SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 11–338 and 11–347
_________________
DOUG DECKER, in his official capacity as
OREGON STATE FORESTER, et al., PETITIONERS
11–338
v.
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
CENTER
GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS
11–347
v.
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
CENTER
on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 20, 2013]
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court’s
opinion; I agree that these cases are not moot and that the
District Court had jurisdiction. I do not join Part III. The Court
there gives effect to a reading of EPA’s regulations that is
not the most natural one, simply because EPA says that it believes
the unnatural reading is right. It does this, more- over, even
though the agency has vividly illustrated that it can write a rule
saying precisely what it means—by doing
just that
while these cases were being briefed.
Enough is enough.
I
For decades, and for no good reason, we have
been giving agencies the authority to say what their rules mean,
under the harmless-sounding banner of “defer[ring] to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”
Talk America, Inc. v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 1). This is generally called
Seminole Rock or
Auer
deference. See
Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.,
325 U.S.
410 (1945);
Auer v.
Robbins,
519 U.S.
452 (1997).
Two Terms ago, in my separate concurrence in
Talk America, I expressed doubts about the validity of this
practice. In that case, however, the agency’s interpretation
of the rule was also the fairest one, and no party had asked us to
reconsider
Auer. Today, however, the Court’s deference
to the agency makes the difference (note the Court’s
defensive insistence that the agency’s interpretation need
not be “the best one,”
ante, at 14). And respon-
dent has asked us, if necessary, to “ ‘reconsider
Auer.’ ” I believe that it is time to do
so. See Brief for Respondent 42, n. 12; see also Brief for Law
Professors on the Propri- ety of Administrative Deference as
Amici Curiae. This is especially true because the
circumstances of these cases illustrate
Auer’s flaws
in a particularly vivid way.
The canonical formulation of
Auer
deference is that we will enforce an agency’s interpretation
of its own rules unless that interpretation is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
Seminole
Rock,
supra, at 414. But of course whenever the
agency’s interpretation of the regulation is different from
the fairest reading, it is in that sense “inconsistent”
with the regulation. Obviously, that is not enough, or there would
be nothing for
Auer to do. In practice,
Auer
deference is
Chevron deference applied to regulations rather
than statutes. See
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S.
837 (1984). The agency’s interpretation will be accepted
if, though not the fairest reading of the regulation, it is a
plausible reading—within the scope of the ambiguity that the
regulation contains.
Our cases have not put forward a persuasive
justification for
Auer deference. The first case to apply
it,
Seminole Rock, offered no justification
whatever—just the
ipse dixit that “the
administrative interpretation . . . becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” 325 U. S., at 414. Our later cases
provide two principal explanations, neither of which has much to be
said for it. See generally Stephenson & Pogoriler,
Seminole
Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449,
1454–1458 (2011). First, some cases say that the agency, as
the drafter of the rule, will have some special insight into its
intent when enacting it.
E.g., Martin v.
Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
499
U.S. 144, 150–153 (1991). The implied premise of this
argument—that what we are looking for is the agency’s
intent in adopting the rule—is false. There is true of
regulations what is true of statutes. As Justice Holmes put it:
“[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.” The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). Whether governing rules are
made by the national legislature or an administrative agency, we
are bound
by what they say, not by the unexpressed intention
of those who made them.
The other rationale our cases provide is that
the agency possesses special expertise in administering its
“ ‘complex and highly technical regulatory
program.’ ” See,
e.g., Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v.
Shalala,
512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994). That is true enough, and it leads to the
conclu- sion that agencies and not courts should make regula-
tions. But it has nothing to do with who should interpret
regulations—unless one believes that the purpose of
interpretation is to make the regulatory program work in a fashion
that the current leadership of the agency deems effective. Making
regulatory programs effective is the purpose of
rulemaking,
in which the agency uses its “special expertise” to
formulate the best rule. But the purpose of interpretation is to
determine the fair meaning of the rule—to “say what the
law is,”
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177
(1803). Not to make policy, but to determine what policy has been
made and promulgated by the agency, to which the public owes
obedience. Indeed, since the leadership of agencies (and hence the
policy preferences of agencies) changes with Presidential
administrations, an agency head can only be sure that the
application of his “special expertise” to the issue
addressed by a regulation
will be given effect if we adhere
to predictable principles of textual interpretation rather than
defer to the “special expertise” of his successors. If
we take agency enactments as written, the Executive has a stable
background against which to write its rules and achieve the policy
ends it thinks best.
Another conceivable justification for
Auer deference, though not one that is to be found in our
cases, is this: If it is reasonable to defer to agencies regarding
the meaning of statutes that
Congress enacted, as we do per
Chevron, it is
a fortiori reasonable to defer to them
regarding the meaning of regulations
that they themselves
crafted. To give an agency less control over the meaning of its
own regulations than it has over the meaning of a congressionally
enacted statute seems quite odd.
But it is not odd at all. The theory of
Chevron (take it or leave it) is that when Congress gives an
agency authority to administer a statute, including authority to
issue in- terpretive regulations, it implicitly accords the agency
a degree of discretion, which the courts must respect, regarding
the meaning of the statute. See
Smiley v.
Citibank (South
Dakota), N. A.,
517 U.S.
735, 740–741 (1996). While the implication of an agency
power to clarify the statute is reasonable enough, there is surely
no congressional implication that the agency can resolve
ambiguities in its own regulations. For that would violate a
fundamental principle of separation of powers—that the power
to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest in the
same hands. “When the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person . . . there can be no liberty;
because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner.” Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws bk. XI, ch. 6, pp.
151–152 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949). Congress
cannot enlarge its
own power through
Chevron—whatever it leaves vague in the statute will
be worked out
by someone else.
Chevron represents a
presumption about who, as between the Executive and the Judiciary,
that someone else will be. (The Executive, by the way—the
competing political branch—is the less congenial repository
of the power as far as Congress is concerned.) So Congress’s
incentive is to speak as clearly as possible on the matters it
regards as important.
But when an agency interprets its
own
rules—that is something else. Then the power to prescribe is
augmented by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak
vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a “flexibility”
that will enable “clarification” with retroactive
effect. “It is per- fectly understandable” for an
agency to “issue vague regula- tions” if doing so will
“maximiz[e] agency power.”
Thomas Jefferson
Univ.,
supra, at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Combining
the power to prescribe with the power to interpret is not a new
evil: Blackstone condemned the practice of resolving doubts about
“the construction of the Roman laws” by
“stat[ing] the case to the emperor in writing, and tak[ing]
his opinion upon it.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 58 (1765). And our Constitution did not mirror the
British practice of using the House of Lords as a court of last
resort, due in part to the fear that he who has “agency in
passing bad laws” might operate in the “same
spirit” in their interpretation. The Federalist No. 81, pp.
543–544 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Auer deference encourages
agencies to be “vague in framing regulations, with the plan
of issuing ‘interpretations’ to create the intended new
law without observance of notice and comment procedures.”
Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don’t Get It, 10 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 1, 11–12
(1996).
Auer is not a logical corollary to
Chevron
but a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power. See
Talk America, 564 U. S., at ___ (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 2–3); Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996).
It is true enough that
Auer deference has
the same beneficial pragmatic effect as
Chevron deference:
The country need not endure the uncertainty produced by divergent
views of numerous district courts and courts of appeals as to what
is the fairest reading of the regulation, until a definitive answer
is finally provided, years later, by this Court. The agency’s
view can be relied upon, unless it is, so to speak, beyond the
pale. But the duration of the uncertainty produced by a vague
regulation need not be as long as the uncertainty produced by a
vague statute. For as soon as an interpretation uncongenial to the
agency is pronounced by a district court, the agency can begin the
process of amending the regulation to make its meaning entirely
clear. The circumstances of this case demonstrate the point. While
these cases were being briefed before us, EPA issued a rule
designed to respond to the Court of Appeals judgment we are
reviewing. See 77 Fed. Reg. 72974 (2012) (to be codified in 40 CFR
pt. 122, sub pt. B). It did so (by the standards of such things)
relatively quickly: The decision below was handed down in May 2011,
and in December 2012 the EPA published an amended rule setting
forth in unmistakable terms the position it ar- gues here. And
there is another respect in which a lack of
Chevron-type
deference has less severe pragmatic consequences for rules than for
statutes. In many cases, when an agency believes that its rule
permits conduct that the text arguably forbids, it can simply
exercise its discretion not to prosecute. That is not possible, of
course, when, as here, a party harmed by the violation has standing
to compel enforcement.
In any case, however great may be the efficiency
gains derived from
Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot
jus- tify a rule that not only has no principled basis but
contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers: He who
writes a law must not adjudge its violation.
II
I would therefore resolve these cases by using
the familiar tools of textual interpretation to decide: Is what the
petitioners did here proscribed by the fairest reading of the
regulations? What they did was to channel stormwater runoff from
logging roads without a permit. To decide whether that was
permissible we must answer one, and possibly two, questions: First,
was the stormwater discharged from a “point source”? If
not, no permit was required. But if so, we face the second
question: Were the stormwater discharges exempt from the permit
requirement because they were not “associated with industrial
activity”? The fairest reading of the statute and regulations
is that these discharges were from point sources, and were
associated with industrial activity.
A
The Clean Water Act generally prohibits
discharging pollution without a permit from what it calls a
“point source.” 33 U. S. C. §1311(a). A
“point source” is defined as “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,” and several other
things. §1362(14). The stormwater here was discharged from
logging roads through a series of pipes, ditches, and
channels—all items expressly named in the definition.
EPA argues that the Silvicultural Rule, 40 CFR
§122.27(b)(1) (2006),
excludes from the definition of
“[s]ilvicultural point source” “harvesting
operations . . . from which there is natural
runoff.” This is relevant, says the agency, because that rule
specifies that only “[s]ilvicultural point sources, as
defined in this section,” are “point sources subject to
the . . . permit program.” §122.27(a). In
EPA’s view, the stormwater here is “natural
runoff.”
But are stormwater discharges “natural
runoff” when they are channeled through manmade pipes and
ditches, and carry with them manmade pollutants from manmade forest
roads? It is not obvious that this is so—as the agency
agrees. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 19 (the
rule’s “reference to ‘natural runoff’
associated with logging roads neither clearly encompasses nor
clearly excludes the sort of channeled runoff that is at issue in
this case”). In my view, giving the term the agency’s
interpretation would contradict the statute’s definition of
“point source,” which explicitly includes any
“pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, [and] conduit.” Applying
the interpretive presumption of validity—the canon that we
are to “prefe[r] the meaning that preserves to the meaning
that destroys,”
Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan,
293 U.S.
388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)—I would hold
that the regulation’s exclusion of “natural
runoff” does not reach the situation here. The stormwater
discharges came from point sources, because they flowed out of
artificial “pipe[s],” “ditch[es],” and
“channel[s],” 33 U. S. C. §1362(14), and
were thus not “
natural runoff” from a logging
opera- tion, 40 CFR §122.27(b)(1) (emphasis added).
B
Many point-source stormwater discharges are
nonetheless exempt from the usual permitting requirement. See 33
U. S. C. §1342(p). This exemption, however, does not
reach discharges “associated with industrial activity.”
Ibid. EPA has enacted a rule defining what it means for
stormwater discharges to be “associated with”
industrial activity, and what activities count as
“industrial.” 40 CFR §122.26(b)(14).
The regulation sets out eleven “categories
of industries”; as to those industries, discharges are
“associated with industrial activity” if they come from
sites used for “transportation” of “any raw
material.”
Ibid. The forest roads at issue here are
used to transport raw material (logs); the only question is whether
logging is a “categor[y] of industr[y]” enumerated in
the definition. It is: The second of the listed “categories
of facilities” is “[f]acilities classified as Standard
Industrial Classifications 24 (except 2434).”
§122.26(b)(14)(ii). Opening one’s hymnal to Standard
Industrial Classification 24 (“Lumber and Wood Products,
Except Furniture”), one finds that the first industry group
listed, No. 2411, is “Logging”—defined as
“[e]stablish- ments primarily engaged in cutting
timber.” 2 App. 64. (As if that were not clear enough, an
illustrative product of this industry is helpfully listed:
“Logs.”) That, I would think, is that.
EPA disagrees, and the Court gives the
agency’s position
Auer deference, but that reading is
certainly not the most natural one. The Court relies heavily on the
fact that the definition of “[s]torm water discharge associ-
ated with industrial activity” requires that the discharge be
“directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw
materials storage areas at an industrial plant,”
§122.26(b)(14). The crucial question this definition presents
is whether the concluding phrase “at an industrial
plant” limits only the last noun phrase (“raw materials
storage areas”) or also the two preceding nouns
(“manufacturing” and “processing”). The
canon of interpretation known as the rule of the last antecedent
states that “a limiting clause or phrase . . .
should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that
it immediately follows.”
Barnhart v.
Thomas,
540 U.S.
20, 26 (2003). If a statute provides that “it shall be
unlawful to possess a grenade launcher, a fully-automatic weapon,
or a shotgun with a barrel shorter than 12 inches,” that does
not mean that a grenade launcher with a barrel
longer than
12 inches is legal. Application of the canon would mean that
“at an industrial plant” modifies only “raw
materials storage areas,” and therefore that
“manufacturing” and “processing”
anywhere, including in the forest, would be
“associated with industrial activity.” (Standard
Industrial Classification 24 categorizes logging as a manufacturing
business, and these discharges are therefore “directly
related to manufacturing.”)
Like all canons of interpretation, the rule of
the last antecedent can be overcome by textual indication of
contrary meaning. But that does not exist here. To the contrary,
the enumerated categories of industries to which the term
“industrial activity” applies reinforce the proposition
that “at an industrial plant” does not modify
“manufacturing” or “processing.” The term
includes (in addition to logging) “active or inactive mining
operations,” §122.26(b)(14)(iii);
“[l]andfills” and “open dumps,”
§122.26(b)(14)(v); “automobile junkyards,”
§122.26(b)(14)(vi); and “[c]onstruction activity
including clearing, grading and excavation,”
§122.26(b)(14)(x).
Those industries and activities
(while related to manufacturing and processing) virtually never
take place at anything like what one might describe as a
“plant.” The rule of the last antecedent is therefore
confirmed as the correct guide to meaning here: “at an
industrial plant” limits only “raw materials storage
areas.”
EPA also insists, Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 24, that the regulation reaches only
“ ‘traditional’ ” sources of
industrial stormwater, such as sawmills. But Standard Industrial
Classification 24
has a specific subcategory (No. 242) that
is “Sawmills and Planing Mills.” 2 App. 64. The rule is
not so limited, reaching by its terms “Standard Industrial
Classificatio[n] 24 (except 2434).” §122.26(b)(14)(ii).
The explicit carving-out of No. 2434 is telling: Why EPA chose to
exclude “establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing
wood kitchen cabinet and wood bathroom vanities” from the
definition of industrial stormwater, I do not know—but the
picayune nature of the exclusion gives lie to the idea that the
rule’s scope ought to be decided by a rough sense of its
gestalt. If EPA had meant to reach only sawmills, it quite
obviously knew how to do so.
Finally, the Court believes that Standard
Industrial Classification 24’s reference to
“establishments” “suggest[s] industrial sites
more fixed and permanent than outdoor timber-harvesting
operations.”
Ante, at 13. Not so. The Standard
Industrial Classification uses “es- tablishments”
throughout to refer to business entities in general; for example,
Classification 2411 refers to “[e]stablishments primarily
engaged in cutting timber,” which includes “producing
wood chips in the field.” 2 App. 64. I cannot imagine what
kind of “fixed and permanent” industrial site the Court
and EPA imagine will be “producing wood chips in the
field.” And the Court’s final point,
ante, at
13—that the regulatory definition of “industrial
activity” uses the word “facilities”—cuts
the other way: EPA regulations define “facility” to
include “any . . . ‘point
source.’ ” 40 CFR §122.2; see,
e.g.,
§122.26(b)(14)(iii) (referring to mines as
“facilities”).
The agency also assures us that its
intent (Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 25)
was to reach a more limited subset of logging activities, an intent
that it believes can essentially float free from the text of the
relevant rule. In the end, this is the real meat of the matter: EPA
states that it simply did not mean to require permits for the
discharges at issue here. And the Court is willing to credit that
intent, even given what I think has been amply demonstrated to be a
contrary text.
* * *
Because the fairest reading of the
agency’s rules proscribes the conduct at issue in these
cases, I would affirm the judgment below. It is time for us to
presume (to coin a phrase) that an agency says in a rule what it
means, and means in a rule what it says there.