SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 16–348
_________________
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PETITIONER
v.ALEIDA JOHNSON
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[May 15, 2017]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg
and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or
Act) prohibits professional debt collectors from using “false,
deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection
with the collection of any debt” and from “us[ing] unfair or
unconscionable means to collect” a debt. 15 U. S. C.
§§1692e, 1692f. The Court today wrongfully holds that a debt
collector that knowingly attempts to collect a time-barred debt in
bankruptcy proceedings has violated neither of these
prohibitions.
Professional debt collectors have built a
business out of buying stale debt, filing claims in bankruptcy
proceedings to collect it, and hoping that no one notices that the
debt is too old to be enforced by the courts. This practice is both
“unfair” and “unconscionable.” I respectfully dissent from the
Court’s conclusion to the contrary.[
1]
I
Americans owe trillions of dollars in consumer
debt to creditors—credit card companies, schools, and car dealers,
among others. See Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Quarterly Report
on Household Debt and Credit 3 (2017). Most people will repay their
debts, but some cannot do so. The debts they do not pay are
increasingly likely to end up in the hands of professional debt
collectors—companies whose business it is to collect debts that are
owed to other companies. See Consumer Financial Protection Bur.,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Annual Report 2016, p. 8 (CFPB
Report). Debt collection is a lucrative and growing industry. Last
year, the Nation’s 6,000 debt collection agencies earned over $13
billion in revenue.
Ibid.
Although many debt collectors are hired by
creditors to work on a third-party basis, more and more collectors
also operate as “debt buyers”—purchasing debts from creditors
outright and attempting to collect what they can, with the profits
going to their own accounts.[
2]
See FTC, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry
11–12 (2013) (FTC Report); CFPB Report 10. Debt buyers now hold
hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer debt; indeed, a study
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2009 found that
nine of the leading debt buyers had purchased over $140 billion in
debt just in the previous three years. FTC Report, at i–ii, T–3
(Table 3).
Because creditors themselves have given up
trying to collect the debts they sell to debt buyers, they sell
those debts for pennies on the dollar.
Id., at 23. The older
the debt, the greater the discount: While debt buyers pay close to
eight cents per dollar for debts under three years old, they pay as
little as two cents per dollar for debts greater than six years
old, and “effectively nothing” for debts greater than 15 years old.
Id., at 23–24. These prices reflect the basic fact that
older debts are harder to collect. As time passes, consumers move
or forget that they owe the debts; creditors have more trouble
documenting the debts and proving their validity; and debts begin
to fall within state statutes of limitations—time limits that
“operate to bar a plaintiff’s suit” once passed.
CTS Corp.
v.
Waldburger, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
5). Because a creditor (or a debt collector) cannot enforce a
time-barred debt in court, the debt is inherently worth very little
indeed.
But statutes of limitations have not deterred
debt buyers. For years, they have filed suit in state courts—often
in small-claims courts, where formal rules of evidence do not
apply—to collect even debts too old to be enforced by those
courts.[
3] See Holland, The One
Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small-Claims Court, 6 J. Bus.
& Tech. L. 259, 261 (2011). Importantly, the debt buyers’ only
hope in these cases is that consumers will fail either to invoke
the statute of limitations or to respond at all: In most States the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, meaning that a
consumer must appear in court and raise it in order to dismiss the
suit. See
ante, at 4–5 (majority opinion). But consumers do
fail to defend themselves in court—in fact, according to the FTC,
over 90% fail to appear at all. FTC Report 45. The result is that
debt buyers have won “billions of dollars in default judgments”
simply by filing suit and betting that consumers will lack the
resources to respond. Holland,
supra, at 263.
The FDCPA’s prohibitions on “misleading” and
“unfair” conduct have largely beaten back this particular practice.
Every court to have considered the question has held that a debt
collector that knowingly files suit in court to collect a
time-barred debt violates the FDCPA. See
Phillips v.
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 1079 (CA7 2013);
Kimber v.
Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480,
1487 (MD Ala. 1987); see also
ante, at 5–6 (majority
opinion) (citing other cases). In 2015, petitioner and its parent
company entered into a consent decree with the Government
prohibiting them from filing suit to collect time-barred debts and
ordering them to pay $34 million in restitution. See Consent Order
in
In re Encore Capital Group, Inc., No. 2015–CFPB–0022
(Sept. 9, 2015), pp. 38, 46. And the leading trade association has
now adopted a resolution barring the practice. See Brief for DBA
International, Inc., as
Amicus Curiae 2–3.
Stymied in state courts, the debt buyers have
now turned to a new forum: bankruptcy courts. The same debt buyers
that for years filed thousands of lawsuits in state courts across
the country have begun to do the same thing in bankruptcy
courts—specifically, in cases governed by Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which allows consumers earning regular incomes to
restructure their debts and repay as many as they can over a period
of several years. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1300.01 (A. Resnick
& H. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016). As in ordinary civil cases, a
debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding is entitled to have
dismissed any claim filed against his estate that is barred by a
statute of limitations. See 11 U. S. C. §558. As in
ordinary civil cases, the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, one that must be raised by either the debtor or the
trustee of his estate before it is honored. §§502, 558. And so—just
as in ordinary civil cases—debt collectors may file claims in
bankruptcy proceedings for stale debts and hope that no one notices
that they are too old to be enforced.
And that is exactly what the debt buyers have
done. As a wide variety of courts and commentators have observed,
debt buyers have “deluge[d]” the bankruptcy courts with claims “on
debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.”
Crawford v.
LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F. 3d 1254,
1256 (CA11 2014); see also
In re Jenkins, 456
B. R. 236, 239, n. 2 (Bkrtcy. Ct. EDNC 2011) (noting a
“plague of stale claims”); Brief for National Association of
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys et al. as
Amici Curiae 9
(noting study describing “hundreds of thousands of proofs of claim
asserting hundreds of millions of dollars of consumer indebtedness,
all in a single year”). This practice has become so widespread that
the Government sued one debt buyer last year “to address [its]
systemic abuse of the bankruptcy process”—including a “business
model” of “knowingly and strategically” filing thousands of claims
for time-barred debt. Complaint in
In re Freeman-Clay
v.
Resurgent Capital Servs., L. P., No. 14–41871
(Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo.), ¶¶1, 35 (
Resurgent Complaint). This
practice, the Government explained, “manipulates the bankruptcy
process by systematically shifting the burden” to trustees and
debtors to object even to “frivolous claims”—especially given that
filing an objection is costly, time consuming, and easy to
overlook.
Id., at ¶¶35, 43–44.
II
The FDCPA prohibits professional debt
collectors from engaging in “unfair” and “unconscionable”
practices. 15 U. S. C. §1692f.[
4] Filing a claim in bankruptcy court for debt that a
collector knows to be time barred—like filing a lawsuit in a court
to collect such a debt—is just such a practice.
A
Begin where the debt collectors themselves
began: with their practice of filing suit in ordinary civil courts
to collect debts that they know are time barred. Every court to
have considered this practice holds that it violates the FDCPA.
There is no sound reason to depart from this conclusion.
Statutes of limitations “are not simply
technicalities.”
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.
v.
Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 487 (1980) . They reflect
strong public-policy determinations that “it is unjust to fail to
put [an] adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of
time.”
United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111,
117 (1979) . And they “promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.”
Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342 –349 (1944). Such
concerns carry particular weight in the context of small-dollar
consumer debt collection. As one thoughtful opinion explains:
“Because few unsophisticated consumers
would be aware that a statute of limitations could be used to
defend against lawsuits based on stale debts, such consumers would
unwittingly acquiesce to such lawsuits. And, even if the consumer
realizes that she can use time as a defense, she will more than
likely still give in rather than fight the lawsuit because she must
still expend energy and resources and subject herself to the
embarrassment of going into court to present the defense
. . . .”
Kimber, 668 F. Supp., at
1487.
Debt buyers’ efforts to pursue stale debt in
ordinary civil litigation may also entrap debtors into forfeiting
their time defenses altogether. When a debt collector sues or
threatens to sue to collect a debt, many consumers respond by
offering a small partial payment to forestall suit. In many States,
a consumer who makes an offer like this has—unbeknownst to
him—forever given up his ability to claim the debt is
unenforceable. That is because in most States a consumer’s partial
payment on a time-barred debt—or his promise to resume payments on
such a debt—will restart the statute of limitations. FTC Report 47;
see,
e.g., Young v.
Sorenson, 47 Cal. App. 3d 911,
914, 121 Cal. Rptr. 236, 237 (1975) (“ ‘The theory on which
this is based is that the payment is an acknowledgement on the
existence of the indebtedness which raises an implied promise to
continue the obligation and to pay the balance’ ”). Debt
collectors’ efforts to entrap consumers in this way have no place
in honest business practice.
B
The same dynamics are present in bankruptcy
proceedings. A proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court represents
the debt collector’s belief that it is entitled to payment, even
though the debt should not be enforced as a matter of public
policy. The debtor’s claim will be allowed, and will be
incorporated in a debtor’s payment plan, unless the debtor or his
trustee objects. But such objections require ordinary and
unsophisticated people (and their overworked trustees) to be on
guard not only against mistaken claims but also against claims that
debt collectors know will fail under law if an objection is raised.
Debt collectors do not file these claims in good faith; they file
them hoping and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail.
Such a practice is “unfair” and “unconscionable” in violation of
the FDCPA.
The Court disagrees. But it does so on narrow
grounds. To begin with, the Court does not hold that the Bankruptcy
Code altogether displaces the FDCPA, leaving it withno role to play
in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a conclusion would be wrong.
Although the Code and the FDCPA “have different purposes and
structural features,”
ante, at 8, the Court has held that
Congress, in passing the FDCPA’s predecessor, did so on the
understanding that “the provisions and the purposes” of the two
statutes were intended to “coexist.”
Kokoszka v.
Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) . Although
petitioner suggests that the FDCPA is best read “to have no
application to [a] debt collector’s conduct” in a bankruptcy
proceeding, Brief for Petitioner 41, the majority declines its
invitation to adopt such a sweeping rule.[
5]
Nor does the majority take a position on whether
a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing suit in an ordinary
court to collect a debt it knows is time barred.
Ante, at 6.
Instead, the majority concludes, even assuming that such a practice
would violate the FDCPA, a debt collector does not violate the Act
by doing the same thing in bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy, the
majority argues, is different. True enough. But none of the
distinctions that the majority identifies bears the weight placed
on it.
First, the majority contends, structural
features of the bankruptcy process reduce the risk that a stale
debt will go unnoticed and thus be allowed.
Ante, at 6–7.
But there is virtually no evidence that the majority’s theory holds
true in practice. The majority relies heavily on the presence of a
bankruptcy trustee, appointed to act on the debtor’s behalf and
empowered to (among other things) object to claims that he believes
lack merit. See 11 U. S. C. §§704(a)(5), 1302(b). In the
majority’s view, the trustee’s gatekeeping role makes it
“considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon a stale
claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance, objection, and
disallowance.”
Ante, at 7. The problem with the majority’s
ipse dixit is that everyone with actual experience in the
matter insists that it is false. The Government, which oversees
bankruptcy trustees, tells us that trustees “cannot realistically
be expected to identify every time-barred . . . claim
filed in every bankruptcy.” Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 25–26; see also
Resurgent Complaint ¶43 (“Filing
objections to all of [one collector]’s unenforceable claims would
clog the docket of this Court and other courts with objections to
frivolous claims”). The trustees themselves (appearing here as
amici curiae) agree, describing the practice as “wasteful”
and “exploit[ative].” Brief for National Association of Chapter
Thirteen Trustees as
Amicus Curiae 12. And courts across the
country recognize that Chapter 13 trustees are struggling under a
“deluge” of stale debt.
Crawford, 758 F. 3d, at
1256.
Second, the other features of the bankruptcy
process that the majority believes will serve as a backstop against
frivolous claims are even less likely to do so in practice. The
majority implies that a person who files for bankruptcy is more
sophisticated than the average consumer debtor because the
initiation of bankruptcy is a choice made by a debtor.
Ante,
at 6. But a person who has filed for bankruptcy will rarely be in
such a superior position; he has, after all, just declared that he
is unable to meet his financial obligations and in need of the
assistance of the courts. It is odd to speculate that such a person
is better situated to monitor court filings and lodge objections
than an ordinary consumer. The majority also suggests that the
rules of bankruptcy help “guide the evaluation of claims.”
Ibid. But the rules of bankruptcy in fact facilitate the
allowance of claims: Claims are automatically allowed and
made part of a plan unless an objection is made. See 11
U. S. C. §502(a). A debtor is arguably more vulnerable in
bankruptcy—not less—to the oversights that the debt buyers know
will occur.
Finally, the majority suggests, in some cases a
consumer will actually
benefit if a claim for an untimely
debt is filed.
Ante, at 7–8. If such a claim is filed but
disallowed, the majority explains, the debt will eventually be
discharged, and the creditor will be barred from collecting it. See
§1328(a). Here, too, practice refutes the majority’s rosy portrait
of these proceedings. A debtor whose trustee does not spot and
object to a stale debt will find no comfort in the knowledge that
other consumers with more attentive trustees may have their
debts disallowed and discharged. Moreover, given the high rate at
which debtors are unable to fully pay off their debts in Chapter 13
proceedings, see Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study
of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 Texas L. Rev. 103, 111–112 (2011),
most debtors who fail to object to a stale claim will end up worse
off than had they never entered bankruptcy at all: They will make
payments on the stale debts, thereby resuscitating them, see
supra, at 6–7, and may thuswalk out of bankruptcy court
owing more to their creditors than they did when they entered it.
There is no benefit to anyone in such a proceeding—except the debt
collectors.
* * *
It does not take a sophisticated attorney to
understand why the practice I have described in this opinion is
unfair. It takes only the common sense to conclude that one should
not be able to profit on the inadvertent inattention of others. It
is said that the law should not be a trap for the unwary. Today’s
decision sets just such a trap.
I take comfort only in the knowledge that the
Court’s decision today need not be the last word on the matter. If
Congress wants to amend the FDCPA to make explicit what in my view
is already implicit in the law, it need only say so.
I respectfully dissent.