NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 16–605
_________________
TOWN OF CHESTER, NEW YORK, PETITIONER
v. LAROE ESTATES, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[June 5, 2017]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Must a litigant possess Article III standing in
order to intervene of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2)? The parties do not dispute—and we hold—that such an
intervenor must meet the requirements of Article III if the
intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff. In
the present case, it is unclear whether the intervenor seeks
different relief, and the Court of Appeals did not resolve this
threshold issue. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for
that court to determine whether the intervenor seeks such
additional relief.
I
In 2001, land developer Steven Sherman paid
$2.7 million to purchase nearly 400 acres of land in the town of
Chester, New York (Town). Sherman planned to build a housing
subdivision called MareBrook, complete with 385 housing units, a
golf course, an onsite restaurant, and other amenities. Sherman
applied for approval of his plan and thus began a “journey through
the Town’s ever-changing labyrinth of red tape.”
Sherman v.
Chester, 752 F. 3d 554, 557 (CA2 2014).
In 2012, Sherman filed this suit against the
Town in New York state court. The suit concerned “the decade’s
worth of red tape put in place” by the Town and its regulatory
bodies.
Id., at 558. According to Sherman, the Town
obstructed his plans for the subdivision and forced him to spend
around $5.5 million to comply with the Town’s demands.
Id.,
at 558, 560. All of this, Sherman claimed, left him financially
exhausted and on the brink of personal bankruptcy.
Id., at
560. Sherman brought nine federal- and state-law claims against the
Town, including a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See App. 98–122. The Town removed the case
to a Federal District Court, which dismissed Sherman’s takings
claim as unripe. Opinion and Order in No. 1:12–cv–00647 (SDNY),
Dkt. 14, p. 25. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the ripeness determination and remanded for the case to go
forward.
Chester,
supra, at 557.[
1]
On remand, real estate development company Laroe
Estates, Inc. (the respondent here) filed a motion to intervene of
right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). This Rule
requires a court to permit intervention by a litigant that “claims
an interest related to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest.” Laroe alleged that in 2003 it had entered
into an agreement with Sherman regarding the MareBrook property.
Under this agreement, Laroe was to make $6 million in payments to
Sherman, secured by a mortgage on all of the development, and
Sherman was to sell Laroe parcels of land within the proposed
subdivision when the MareBrook plan was approved. However, Laroe
reserved the right to terminate the entire agreement if Sherman was
unable to obtain Town approval for a sufficient number of lots.
While this agreement was in place and Sherman continued his futile
quest for regulatory approval, Laroe paid Sherman more than $2.5
million.
In 2013, TD Bank commenced a foreclosure
proceeding on Sherman’s property. In an effort to save the deal,
Laroe and Sherman entered into a new agreement. That agreement
provided that the purchase price of the property would be the $2.5
million that Laroe had already advanced Sherman plus any amount
Sherman had to pay to settle with TD Bank. Once the Town approved
the plan, Laroe was required to transfer a certain number of lots
back to Sherman. In addition to imposing this transfer obligation,
the agreement deemed Laroe to have paid for the land in full. Laroe
was also given the authority to settle the debt Sherman owed TD
Bank and to terminate the agreement if the settlement failed. The
settlement did fail, and TD Bank took over the property. But Laroe
never terminated its agreement with Sherman.
In support of its motion to intervene, Laroe
argued that, under New York law, it is “the equitable owner of the
Real Property” at issue in Sherman’s suit. App. 131, 135–139. Laroe
asserted that its status as equitable owner gave it an interest in
the MareBrook property; that its interest would be impaired if it
could not intervene; and that Sherman “ha[d] his own agenda” and
consequently could not adequately represent Laroe’s interest.
Id., at 143–145. Along with its other intervention-related
pleadings, Laroe filed an intervenor’s complaint asserting a
regulatory takings claim that was substantively identical to
Sherman’s. Laroe’s complaint sought, among other things, a
“judgment against [the Town] awarding [Laroe] damages,” namely,
“compensation for the taking of Laroe’s interest in the subject
real property.”
Id., at 162.
The District Court denied Laroe’s motion to
intervene on the ground that Laroe lacked standing to bring a
takings claim “based on its status as contract vendee to the
property.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. The District Court
interpreted Second Circuit precedent—specifically,
United States
Olympic Comm. v.
Intelicense Corp.,
S. A.,
737 F. 2d 263, 268 (1984)—to mean that Laroe’s equitable
interest did not confer standing. App. to Pet. for Cert.
55a–56a.[
2]
The Court of Appeals reversed. 828 F. 3d
60, 62 (CA2 2016). Acknowledging a division among the Courts of
Appeals on whether an intervenor of right must meet the
requirements of Article III, the Second Circuit sided with the
courts that have held that Article III standing is not required.
Id., at 64–65.
We granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___
(2017).
II
Article III of the Constitution limits the
exercise of the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” §2,
cl. 1. This fundamental limitation preserves the “tripartite
structure” of our Federal Government, prevents the Federal
Judiciary from “intrud[ing] upon the powers given to the other
branches,” and “confines the federal courts to a properly judicial
role.”
Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U. S. ___,
___ (2016) (slip op., at 5–6). “If a dispute is not a proper case
or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or
expounding the law in the course of doing so.”
DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006) .
“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the
traditional understanding of a case or controversy.”
Spokeo,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6). “The law of Article III
standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves
to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers
of the political branches.”
Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U. S. 398, 408 (2013) . Our standing doctrine
accomplishes this by requiring plaintiffs to “alleg[e] such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
. . . justify [the] exercise of the court’s remedial
powers on [their] behalf.”
Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 38 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To establish Article III standing, the
plaintiff seeking compensatory relief must have “(1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo,
supra, at ___
(slip op., at 6). “Absent such a showing, exercise of its power by
a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the
Art. III limitation.”
Simon,
supra, at 38.
Our standing decisions make clear that
“ ‘standing is not dispensed in gross.’ ”
Davis v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 734 (2008)
(quoting
Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U. S. 343 ,
n. 6 (1996); alteration omitted). To the contrary, “a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to
press and for each form of relief that is sought.”
Davis,
supra, at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
e.g.,
DaimlerChrysler,
supra, at 352 (“[A]
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of
relief sought”);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 185
(2000) (same);
Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U. S.
95 –106, and n. 7 (1983) (a plaintiff who has standing to seek
damages must also demonstrate standing to pursue injunctive
relief). The same principle applies when there are multiple
plaintiffs. At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each
form of relief requested in the complaint. Both of the parties
accept this simple rule.[
3]
The same principle applies to intervenors of
right. Although the context is different, the rule is the same: For
all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing, whether
that litigant joins the lawsuit as a plaintiff, a coplaintiff, or
an intervenor of right. Thus, at the least, an intervenor of right
must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional
relief beyond that which the plaintiff requests. This result
follows ineluctably from our Article III case law, so it is not
surprising that both parties accept it (as does the United States
as
amicus curiae). See Brief for Petitioner 13 (arguing that
an intervenor must always demonstrate standing); Brief for
Respondent 28 (“[A]n intervenor who . . . seeks relief
beyond that requested by a party with standing must satisfy
Arti-cle III”); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 16
(An intervenor must demonstrate its own standing if it “seek[s]
damages” or “injunctive relief that is broader than or different
from the relief sought by the original plaintiff(s)”).
In sum, an intervenor of right must have Article
III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that
which is sought by a party with standing. That includes cases in
which both the plaintiff and the intervenor seek separate money
judgments in their own names. Cf.
General Building Contractors
Assn., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 402, n.
22 (1982) (declining to address the State’s standing “until [it]
obtains relief different from that sought by plaintiffs whose
standing has not been questioned”).
That principle dictates the disposition of this
case. It is unclear whether Laroe seeks the same relief as Sherman
or instead seeks different relief, such as a money judgment against
the Town in Laroe’s own name. Laroe’s complaint—the best evidence
of the relief Laroe seeks—requests a judgment awarding damages
to Laroe. App. 162. Unsurprisingly, Sherman requests
something different: specifically, compensation for the taking of
his interest in the property.
Id., at 122. In other
words, as Laroe’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the complaint
plainly seeks separate monetary relief for Laroe directly against
the Town. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43–44. And, as Laroe’s counsel conceded
further, if Laroe
is “seeking additional damages in [its]
own name,” “at that point, an Article III inquiry would be
required.”
Id., at 47.
To be sure, at some points during argument in
the Court of Appeals, Laroe made statements that arguably indicated
that Laroe is not seeking damages different from those sought by
Sherman. In particular, Laroe’s counsel stated that he was “not
saying that Sherman and [Laroe’s] damages are not the same
damages,” and insisted that there is “exactly one fund, and the
town doesn’t have to do anything except turn over the fund.”
Tr. 16, 33; see also Reply Brief in No. 15–1086 (CA2),
p. 12 (similar). At other points, however, the same counsel
made statements pointing in the opposite direction. When asked
directly whether “there would be separate awards to you and to the
Sherman estate” if Sherman’s suit was successful, Laroe’s counsel
admitted that he “ha[d] never contemplated how [damages] ge[t]
allocated at the end of the day” and suggested bifurcated
proceedings so that once liability was settled, Laroe and Sherman
could “duke it out” over damages if necessary. Tr. 32–35. And in
its Court of Appeals briefing, Laroe argued that it—not
Sherman—would be entitled to most of the damages from the takings
claim, flagging the allocation issue as one that the District Court
would have to resolve. Brief for Appellant in No. 15–1086 (CA2),
p. 32 (“[T]he trier of fact will have to determine the
relative allocation of rights over the fund . . . .
Specifi-cally, what is the value of Sherman’s bare legal title as
com-pared to Laroe’s equitable title in the subject property”);
Reply Brief in No. 15–1086, at 15 (“[M]ost, if not all of the
benefits” of this litigation “will accrue [to] Laroe”); see also
828 F. 3d, at 70 (noting that Sherman and Laroe “may disagree
about . . . the issue of damages were they to prevail”).
Taken together, these representations at best leave it ambiguous
whether Laroe is seeking damages for itself or is simply seeking
the same damages sought by Sherman.[
4]
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not
resolve this ambiguity. In fact, the section of its opinion
concerning standing did not discuss whether Laroe sought different
relief than Sherman.
Id., at 64–66. Elsewhere, in a
different context, the court did acknowledge Laroe’s statement that
it sought “essentially the same” damages as Sherman.
Id., at
66. But the court also found that “it is unclear from the record
whether Laroe believes the Town is directly liable to Sherman or
Laroe for the taking.”
Ibid.
This confusion needs to be dispelled. If Laroe
wants only a money judgment of its own running directly against the
Town, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman
and must establish its own Article III standing in order to
intervene. We leave it to the Court of Appeals to address this
question on remand.
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
