Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. ___ (2018)
Hughes, indicted on drug and gun charges, negotiated a Type-C plea agreement, which stipulated that Hughes would receive a sentence of 180 months but did not refer to a particular Guidelines range. The district court sentenced him to 180 months, calculating Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188-235 months and finding that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors it was required to consider. Weeks later, the Sentencing Commission adopted and made retroactive an amendment that had the effect of reducing Hughes’ sentencing range to 151-188 months. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Hughes’ motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, resolving a split among the circuits. A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” a Guidelines range if that range was part of the framework the district court relied on to impose the sentence or accept the agreement. A district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” a Guidelines range for purposes of section 3582(c)(2) if the range was a basis for the court’s exercise of discretion. District courts are required to calculate and consider a defendant’s Guidelines range in every case. The Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s Guidelines range.
A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C plea agreement is “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range if that range was part of the framework relied upon by the district court relied in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Hughes v. United States
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 17–155. Argued March 27, 2018—Decided June 4, 2018
In Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522, this Court considered whether a prisoner who had been sentenced under a plea agreement authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could have his sentence reduced under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2) when his Federal Guidelines sentencing range was lowered retroactively. No single interpretation or rationale commanded a majority, however. Some Courts of Appeals, turning to Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, for guidance, adopted the reasoning of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the judgment. Others interpreted Marks differently and adopted the plurality’s reasoning. Because this Court can now resolve the substantive, sentencing issue discussed in Freeman, it is unnecessary to reach questions regarding the proper application of Marks.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes the United States Sentencing Commission to establish, and retroactively amend, Sentencing Guidelines. Though the Guidelines are only advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, a district court must consult them during sentencing, id., at 264, along with other factors specified in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities,” §3553(a)(6). When an amendment applies retroactively, district courts may reduce the sentences of prisoners whose sentences were “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” §3582(c)(2).
This case concerns the issue whether a defendant may seek relief under §3582(c)(2) if he entered a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (Type-C agreement), which permits the defendant and the Government to “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case,” and “binds the court [to the agreed-upon sentence] once [it] accepts the plea agreement.” In making its decision, the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. And it may not accept the agreement unless the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, or it is outside that range for justifiable reasons specifically set out.
After petitioner Erik Hughes was indicted on drug and gun charges, he and the Government negotiated a Type-C plea agreement, which stipulated that Hughes would receive a sentence of 180 months but did not refer to a particular Guidelines range. Hughes pleaded guilty. At his sentencing hearing, the District Court accepted the agreement and sentenced him to 180 months. In so doing, it calculated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and determined that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors the court was required to consider. Less than two months later, the Sentencing Commission adopted, and made retroactive, an amendment that had the effect of reducing Hughes’ sentencing range to 151 to 188 months. The District Court denied Hughes’ motion for a reduced sentence under §3582(c)(2), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts concluded that, under the Freeman concurrence, Hughes was ineligible for a reduced sentence because his plea agreement did not expressly rely on a Guidelines range.
Held:
1. A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. Pp. 7–14.
(a) A principal purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to promote sentencing uniformity. But in the aftermath of Freeman, a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced sentence under §3582(c)(2) turns on the Circuit in which the case arises. Even within Circuits that follow the Freeman concurrence, unwarranted disparities have resulted depending on whether a defendant’s Type-C agreement has a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range. This Court’s precedents since Freeman have confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. 530; Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ___. Pp. 7–9.
(b) A district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” a Guidelines range for purposes of §3582(c)(2) if the range was a basis for the court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence. Given the standard legal definition of “base,” there will be no question in the typical case that the defendant’s Guidelines range was a basis for his sentence. A district court is required to calculate and consider a defendant’s Guidelines range in every case. §3553(a). Indeed, the Guidelines are “the starting point for every sentencing calculation in the federal system.” Peugh, supra, at 542. Thus, in general, §3582(c)(2) allows district courts to reconsider a prisoner’s sentence based on a new starting point—that is, a lower Guidelines range—and determine whether a reduction is appropriate.
A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant’s Guidelines range is the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. The Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, but the Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s Guidelines range. So in the usual case the court’s acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range. Since the Guidelines are a district court’s starting point, when the Commission lowers the range, the defendant will be eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2) absent clear demonstration, based on the record as a whole, that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines.
This interpretation furthers §3582(c)(2)’s purpose, as well as the broader purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. It is also reinforced by Molina-Martinez and Peugh, which both confirm that the Guidelines remain a basis for almost all federal sentences. Experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of §3582(c)(2), as a systemic, structural matter the system Congress put in place is best implemented by the interpretation confirmed in this case. Pp. 9–12.
(c) The Government’s counterarguments—that allowing defendants with Type-C agreements to seek reduced sentences under §3582(c)(2) would deprive the Government of a benefit of its bargain, namely, the defendant’s agreement to a particular sentence; and that allowing courts to reduce the sentences of defendants like Hughes would be inconsistent with one of the Commission’s policy statements—are unpersuasive. Pp. 12–14.
2. Hughes is eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2). The District Court accepted his Type-C agreement after concluding that a 180-month sentence was consistent with the Guidelines, and then calculated Hughes’ sentencing range and imposed a sentence it deemed “compatible” with the Guidelines. The sentencing range was thus a basis for the sentence imposed. And that range has since been lowered by the Commission. The District Court has discretion to decide whether to reduce Hughes’ sentence after considering the §3553(a) factors and the Commission’s relevant policy statements. P. 14.
849 F. 3d 1008, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.
The record from the U.S.D.C. Northern Dist. of Georgia has been returned. |
JUDGMENT ISSUED. |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. |
Argued. For petitioner: Eric Shumsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. |
Reply of petitioner Erik Hughes filed. (Distributed) |
Record received from the U.S.D.C. Northern Dist. of Georgia. (1 Envelope, part of the record is Sealed) |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 11th Circuit. |
Brief of respondent United States filed. (Distributed) |
Motion for leave to file amici brief filed by Law Professors in support of neither party GRANTED. |
CIRCULATED |
Brief amici curiae of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Association of Federal Defenders filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Professor Douglas A. Berman filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Agricultural Building, Forestry, Livestock, Manufacturing, Mining, and Petroleum Business Interests filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Richard M. Re in support of neither party filed. |
Motion for leave to file amici brief filed by Law Professors in support of neither party filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Chantell and Michael Sackett, and Duarte Nursery, Inc. filed. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday, March 27, 2018 |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Brief of petitioner Erik Hughes filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Erik Hughes. |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/8/2017. |
Reply of petitioner Erik Hughes filed. |
Brief of respondent United States in opposition filed. |
Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including November 1, 2017. |
Order extending time to file response to petition to and including October 2, 2017. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due August 31, 2017) |
Application (16A1134) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until July 27, 2017. |
Application (16A1134) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from May 28, 2017 to July 27, 2017, submitted to Justice Thomas. |
Prior History
- United States v. Hughes, No. 15-15246 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017)
Defendant pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses, entering into a binding agreement with the government. At issue is whether the court should apply the rule of Marks v. United States to the splintered opinion in Freeman v. United States to determine whether a defendant who entered into a plea agreement that recommended a particular sentence as a condition of his guilty plea is eligible for a reduced sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court agreed with the district court's determination that Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion stated the holding in Freeman because she concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds, and the district court's denial of defendant's motion based on the reasoning of that concurring opinion. The court explained that, in this case, defendant was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced "based on a sentencing range," 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), that has since been lowered. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.