Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. ___ (2018)
Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He unsuccessfully sought habeas relief in Georgia courts, claiming ineffectiveness of counsel during sentencing. The Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied relief. Wilson filed a federal habeas petition, raising the same ineffective-assistance claim. The district court assumed that his counsel was deficient but deferred to the state court’s conclusion that any deficiencies did not prejudice Wilson. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's methodology. A federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. The state may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds. The presumption is often realistic; state higher courts often issue summary decisions when they have examined the lower court’s reasoning and found nothing significant with which they disagree. The presumption also is often more efficient than requiring a federal court to imagine what might have been the state court’s supportive reasoning. The “look through” presumption is not an absolute rule and does not show disrespect for the states but seeks to replicate the grounds for the higher state court’s decision.
A federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Wilson v. Sellers, Warden
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 16–6855. Argued October 30, 2017—Decided April 17, 2018
Petitioner Marion Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He sought habeas relief in Georgia Superior Court, claiming that his counsel’s ineffectiveness during sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the petition, in relevant part, because it concluded that counsel’s performance was not deficient and had not prejudiced Wilson. The Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson subsequently filed a federal habeas petition, raising the same ineffective-assistance claim. The District Court assumed that his counsel was deficient but deferred to the state habeas court’s conclusion that any deficiencies did not prejudice Wilson. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, however, the panel concluded that the District Court was wrong to “look though” the State Supreme Court’s unexplained decision and assume that it rested on the grounds given in the state habeas court’s opinion, rather than ask what arguments “could have supported” the State Supreme Court’s summary decision. The en banc court agreed with the panel’s methodology.
Held: A federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. The State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below. Pp. 5–11.
(a) In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U. S. 797 , the Court held that where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim are presumed to rest upon the same ground. In Ylst, where the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposed a procedural default, the Court presumed that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.
Since Ylst, every Circuit to have considered the matter, but for the Eleventh Circuit, has applied a “look through” presumption even where the state courts did not apply a procedural bar to review, and most Circuits applied the presumption prior to Ylst. The presumption is often realistic, for state higher courts often issue summary decisions when they have examined the lower court’s reasoning and found nothing significant with which they disagree. The presumption also is often more efficiently applied than a contrary approach that would require a federal court to imagine what might have been the state court’s supportive reasoning.
The State argues that Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86 , controls here and that Ylst should apply, at most, where the federal habeas court is trying to determine whether a state-court decision without opinion rested on a state procedural ground or whether the state court reached the merits of a federal issue. Richter, however, did not directly concern the issue in this case—whether to “look through” the silent state higher court opinion to the lower court’s reasoned opinion in order to determine the reasons for the higher court’s decision. In Richter, there was no lower court opinion to look to. And Richter does not say that Ylst’s reasoning does not apply in the context of an unexplained decision on the merits. Indeed, this Court has “looked though” to lower court decisions in cases involving the merits. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 562 U. S. 115, 123 –133. Pp. 5–9.
(b) The State’s further arguments are unconvincing. It points out that the “look though” presumption may not accurately identify the grounds for a higher court’s decision. But the “look through” presumption is not an absolute rule. Additional evidence that might not be sufficient to rebut the presumption in a case like Ylst, where the lower court rested on a state-law procedural ground, would allow a federal court to conclude that counsel has rebutted the presumption in a case decided on the merits. For instance, a federal court may conclude that the presumption is rebutted where counsel identifies convincing alternative arguments for affirmance that were made to the State’s highest court, or equivalent evidence such as an alternative ground that is obvious in the state-court record. The State also argues that this Court does not necessarily presume that a federal court of appeals’ silent opinion adopts the reasoning of the court below, but that is a different context. Were there to be a “look through” approach as a general matter in that context, judges and lawyers might read those decisions as creating, through silence, binding circuit precedent. Here, a federal court “looks through” the silent decision for a specific and narrow purpose, to identify the grounds for the higher court’s decision as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires. Nor does the “look through” approach show disrespect for the States; rather, it seeks to replicate the grounds for the higher state court’s decision. Finally, the “look though” approach is unlikely to lead state courts to write full opinions where they would have preferred to decide summarily, at least not to any significant degree. Pp. 9–11.
834 F. 3d 1227, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due December 15, 2016) |
Order extending time to file response to petition to and including January 5, 2017. |
Brief of respondent Eric Sellers, Warden filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Adam K. Mortara, in support of respondent filed. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 17, 2017. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 24, 2017. |
Motion to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for a writ of certiorari GRANTED. Adam K. Mortara, Esquire, of Chicago, Illinois, is invited to brief and argue, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below. |
Letter from respondent regarding position in case. (Distributed) |
In light of the letter filed by respondent on March 15, 2017, the order inviting Adam K. Mortara, Esquire to brief and argue, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below is withdrawn. |
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including May 30, 2017. |
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is further extended to and including June 5, 2017. |
Brief of petitioner Marion Wilson filed. |
Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed) |
Brief amici curiae of Retired State Supreme Court Justices filed. |
The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 21, 2017. |
Brief of respondent Eric Sellers, Warden filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Arkansas, et al. filed. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, October 30, 2017 |
CIRCULATED |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A.11th Circuit. |
Reply of petitioner Marion Wilson filed. (Distributed) |
Argued. For petitioner: Mark E. Olive, Tallahassee, Fla. For respondent: Sarah Hawkins Warren, Solicitor General of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga. |
Motion to appoint counsel filed by petitioner Marion Wilson. |
Motion DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/8/2017. |
Motion to appoint counsel filed by petitioner GRANTED. , and Mark E. Olive, Esquire, of Tallahassee, Florida, is appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner in this case. |
Letter filed by respondent Warden Sellers. (Distributed) |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. |
JUDGMENT ISSUED. |
Prior History
- Marion Wilson, Jr. v. Warden, No. 14-10681 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016)