NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 17–778
_________________
JAMAR ALONZO QUARLES, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[June 10, 2019]
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Section 924(e) of Title 18, also known as the
Armed Career Criminal Act, mandates a minimum 15-year prison
sentence for a felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm and has
three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent
felony.” Section 924(e) defines “violent felony” to include
“burglary.” Under this Court’s 1990 decision in
Taylor v.
United States,
495 U.S.
575, the generic statu- tory term “burglary” means “unlawful or
unprivileged entry into,
or remaining in, a building or
structure, with intent to commit a crime.”
Id., at 599
(emphasis added).
The exceedingly narrow question in this case
concerns remaining-in burglary. The question is whether
remaining-in burglary (i) occurs only if a person has the intent to
commit a crime
at the exact moment when he or she
first unlawfully remains in a building or structure, or (ii)
more broadly, occurs when a person forms the intent to commit a
crime
at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building
or structure. For purposes of §924(e), we conclude that
remaining-in burglary occurs when the defendant forms the intent to
commit a crime
at any time while unlawfully remaining in a
building or structure. We affirm the judgment of the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
I
On August 24, 2013, police officers in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, responded to a 911 call. When the officers
arrived at the scene, the caller, Chasity Warren, told the officers
that she had just escaped from her boyfriend, Jamar Quarles. Warren
said that Quarles had threatened her at gunpoint and also hit her.
While the police officers were speaking with Warren, Quarles drove
by. The officers then arrested Quarles and later searched his
house. Inside they found a semiautomatic pistol.
Quarles pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§922(g)(1). Quarles had at least three prior convictions that
appeared to qualify as violent felonies under the Armed Career
Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. §924(e). Those three
convictions were: (1) a 2002 Michigan conviction for third-degree
home invasion stemming from an attempt to chase down an
ex-girlfriend who had sought refuge in a nearby apartment; (2) a
2004 Michigan conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon based
on an incident where Quarles held a gun to the head of another
ex-girlfriend and threatened to kill her; and (3) a 2008 Michigan
conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon arising from an
altercation with another man and that same ex-girlfriend in which
Quarles shot at the man.
In the sentencing proceedings for his federal
felon-in-possession offense, Quarles argued that his 2002 Michigan
conviction for third-degree home invasion did not qualify as a
burglary under §924(e). Under this Court’s precedents, the District
Court had to decide whether the Michigan statute under which
Quarles was convicted in 2002 was broader than the generic
definition of burglary set forth in
Taylor (in which case
the conviction would not qualify as a prior conviction under
§924(e)) or, instead, whether the Michigan statute “substantially
correspond[ed]” to or was narrower than the generic definition of
burglary set forth in
Taylor. 495 U. S., at 602. To
reiterate,
Taylor interpreted burglary under §924(e) to mean
“unlawful or unprivileged entry into,
or remaining in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.”
Id.,
at 599 (emphasis added).
Under the Michigan law at issue here, a person
commits third-degree home invasion if he or she “breaks and enters
a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and,
at any
time while he or she is entering,
present in, or exiting
the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§750.110a(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Quarles argued to the
District Court that the Michigan third-degree home invasion statute
swept too broadly to qualify as burglary under §924(e) because the
Michigan statute encompassed situations where the defendant forms
the intent to commit a crime
at any time while
unlawfully remaining in a dwelling, not
at the exact moment
when the defendant is
first unlawfully present in a
dwelling. The District Court rejected that argument and sentenced
Quarles to 17 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. 850 F.3d
836, 840 (2017). We granted certio- rari in light of a Circuit
split on the question of how to assess state remaining-in burglary
statutes for purposes of §924(e). 586 U. S. ___ (2019).
II
Section 924(e) lists “burglary” as a
qualifying predicate offense for purposes of the Armed Career
Criminal Act. But §924(e) does not define “burglary.” The question
here is how to define “burglary” under §924(e). We do not write on
a clean slate. See
Taylor, 495 U. S., at 599.
At common law, burglary was confined to unlawful
breaking and entering a dwelling at night with the intent to commit
a felony. See,
e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 224 (1769). But by the time Congress passed and
President Reagan signed the current version of §924(e) in 1986,
state burglary statutes had long since departed from the common-law
formulation. See
Taylor, 495 U. S., at 593–596. In
addition to casting off relics like the requirement that there be a
breaking, or that the unlawful entry occur at night, a majority of
States by 1986 prohibited unlawfully “remaining in” a building or
structure with intent to commit a crime. Those remaining-in
statutes closed a loophole in some States’ laws by extending
burglary to cover situations where a per- son enters a structure
lawfully but stays unlawfully—for example, by remaining in a store
after closing time without permission to do so.
In the 1990
Taylor decision, this Court
interpreted the term “burglary” in §924(e) in accord with the more
expansive understanding of burglary that had become common by 1986:
“We believe that Congress meant by ‘burglary’ the generic sense in
which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.”
495 U. S., at 598. The Court concluded that generic burglary
under §924(e) means “unlawful or unprivileged entry into,
or
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a
crime.”
Id., at 599 (emphasis added). A defendant’s prior
conviction under a state statute qualifies as a predicate burglary
under §924(e) if the state statute—regardless of its “exact
definition or label”—“substantially corresponds” to or is narrower
than the generic definition of burglary.
Id., at 599,
602.
In this case, we must determine the scope of
generic remaining-in burglary under
Taylor—in particular,
the timing of the intent requirement. Quarles argues that
remaining-in burglary occurs only when the defendant has the intent
to commit a crime
at the exact moment when he or she
first unlawfully remains in a building or structure. The
Government argues for a broader definition of remaining-in
burglary. According to the Government, remaining-in burglary occurs
when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime
at any
time while unlawfully present in a building or structure. We
agree with the Government.
As noted,
Taylor interpreted generic
burglary under §924(e) to include remaining-in burglary.
Id., at 599. In ordinary usage, “remaining in” refers to a
continuous activity. See
United States v.
Cores,
356 U.S.
405, 408 (1958); see also Webster’s New International
Dictionary 2106 (2d ed. 1949); 8 Oxford English Dictionary 418
(1933). This Court has followed that ordinary meaning in analogous
legal contexts. For example, when interpreting a federal criminal
statute punishing any “ ‘alien crewman who willfully remains
in the United States in excess of the number of days
allowed,’ ” the Court stated that “the crucial word ‘remains’
permits no connotation other than continuing presence.”
Cores, 356 U. S., at 408. The law of trespass likewise
proscribes remaining on the land of another without permission. In
that context, the term “remain” refers to “a continuing trespass
for the entire time during which the actor wrongfully remains.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts §158, Comment m, p. 280 (1965).
Those interpretations of “remaining in” in
analogous areas of the law inform our interpretation of
“remaining-in” burglary in §924(e). In particular, the common
understanding of “remaining in” as a continuous event means that
burglary occurs for purposes of §924(e) if the defendant forms the
intent to commit a crime
at any time during the continuous
event of unlawfully remaining in a building or structure. To put it
in conventional criminal law terms: Because the
actus reus
is a continuous event, the
mens rea matches the
actus
reus so long as the burglar forms the intent to commit a crime
at any time while unlawfully present in the building or
structure.
Quarles insists, however, that to constitute a
burglary under §924(e), the intent to commit a crime must be
contemporaneous with unlawful entry or remaining. That is true. But
the defendant’s intent
is contemporaneous with the unlawful
remaining so long as the defendant forms the intent at any time
while unlawfully remaining. Put sim- ply, for burglary predicated
on unlawful
entry, the defendant must have the intent to
commit a crime at the time of entry. For burglary predicated on
unlawful
remaining, the defendant must have the intent to
commit a crime at the time of remaining, which is any time during
which the defendant unlawfully remains.
That conclusion is supported by the States’ laws
as of 1986 when Congress enacted §924(e). As of 1986, a majority of
States proscribed remaining-in burglary. At that time, there was
not much case law addressing the precise timing of the intent
requirement for remaining-in bur- glary. That is presumably because
in most remaining-in burglaries, the defendant has the intent to
commit a crime when he or she first unlawfully remains in a
building or structure. The timing issue arises only in the rarer
cases where the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime only
after unlawfully remaining in the building or structure for a
while. In any event, for present purposes, the important point is
that all of the state appellate courts that had definitively
addressed this issue as of 1986 had interpreted remaining-in
burglary to occur when the defendant forms the intent to commit a
crime at any time while unlawfully present in the building or
structure. See
Gratton v.
State,
456 So. 2d 865, 872 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984);
State v.
Embree, 130 Ariz. 64, 66, 633 P.2d 1057, 1059 (App. 1981);
Keith v.
State, 138 Ga. App. 239,
225 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1976);
State v.
Mogenson, 10
Kan. App. 2d 470, 472–476,
701 P.2d 1339, 1343–1345 (1985);
State v.
Papineau, 53 Ore. App. 33, 38,
630 P.2d 904, 906–907 (1981).[
1]
Especially in light of the body of state law as
of 1986, it is not likely that Congress intended generic burglary
under §924(e) to
include (i) a burglar who intends to commit
a crime at the exact moment when he or she first unlawfully remains
in a building or structure, but to
exclude (ii) a burglar
who forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully
remaining in a building or structure.
Indeed, excluding that latter category of
burglaries from generic burglary under §924(e) would make little
sense in light of Congress’ rationale for specifying burglary as a
violent felony. As the Court recognized in
Taylor, Congress
“singled out burglary” because of its “inherent potential for harm
to persons.” 495 U. S., at 588. Burglary is dangerous because
it “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the
offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes
to investigate.”
Ibid.; see also
United States v.
Stitt, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 6).
With respect to remaining-in burglary, the
possibility of a violent confrontation does not depend on the exact
moment when the burglar forms the intent to commit a crime while
unlawfully present in a building or structure. Once an intruder is
both unlawfully present inside a building or structure and has the
requisite intent to commit a crime, all of the reasons that led
Congress to include burglary as a §924(e) predicate fully apply.
The dangers of remaining-in burglary are not tied to the esoteric
question of precisely when the defendant forms the intent to commit
a crime. That point underscores that Congress, when enacting
§924(e) in 1986, would not have understood the meaning of burglary
to hinge on exactly when the defendant forms the intent to commit a
crime while unlawfully present in a building or structure.
Moreover, to interpret remaining-in burglary
narrowly, as Quarles advocates, would thwart the stated goals of
the Armed Career Criminal Act. After all, most burglaries involve
unlawful entry, not unlawful remaining in. Yet if we were to
narrowly interpret the remaining-in category of generic burglary so
as to require that the defendant have the intent to commit a crime
at the exact moment he or she first unlawfully remains, then many
States’ bur- glary statutes would be broader than generic burglary.
As a result, under our precedents, many States’ burglary statutes
would presumably be eliminated as predicate offenses under §924(e).
That result not only would defy common sense, but also would defeat
Congress’ stated objective of imposing enhanced punishment on armed
career criminals who have three prior convictions for burglary or
other violent felonies. We should not lightly conclude that
Congress enacted a self-defeating statute. See,
e.g.,
Stokeling v.
United States, 586 U. S. ___, ___
(2019) (slip op., at 8);
Taylor, 495 U. S., at 594.
To sum up: The Armed Career Criminal Act does
not define the term “burglary.” In
Taylor, the Court
explained that “Congress did not wish to specify an exact
formulation that an offense must meet in order to count as
‘burglary’ for enhancement purposes.”
Id., at 599. And the
Court recognized that the definitions of burglary “vary” among the
States.
Id., at 598. The
Taylor Court therefore
interpreted the generic term “burglary” in §924(e) in light of: the
ordinary understanding of burglary as of 1986; the States’ laws at
that time; Congress’ recognition of the dangers of burglary; and
Congress’ stated objective of imposing increased punishment on
armed career criminals who had committed prior burglaries. Looking
at those sources, the
Taylor Court interpreted generic
burglary under §924(e) to encompass remaining-in burglary. Looking
at those same sources, we interpret remaining-in burglary under
§924(e) to occur when the defendant forms the intent to commit a
crime at any time while unlawfully present in a building or
structure.
III
In light of our conclusion that generic
remaining-in burglary occurs when the defendant forms the intent to
commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building
or structure, Quarles’ case is easily resolved. The question in
Quarles’ case is whether the Michigan home-invasion statute under
which he was convicted in 2002 is broader than generic burglary or,
instead, “substantially corresponds” to or is narrower than generic
burglary.
Id., at 602. Regarding that inquiry, the
Taylor Court cautioned courts against seizing on modest
state-law deviations from the generic definition of burglary. A
state law’s “exact definition or label” does not control.
Id., at 599. As the Court stated in
Taylor, so long
as the state law in question “substantially corresponds” to (or is
narrower than) generic burglary, the conviction qualifies under
§924(e).
Id., at 602.
As stated above, generic remaining-in burglary
occurs under §924(e) when the defendant forms the intent to commit
a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or
structure. For the Court’s purposes here, the Michigan statute
substantially corresponds to or is narrower than generic
burglary.[
2]
* * *
We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
