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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 18–315
_________________
COCHISE CONSULTANCY, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS
v. UNITED STATES, ex rel
. BILLY JOE
HUNT
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[May 13, 2019]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The False Claims Act contains two limitations
periods that apply to a “civil action under section 3730”—that is,
an action asserting that a person presented false claims to the
United States Government. 31 U. S. C. §3731(b). The first
period requires that the action be brought within 6 years after the
statutory violation occurred. The second period requires that the
action be brought within 3 years after the United States official
charged with the responsibility to act knew or should have known
the relevant facts, but not more than 10 years after the violation.
Whichever period provides the later date serves as the limitations
period.
This case requires us to decide how to calculate
the limitations period for
qui tam suits in which the
United States does not intervene. The Court of Appeals held that
these suits are “civil action[s] under section 3730” and that the
limitations periods in §3731(b) apply in accordance with their
terms, regardless of whether the United States intervenes. It
further held that, for purposes of the second period, the private
person who initiates the
qui tam suit cannot be deemed
the official of the United States. We agree, and therefore
affirm.
I
As relevant, the False Claims Act imposes
civil liability on “any person” who “knowingly presents, or causes
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval” to the Government or to certain third parties acting on
the Government’s behalf. 31 U. S. C. §§3729(a), (b)(2).
Section 3730 authorizes two types of actions: First, the Attorney
General, who “diligently shall investigate a violation under
section 3729,” may bring a civil action against the alleged false
claimant. §3730(a). Second, a private person, known as a relator,
may bring a
qui tam civil action “for the person and for the
United States Government” against the alleged false claimant, “in
the name of the Government.” §3730(b).
If a relator initiates the action, he must
deliver a copy of the complaint and supporting evidence to the
Government, which then has 60 days to intervene in the action.
§§3730(b)(2), (4). During this time, the complaint remains sealed.
§3730(b)(2). If the Government intervenes, it assumes primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action, though the relator may
continue to participate. §3730(c). Otherwise, the relator has the
right to pursue the action. §§3730(b)(4), (c)(3). Even if it does
not intervene, the Government is entitled to be served with all
pleadings upon request and may intervene at any time with good
cause. §3730(c)(3). The relator receives a share of any proceeds
from the action—generally 15 to 25 percent if the Government
intervenes, and 25 to 30 percent if it does not—plus attorney’s
fees and costs. §§3730(d)(1)–(2). See
Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S.
765, 769–770 (2000).
At issue here is the Act’s statute of
limitations, which provides:
“(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not
be brought—
“(1) more than 6 years after the date on which
the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
“(2) more than 3 years after the date when
facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably
should have been known by the official of the United States charged
with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event
more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is
committed,
“whichever occurs last.” §3731(b).
On November 27, 2013, respondent Billy Joe Hunt
filed a complaint alleging that petitioners—two defense contractors
(collectively, Cochise)—defrauded the Government by submitting
false claims for payment under a subcontract to provide security
services in Iraq “from some time prior to January 2006 until early
2007.” App. 43a. A little less than three years before bringing his
complaint, Hunt was interviewed by federal agents about his role in
an unrelated contracting fraud in Iraq. Hunt claims to have
revealed Cochise’s allegedly fraudulent scheme during this November
30, 2010, interview.
The United States declined to intervene in
Hunt’s action, and Cochise moved to dismiss the complaint as barred
by the statute of limitations. Hunt conceded that the 6-year
limitations period in §3731(b)(1) had elapsed before he filed suit
on November 27, 2013. But Hunt argued that his complaint was timely
under §3731(b)(2) because it was filed within 3 years of the
interview in which he informed federal agents about the alleged
fraud (and within 10 years after the violation occurred).
The District Court dismissed the action. It
considered three potential interpretations of §3731(b). Under the
first interpretation, §3731(b)(2) does not apply to a
relator-initiated action in which the Government elects not to
intervene, so any such action must be filed within six years after
the violation. Under the second interpretation, §3731(b)(2) applies
in nonintervened actions, and the limitations period begins when
the relator knew or should have known the relevant facts. Under the
third interpretation, §3731(b)(2) applies in nonintervened actions,
and the limitations period begins when “the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances”
knew or should have known the relevant facts. The District Court
rejected the third interpretation and declined to choose between
the first two because it found that Hunt’s complaint would be
untimely under either. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
adopting the third interpretation. 887 F.3d 1081 (CA11 2018).
Given a conflict between the Courts of
Appeals,[
1]* we granted
certiorari. 586 U. S. ___ (2018).
II
The first question before us is whether the
limitations period in §3731(b)(2) is available in a
relator-initiated suit in which the Government has declined to
intervene. If so, the second question is whether the relator in
such a case should be considered “the official of the United
States” whose knowledge triggers §3731(b)(2)’s 3-year limitations
period.
A
Section 3731(b) sets forth two limitations
periods that apply to “civil action[s] under section 3730.” Both
Government-initiated suits under §3730(a) and relator-initiated
suits under §3730(b) are “civil action[s] under section 3730.”
Thus, the plain text of the statute makes the two limitations
periods applicable in both types of suits.
Cochise agrees with that view as to the
limitations period in §3731(b)(1), but argues that the period in
§3731(b)(2) is available in a relator-initiated suit only if the
Government intervenes. According to Cochise, starting a limitations
period when the party entitled to bring a claim learns the relevant
facts is a default rule of tolling provisions, so subsection (b)(2)
should be read to apply only when the Government is a party. In
short, under Cochise’s reading, a relator-initiated, nonintervened
suit is a “civil action under section 3730” for purposes of
subsection (b)(1) but not subsection (b)(2).
This reading is at odds with fundamental rules
of statutory interpretation. In all but the most unusual
situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed
meaning. See
Ratzlaf v.
United States,
510 U.S.
135, 143 (1994). We therefore avoid interpretations that would
“attribute different meanings to the same phrase.”
Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Bd.,
528 U.S.
320, 329 (2000). Here, either a relator-initiated,
nonintervened suit is a “civil action under section 3730”—and thus
subject to the limitations periods in subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(2)—or it is not. It is such an action. Whatever the default
tolling rule might be, the clear text of the statute controls this
case.
Under Cochise’s reading, a relator-initiated
civil action would convert to “[a] civil action under section 3730”
for purposes of subsection (b)(2) if and when the Government
intervenes. That reading cannot be correct. If the Government
intervenes, the civil action remains the same—it simply has one
additional party. There is no textual basis to base the meaning of
“[a] civil action under section 3730” on whether the Government has
intervened.
Cochise relies on our decision in
Graham
County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States
ex rel. Wilson,
545 U.S.
409 (2005), which addressed the question whether §3731(b)(1) or
federal common law provided the limitations period for §3730(h)
retaliation actions. Section 3730(h) creates a cause of action for
an employee who suffers retaliation for, among other things,
assisting with the prosecution of a False Claims Act action. At the
time, §3730(h) did not specify a time limit for bringing a
retaliation action, so the question before us was whether the
phrase “civil action under section 3730” in §3731(b) encompassed
actions under §3730(h). We considered the statute “ambiguous
because its text, literally read, admits of two plausible
interpretations.”
Id., at 419, n. 2. One reading was
that a “civil action under section 3730” includes §3730(h) actions
because such actions arise under §3730.
Id., at 415.
“Another reasonable reading” was that a “civil action under section
3730” “applies only to actions arising under §§3730(a) and (b)”
because “§3731(b)(1) t[ies] the start of the time limit to ‘the
date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.’ ”
Ibid. That reading had force because retaliation claims need
not involve an actual violation of §3729.
Ibid. Looking to
statutory context, we explained that the phrase “ ‘civil
action under section 3730’ means only those civil actions under
§3730 that have as an element a ‘violation of section 3729,’ that
is, §§3730(a) and (b) actions”—not §3730(h) retaliation actions.
Id., at 421–422.
A relator-initiated, nonintervened suit arises
under §3730(b) and has as an element a violation of §3729.
Graham County supports our reading. Nonetheless, Cochise
points out that in considering the statutory context, we discussed
a similar phrase contained in §3731(c) (now §3731(d)), which
stated: “In
any action brought under section 3730, the
United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of
the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (Emphasis added.) We explained that §3731(c) “use[d] the
similarly unqualified phrase ‘action brought under section 3730’ to
refer only to §§3730(a) and (b) actions.”
Id., at 417–418.
We then stated: “As [respondent] and the United States concede, the
context of this provision implies that the phrase ‘any action
brought under section 3730’ is limited to §3730(a) actions brought
by the United States and §3730(b) actions in which the United
States intervenes as a party, as those are the types of §3730
actions in which the United States necessarily participates.”
Id., at 418.
Cochise contends that we should adopt a similar
construction of the phrase “civil action under section 3730” in
§3731(b). We disagree. Our discussion of §3731(c) was focused on
“the context of th[at] provision” and on whether it could be read
to impose the burden of proof on the Government even in cases where
the Government did not participate.
Id., at 418. Those
considerations do not apply here; there is nothing illogical about
reading §3731(b) to apply in accordance with its plain terms.
Moreover, if a “civil action under section 3730” included only an
action in which the Government participates for purposes of
§3731(b)(2), then we would be obligated to give it a like meaning
for purposes of §3731(b)(1). This would mean that a
relator-initiated, nonintervened suit would be subject to neither
§3731(b)(1) nor §3731(b)(2)—a reading Cochise expressly disclaims.
See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 3. Nothing in
Graham
County supports giving the same phrase in §3731(b) two
different meanings depending on whether the Government
intervenes.
Again pointing to
Graham County, Cochise
next contends that our reading would lead to
“ ‘counterintuitive results.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 26.
For instance, if the Government discovers the fraud on the day it
occurred, it would have 6 years to bring suit, but if a relator
instead discovers the fraud on the day it occurred and the
Government does not discover it, the relator could have as many as
10 years to bring suit. That discrepancy arises because §3731(b)(2)
begins its limitations period on the date that “the official of the
United States charged with responsibility to act” obtained
knowledge of the relevant facts. But we see nothing unusual about
extending the limitations period when the Government official did
not know and should not reasonably have known the relevant facts,
given that the Government is the party harmed by the false claim
and will receive the bulk of any recovery. See §3730(d). In any
event, a result that “may seem odd . . . is not absurd.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services,
Inc.,
545 U.S.
546, 565 (2005). Although in
Graham County we
sought “a construction that avoids . . . counterintuitive
results,” there the text “admit[ted] of two plausible
interpretations.” 545 U. S., at 421, 419, n. 2. Here,
Cochise points to no other plausible interpretation of the text, so
the “ ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ”
Barnhart
v.
Sigmon Coal Co.,
534 U.S.
438, 462 (2002).
B
Cochise’s fallback argument is that the
relator in a nonintervened suit should be considered “the official
of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the
circumstances,” meaning that §3731(b)(2)’s 3-year limitations
period would start when the relator knew or should have known about
the fraud. But the statute provides no support for reading “the
official of the United States” to encompass a private relator.
First, a private relator is not an “official of
the United States” in the ordinary sense of that phrase. A relator
is neither appointed as an officer of the United States, see
U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2, nor employed by the United
States. Indeed, the provision that authorizes
qui tam suits
is entitled “Actions by Private Persons.” §3730(b). Although that
provision explains that the action is brought “for the person and
for the United States Government” and “in the name of the
Government,”
ibid., it does not make the relator anything
other than a private person, much less “the official of the United
States” referenced by the statute. Cf.
Stevens, 529
U. S., at 773, n. 4 (“[A]
qui tam relator is, in
effect, suing as a partial as- signee of the United States”
(emphasis deleted)).
Second, the statute refers to “the” official
“charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances.” The
Government argues that, in context, “the” official refers to the
Attorney General (or his delegate), who by statute “shall
investigate a violation under section 3729.” §3730(a). Regardless
of precisely which official or officials the statute is referring
to, §3731(b)(2)’s use of the definite article “the” suggests that
Congress did not intend for any and all private relators to be
considered “the official of the United States.” See
Rumsfeld
v.
Padilla,
542 U.S.
426, 434 (2004) (explaining that the “use of the definite
article . . . indicates that there is generally only one”
person covered). More fundamentally, private relators are not
“charged with responsibility to act” in the sense contemplated by
§3731(b), as they are not required to investigate or prosecute a
False Claims Act action.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
