SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 16–1423
_________________
KEANU D. W. ORTIZ, PETITIONER
v. UNITED
STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the armed forces
[June 22, 2018]
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins, dissenting.
I begin with a story that is familiar to
students of constitutional law. After his Federalist Party was
defeated in the pivotal election of 1800, outgoing President John
Adams attempted to fill the Federal Judiciary with individuals
favored by his party. The Senate confirmed Adams’s nominees, and
Adams diligently signed their commissions and sent them to the
Secretary of State, one John Marshall, so that the Great Seal could
be affixed and the commissions could be delivered. Most of the
commissions were promptly sealed and dispatched, but a few were
left behind, including the commission of William Marbury, who had
been nominated and confirmed as a justice of the peace for the
District of Columbia.
After Thomas Jefferson was sworn in as the
Nation’s third President, he was furious about Adams’s
eleventh-hour judicial appointments,[
1] and his Secretary of State, James Madison, made a
fateful decision. Evaluating the facts and the law as he saw them,
Madison concluded that he was under no legal obligation to deliver
the commissions that had been left in Marshall’s office, and he
decided not to do so.
Outraged, Marbury filed suit directly in our
Court, asking that Madison be ordered to deliver his commission.
But we dismissed his case, holding, among other things, that it did
not fall within our “appellate jurisdiction.”
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175–176, 180 (1803). Why? Because
“appellate jurisdiction” means jurisdiction to review “the
proceedings in a cause [
i.e., a case] already instituted” in
another court.
Id., at 175. Madison was an Executive Branch
officer, not a court, and therefore Marbury’s dispute with Madison
did not become a “cause” or case until it was brought before this
Court. As a result, review of Madison’s decision did not fall
within our “appellate” jurisdiction.
Id., at 175–176.
That conclusion was straightforward enough. But
suppose that Madison’s decisionmaking process had been more formal.
Suppose that he had heard argument about his legal obligations—and
perhaps even testimony about Marbury’s qualifications. (After all,
President Jefferson reappointed some of Adams’s nominees, but not
Marbury.[
2]) Or suppose Madison
had convened an Executive Branch committee to make an initial
determination. Suppose that this entity was labeled the “Court of
Commission Review.” Suppose that the members wore robes and were
called judges, held their meeting in a courthouse, and adopted
court-like procedures. With all these adornments, would Madison’s
decision have fallen within our appellate jurisdiction? Would
Marbury v.
Madison have come out the other way?
The answer is no, and the reason is the same as
before. Our appellate jurisdiction permits us to review one thing:
the lawful exercise of
judicial power. Lower federal courts
exercise the judicial power of the United States. State courts
exercise the judicial power of sovereign state governments. Even
territorial courts, we have held, exercise the judicial power of
the territorial governments set up by Congress. Executive Branch
officers, on the other hand, cannot lawfully exercise the judicial
power of
any sovereign, no matter how court-like their
decisionmaking process might appear. That means their decisions
cannot be appealed directly to our Court.
We have followed this rule for more than two
centuries. It squarely resolves this case. Courts-martial are older
than the Republic and have always been understood to be Executive
Branch entities that help the President, as Commander in Chief, to
discipline the Armed Forces. As currently constituted, military
tribunals do not comply with Article III, and thus they cannot
exercise the Federal Government’s judicial power. That fact compels
us to dismiss Ortiz’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Today’s decision is unprecedented, and it flatly
violates the unambiguous text of the Constitution. Although the
arguments in the various opinions issued today may seem complex,
the ultimate issue is really quite simple. The Court and the
concurrence say that Congress may confer part of the judicial power
of the United States on an entity that is indisputably part of the
Executive Branch. But Article III of the Constitution vests “[t]he
Judicial Power of the United States”—every single drop of it—in
“one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish” in compliance with that
Article. A decision more contrary to the plain words of the
Constitution is not easy to recall.
I
Under Article III of the Constitution, the
judicial power of the United States may be vested only in tribunals
whose judges have life tenure and salary protection. §1. “There is
no exception to this rule in the Constitution.”
Benner v.
Porter, 9 How. 235, 244 (1850);
Oil States Energy
Services, LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 584
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6);
Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 503 (2011);
Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 330–331 (1816) (Story,
J.).
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)
is not such a tribunal. Its judges serve 15-year terms and can be
removed by the President for cause. 10 U. S. C. §§942(b),
(c). As the majority acknowledges, the CAAF is an Executive Branch
entity, and as such, it cannot be vested with the judicial power
conferred by Article III. If the CAAF
were to do something
that either amounts to or requires the exercise of judicial power,
it would be unconstitutional.
After specifying the only institutions that may
exercise the judicial power of the United States, Article III
defines the permissible scope of the jurisdiction of this Court.
Article III allows us to exercise both “original” and “appellate”
jurisdiction. Our original jurisdiction is limited to “Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party,” §2, so it is obvious that
Ortiz’s case does not fall within our original jurisdiction. But
what about our appellate jurisdiction? If we directly reviewed a
decision of the CAAF, would that be an exercise of “appellate”
review in the sense meant by Article III? The answer is no.
A
The understanding of appellate jurisdiction
embodied in Article III has deep roots. Blackstone explained that a
“court of appeal” has jurisdiction only to “reverse or affirm the
judgment of the inferior
courts.” 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 411 (1768) (Blackstone)
(emphasis added). Echoing Blackstone, we have held that our
appellate jurisdiction permits us to act only as “[a] supervising
Court, whose peculiar province it is to correct the errors of an
inferior Court.”
Cohens v.
Vir- ginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
396 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.). And we have reiterated that
“[a]n appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial
determination, some judgment, decree, or order of an inferior
tribunal, from which an appeal has been taken.”
The Alicia,
7 Wall. 571, 573 (1869);
Webster v.
Cooper, 10 How.
54, 55 (1850); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States §916, p. 652 (1833) (Story).
Those principles make it easy to understand what
Marbury meant when it held that “[i]t is the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects
the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
that cause.” 1 Cranch, at 175. The cause (or case) must have been
created previously, somewhere else. And as Blackstone suggested,
what “creates” a “case” in the relevant sense—that is, what
transforms a dispute into a “case” that an appellate court has
jurisdiction to resolve—is the prior submission of the dispute to a
tribunal that is lawfully vested with judicial power.
We held exactly that not long after
Marbury, and in a decision no less seminal. A dispute
“becomes a case” for purposes of Article III, we held, only when it
“assume[s] such a form that
the judicial power is
capable
of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the
subject is
submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights
in the form prescribed by law. It
then becomes a case.”
Osborn v.
Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819
(1824) (Marshall, C. J.) (emphasis added). Hence, in order to
create a “case” that Article III permits us to review on appeal, a
litigant must have first “submitted” the dispute to another
tribunal that was “capable” of exercising the “judicial power” of
the government to which the tribunal belongs. As discussed,
Executive Branch tribunals cannot fill that essential role.
We reiterated this principle in
Cohens,
another foundational precedent of the Marshall Court. “To commence
a suit,” Chief Justice Marshall explained, “is to demand something
by the institution of process
in a Court of justice.” 6
Wheat., at 408 (emphasis added). Courts of justice are those
tribunals “erected by” the sovereign and properly vested with the
sovereign’s own “power of judicature.” 1 Blackstone 257 (1765).
When the sovereign is the Federal Government, that means only
courts established under Article III, for only those courts may
exercise the judicial power of the United States. See
Cohens,
supra, at 405; The Federalist No. 78,
pp. 469–472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (“the courts of justice”
are those described in Article III).
This view of appellate jurisdiction explains
why, in
Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story
declared that “if . . . congress should not establish
[inferior Article III] courts, the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court would have nothing to act upon, unless it could act
upon cases pending in the state courts.” 1 Wheat., at 339–340.
Without decisions of Article III courts or state courts to review,
our appellate jurisdiction would have lain idle—but
not
because there were no Executive Branch tribunals, like the CAAF,
deciding federal questions. To the contrary, executive agencies
have “conduct[ed] adjudications”—often taking “ ‘judicial’
forms”—“since the beginning of the Republic.”
Arlington v.
FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 304–305, n. 4 (2013);
Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 910
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
see generally J. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution
34–35 (2012).
Such Executive Branch adjudications, however, do
not give rise to “cases” that Article III grants us appellate
jurisdiction to review, precisely because officers of the Executive
Branch cannot lawfully be vested with judicial power. That is why
Chief Justice Marshall declared, without qualification, that “[a]
mandamus to an
officer [of the Executive Branch] is held to
be the exercise of original jurisdiction; but a mandamus to an
inferior court of the United States, is in the nature of
appellate jurisdiction.”
Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 190, 193
(1831) (emphasis added). Time has not sown doubts about the truth
of that rule.
E.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v.
Public Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002)
(“judicial review of executive action, including determinations
made by a state administrative agency,” involves the exercise of
federal court’s “original jurisdiction” rather than its “appellate
jurisdiction,” which covers only “state-court judgments”); L.
Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 263, n. 5
(1965).
We have taken this same approach when deciding
whether we may assert appellate jurisdiction to review the decision
of a state tribunal: We look to state law to see whether the
tribunal in question was eligible to receive the State’s judicial
power.
E.g., Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S.
455, 458–460 (1942); cf.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S. 574, 578–579 (1954) (federal courts
cannot exercise removal jurisdiction—which is appellate in nature,
Martin,
supra, at 349—while a dispute is still in
state “administrative” proceedings; removal is proper only after
“the jurisdiction of the state district court is invoked”);
Verizon Md.,
supra.
B
This understanding of appellate jurisdiction
bars our review here. The dispute between Ortiz and the Federal
Government has been presented to four tribunals: the initial
court-martial, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, the CAAF,
and this Court. Each of those tribunals belongs to a branch of the
Federal Government. Yet only one of them—our Court—is capable,
under the Constitution, of exercising the Government’s judicial
power. Thus, the dispute between Ortiz and the Federal Government
did not become an Article III “case” until Ortiz petitioned our
Court to hear it. That means our present adjudication—no less than
our adjudication of the dispute between Marbury and Madison—lacks
“the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction.” 1 Cranch, at
175.
The majority does not question this framework;
indeed, it acknowledges that, per
Marbury, we can assert
jurisdiction here only if the dispute before us blossomed into an
Article III “case” before it landed at our doorstep.
Ante,
at 6–7. Curiously, however, the majority basically proceeds as
though
Marbury were our last word on the subject.
Ante, at 6–8. That is simply not right. As discussed, our
foundational precedents expressly delineate the prerequisites to
the formation of a constitutional case: The dispute must, at a
minimum, have been previously presented to and decided by a
tribunal lawfully vested with the judicial power of the government
to which it belongs. Nothing of the sort occurred here; traversing
a series of “proceedings” internal to the Executive Branch,
ante, at 7, does not count. And while there undoubtedly are
differences between this case and
Marbury, even some that
“lea[p] off the page,”
ante, at 18, those distinctions are
irrelevant to our jurisdiction. The dispositive common ground is
that, just as in
Marbury, we are here asked to resolve a
dispute that has been presented only to Executive Branch officers.
The present dispute thus lies beyond the “peculiar province” of our
appellate jurisdiction to review.
Cohens, 6 Wheat., at
396.
C
If there were any doubt that Article III
forbids us to take appeals directly from the Executive Branch, two
centuries of precedent—almost all of it overlooked by the
majority—would put those doubts to rest.
1
First consider the history of our relationship
with the Court of Claims. Congress established that court in 1855
to adjudicate claims against the United States. §1, 10 Stat. 612.
Congress provided the court’s judges with life tenure and salary
protection, just as Article III requires.
Ibid. The Court of
Claims was a court of record, and it followed all the
procedures—and possessed all the ancillary powers (subpoena,
contempt, etc.)—that one would expect to find in a court of
justice. §§3–7, 10Stat. 613; §4, 12Stat. 765–766. Its decisions had
preclusive effect, and were appealable directly to our Court. §§7,
5,
id., at 766. If the court rendered judgment for a
claimant, however, the Secretary of the Treasury could partially
revise its decision by modifying the amount of the judgment to be
paid (though not the court’s legal conclusion that the claimant was
in the right). §14,
id., at 768.
Under principles as old as
Hayburn’s
Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), a court whose judgments are not
self-executing no more complies with Article III than a tribunal
whose judges are not life tenured. For that reason alone, we
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the first time a party appealed
a Court of Claims decision directly to our Court.
Gordon v.
United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1865), 117 U. S. Appx. 697
(1864). It did not even matter that the court’s decision in that
case had been
against the claimant, and was thus immune from
revision, and would have been fully binding if we had affirmed. All
that mattered was that the Court of Claims, like the CAAF, lacked
an attribute that Article III makes prerequisite to the vesting of
judicial power.
Id., at 704. In words that apply as much
here, we said that “the so-called judgments of the Court of Claims
. . . could not be deemed an exercise of judicial power,
and could not, therefore, be revised by this court.”
In re
Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, 224 (1893). It was irrelevant how
much the Court of Claims otherwise “resemble[d] . . .
courts whose decisions we review.”
Ante, at 9.
The story does not end there, however. In 1866
Congress did something it has never done with respect to
courts-martial: It brought the Court of Claims into compliance with
Article III by repealing the provision that made some of its
decisions revisable by the Treasury Secretary. Ch. 19, §1, 14Stat.
9. We began hearing appeals from it “immediately.”
United
States v.
Jones, 119 U. S. 477, 478 (1886). We now
were able to “accep[t] appellate jurisdiction over what was,
necessarily, an exercise of the judicial power which
alone
[we] may review.”
Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370
U. S. 530, 554 (1962) (plurality opinion) (citing
Marbury,
supra, at 174–175; emphasis added).
2
Next consider our practice in entertaining
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
Four years after
Marbury, we reaffirmed
its core holding in
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807)
(Marshall, C. J.). Two men were taken into federal custody,
and their confinement was approved by an Article III court.
United States v.
Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1190,
1196 (No. 14,622) (CC DC 1807). They then petitioned our Court for
a writ of habeas corpus. Applying
Marbury, we held that the
jurisdiction “which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly
appellate. It is the revision of a decision of an inferior
court.” 4 Cranch, at 101.
Contrast
Bollman with
Ex parte
Barry, 2 How. 65 (1844) (Story, J.), and
In re Metzger,
5 How. 176 (1847). In
Barry, the petitioner sought relief in
this Court without first presenting his claim to an inferior
federal court or a state court, and so Justice Story explained that
“[t]he case, then, is one avowedly and nakedly for the exercise of
original jurisdiction by this court,” and was required to be
dismissed. 2 How., at 65. In
Metzger, “the district judge”
had “heard and decided” the lawfulness of the petitioner’s custody,
but the judge had done so only “
at his chambers, and not in
court.” 5 How., at 191 (emphasis added). His judgment was not
provisional, like some early Court of Claims decisions—but his
status as a judge at chambers was still fatal to our jurisdiction.
In a technical sense, a judge at chambers “exercises a special
authority” distinct from the judicial power vested by Article
III—which meant that the Constitution would permit us to review his
decision in “[t]he exercise of an original jurisdiction only.”
Id., at 191–192.
3
Finally, and especially pertinent here, we
have adhered to the
Marbury principle in the many instances
in our Court’s history in which we have been asked to review the
decision of a military tribunal. First, in
Ex parte
Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (1864), an Ohio resident had been
tried and sentenced by a military commission, and its decision
became final after being approved up the chain of command.
Vallandigham sought relief directly from our Court, without first
petitioning a lower federal court. We held that we lacked
jurisdiction.
Id., at 254. The military commission, like the
CAAF, was not one of the “courts of the United States” established
under Article III,
id., at 251, and thus it could not
exercise the judicial power of the Federal Government, but could
exercise only “a special authority,”
id., at 253—just like
the Court of Claims, and just like a judge at chambers. Given that
fact, we held it was “certain” that any review of its decisions
could take place only in the exercise of our original, and not
appellate, jurisdiction.
Id., at 251–252. And despite what
the majority seems to think, see
ante, at 17, n. 8, in
Vallandigham we
recognized that the military tribunal
had “judicial character” in the sense that it had “the authority
. . . to examine, to decide and sentence,” but—in the
same breath—we affirmed the crucial point, namely, that such
character “ ‘is not judicial . . . in the sense in
which judicial
power is granted to the courts of the United
States.’ ” 1 Wall., at 253 (emphasis added).
Contrast
Vallandigham with a pair of
decisions we issued shortly thereafter. In
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866), and
Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall.
85 (1869), we again were asked to grant relief to petitioners who,
just like Vallandigham (and just like Ortiz), were in custody under
orders of a non-Article III military tribunal. But unlike
Vallandigham and Ortiz, Milligan and Yerger first sought relief in
a lower federal court.
Milligan,
supra, at 107–108;
Yerger, 8 Wall., at 102–103. That fact made all the
difference—again, because of the rule that we possess, “under the
Constitution, an appellate jurisdiction, to be exercised only in
the revision of judicial decisions.”
Id., at 97. The
decisions of non-Article III military courts do not qualify.
Similarly, after World War II we received “more
than a hundred” habeas petitions from individuals in the custody of
“various American or international military tribunals abroad,”
almost none of whom had “first sought [relief ] in a lower
federal court.” R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D.
Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 292 (7th ed. 2015). Consistent with
Marbury, we
denied review in every one. Fallon,
supra, at 292–293. Thus,
while it is surely true that “not every military tribunal is alike”
in all respects,
ante, at 17, before today, they were at
least alike in this respect: Their decisions could not be reviewed
directly here.
D
The unbroken line of authorities discussed
above vividly illustrates the nature and limits of our appellate
jurisdiction as defined in Article III. Today’s decision cannot be
squared with those authorities, and the majority barely even tries.
The majority says not a word about the Court of Claims, even though
that tribunal surely had sufficient “court-likeness,”
ante,
at 16 (emphasis deleted), to come within the scope of our appellate
jurisdiction under today’s test. Nor does the majority acknowledge
the slew of on-point habeas decisions—save for
Vallandigham,
which it waves away by emphasizing irrelevant factual details (like
the commanding officer’s facial hair). Despite its running refrain
that the CAAF displays a “judicial
character,”
ante,
at 6 (emphasis added); see also
ante, at 8, 18, 19, the
majority simply never comes to grips with the substance of our
holdings: We may not hear an appeal directly from any tribunal that
has not been lawfully vested with judicial
power. That rule
directly covers the CAAF, and it bars our review.
II
Having said very little about a large body of
controlling precedent, the majority says very much about the fact
that we have long heard appeals directly from territorial courts
and the courts of the District of Columbia.
Ante, at 12–16.
The majority claims to be looking for a “powerful reason” why our
appellate jurisdiction should treat courts-martial any differently.
Ante, at 15. A careful reading of our decisions shows that
we have a good reason ready at hand—one that is fully consistent
with
Marbury.
The reason, as I explain below, is this:
Congress enjoys a unique authority to create governments for the
Territories and the District of Columbia and to confer on the
various branches of those governments powers that are distinct from
the legislative, executive, and judicial power of the United
States. Thus, for example, the courts of the District of Columbia
exercise the judicial power of the District, not that of the United
States. The courts of the United States Virgin Islands exercise the
judicial power of that Territory, not the judicial power of the
United States. By contrast, the CAAF and other military tribunals
are indisputably part of the Executive Branch of the Government of
the United States. They exercise the power of the United States,
not that of any other government, and since they are part of the
Executive, the only power that they may lawfully exercise is
executive, not judicial. Unless they are removed from the Executive
Branch and transformed into Article III courts, they may not
exercise any part of the judicial power of the United States. Nor
need they exercise judicial power to carry out their functions, as
we have always understood.
A
We have long said that Congress’s authority to
govern the Territories and the District of Columbia stems as much
from its inherent sovereign powers as it does from specific
constitutional provisions in Articles IV and I.
Sere v.
Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336–337 (1810) (Marshall, C. J.);
American Ins. Co. v.
356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511,
546 (1828) (Marshall, C. J.);
Late Corp. of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
United States, 136
U. S. 1, 42 (1890); see also Art. IV, §3, cl. 2
(Territories); Art. I, §8, cl. 17 (District). Perhaps
reflecting that view, the founding generation understood—and for
more than two centuries, we have recognized—that Congress’s power
to govern the Territories and the District is
sui generis in
one very specific respect: When exercising it, Congress is not
bound by the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III.
The Vesting Clauses impose strict limits on the
kinds of institutions that Congress can vest with legislative,
executive, and judicial power. See generally
Department of
Transportation v.
Association of American Railroads, 575
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(slip op., at 2–3). Those limits apply when Congress legislates in
every other area, including when it regulates the Armed Forces. See
Loving v.
United States, 517 U. S. 748, 767–768,
771–774 (1996) (Article I nondelegation doctrine applies to
congressional regulation of courts-martial). But it has been our
consistent view that those same limits do not apply when Congress
creates institutions to govern the Territories and the District. As
we said in
Benner v.
Porter, 9 How. 235, 242 (1850),
territorial governments set up by Congress “are not organized under
the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution of the
powers of government, as the organic law; but are the creations,
exclusively, of the legislative department.” Congress may therefore
give territorial governments “a legislative, an executive, and a
judiciary, with such powers as it has been their will to assign to
those departments.”
Sere,
supra, at 337. That is why
we have often repeated that “[i]n legislating for [the
Territories], Congress exer- cises the combined powers of the
general, and of a state government.”
American Ins. Co.,
supra, at 546;
Palmore v.
United States, 411
U. S. 389, 403 (1973). Just as the Vesting Clauses do not
constrain the States in organizing their own governments,
Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 84 (1902),
those Clauses do not constrain Congress in organizing territorial
governments.
Thus, unlike any of its other powers, Congress’s
power over the Territories allows it to create governments in
miniature, and to vest those governments with the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, not of the United States, but of
the Territory itself. For that reason we have upheld delegations of
legislative, executive, and judicial power to territorial
governments despite acknowledging that each one would be
incompatible with the Vesting Clauses of the Federal Constitution
if those Clauses applied. See,
e.g., Dorr v.
United
States, 195 U. S. 138, 153 (1904) (territorial
legislature);
Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
United States,
301 U. S. 308, 322–323 (1937);
Snow v.
United
States, 18 Wall. 317, 321–322 (1873) (territorial executive);
American Ins. Co.,
supra (territorial courts);
Sere,
supra;
Kendall v.
United States ex
rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 619 (1838);
Keller v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 442–443
(1923).
The Framers evidently shared this view. Thus,
James Madison took it for granted that Congress could create “a
municipal legislature” for the District of Columbia, The Federalist
No. 43, at 272–273, something that would otherwise violate the
Vesting Clause of Article I, which prohibits Congress from
delegating legislative powers to any other entity,
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825) (Marshall, C. J.).
And Justice Story declared, without hesitation, that “[w]hat shall
be the form of government established in the territories depends
exclusively upon the discretion of congress. Having a right to
erect a territorial government, they may confer on it such powers,
legislative, judicial, and executive, as they may deem best.” 3
Story §667, at 478.
The upshot is that it is
only when
Congress legislates for the Territories and the District that it
may lawfully vest judicial power in tribunals that do not conform
to Article III. And that, in turn, explains why territorial courts
and those of the District—exercising the judicial power of their
respective governments—may have their decisions appealed directly
here. We said as much in
United States v.
Coe, 155
U. S. 76, 86 (1894), where we explained that
because
Congress’s “power of government . . . over the
Territories . . . includes the ultimate executive,
legislative, and judicial power, it follows that the judicial
action of all inferior courts established by Congress may, in
accordance with the Constitution, be subjected to [our] appellate
jurisdiction.”
The rule of appellate jurisdiction we recognized
in
Coe is identical to the rule we have applied ever since
Marbury: Our appellate jurisdiction is proper only if the
underlying decision represents an exercise of judicial power
lawfully vested in the tribunal below. Territorial courts and those
of the District of Columbia have such power; the CAAF does not, and
cannot be given it so long as it fails to comply with Article III.
That is reason enough to treat these tribunals
differently.[
3]
B
The majority responds to this conclusion by
suggesting, albeit without much elaboration, that just as the
Constitution gives Congress the “exceptional” power to confer
non-Article III judicial power on the courts of the Territories and
the District of Columbia, the Constitution also gives Congress the
“exceptional” power to vest military tribunals with non-Article III
judicial power. See
ante, at 15, and n. 7. But the
Vesting Clauses are exclusive, which means that the Government’s
judicial power is not shared between Article II and Article III.
See
supra, at 3–4 (collecting cases); see also,
e.g.,
Arlington, 569 U. S., at 304–305, n. 4;
Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No.
11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J.) (those whose “offices
are held at the pleasure of the president . . . are,
consequently, incapable of exercising any portion of the judicial
power”);
Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S.,
at ___, ___ (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2,
9);
B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Industries,
Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 11). And neither the majority nor the concurrence
ever explains how the Constitution’s various provisions relating to
the military, through their penumbras and emanations, can be said
to produce a hybrid executive-judicial power that is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution’s text, that is foreclosed by its
structure, and that had gone almost entirely unnoticed before
today.
Thus, to make the majority’s argument parallel
to the argument regarding the courts of the Territories and the
District of Columbia, the majority would have to argue that the
military, like the governments of the Territories and the District,
is somehow not part of the Federal Government—“not organized under
the Constitution, . . . as the organic law,”
Benner, 9 How., at 242—but is a government unto itself. To
set out that argument, however, is to expose its weakness, for
nothing could be more antithetical to the Constitution and to our
traditional understanding of the relationship between the military
and civilian authority. The military is not an entity unto itself,
separate from the civilian government established by the
Constitution. On the contrary, it is part of the Executive Branch
of the Government of the United States, and it is under the command
of the President, who is given the power of Commander in Chief and
is ultimately answer- able to the people.
To appreciate the constitutional status of
military tribunals, it is helpful to recall their origins.
Courts-martial are older than the Republic, and they have always
been understood to be an arm of military command exercising
executive power, as opposed to independent courts of law exercising
judicial power. Blackstone declared that the court-martial system
of the British Empire was based solely on “the necessity of order
and discipline” in the military. 1 Blackstone 400. Indeed,
Blackstone explained that courts-martial exercise a “discretionary
power” to “inflict” “punishment . . . extend[ing] to
death itself,” which was “to be guided by the directions of the
crown,” in express contrast to “the king’s courts” which dispense
“justice according to the laws of the land.”
Id., at 402,
400. The crown’s “extensive” power over the military—exercised, in
part, through courts-martial—was “executive power.”
Id., at
408. Many others have echoed the point. Thus, “[a]t the time of our
separation [from Britain], . . . a court-martial
. . . was not a judicial body. Its functions were not
judicial functions. It was but an agency of the power of military
command to do its bidding.” Ansell, Military Justice, 5 Cornell
L. Q. 1, 6 (1919).
When the United States declared its independence
and prepared for war with Britain, the leaders of the new Nation
were deeply impressed by the British court-martial system and
sought to replicate it. John Adams, who in 1776 drafted the
Continental Articles for the Government of the Army, was convinced
that it would be “in vain” for the American patriots to seek “a
more complete system of military discipline” than the existing
British model. 3 The Works of John Adams 68 (C. Adams ed. 1851). He
and Thomas Jefferson therefore proposed adopting “the British
articles of war,
totidem verbis.”
Id., at 68–69. The
Continental Congress agreed.
Id., at 69. And when the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted, no one suggested
that this required any alteration of the existing system of
military justice. On the contrary, as the majority recounts, the
First Congress continued the existing articles of war unchanged.
Ante, at 10. Courts-martial fit effortlessly into the
structure of government established by the Constitution. They were
instruments of military command. Under the Constitution, the
President, as the head of the Executive Branch, was made the
Commander in Chief. Art. II, §2. So the role of the
courts-martial was to assist the President in the exercise of that
command authority.
The ratification of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights did naturally raise some constitutional questions.
For example, founding-era courts-martial adjudicated a long list of
offenses, some carrying capital punishment, including for crimes
involving homicide, assault, and theft. American Articles of War of
1776, §13, in 2 W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 1495–1498
(2d ed. 1896) (Winthrop); see also,
e.g., American Articles
of War of 1806, Arts. 39, 51, 54, in
id., at 1514–1516. In
civilian life, a person charged with similar offenses was entitled
to protections, such as trial by jury, that were unavailable in
courts-martial. Moreover, the Constitution entitled such persons to
judicial process—which courts-martial, lacking the necessary
structural attributes of Article III courts, could not afford. So
how could they try serious crimes, including even capital
offenses?
The simple answer goes back to the fundamental
nature of courts-martial as instruments of command. As Blackstone
recognized, the enforcement of military discipline, an essential
feature of any effective fighting force, was viewed as an
executive prerogative. It represented the exercise of the
power given to the President as the head of the Executive Branch
and the Commander in Chief and delegated by him to military
commanders. Thus, adjudications by courts-martial are executive
decisions; courts-martial are not courts; they do not wield
judicial power; and their proceedings are not criminal prosecutions
within the meaning of the Constitution. As we explained in
Milligan, the need to maintain military order required those
serving in the military to surrender certain rights that they
enjoyed in civilian life and to submit to discipline by the
military command. Although
Milligan confirmed the general
rule that “it is the birthright of every American citizen” to have
the Federal Government adjudicate criminal charges against him only
in an Article III court, 4 Wall., at 119, 122, we also stated that
“[e]very one connected with” “the military or naval service
. . . while thus serving, surrenders his right to be
tried by the civil courts,”
id., at 123. That is why the
historical evidence strongly suggests that the provisions of the
Bill of Rights were not originally understood to apply to
courts-martial. See Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of
Congress, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1337, 1346 (2015); Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 266, 290–291, 294 (1958); see also 1 Winthrop
54, 241, 430, 605;
Milligan,
supra, at 137–138
(Chase, C. J., concurring in judgment).[
4]
Due to reforms adopted in the recent past, it is
possible today to mistake a military tribunal for a regular court
and thus to forget its fundamental nature as an instrument of
military discipline, but no one would have made that mistake at the
time of the founding and for many years thereafter. Notwithstanding
modest reforms in 1874, a court-martial continued into the 20th
century to serve “primarily as a function or instrument of the
executive department to be used in maintaining discipline in the
armed forces. It was therefore not a ‘court,’ as that term is
normally used.” Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey,
87 Mil. L. Rev. 129, 150–153, 154–155 (1980). Hence, Colonel
Winthrop—whom we have called “the ‘Blackstone of Military
Law,’ ”
Reid v.
Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 19,
n. 38 (1957) (plurality opinion)—echoed the original
Blackstone in describing courts-martial as “simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-chief, to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline
therein.” 1 Winthrop 54.
Indeed, Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, who
served as acting Judge Advocate General from 1917 to 1919, groused
that the American system at the time of World War I was still
“basically . . . the British system as it existed at the
time of the separation,” and described it as one “arising out of
and regulated by the mere power of Military Command rather than
Law.” Ansell, 5 Cornell L. Q., at 1. Around the same time,
Edmund Morgan—who would later help draft the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ)—declared it “too clear for argument that
the principle at the foundation of the existing system is the
supremacy of military command. To maintain that principle, military
command dominates and controls the proceeding from its initiation
to the final execution of the sentence. While the actual trial has
the semblance of a judicial proceeding and is required to be
conducted pursuant to the forms of law, . . . [i]n truth
and in fact, . . . courts-martial are exactly what
Colonel Winthrop has asserted them to be.” Morgan, The Existing
Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 Yale
L. J. 52, 66 (1919).
For instance, until 1920 the President and
commanding officers could disapprove a court-martial sentence and
order that a more severe one be imposed instead, for whatever
reason. We twice upheld the constitutionality of this practice,
Swaim v.
United States, 165 U. S. 553, 564–566
(1897);
Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 20, 23 (1879),
which was widely used during World War I, see Wiener,
supra,
at 273. Similarly, until 1920 it was permissible for the same
officer to serve as both prosecutor and defense counsel in the same
case. West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial
System, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 14 (1970). Congress discontinued
such practices by statute, but through the end of World War II,
courts-martial remained blunt instruments to enforce discipline.
Schlueter,
supra, at 157–158; see also West,
supra,
at 8, n. 18.
It is precisely because Article II authorizes
the President to discipline the military without invoking the
judicial power of the United States that that the Constitution has
always been understood to permit courts-martial to operate in the
manner described above. Thus, in
Dynes v.
Hoover, 20
How. 65, 79 (1858), we said that the Constitution makes clear that
the Government’s power to “tr[y] and punis[h]” military offenses
“is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of
the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States;
indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each
other.”
Moreover, the principle that the Government need
not exercise judicial power when it adjudicates military offenses
accords with the historical understanding of the meaning of due
process. In the 19th century, it was widely believed that the
constitutional guarantee of due process imposed the rule that the
Government must exercise its judicial power before depriving anyone
of a core private right. See generally Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 562, 568–569, and
n. 42 (2007);
e.g., Cohen v.
Wright, 22
Cal. 293, 318 (1863) (“The terms ‘due process of law’ have a
distinct legal signification, clearly securing to every person
. . . a judicial trial . . . before he can be
deprived of life, liberty, or property”);
Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 275, 280
(1856) (similar). Yet for most of our history we held that “[t]o
those in the military or naval service of the United States the
military law is due process.”
Reaves v.
Ainsworth,
219 U. S. 296, 304 (1911);
United States ex rel. French
v.
Weeks, 259 U. S. 326, 335 (1922); see also
Milligan, 4 Wall., at 138 (Chase, C. J., concurring in
judgment) (“the power of Congress, in the government of the land
and naval forces and of the militia, is not at all affected by the
fifth or any other amendment”); Wiener, 72 Harv. L. Rev., at
279 (in the history of courts-martial, “of due process of law as a
constitutional concept, there is no trace”); cf. 1 Blackstone
403–404 (explaining the basic due process rights soldiers surrender
upon entering the army).
This understanding of the power wielded by
military tribunals parallels our current jurisprudence regarding
the authority of other Executive Branch entities to adjudicate
disputes that affect individual rights. An exercise of judicial
power may be necessary for the disposition of private rights,
including the rights at stake in a criminal case.
B&B
Hardware, 575 U. S., at ___–___ (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 12–13); see also
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd.
v.
Sharif, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 6). But the adjudication of public rights
does not demand the exercise of judicial power.
Id., at
___–___ (slip op., at 6–7). Similarly, enforcement of military
discipline is not a function that demands the exercise of judicial
power, either.
Dynes,
supra;
Murray’s Lessee,
supra, at 284.
In short, military offenses are “exceptions” to
Article III in the same way that true public rights disputes are
exceptions to Article III: the Federal Government can adjudicate
either one without exercising its judicial power. This means that
when Congress assigns either of these functions to an Executive
Branch tribunal—whether the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, the
Court of Claims, or the CAAF—that does not imply that the tribunal
in question is exercising judicial power. And the point holds
notwithstanding the undoubted fidelity to “the rule of law” that
such officers bring to their tasks.
Ante, at 11, n. 5.
Contrary to the majority’s odd suggestion, acting “in strict
compliance with legal rules and principles” is not a uniquely
judicial virtue.
Ibid. The most basic duty of the President
and his subordinates, after all, is to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3 (emphasis added).
Hence, acting with fidelity to law is something every executive
officer is charged with doing, but those officers remain
executive officers all the same. For that reason, and in
light of the history recounted above, the majority’s suggestion
that “[t]he military justice system’s essential character” is
“judicial,” and has been “maintained” as such since the “very first
Congress,”
ante, at 8, 10, simply does not square with the
actual operation of the court-martial system or the consensus view
of its place in our constitutional scheme.
C
In response to this history, the majority
tries to enlist Colonel Winthrop as an ally,
ante, at 10–11,
and n. 5, but Winthrop had a firmer grasp than the majority on
the distinction between functions that can be described as
“judicial” in a colloquial sense and functions that represent an
exercise of “judicial power” in the constitutional sense. Thus,
while Winthrop observed that courts-martial resemble constitutional
courts in certain respects, he made those observations
“
[n]otwithstanding that the court-martial is only an
instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or
connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the
country.” 1 Winthrop 61 (emphasis added). Nor was Winthrop the only
military commentator who employed such terms casually from time to
time.
E.g., W. De Hart, Observations on Military Law 6
(1859) (describing an officer’s authority to appoint members of a
court-martial as “a legislative power”);
id., at 14
(describing courts-martial as “being clothed with judicial
powers”). Indeed, our own Court has frequently described functions
as “judicial” in a colloquial sense, despite knowing they are
executive in the constitutional sense.
E.g., Smelting Co. v.
Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 640 (1882) (Land Department
officers “exercise a judicial function” although they are “part of
the administrative and executive branch of the government”);
Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 280–281;
Vallandigham, 1
Wall., at 253;
Arlington, 569 U. S., at 304–305,
n. 4.
The majority’s reliance on Attorney General
Bates is even weaker.
Ante, at 10. Bates wrote a memo to
President Lincoln opining that when the President acts to “approve
and confirm the sentence of a court martial,” or to “revis[e] its
proceedings,” Congress intended him to “act
judicially—that
is, [to] exercise the discretion confided to him within the limits
of law.” 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 20–21 (1864). Bates was arguing that a
President could not revoke a court-martial sentence after it had
been carried into execution. He was describing an implicit limit on
the power of the President under the system of military justice
established by statute. His reference to certain Presidential
actions as “judicial” had nothing to do with judicial review, and
in
Vallandigham,
supra, at 254, we rejected the idea
that “the President’s action” in approving a court-martial decision
is an exercise of judicial power that we can review directly.
In sum, the majority has done nothing to
undermine the overwhelming historical consensus that courts-martial
permissibly carry out their functions by exercising executive
rather than judicial power.
III
What remains of the majority’s analysis boils
down to the assertion that courts-martial “resemble” conventional
courts,
ante, at 9, indeed, that “court-likeness” is the
dispositive issue,
ante, at 16 (emphasis deleted).
The first thing to be said in response to this
theory is that we have “never adopted a ‘looks like’ test to
determine if an adjudication” involves an exercise of judicial
power.
Oil States, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).
On the contrary, we have frequently repudiated this mode of
analysis as utterly inadequate to police separation-of-powers
disputes. See,
e.g., INS v.
Chadha, 462
U. S. 919, 953, n. 16 (1983);
Arlington,
supra;
Gordon, 117 U. S. Appx., at 699. In fact,
of all the cases on which the majority relies, not a single one
suggests that our appellate jurisdiction turns on the extent to
which the underlying tribunal looks like a court.
In any event, the majority’s “looks like” test
fails on its own terms. It is certainly true that today’s military
justice system provides many protections for the accused and is
staffed by officers who perform their duties diligently,
responsibly, and with an appropriate degree of independence.
Nothing I say about the current system should be interpreted as
denigrating that system or as impugning the dedication,
professionalism, and integrity of the offi- cers who serve in it,
notwithstanding the majority’s insistence to the contrary.
Ante, at 11, n. 5. As explained above, military
officers’ undoubted fidelity to law has nothing to do with the
court-martial system’s status under our Constitution. That status
is what my point here concerns. And that status has never
changed.
Today’s court-martial system was put in place in
1950, when Congress enacted the UCMJ in response to criticism
following World War II. 64Stat. 108. Among its innovations, the
UCMJ subjected courts-martial to more elaborate procedural rules
than ever before. It also created a system of internal appellate
tribunals within the military chain of command. Those
entities—which we now call the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force,
and Coast Guard Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces—did not exist before 1950. Congress augmented
this system in 1983, for the first time in American history
providing for direct Supreme Court review of certain decisions of
the highest military tribunal. 97Stat. 1405–1406; 10
U. S. C. §867a; 28 U. S. C. §1259.
Such reforms, as I have indicated, are fully
consistent with the President’s overriding duty to “faithfully
execut[e]” the laws. Art. II, §3. Hence, even after Congress
passed the UCMJ, we continued to recognize that the court-martial
system “has always been and continues to be primarily an instrument
of discipline,”
O’Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U. S.
258, 266 (1969), and that “courts-martial are constitutional
instruments to carry out congressional and executive will,”
Palmore, 411 U. S., at 404; see also,
e.g.,
Reid, 354 U. S., at 36 (plurality opinion);
United
States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17
(1955);
Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300
(1983). For that reason, even if the majority were to begin its
analysis in 1950, and to confine it to the CAAF—which the majority
has
not done—it would still be incorrect to perceive
anything other than executive power at issue here.
An examination of the CAAF confirms this point.
The CAAF’s members are appointed by the President for a term of
years, and he may remove them for cause, 10 U. S. C.
§§942(b), (c), under a standard we have recognized as “very broad,”
Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 729 (1986).
These and other provisions of the UCMJ “make clear that [the CAAF]
is within the Executive Branch.”
Edmond v.
United
States, 520 U. S. 651, 664, n. 2 (1997). For
instance, the CAAF is subject to oversight by the Secretaries of
Defense, Homeland Security, and the military departments, and its
members must meet annually to discuss their work with members of
the military and appointees of the Secretary of Defense. 10
U. S. C. §946. The CAAF must review any case a Judge
Advocate General orders it to hear. §867(a)(2). And, contrary to
the majority’s assertion, the CAAF’s decisions are not “final
(except if we review and reverse them).”
Ante, at 18.
In fact, in the most serious cases that the CAAF
reviews—those in which a court-martial imposes a sentence of death
or dismissal from the Armed Forces—the CAAF’s judgment cannot be
executed until the President, the relevant branch Secretary, or one
of his subordinates approves it. 10 U. S. C. §§871(a),
(b). That is why the UCMJ provides that “[a]fter [the CAAF] has
acted on a case,” the “convening authority [shall] take action in
accordance with that decision,” “
unless there is to be further
action by the President or the Secretary concerned.” §867(e)
(emphasis added). In such cases the “proceedings, findings, and
sentences” of the court-martial system—including the CAAF’s
“appellate review”—are not final until approved. §876.[
5] Indeed, even if
our Court
affirms such a judgment, it cannot be executed until the relevant
military authority approves it—a requirement that is not subject to
any timeframe or substantive standards. See Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States Rule for Courts-Martial 1205(b)
(2016).[
6]
Such revisory powers have always been a feature
of the court-martial system. 1 Winthrop 683. And because the UCMJ
preserves the chain of command’s historic revisory power over the
CAAF’s most significant decisions, there is no way for us to
conclude that the CAAF is “judicial” under any known definition of
that term. And it should not matter that Ortiz’s own sentence is
not subject to approval, just as it did not matter that the Court
of Claims decision at issue in
Gordon was not subject to
review by the Treasury Secretary. This point is elementary. At
least since
Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall., at 411, n., 413, n., it
has been firmly established that it is “radically inconsistent”
with the “judicial power” for any court’s judgments, “under any
circumstances,” to “be liable to a reversion, or even suspension,”
by members of the Executive or Legislative Branches
. Indeed,
“[t]he award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power.”
Gordon, 117 U. S. Appx., at 702;
Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218–219
(1995).
Simply put, the CAAF’s Executive Branch status
is more than a label. The CAAF is what we have always thought it to
be: an agent of executive power to aid the Commander in Chief. It
follows that our appellate jurisdiction does not permit us to
review its decisions directly. That conclusion is unaffected by
Congress’s decision to give greater procedural protections to
members of the military. Nor would the conclusion be altered if
Congress imported into the military justice system additional
rights and procedures required in the civilian courts. If Congress
wants us to review CAAF decisions, it can convert that tribunal
into an Article III court or it can make CAAF decisions reviewable
first in a lower federal court—perhaps one of the regional Courts
of Appeals or the Federal Circuit—with additional review available
here. But as long as the CAAF retains its current status as an
Executive Branch entity, Congress cannot give our Court
jurisdiction to review its decisions directly.
* * *
The arguments in this case might appear
technical, but important interests are at stake. The division
between our Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction provoked
extended and impassioned debate at the time of the founding. See
Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 468–478 (1989). The
Framers well understood that the resolution of this dry
jurisdictional issue would have practical effects,
ibid.,
and in a similar vein, the Court’s holding that the CAAF exercises
something akin to judicial power will have unavoidable implications
for many important issues that may arise regarding the operation of
the military justice system, not to mention judicial review of the
many decisions handed down by administrative agencies.
The majority disclaims the latter possibility,
ante, at 19, but its effort is halfhearted at best. In
reality there is no relevant distinction, so far as our appellate
jurisdiction is concerned, between the court-martial system and the
“other adjudicative bodies in the Executive Branch” that the
majority tells us not to worry about.
Ibid. The majority
cites the “judicial character . . . of the court-martial
system,” as well as its “constitutional foundations and history,”
ibid., but as I have explained, the constitutional
foundations, history, and fundamental character of military
tribunals show that they are Executive Branch entities that can
only permissibly exercise executive power—just like civilian
administrative agencies.
The Founders erected a high wall around our
original jurisdiction, deliberately confining it to two classes of
cases that were unlikely to touch the lives of most people. See The
Federalist No. 81, at 488. Today’s decision erodes that wall.
Because the Court ignores both the wisdom of the Founders, the
clear, consistent teaching of our precedents, and the unambiguous
text of the Constitution, I respectfully dissent.