to
these foundational principles. Under the APA, substantive rules
issued by federal agencies through notice-and-comment procedures
bear “the ‘force and effect of law’ ”[
84] and are part of the body of federal law,
binding on private individuals, that the Constitution charges
federal judges with interpreting. Yet
Auer tells the judge
that he must interpret these binding laws to mean not what he
thinks they mean, but what an executive agency says they mean.
Unlike Article III judges, executive officials are not, nor are
they supposed to be, “wholly impartial.”[
85] They have their own interests, their own
constituencies, and their own policy goals—and when interpreting a
regulation, they may choose to “press the case for the side [they]
represen[t]” instead of adopting the fairest and best
reading.[
86]
Auer
thus means that, far from being “kept distinct,” the powers of
making, enforcing, and interpreting laws are united in the same
hands—and in the process a cornerstone of the rule of law is
compromised.
Consider an analogy. The Court has long held
that Congress cannot “ ‘indirectly control the action of the
courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to
its own views.’ ”[
87]
If Congress disagrees with how courts are interpreting an existing
statute, it is free to amend the statute to establish a different
rule going forward. What it cannot do is issue “a mandate
. . . to compel the courts to construe and apply
[existing law], not according to the judicial, but according to the
legislative judgment.”[
88]
As early as 1804, when a lawyer argued before this Court that an
Act of the North Carolina legislature could not control the Court’s
construction of an earlier North Carolina statute because “[t]o
declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power,” not a
legislative power, the Court stopped him, deeming the point too
plain for argument.[
89]
But if the legislature can’t control a judge’s
interpretation of an existing statute, how can an executive agency
control a judge’s interpretation of an existing and equally binding
regulation?
Auer allows an agency to do exactly what this
Court has always said a legislature cannot do: “compel the courts
to construe and apply” a law on the books, “not according to the
judicial . . . judgment,” but according to the judgment
of another branch.[
90] When
we defer to an agency interpretation that differs from what we
believe to be the best interpretation of the law, we compromise our
judicial independence and deny the people who come before us the
impartial judgment that the Constitution guarantees them. And we
mislead those whom we serve by placing a judicial
imprimatur
on what is, in fact, no more than an exercise of raw political
executive power.[
91]
B
What do our colleagues have to say about these
concerns? A majority has nothing to offer, and Justice Kagan
dismisses them out of hand. In fact, she barely mentions the
Constitution, other than to assure us that
Auer does not
allow agencies to “usur[p] the interpretive role of courts” because
“courts retain a firm grip on the interpretive function” through
their ability to decide whether
Auer deference applies.
Ante, at 25. But that is no assurance at all. The judicial
power has always been understood to provide the people with a
neutral arbiter who bears the responsibility and duty to “expound
and interpret” the governing law, not just the power to say whether
someone else’s interpretation, let alone the interpretation
of a self-interested political actor, is “reasonable.”[
92]
To be sure, it’s conceivable that Congress might
seek to limit the ability of judges to remedy an adverse agency
action. It might, for example, provide that a court shall have
power to set aside agency action pursuant to a regulation only if
the action was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the
regulation. But even assuming the constitutionality of a
hypothetical statute like that,
Auer is different. It does
not
limit the scope of the judicial power; instead, it seeks
to
coopt the judicial power by requiring an Article III
judge to decide a case before him according to principles that he
believes do not accurately reflect the law. Under
Auer, a
judge is required to lay aside his independent judgment and declare
affirmatively that a regulation
means what the agency
says it means—and, thus, that the law
is what the
agency
says it is. Then the judge is compelled to exercise
his judicial authority to adjust private rights and obligations
based on the agency’s (mis)understanding of the law. If
Auer
were a statute, it would not be an exercise of Congress’s “power
(within limits) to tell the courts what
classes of cases
they may decide,” or what relief they may supply, but a forbidden
attempt “to prescribe or superintend
how they decide those
cases.”[
93] And in the
absence of any statute like that, this Court surely should not so
freely give away to the executive branch its assigned
responsibility to interpret the laws. “Abdication of responsibility
is not part of the constitutional design.”[
94]
In the end, Justice Kagan’s only real reply is
this: However misguided it may be to hand over our interpretive
powers to executive agencies, at least there isn’t a mountain of
empirical evidence showing that agencies have used this power to
deliberately write “vague and open-ended” regulations to maximize
their interpretive leeway.
Ante, at 24. But even this misses
the point. Whether or not regulations are “ ‘designed’ ”
to be vague,
ibid., many can be read in different ways,
especially when new and unanticipated applications arise; cases
like that come before the courts all the time. Without
Auer’s shadow hanging over them, parties would receive a
fair hearing before an impartial judge. The agency’s interpretation
would sometimes be rejected; and that, in turn, might lead it to
solicit public comment on possible amendments to the regulation,
which would provide an opportunity for public input that might
produce better policy. But with
Auer, there is no fair
hearing and no need for the agency to amend the regulation through
notice and comment. Whether purposeful or not, the agency’s failure
to write a clear regulation winds up increasing its power, allowing
it to both write and interpret rules that bear the force of law—in
the process uniting powers the Constitution deliberately separated
and denying the people their right to an independent judicial
determination of the law’s meaning.
IV. Policy Arguments
Lacking support elsewhere, Justice Kagan is
forced to resort to policy arguments to defend
Auer. But
even the most sensible policy argument would not empower us to
ignore the plain language of the APA or the demands of the
Constitution. And as we’ve seen, those documents reflect a very
different “policy” judgment by the people and their
representatives. Besides, the policy argu- ments offered today are
not just unpersuasive, they are troubling.
Take the first and boldest offering. Justice
Kagan suggests that determining the meaning of a regulation is
largely a matter of figuring out what the “person who wrote it
. . . intended.”
Ante, at 8. In this way, we’re
told, a legally binding regulation isn’t all that different from “a
memo or an e-mail”—if you “[w]ant to know what [it] means,” you’d
better “[a]sk its author.”
Ante, at 8–9. But the federal
government’s substantive rules are not like memos or e-mails; they
are binding edicts that carry the force of law for all citizens.
And if the rule of law means anything, it means that we are
governed by the public meaning of the words found in statutes and
regulations, not by their authors’ private intentions. This is a
vital part of what it means to have “a government of laws, and not
of men.”[
95] When judges
interpret a regulation, what we are trying to get at, as Justice
Holmes explained long ago, is not the “particular intent” of those
who wrote it, but “what [its] words would mean [to] a normal
speaker of English . . . in the circumstances in which
they were used.”[
96] If the
best reading of the regulation turns out to be something other than
what the agency claims to have intended, the agency is free to
rewrite the regulation; but its secret intentions are not the
law.
Nor does Justice Kagan’s account of the
interpretive process even wind up supporting
Auer. If a
court’s goal in interpreting a regulation really were to determine
what its author “intended,”
Auer would be an almost complete
mismatch with the goal. Agency personnel change over time, and an
agency’s policy priorities may shift dramatically from one
presidential administration to another. Yet
Auer tells
courts that they must defer to the agency’s
current view of
what the regulation ought to mean, which may or may not correspond
to the views of those who actually wrote it. If interpreting a
regulation really were just like reading an e-mail,
Auer
would be like seeking guidance about the e-mail’s meaning, years or
decades later, from the latest user of the computer from which the
e-mail was sent. We’ve repeatedly rejected that approach in the
context of statutory interpretation. While Members of this Court
sometimes disagree about the usefulness of
pre-enactment
legislative history, we all agree that legislators’ statements
about the meaning of an already-enacted statute are not “a
legitimate tool of statutory interpretation,’ ” much less a
controlling one.[
97] So why
on earth would we give “controlling weight” to an agency’s
statements about the meaning of an already-promulgated
regulation?
Proceeding farther down this doubtful path,
Justice Kagan asserts that resolving ambiguities in a regulation
“sounds more in policy than in law” and is thus a task more suited
to executive officials than judges.
Ante, at 9. But this
claim, too, contradicts a basic premise of our legal order: that we
are governed not by the shifting whims of politicians and
bureaucrats, but by written laws whose meaning is fixed and
ascertainable—if not by all members of the public, then at least by
lawyers who can advise them and judges who must apply the law to
individual cases guided by the neutral principles found in our
traditional tools of interpretation. The text of the regulation is
treated
as the law, and the agency’s policy judgment has the
force of law
only insofar as it is embodied in the
regulatory text. If “new issues demanding new policy calls” arise
that aren’t addressed in existing regulations,
ante, at 10,
the solution is for the agency to promulgate new regulations using
the notice-and-comment procedures set forth in the APA. But an
agency has no warrant to compel judges to change the law to conform
with the agency’s current policy preferences.
To be sure, during the period of
Auer’s
ascendancy some suggested that the meaning of written law is always
“radically indeterminate” and that judges expounding it are “for
the most part, guided by policy—not text.”[
98] And in an environment like that it was
perhaps thought a small step to conclude that, if legal disputes
are going to be resolved on political grounds, then they ought to
be resolved by real politicians in the executive branch rather than
ersatz politicians on the bench. But the proposed cure proved worse
than the disease. Arguments like these surrendered the judgment
embodied in our Constitution and the APA that courts owe the people
they serve their independent legal judgment about the law’s
meaning. Besides, we’ve long since come to realize that the real
cure doesn’t lie in turning judges into rubber stamps for
politicians, but in redirecting the judge’s interpretive task back
to its roots, away from open-ended policy appeals and speculation
about legislative intentions and toward the traditional tools of
interpretation judges have employed for centuries to elucidate the
law’s original public meaning. Today it is even said that we judges
are, to one degree or another, “all textualists now.”[
99]
Pursuing a more modest tack, Justice Kagan next
suggests that
Auer is justified by the respect due agencies’
“technical” expertise.
Ante, at 10. But no one doubts that
courts should pay close attention to an expert agency’s views on
technical questions in its field. Just as a court “would want to
know what John Henry Wigmore said about an issue of evidence law
[or] what Arthur Corbin thought about a matter of contract law,” so
too should courts carefully consider what the Food and Drug
Administration thinks about how its prescription drug safety
regulations operate.[
100]
The fact remains, however, that even agency experts “can be wrong;
even Homer nodded.”[
101]
Skidmore and the traditional approach it embodied recognized
both of these facts of life long ago, explaining that, while courts
should of course afford respectful consideration to the expert
agency’s views, they must remain open to competing expert and other
evidence supplied in an adversarial setting. Respect for an
agency’s technical expertise demands no more.
Justice Kagan’s final policy argument is that
Auer promotes “consistency” and “uniformity” in the
interpretation of regulations.
Ante, at 10–11. If we let
courts decide what regulations mean, she warns, they might
disagree, and it might take some time for higher courts to resolve
those disagreements. But consistency and uniformity are hardly
grounds on which
Auer’s advocates should wish to fight. The
judicial process is how we settle disputes about the meaning of
written law, and our judicial system is more than capable of
producing a single, uniform, and stable interpretation that will
last until the regulation is amended or repealed. Meanwhile, under
Auer courts often disagree about whether deference is
warranted, see
supra, at 10–11, and a regulation’s “meaning”
can be transformed with the stroke of a pen any time there is a new
presidential administration. “Consistency,” “uniformity,” and
stability in the law are hardly among
Auer’s crowning
achievements.
V.
Stare Decisis
In the end, a majority declines to endorse
Justice Kagan’s arguments and insists only that, even if
Auer is not “right and well-reasoned,” we’re stuck with it
because of the respect due precedent.
Ante, at 27.
But notice: While pretending to bow to
stare
decisis, the majority goes about reshaping our precedent in new
and experimental ways. True, the majority admits, this Court has in
the past accorded
Auer deference
“ ‘reflexive[ly],’ ” “without significant analysis of the
underlying regulation” or “careful attention to [its] nature and
context,” and encouraged lower courts to do the same.
Ante,
at 12–13. But no more. From now on, the majority says, not only
must judges “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction”
to decide whether the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable,” they
must also make “an independent inquiry into whether the character
and context of the agency interpretation” justifies deference.
Ante, at 13–15. The majority candidly admits that it finds
it impossible to “reduce” this new inquiry “to any exhaustive
test,” so it settles for laying out some “markers.”
Ante, at
15. What are the markers? We are told that courts should often—but
not always—withhold deference from an interpretation offered by
mid-level agency staff; often—but not always—withhold deference
from a nontechnical, “prosaic-seeming” interpretation; often—but
not always—withhold deference from an interpretation advanced for
the first time in an
amicus brief; and often—but not
always—withhold deference from an interpretation that conflicts
with an earlier one. See
ante, at 15–18. The only certainty
in all this is that the majority isn’t really much moved by
stare decisis; everyone recognizes, to one degree or
another, that
Auer cannot stand. And between our remaining
choices—continuing to make up new deference rules, or returning to
the text of the APA and the approach to judicial review that
prevailed for most of our history—the answer should have been
easy.
A
There are serious questions about whether
stare decisis should apply here at all. To be sure,
Auer’s narrow holding about the meaning of the regulation at
issue in that case may be entitled to
stare decisis effect.
The same may be true for the specific holdings in other cases where
this Court has applied
Auer deference. But does
stare
decisis extend beyond those discrete holdings and bind future
Members of this Court to apply
Auer’s broader deference
framework?
It seems doubtful that
stare decisis
demands that much. We are not dealing with a precedent that
purported to settle the meaning of a single statute or regulation
or resolve a particular case. The
Auer doctrine claims to do
much more than that—to prescribe an interpretive methodology
governing every future dispute over the meaning of every
regulation. In other contexts, we do not regard statements in our
opinions about such generally applicable interpretive methods, like
the proper weight to afford historical practice in constitutional
cases or legislative history in statutory cases, as binding future
Justices with the full force of horizontal
stare
decisis.[
102] Why,
then, should we regard as binding
Auer’s statements about
the weight to afford agencies’ interpretations in regulatory cases?
To the extent
Auer purports to dictate “the interpretive
inferences that future Justices must draw in construing statutes
and regulations that the Court has never engaged,” it may well
“exceed the limits of stare decisis.”[
103]
Even if our past expressions of support for
Auer deference bear
some precedential force, they
certainly are not entitled (as the majority suggests,
ante,
at 26–27) to the special, heightened form of
stare decisis
we reserve for narrow statutory decisions. In contrast to
precedents that fix the meaning of
particular statutes and
generate reliance interests in the process, the
Auer
doctrine is an abstract default rule of interpretive methodology
that settles nothing of its own force. And this Court has
recognized that it is “inconsistent with the Court’s proper role”
to insist that Congress exercise its legislative power to overturn
such erroneous and judicially invented “default rule[s].”[
104] That should be especially so
here because
Auer’s default rule undermines judicial
independence, which this Court has a special responsibility to
defend.
Nor is it entirely clear that Congress
could overturn the
Auer doctrine legislatively. The
majority describes
Auer as a “presumption” about how courts
should interpret statutes granting rulemaking power to agencies.
Ante, at 12. Congress can, of course,
rebut the
presumption on a statute-by-statute basis, or even for all past
statutes. But can Congress
eliminate the
Auer
presumption for future statutes? Perhaps—but legislation like that
would raise questions, which the majority does not address, about
the ability of one Congress to entrench its preferences by
attempting to control the interpretation of legislation enacted by
future Congresses.[
105]
We should not be in the business of tossing “ ‘balls
. . . into Congress’s court,’ ”
ante, at 27,
that would explode with constitutional questions if Congress tried
to pick them up.
B
Even assuming for argument’s sake that
standard
stare decisis considerations apply, they still do
not require us to retain
Auer. Even the majority implicitly
recognizes this much, as it proceeds to vacate a lower court
judgment that faithfully applied
Auer and instruct that
court to try again using the majority’s new directions. If
stare
decisis allows us so freely to remodel
Auer, it’s hard
to see on what account it might require us to retain it.
We do not lightly overturn precedents, and we
seek always to honor the thoughtful guidance of those who have
preceded us. At the same time, everyone agrees that
stare
decisis is not an “ ‘inexorable command,’ ”[
106] and this Court should not
always remain bound to decisions whose “rationale no longer
withstands ‘careful analysis.’ ”[
107] Recognizing the need for balance in this area,
the Court has, over time, fashioned principles to guide our
treatment of precedent. Those principles call on us to consider
factors such as “the quality of [the precedent’s] reasoning, the
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other
related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down,
and reliance on the decision.”[
108] As applied to
Auer, all of these
considerations weigh strongly in favor of bidding farewell to the
doctrine rather than keeping it on life support.
First, we’ve already seen that no
persuasive rationale supports
Auer. From its humble origins
as an unexplained bit of dictum in a wartime case about emergency
price controls, the
Auer doctrine evolved into a rigid rule
of deference—all without any serious attempt by this Court to
rationalize it or reconcile it with the APA, the Constitution, or
traditional modes of judicial review. See Part I,
supra.
Even its fiercest defenders acknowledge that “
Auer deference
has not remained static over time” and urge the Court to continue
to “shape” and “refin[e]” the doctrine.[
109] Today’s decision attempts just such a
“refinement” by hedging
Auer with new qualifications and
limitations. See
ante, at 11–18. This shifting ground
“undermin[es] the force of
stare decisis.”[
110]
Second, today’s ruling all but admits
that
Auer has not proved to be a workable standard. Even
before this latest overhaul, uncertainty surrounding
Auer’s
scope and application had caused many to question whether there was
any “practical benefit” in continuing to apply
Auer “rather
than a less deferential but more flexible and open-ended standard
like
Skidmore.”[
111] See
supra, at 10–11. Nor does the majority’s
kinder, gentler version of
Auer promise to solve the
problem. On the contrary, its newly mandated inquiry into the
“character and context of the agency interpretation,” which it
admits cannot be reduced “to any exhaustive test,”
ante, at
15, seems destined only to compound the confusion. See
supra, at 35. Many words come to mind to describe the tasks
we assign lower court judges today, but “workable” is not among
them.
Third, the
Auer doctrine is, as we
have also already seen, out of step with how courts normally
interpret written laws. When we interpret a regulation, we
typically (at least when there is no agency say-so) proceed in the
same way we would when interpreting any other written law: We
“begin our interpretation of the regulation with its text” and, if
the text is unclear, we “turn to other canons of interpretation”
and tie-breaking rules to resolve the ambiguity.[
112] And when we interpret an ambiguous
statute, we never ask what current members of Congress think
it means; in fact, we’ve held unanimously that legislators’
post-enactment views about a statute’s meaning are not even a
“ ‘legitimate tool of statutory
interpretation.’ ”[
113] Affording “controlling weight” to regulators’
post-promulgation views about the meaning of an ambiguous
regulation is hard to square with these usual judicial
practices.[
114]
Fourth, the explosive growth of the
administrative state over the last half-century has exacerbated
Auer’s potential for mischief. When the Court first uttered
its dictum in
Seminole Rock, the administrative state was
new and the APA was only a gleam in Congress’s eye. Even 20 years
later, when the Court began reviving the
Seminole Rock
dictum and turning it into a new deference doctrine, it was not yet
apparent how pervasive the administrative state would become in the
lives of ordinary Americans. Now, in the 21st century, “[t]he
administrative state wields vast power and touches almost every
aspect of daily life.”[
115] Among other things, it produces “ ‘reams of
regulations’ ”[
116]—so many that they dwarf the statutes enacted by
Congress. As of 2018, the Code of Federal Regulations filled 242
volumes and was about 185,000 pages long, almost quadruple the
length of the most recent edition of the U. S. Code.[
117] And agencies add thousands
more pages of regulations every year. Whether you think this
administrative fecundity is a good or a bad thing, it surely means
that the cost of continuing to deny citizens an impartial judicial
hearing on the meaning of disputed regulations has increased
dramatically since this Court started down this road.
Fifth,
Auer has generated no
serious reliance interests. The only parties that might have relied
on
Auer’s promise of deference are agencies that use
post hoc interpretations to bypass the APA’s
notice-and-comment procedures. But this Court has never suggested
that the convenience of government officials should count in the
balance of
stare decisis, especially when weighed against
the interests of citizens in a fair hearing before an independent
judge and a stable and knowable set of laws. In short,
“ ‘[t]he fact that [agencies] may view [
Auer deference]
as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest
that could outweigh the countervailing interest’ ” of all
citizens “ ‘in having their constitutional rights fully
protected.’ ”[
118]
Coming closer to the mark, the majority worries
that “abandoning
Auer deference would cast doubt on many
settled constructions” of regulations on which regulated parties
might have relied.
Ante, at 26. But, again, decisions
construing particular regulations might retain
stare decisis
effect even if the Court announced that it would no longer adhere
to
Auer’s interpretive methodology. After all, decisions
construing particular statutes continue to command respect even
when the interpretive methods that led to those constructions fall
out of favor. Besides, if the majority is correct that abandoning
Auer would require revisiting regulatory constructions that
were upheld based on
Auer deference, the majority’s revision
of
Auer will yield exactly the same result. There are
innumerable lower court decisions that have followed this Court’s
lead and afforded
Auer deference mechanically, without
conducting the inquiry the Court now holds is required. Today’s
ruling casts no less doubt on the continuing validity of those
decisions than we would if we simply moved on from
Auer.
*
Overruling
Auer would have taken us
directly back to
Skidmore, liberating courts to decide cases
based on their independent judgment and “follow [the] agency’s
[view] only to the extent it is persuasive.”[
119] By contrast, the majority’s attempt to
remodel
Auer’s rule into a multi-step, multi-factor inquiry
guarantees more uncertainty and much litigation. Proceeding in this
convoluted way burdens our colleagues on the lower courts, who will
have to spend time debating deference that they could have spent
interpreting disputed regulations. It also continues to deny the
people who come before us the neutral forum for their disputes that
they rightly expect and deserve.
But this cloud may have a silver lining: The
majority leaves
Auer so riddled with holes that, when all is
said and done, courts may find that it does not constrain their
independent judgment any more than
Skidmore. As
reengineered,
Auer requires courts to “exhaust all the
‘traditional tools’ of construction” before they even consider
deferring to an agency.
Ante, at 13–14. And those tools
include all sorts of tie-breaking rules for resolving ambiguity
even in the closest cases. Courts manage to make do with these
tools in many other areas of the law, so one might hope they will
hardly ever find them inadequate here. And if they do, they will
now have to conduct a further inquiry that includes so few firm
guides and so many cryptic “markers” that they will rarely, if
ever, have to defer to an agency regulatory interpretation that
differs from what they believe is the best and fairest reading.
But whatever happens, this case hardly promises
to be this Court’s last word on
Auer. If today’s opinion
ends up reducing
Auer to the role of a tin god—officious,
but ultimately powerless—then a future Court should candidly admit
as much and stop requiring litigants and lower courts to pay token
homage to it. Alternatively, if
Auer proves more resilient,
this Court should reassert its responsibility to say what the law
is and afford the people the neutral forum for their disputes that
they expect and deserve.