NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 15–1500
_________________
BRIAN LEWIS, et al., PETITIONERS
v.WILLIAM CLARKE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
connecticut
[April 25, 2017]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Indian tribes are generally entitled to immunity
from suit. This Court has considered the scope of that immu-nity in
a number of circumstances. This case presents an ordinary
negligence action brought against a tribal employee in state court
under state law. We granted certiorari to resolve whether an Indian
tribe’s sovereign immu-nity bars individual-capacity damages
actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the
scope of their employment and for which the employees are
indemnified by the tribe.
We hold that, in a suit brought against a tribal
employee in his individual capacity, the employee, not the tribe,
is the real party in interest and the tribe’s sovereign immu-nity
is not implicated. That an employee was acting within the scope of
his employment at the time the tort was committed is not, on its
own, sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of
tribal sovereign immunity. We hold further that an indemnification
provision does not extend a tribe’s sovereign immunity where it
otherwise would not reach. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
I
A
The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut
traces its lineage back centuries. Originally part of the Lenni
Lenape, the Tribe formed the independent Mohegan Tribe under the
leadership of Sachem Uncas in the early 1600’s. M. Fawcett, The
Lasting of the Mohegans 7, 11–13 (1995). In 1994, in accordance
with the petition procedures established by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Tribe attained federal recognition.[
1] See 59 Fed. Reg. 12140 (1994); Mohegan
Const., Preamble and Art. II.
As one means of maintaining its economic
self-sufficiency, the Tribe entered into a Gaming Compact with the
State of Connecticut pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
102Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701
et seq. The
compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct gaming on its land, subject
to certain conditions including establishment of the Gaming
Disputes Court. See 59 Fed. Reg. 65130 (approving the Tribal-State
Compact Between the Mohegan Indian Tribe and the State of
Connecticut (May 17, 1994)); Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, §2; Mohegan
Tribe Code 3–248(a) (Supp. 2016). The Mohegan Tribal Gaming
Authority, an arm of the Tribe, exercises the powers of the Mohegan
Tribe over tribal gaming activities. Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, §1;
Mohegan Tribe Code §2–21.
Of particular relevance here, Mohegan law sets
out sovereign immunity and indemnification policies applicable to
disputes arising from gaming activities. The Gaming Authority has
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in the
Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court. Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, §1;
Mohegan Tribe Code §3–250(b). Neither the Tribe nor the Gaming
Authority has consented to suit for claims arising under
Connecticut state law. See Mohegan Const., Art. IX, §2(t); Mohegan
Tribe Code §3–250(g); see also
Blatchford v.
Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 782 (1991) (observing
that Indian tribes have not surrendered their immunity against
suits by States). Further, Mohegan Tribe Code §4–52 provides that
the Gaming Authority “shall save harmless and indemnify its Officer
or Em-ployee from financial loss and expense arising out of any
claim, demand, or suit by reason of his or her alleged negligence
. . . if the Officer or Employee is found to have been
acting in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of
his or her employment.” The Gaming Authority does not indemnify
employees who engage in “wanton, reckless or malicious” activity.
Mohegan Tribe Code§4–52.
B
Petitioners Brian and Michelle Lewis were
driving down Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when a
limousine driven by respondent William Clarke hit their vehicle
from behind. Clarke, a Gaming Authority employee, was transporting
patrons of the Mohegan Sun Casino to their homes. For purposes of
this appeal, it is undisputed that Clarke caused the accident.
The Lewises filed suit against Clarke in his
individual capacity in Connecticut state court, and Clarke moved to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of
tribal sovereign immunity. See 2014 WL 5354956, *2 (Super. Ct.
Conn., Sept. 10, 2014) (Cole-Chu, J.). Clarke argued that because
the Gaming Authority, an arm of the Tribe, was entitled to
sovereign immunity, he, an employee of the Gaming Authority acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, was
similarly entitled to sovereign immunity against suit. According to
Clarke, denying the motion would abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign
immunity.
The trial court denied Clarke’s motion to
dismiss.
Id., at *8. The court agreed with the Lewises that
the sovereign immunity analysis should focus on the remedy sought
in their complaint. To that end, the court identified Clarke, not
the Gaming Authority or the Tribe, as the real party in interest
because the damages remedy sought was solely against Clarke and
would in no way affect the Tribe’s ability to govern itself
independently. The court therefore concluded that tribal sovereign
immunity was not implicated.
Id., at *2–*8. It also rejected
Clarke’s alternative argument that because the Gaming Authority was
obligated to indemnify him pursuant to Mohegan Tribe Code §4–52 and
would end up paying the damages, he should prevail under the remedy
analysis.
Id., at *7. The trial court reasoned that a
“voluntary undertaking cannot be used to extend sovereign immunity
where it did not otherwise exist.”
Ibid.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed,
holding that tribal sovereign immunity did bar the suit. 320 Conn.
706, 135 A. 3d 677 (2016). The court agreed with Clarke that
“because he was acting within the scope of his employment for the
Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority and the Mohegan Tribal Gaming
Authority is an arm of the Mohegan Tribe, tribal sovereign immunity
bars the plaintiffs’ claims against him.”
Id., at 709, 135
A. 3d, at 680. Of particular significance to the court was
ensuring that “plaintiffs cannot circumvent tribal immunity by
merely naming the defendant, an employee of the tribe, when the
complaint concerns actions taken within the scope of his duties and
the complaint does not allege, nor have the plaintiffs offered any
other evidence, that he acted outside the scope of his authority.”
Id., at 720, 135 A. 3d, at 685. To do otherwise, the
court reasoned, would “ ‘eviscerate’ ” the protections of
tribal immunity.
Id., at 717, 135 A. 3d, at 684
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
court determined that Clarke was entitled to sovereign immunity on
the sole basis that he was acting within the scope of his
employment when the accident occurred,
id., at 720, 135
A. 3d, at 685–686, it did not consider whether Clarke should
be entitled to sovereign immunity on the basis of the
indemnification statute.
We granted certiorari to consider whether tribal
sovereign immunity bars the Lewises’ suit against Clarke, 579
U. S. ___ (2016), and we now reverse the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
II
Two issues require our resolution: (1) whether
the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity
damages against tribal employees for torts committed within the
scope of their employment; and (2) what role, if any, a tribe’s
decision to indemnify its employees plays in this analysis. We
decide this case under the framework of our precedents regarding
tribal immunity.
A
Our cases establish that, in the context of
lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities, courts
should look to whether the sovereign is the real party in interest
to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit. See
Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 25 (1991) . In
making this assessment, courts may not simply rely on the
characterization of the parties in the complaint, but rather must
determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly
against the sovereign. See,
e.g., Ex parte New York,
256 U. S. 490 –502 (1921). If, for example, an action is in
essence against a State even if the State is not a named party,
then the State is the real party in interest and is entitled to
invoke the Eleventh Amendment’s protection. For this reason, an arm
or instrumentality of the State generally enjoys the same immunity
as the sovereign itself.
E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Doe, 519 U. S. 425 –430 (1997). Similarly, lawsuits
brought against employees in their official capacity “represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent,” and they may also be barred by sovereign
immunity.
Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U. S. 159 –166
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The distinction between individual- and
official-capacity suits is paramount here. In an official-capacity
claim, the relief sought is only nominally against the official and
in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign
itself.
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U. S. 58, 71 (1989) ;
Dugan v.
Rank, 372
U. S. 609 –622 (1963). This is why, when officials sued in
their official capacities leave office, their successors
automatically assume their role in the litigation.
Hafer,
502 U. S., at 25. The real party in interest is the government
entity, not the named official. See
Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 –665 (1974). “Personal-capacity
suits, on the other hand, seek to impose
individual
liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color
of state law.”
Hafer, 502 U. S., at 25 (emphasis
added); see also
id., at 27–31 (discharged employees
entitled to bring personal damages action against state auditor
general); cf.
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971) . “[O]fficers sued in their
personal capacity come to court as individuals,”
Hafer, 502
U. S., at 27, and the real party in interest is the
individual, not the sovereign.
The identity of the real party in interest
dictates what immunities may be available. Defendants in an
official-capacity action may assert sovereign immunity.
Graham, 473 U. S., at 167. An officer in an
individual-capacity action, on the other hand, may be able to
assert
personal immunity defenses, such as, for example,
absolute prosecutorial immunity in certain circumstances.
Van de
Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U. S. 335 –344 (2009). But
sovereign immunity “does not erect a barrier against suits to
impose individual and personal liability.”
Hafer, 502
U. S., at 30–31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Alden v.
Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 757 (1996) .
B
There is no reason to depart from these
general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity. It is
apparent that these general principles foreclose Clarke’s sovereign
immunity defense in this case. This is a negligence action arising
from a tort committed by Clarke on an interstate highway within the
State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee
operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state
lands, and the judgment will not operate against the Tribe. This is
not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a
suit against Clarke to recover for his personal actions, which
“will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the
sovereign’s property.”
Larson v.
Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949) . We are
cognizant of the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s concern that
plaintiffs not circumvent tribal sovereign immunity. But here, that
immunity is simply not in play. Clarke, not the Gaming Authority,
is the real party in interest.
In ruling that Clarke was immune from this suit
solely because he was acting within the scope of his employment,
the court extended sovereign immunity for tribal employees beyond
what common-law sovereign immunity principles would recognize for
either state or federal employees. See,
e.g., Graham, 473
U. S., at 167–168. The protection offered by tribal sovereign
immunity here is no broader than the protection offered by state or
federal sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, under established sovereign
immunity principles, the Gaming Authority’s immunity does not, in
these circumstances, bar suit against Clarke.[
2]
III
The conclusion above notwithstanding, Clarke
argues that the Gaming Authority
is the real party in
interest here because it is required by Mohegan Tribe Code §4–52 to
indemnify Clarke for any adverse judgment.[
3]
A
We have never before had occasion to decide
whether an indemnification clause is sufficient to extend a
sovereign immunity defense to a suit against an employee in his
individual capacity. We hold that an indemnification provision
cannot, as a matter of law, extend sovereign immunity to individual
employees who would otherwise not fall under its protective
cloak.
Our holding follows naturally from the
principles discussed above. Indeed, we have applied these same
principles to a different question before—whether a state
instrumentality may invoke the State’s immunity from suit even when
the Federal Government has agreed to indemnify that instrumentality
against adverse judgments. In
Regents of Univ. of Cal., an
individual brought suit against the University of California, a
public university of the State of California, for breach of
contract related to his employment at a laboratory operated by the
university pursuant to a contract with the Federal Government. We
held that the indemnification provision did not divest the state
instrumentality of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 519 U. S., at
426. Our analysis turned on where the potential
legal
liability lay, not from whence the money to pay the damages award
ultimately came. Because the lawsuit bound the university, we held,
the Eleventh Amendment applied to the litigation even though the
damages award would ultimately be paid by the federal Department of
Energy.
Id., at 429–431. Our reasoning remains the same. The
critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse
judgment, not who will ultimately pick up the tab.[
4]
Here, the Connecticut courts exercise no
jurisdiction over the Tribe or the Gaming Authority, and their
judgments will not bind the Tribe or its instrumentalities in any
way. The Tribe’s indemnification provision does not somehow convert
the suit against Clarke into a suit against the sovereign; when
Clarke is sued in his individual capacity, he is held responsible
only for his individual wrongdoing. Moreover, indemnification is
not a certainty here. Clarke will not be indemnified by the Gaming
Authority should it determine that he engaged in “wanton, reckless,
or malicious” activity. Mohegan Tribe Code §4–52. That
determination is not necessary to the disposition of the Lewises’
suit against Clarke in the Connecticut state courts, which is a
separate legal matter.
B
Clarke notes that courts have extended
sovereign immunity to private healthcare insurance companies under
certain circumstances. See,
e.g., Pani v.
Empire
Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F. 3d 67, 71–72 (CA2 1998);
Pine View Gardens, Inc. v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
485 F. 2d 1073, 1074–1075 (CADC 1973); Brief for Respondent
19, n. 4. But, these cases rest on the proposition that the
fiscal intermediaries are essentially state instrumentalities, as
the governing regulations make clear. See 42 CFR §421.5(b) (2016)
(providing that the Medicare Administrator “is the real party of
interest in any litigation involving the administration of the
program”). It is well established in our precedent that a suit
against an arm or instrumentality of the State is treated as one
against the State itself. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 519
U. S., at 429. We have not before treated a lawsuit against an
individual em-ployee as one against a state instrumentality, and
Clarke offers no persuasive reason to do so now.
Nor have we ever held that a civil rights suit
under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against a state officer in his
individual capacity implicates the Eleventh Amendment and a State’s
sovereign immunity from suit.[
5] Federal appellate courts that have considered the
indemnity question have rejected the argument that an indemnity
statute brings the Eleventh Amendment into play in §1983 actions.
See,
e.g., Stoner v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Agriculture,
Trade and Consumer Protection, 50 F. 3d 481, 482–483 (CA7
1995);
Blalock v.
Schwinden, 862 F. 2d 1352,
1354 (CA9 1988);
Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F. 2d
645, 650 (CA7 1985). These cases rely on the concern that
originally drove the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment—the
protection of the States against involuntary liability. See
Hess v.
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513
U. S. 30, 39, 48 (1994) . But States institute indemnification
policies voluntarily. And so, indemnification provisions do not
implicate one of the underlying rationales for state sovereign
immunity—a government’s ability to make its own decisions about
“the allocation of scarce resources.”
Alden, 527 U. S.,
at 751.
Finally, our conclusion that indemnification
provisions do not alter the real-party-in-interest analysis for
purposes of sovereign immunity is consistent with the practicethat
applies in the contexts of diversity of citizenship and joinder. In
assessing diversity jurisdiction, courts look to the real parties
to the controversy.
Navarro Savings Assn. v.
Lee, 446
U. S. 458, 460 (1980) . Applying this principle, courts below
have agreed that the fact that a third party indemnifies one of the
named parties to the case does not, as a general rule, influence
the diversity analysis. See,
e.g., Corfield v.
Dallas
Glen Hills LP, 355 F. 3d 853, 865 (CA5 2003);
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Accident & Cas.
Ins. Co., 160 F. 3d 925, 936–937 (CA2 1998). They have
similarly held that a party does not become a required party for
joinder purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 simply by
virtue of indemnifying one of the named parties. See,
e.g.,
Gardiner v.
Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 145
F. 3d 635, 641 (CA3 1998);
Rochester Methodist Hospital
v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F. 2d 1006, 1016–1017 (CA8
1984).
In sum, although tribal sovereign immunity is
implicated when the suit is brought against individual officers in
their official capacities, it is simply not present when the claim
is made against those employees in their individual capacities. An
indemnification statute such as the one at issue here does not
alter the analysis. Clarke may not avail himself of a sovereign
immunity defense.
IV
The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
