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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 16–1094
_________________
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, PETITIONER
v. RICK
HARRISON, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[March 26, 2019]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case concerns the requirements applicable
to a particular method of serving civil process on a foreign state.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a
foreign state may be served by means of a mailing that is
“addressed and dispatched . . . to the head of the
ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” 28
U. S. C. §1608(a)(3). The question now before us is
whether this provision is satisfied when a service packet that
names the foreign minister is mailed to the foreign state’s embassy
in the United States. We hold that it is not. Most naturally read,
§1608(a)(3) requires that a mailing be sent directly to the foreign
minister’s office in the minister’s home country.
I
A
Under the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from
the jurisdiction of courts in this country unless one of several
enumerated exceptions to immunity applies. 28 U. S. C.
§§1604, 1605–1607. If a suit falls within one of these exceptions,
the FSIA provides subject-matter jurisdiction in federal district
courts. §1330(a). The FSIA also provides for personal jurisdiction
“where service has been made under section 1608.” §1330(b).
Section 1608(a) governs service of process on “a
foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state.”
§1608(a); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(j)(1). In particular, it sets out
in hierarchical order the following four methods by which
“[s]ervice . . . shall be made.” 28 U. S. C.
§1608(a). The first method is by delivery of a copy of the summons
and complaint “in accordance with any special arrangement for
service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political
subdivision.” §1608(a)(1). “[I]f no special arrangement exists,”
service may be made by the second method, namely, delivery of a
copy of the summons and complaint “in accordance with an applicable
international convention on service of judicial documents.”
§1608(a)(2). If service is not possible under either of the first
two methods, the third method, which is the one at issue in this
case, may be used. This method calls for
“sending a copy of the summons and
complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each
into the official language of the foreign state,
by any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of the court
to the head of the ministry of foreign
affairs of the foreign state concerned.” §1608(a)(3) (emphasis
added).
Finally, if service cannot be made within 30
days under §1608(a)(3), service may be effected by sending the
service packet “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to
be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia,” for
transmittal “through diplomatic channels to the foreign state.”
§1608(a)(4).
Once served, a foreign state or political
subdivision has 60 days to file a responsive pleading. §1608(d). If
the foreign state or political subdivision does not do this, it
runs the risk of incurring a default judgment. See §1608(e). A copy
of any such default judgment must be “sent to the foreign state or
political subdivision in the [same] manner prescribed for service.”
Ibid.
B
On October 12, 2000, the USS
Cole, a
United States Navy guided-missile destroyer, entered the harbor of
Aden, Yemen, for what was intended to be a brief refueling stop.
While refueling was underway, a small boat drew along the side of
the
Cole, and the occupants of the boat detonated explosives
that tore a hole in the side of the
Cole. Seventeen
crewmembers were killed, and dozens more were injured. Al Qaeda
later claimed responsibility for the attack.
Respondents in this case are victims of the USS
Cole bombing and their family members. In 2010, respondents
sued petitioner, the Republic of Sudan, alleging that Sudan had
provided material support to al Qaeda for the bombing. See 28
U. S. C. §§1605A(a)(1), (c). Because respondents brought
suit under the FSIA, they were required to serve Sudan with process
under §1608(a). It is undisputed that service could not be made
under §1608(a)(1) or §1608(a)(2), and respondents therefore turned
to §1608(a)(3). At respondents’ request, the clerk of the court
sent the service packet, return receipt requested, to: “Republic of
Sudan, Deng Alor Koul, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of the
Republic of Sudan, 2210 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC
20008.” App. 172. The clerk certified that the service packet had
been sent and, a few days later, certified that a signed receipt
had been returned.[
1] After
Sudan failed to appear in the litigation, the District Court for
the District of Columbia held an evidentiary hearing and entered a
$314 million default judgment against Sudan. Again at respondents’
request, the clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default
judgment in the same manner that the clerk had previously used. See
§1608(e).
With their default judgment in hand, respondents
turned to the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
where they sought to register the judgment and satisfy it through
orders requiring several banks to turn over Sudanese assets. See 28
U. S. C. §1963 (providing for registration of judgments
for enforcement in other districts). Pursuant to §1610(c), the
District Court entered an order confirming that a sufficient period
of time had elapsed following the entry and notice of the default
judgment, and the court then issued three turnover orders.
At this point, Sudan made an appearance for the
purpose of contesting jurisdiction. It filed a notice of appeal
from each of the three turnover orders and contended on appeal that
the default judgment was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In particular, Sudan maintained that §1608(a)(3) required that the
service packet be sent to its foreign minister at his principal
office in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and not to the Sudanese
Embassy in the United States.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this argument and affirmed the orders of the District
Court. 802 F.3d 399 (2015). The Second Circuit reasoned that,
although §1608(a)(3) requires that a service packet be mailed “to
the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state
concerned,” the statute “is silent as to a specific location where
the mailing is to be addressed.”
Id., at 404. In light of
this, the court concluded that “the method chosen by plaintiffs—a
mailing addressed to the minister of foreign affairs at the
embassy—was consistent with the language of the statute and could
reasonably be expected to result in delivery to the intended
person.”
Ibid.
Sudan filed a petition for rehearing, and the
United States filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of
Sudan’s petition. The panel ordered supplemental briefing and heard
additional oral argument, but it once again affirmed, reiterating
its view that §1608(a)(3) “does not specify that the mailing be
sent to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs
in the
foreign country.” 838 F.3d 86, 91 (CA2 2016). The court thereafter
denied Sudan’s petition for rehearing en banc.
Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in a similar case that
§1608(a)(3) “does not authorize delivery of service to a foreign
state’s embassy even if it correctly identifies the intended
recipient as the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.”
Kumar v.
Republic of Sudan, 880 F.3d 144, 158 (2018),
cert. pending, No. 17–1269.
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
585 U. S. ___ (2018)
II
A
The question before us concerns the meaning of
§1608(a)(3), and in interpreting that provision, “[w]e begin ‘where
all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute
itself.’ ”
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S,
566 U.S.
399, 412 (2012) (quoting
United States v.
Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc.,
489 U.S.
235, 241 (1989)). As noted, §1608(a)(3) requires that service
be sent “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of
the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state
concerned.”
The most natural reading of this language is
that service must be mailed directly to the foreign minister’s
office in the foreign state. Although this is not, we grant, the
only plausible reading of the statutory text, it is the most
natural one. See,
e.g., United States v.
Hohri,
482 U.S.
64, 69–71 (1987) (choosing the “more natural” reading of a
statute);
ICC v.
Texas,
479 U.S.
450, 456–457 (1987) (same); see also
Florida Dept. of
Revenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
554 U.S.
33, 41 (2008) (similar).
A key term in §1608(a)(3) is the past participle
“addressed.” A letter or package is “addressed” to an intended
recipient when his or her name and “address” is placed on the
outside of the item to be sent. And the noun “address,” in the
sense relevant here, means “the designation of a place (as a
residence or place of business) where a person or organization may
be found or communicated with.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 25 (1971) (Webster’s Third); see also Webster’s Second
New International Dictionary 30 (1957) (“the name or description of
a place of residence, business, etc., where a person may be found
or communicated with”); Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 17 (1966) (“the place or the name of the place where a
person, organization, or the like is located or may be reached”);
American Heritage Dictionary 15 (1969) (“[t]he location at which a
particular organization or person may be found or reached”); Oxford
English Dictionary 106 (1933) (OED) (“the name of the place to
which any one’s letters are directed”). Since a foreign nation’s
embassy in the United States is neither the residence nor the usual
place of business of that nation’s foreign minister and is not a
place where the minister can customarily be found, the most common
understanding of the minister’s “address” is inconsistent with the
interpretation of §1608(a)(3) adopted by the court below and
advanced by respondents.
We acknowledge that there are circumstances in
which a mailing may be “addressed” to the intended recipient at a
place other than the individual’s residence or usual place of
business. For example, if the person sending the mailing does not
know the intended recipient’s current home or business address, the
sender might use the intended recipient’s last known address in the
hope that the mailing will be forwarded. Or a sender might send a
mailing to a third party who is thought to be in a position to
ensure that the mailing is ultimately received by the intended
recipient. But in the great majority of cases, addressing a mailing
to X means placing on the outside of the mailing both X’s name and
the address of X’s residence or customary place of work.
Section 1608(a)(3)’s use of the term
“dispatched” points in the same direction. To “dispatch” a
communication means “to send [it] off or away (as to a special
destination) with promptness or speed often as a matter of official
business.” Webster’s Third 653; see also OED 478 (“To send off
post-haste or with expedition or promptitude (a messenger, message,
etc., having an express destination)”). A person who wishes to
“dispatch” a letter to X will generally send it directly to X at a
place where X is customarily found. The sender will not “dispatch”
the letter in a roundabout way, such as by directing it to a third
party who, it is hoped, will then send it on to the intended
recipient.
A few examples illustrate this point. Suppose
that a person is instructed to “address” a letter to the Attorney
General of the United States and “dispatch” the letter
(
i.e., to “send [it] off post-haste”) to the Attorney
General. The person giving these instructions would likely be
disappointed and probably annoyed to learn that the letter had been
sent to, let us say, the office of the United States Attorney for
the District of Idaho. And this would be so even though a
U. S. Attorney’s office is part of the Department headed by
the Attorney General and even though such an office would very
probably forward the letter to the Attorney General’s office in
Washington. Similarly, a person who instructs a subordinate to
dispatch a letter to the CEO of a big corporation that owns retail
outlets throughout the country would probably be irritated to learn
that the letter had been mailed to one of those stores instead of
corporate headquarters. To “dispatch” a letter to an addressee
connotes sending it directly.
A similar understanding underlies the venerable
“mailbox rule.” As first-year law students learn in their course on
contracts, there is a presumption that a mailed acceptance of an
offer is deemed operative when “dispatched” if it is “properly
addressed.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 66, p. 161 (1979)
(Restatement);
Rosenthal v.
Walker,
111 U.S.
185, 193 (1884). But no acceptance would be deemed properly
addressed and dispatched if it lacked, and thus was not sent to,
the offer- or’s address (or an address that the offeror held out as
the place for receipt of an acceptance). See Restatement § 66,
Comment
b.
It is also significant that service under
§1608(a)(3) requires a signed returned receipt, a standard method
for ensuring delivery to the addressee. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary
1096 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “certified mail” as “[m]ail for
which the sender requests proof of delivery in the form of a
receipt signed by the addressee”). We assume that certified mail
sent to a foreign minister will generally be signed for by a
subordinate, but the person who signs for the minister’s certified
mail in the foreign ministry itself presumably has authority to
receive mail on the minister’s behalf and has been instructed on
how that mail is to be handled. The same is much less likely to be
true for an employee in the mailroom of an embassy.
For all these reasons, we think that the most
natural reading of §1608(a)(3) is that the service packet must bear
the foreign minister’s name and customary address and that it be
sent to the minister in a direct and expeditious way. And the
minister’s customary office is the place where he or she generally
works, not a farflung outpost that the minister may at most
occasionally visit.
B
Several related provisions in §1608 support
this reading. See
Davis v.
Michigan Dept. of
Treasury,
489 U.S.
803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme”).
1
One such provision is §1608(b)(3)(B). Section
1608(b) governs service on “an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.” And like §1608(a)(3), §1608(b)(3)(B) requires
delivery of a service packet to the intended recipient “by any form
of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of the court.” But §1608(b)(3)(B), unlike §1608(a)(3),
contains prefatory language saying that service by this method is
permissible “if reasonably calculated to give actual notice.”
Respondents read §1608(a)(3) as embodying a
similar requirement. See Brief for Respondents 34. At oral
argument, respondents’ counsel stressed this point, arguing that
respondents’ interpretation of §1608(a)(3) “gives effect” to the
“familiar” due process standard articulated in
Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S.
306 (1950), which is “the notion that [service] must be
reasonably calculated to give notice.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38.
This argument runs up against two well-settled
principles of statutory interpretation. First, “Congress generally
acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another.”
Department of Homeland
Security v.
MacLean, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)
(slip op., at 7). Because Congress included the “reasonably
calculated to give actual notice” language only in §1608(b), and
not in §1608(a), we resist the suggestion to read that language
into §1608(a). Second, “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation
of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another
portion of that same law.”
Mackey v.
Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc.,
486 U.S.
825, 837 (1988). Here, respondents encounter a superfluity
problem when they argue that the “addressed and dispatched” clause
in §1608(a)(3) gives effect to the
Mullane due process
standard. They fail to account for the fact that §1608(b)(3)(B)
contains
both the “addressed and dispatched” and “reasonably
calculated to give actual notice” requirements. If respondents were
correct that “addressed and dispatched” means “reason- ably
calculated to give notice,” then the phrase “reasonably calculated
to give actual notice” in §1608(b)(3) would be superfluous. Thus,
as the dissent agrees, §1608(a)(3) “does not deem a foreign state
properly served solely because the service method is reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice.”
Post, at 2 (opinion of
Thomas, J.).
2
Section 1608(b)(2) similarly supports our
interpretation of §1608(a)(3). Section 1608(b)(2) provides for
delivery of a service packet to an officer or a managing or general
agent of the agency or instrumentality of a foreign state or “to
any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process in the United States.”
This language is significant for three reasons.
First, it expressly allows service on an agent. Second, it
specifies the particular individuals who are permitted to be served
as agents of the recipient. Third, it makes clear that service on
the agent may occur
in the United States if an agent here
falls within the provision’s terms.
If Congress had contemplated anything similar
under §1608(a)(3), there is no apparent reason why it would not
have included in that provision terms similar to those in
§1608(b)(2). Respondents would have us believe that Congress was
content to have the courts read such terms into §1608(a)(3). In
view of §1608(b)(2), this seems un- likely.[
2] See also
post, at 2 (“Nor does the FSIA
authorize service on a foreign state by utilizing an agent
designated to receive process for the state”).
3
Section 1608(c) further buttresses our reading
of §1608(a)(3). Section 1608(c) sets out the rules for determining
when service “shall be deemed to have been made.” For the first
three methods of service under §1608(a), service is deemed to have
occurred on the date indicated on “the certification, signed and
returned postal receipt, or other proof of service applicable to
the method of service employed.” §1608(c)(2). The sole exception is
service under §1608(a)(4), which requires the Secretary of State to
transmit a service packet to the foreign state through diplomatic
channels. Under this method, once the Secretary has transmitted the
packet, the Secretary must send to the clerk of the court “a
certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers
were transmitted.” §1608(a)(4). And when service is effected in
this way, service is regarded as having occurred on the transmittal
date shown on the certified copy of the diplomatic note.
§1608(c)(1).
Under all these methods, service is deemed to
have occurred only when there is a strong basis for concluding that
the service packet will very shortly thereafter come into the hands
of a foreign official who will know what needs to be done. Under
§1608(a)(4), where service is transmitted by the Secretary of State
through diplomatic channels, there is presumably good reason to
believe that the service packet will quickly come to the attention
of a high-level foreign official, and thus service is regarded as
having been completed on the date of transmittal. And under
§§1608(a)(1), (2), and (3), where service is deemed to have
occurred on the date shown on a document signed by the person who
received it from the carrier, Congress presumably thought that the
individuals who signed for the service packet could be trusted to
ensure that the service packet is handled properly and
expeditiously.
It is easy to see why Congress could take that
view with respect to a person designated for the receipt of process
in a “special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the
foreign state or political subdivision,” §1608(a)(1), and a person
so designated under “an applicable international convention,”
§1608(a)(2). But what about §1608(a)(3), the provision now before
us? Who is more comparable to those who sign for mail under
§§1608(a)(1) and (2)? A person who works in the office of the
foreign minister in the minister’s home country and is authorized
to receive and process the minister’s mail? Or a mailroom employee
in a foreign embassy? We think the answer is obvious, and therefore
interpreting §1608(a)(3) to require that a service packet be sent
to a foreign minister’s own office better harmonizes the rules for
determining when service is deemed to have been made.
Respondents seek to soften the blow of an
untimely delivery to the minister by noting that the foreign state
can try to vacate a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(c). Brief for Respondents 27. But that is a poor
substitute for sure and timely receipt of service, since a foreign
state would have to show “good cause” to vacate the judgment under
that Rule. Here, as with the previously mentioned provisions in
§1608, giving §1608(a)(3) its ordinary meaning better harmonizes
the various provisions in §1608 and avoids the oddities that
respondents’ interpretation would create.
C
The ordinary meaning of the “addressed and
dispatched” requirement in §1608(a)(3) also has the virtue of
avoiding potential tension with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
1
Take the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
first. At the time of the FSIA’s enactment, Rule 4(i), entitled
“Alternative provisions for service in a foreign-country,” set out
certain permissible methods of service on “part[ies] in a foreign
country.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(i)(1) (1976). One such method
was “by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court
to the party
to be served.” Rule 4(i)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Rule 4(i)(2)
further provided that “proof of service” pursuant to that method
“shall include a receipt
signed by the addressee or other
evidence of
delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the
court.” (Emphasis added.) The current version of Rule 4 is similar.
See Rules 4(f )(2)(C)(ii), 4(
l)(2)(B).
The virtually identical methods of service
outlined in Rule 4 and §1608(a)(3) pose a problem for respondents’
position: If mailing a service packet to a foreign state’s embassy
in the United States were sufficient for purposes of §1608(a)(3),
then it would appear to be easier to serve the foreign state than
to serve a person in that foreign state. This is so because a
receipt signed by an embassy employee would not necessarily satisfy
Rule 4 since such a receipt would not bear the signature of the
foreign minister and might not constitute evidence that is
sufficient to show that the service packet had actually been
delivered to the minister. It would be an odd state of affairs for
a foreign state’s inhabitants to enjoy more protections in federal
courts than the foreign state itself, particularly given that the
foreign state’s immunity from suit is at stake. The natural reading
of §1608(a)(3) avoids that oddity.
2
Our interpretation of §1608(a)(3) avoids
concerns regarding the United States’ obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We have previously noted that
the State Department “helped to draft the FSIA’s language,” and we
therefore pay “special attention” to the Department’s views on
sovereign immunity.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v.
Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U. S.
___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9). It is also “well settled that the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great
weight.’ ”
Abbott v.
Abbott,
560 U.S.
1, 15 (2010) (quoting
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano,
457 U.S.
176, 185 (1982)).
Article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention provides:
“The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the
head of the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U. S. T. 3237, T. I. A. S. No. 7502. Since
at least 1974, the State Department has taken the position that
Article 22(1)’s principle of inviolability precludes serving a
foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state’s embassy in
the United States. See Service of Legal Process by Mail on Foreign
Governments in the United States, 71 Dept. State Bull. 458–459
(1974). In this case, the State Department has reiterated this view
in
amicus curiae briefs filed in this Court and in the
Second Circuit. The Government also informs us that United States
embassies do not accept service of process when the United States
is sued in a foreign court, and the Government expresses concern
that accepting respondents’ interpretation of §1608 might imperil
this practice. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae
25–26.
Contending that the State Department held a
different view of Article 22(1) before 1974, respondents argue that
the Department’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention is wrong,
but we need not decide this question. By giving §1608(a)(3) its
most natural reading, we avoid the potential international
implications of a contrary interpretation.
III
Respondents’ remaining arguments do not alter
our conclusion. First, respondents contend that §1608(a)(3) says
nothing about where the service packet must be sent. See Brief for
Respondents 22 (“the statute is silent as to the location
where the service packet should be sent”). But while it is
true that §1608(a)(3) does not expressly provide where service must
be sent, it is common ground that this provision must implicitly
impose some requirement. Respondents acknowledge this when they
argue that the provision demands that service be sent “to a
location that is likely to have a direct line of communication to
the foreign minister.”
Id., at 34; cf.
post, at 6
(stating that sending a letter to a Washington-based embassy “with
a direct line of communication” to the foreign minister seems as
efficient as sending it to the minister’s office in the foreign
state). The question, then, is precisely what §1608(a)(3)
implicitly requires. Respondents assure us that a packet sent to
“an embassy plainly would qualify,” while a packet sent to “a
tourism office plainly would not.” Brief for Respondents 34. But if
the test is whether “a location . . . is likely to have a
direct line of communication to the foreign minister,”
ibid., it is not at all clear why service could not be sent
to places in the United States other than a foreign state’s
embassy. Why not allow the packet to be sent, for example, to a
consulate? The residence of the foreign state’s ambassador? The
foreign state’s mission to the United Nations? Would the answer
depend on the size or presumed expertise of the staff at the
delivery location? The difficult line-drawing problems that flow
from respondents’ interpretation of §1608(a)(3) counsel in favor of
maintaining a clear, administrable rule: The service packet must be
mailed directly to the foreign minister at the minister’s office in
the foreign state.
Second, respondents (and the dissent, see
post, at 5–6) contrast the language of §1608(a)(3) with that
of §1608(a)(4), which says that service by this method requires
that process be sent to the Secretary of State in “Washington,
District of Columbia.” If Congress wanted to require that process
under §1608(a)(3) be sent to a foreign minister’s office in the
minister’s home country, respondents ask, why didn’t Congress use a
formulation similar to that in §1608(a)(4)? This is respondents’
strongest argument, and in the end, we see no entirely satisfactory
response other than that §1608(a) does not represent an example of
perfect draftsmanship. We grant that the argument based on the
contrasting language in §1608(a)(4) cuts in respondents’ favor, but
it is outweighed in our judgment by the countervailing arguments
already noted.
Finally, respondents contend that it would be
“the height of unfairness to throw out [their] judgment” based on
the highly technical argument belatedly raised by petitioner. See
Brief for Respondents 35. We understand respondents’ exasperation
and recognize that enforcing compliance with §1608(a)(3) may seem
like an empty formality in this particular case, which involves
highly publicized litigation of which the Government of Sudan may
have been aware prior to entry of default judgment. But there are
circumstances in which the rule of law demands adherence to strict
requirements even when the equities of a particular case may seem
to point in the opposite direction. The service rules set out in
§1608(a)(3), which apply to a category of cases with sensitive
diplo- matic implications, clearly fall into this category. Under
those rules, all cases must be treated the same.
Moreover, as respondents’ counsel acknowledged
at oral argument, holding that Sudan was not properly served under
§1608(a)(3) is not the end of the road. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56.
Respondents may attempt service once again under §1608(a)(3), and
if that attempt fails, they may turn to §1608(a)(4). When asked at
argument to provide examples of any problems with service under
§1608(a)(4), respondents’ counsel stated that he was unaware of any
cases where such service failed.
Id., at 59–62.
* * *
We interpret §1608(a)(3) as it is most
naturally understood: A service packet must be addressed and
dispatched to the foreign minister at the minister’s office in the
foreign state. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.