SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 15–1256
_________________
SHANNON NELSON, PETITIONER
v.
COLORADO
LOUIS A. MADDEN, PETITIONER
v.
COLORADO
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
colorado
[April 19, 2017]
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgments of the Colorado
Supreme Court must be reversed, but I reach that conclusion by a
different route.
I
The proper framework for analyzing these cases
is provided by
Medina v.
California, 505 U. S.
437 (1992) .
Medina applies when we are called upon to
“asses[s] the validity of state procedural rules which
. . . are part of the criminal process,”
id., at
443, and that is precisely the situation here. These cases concern
Colorado’s rules for determining whether a defendant can obtain a
refund of money that he or she was required to pay pursuant to a
judgment of conviction that is later reversed. In holding that
these payments must be refunded, the Court relies on a feature of
the criminal law, the presumption of innocence. And since the Court
demands that refunds occur either automatically or at least without
imposing anything more than “minimal” procedures, see
ante,
at 10, it appears that they must generally occur as part of the
criminal case. For these reasons, the refund obligation is surely
“part of the criminal process” and thus falls squarely within the
scope of
Medina. The only authority cited by the Court in
support of its contrary conclusion is a footnote in a dissent. See
ante, at 6 (citing
Kaley v.
United States, 571
U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2014) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)
(slip op., at 10–11, n. 4)). Under
Medina, a state rule
of criminal procedure not governed by a specific rule set out in
the Bill of Rights violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment only if it offends a fundamental and deeply
rooted principle of justice. 505 U. S., at 445. And
“[h]istorical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule
can be characterized as fundamental.”
Id., at 446. Indeed,
petitioners invite us to measure the Colorado scheme against
traditional practice, reminding us that our “ ‘first due
process cases’ ” recognized that “ ‘traditional practice
provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis,’ ” Brief
for Petitioners 26 (quoting
Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg,
512 U. S. 415, 430 (1994) ). Petitioners then go on to argue
at some length that “[t]he traditional rule has always been that
when a judgment is reversed, a person who paid money pursuant to
that judgment is entitled to receive the money back.” Brief for
Petitioners 26; see
id., at 26–30. See also Brief for
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus
Curiae 4–14 (discussing traditional practice).
The Court, by contrast, turns its back on
historical practice, preferring to balance the competing interests
according to its own lights. The Court applies the balancing test
set out in
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319
(1976) , a modern invention “first conceived” to decide what
procedures the government must observe before depriving persons of
novel forms of property such as welfare or Social Security
disability benefits.
Dusenbery v.
United States, 534
U. S. 161, 167 (2002) . Because these interests had not
previously been regarded as “property,” the Court could not draw on
historical practice for guidance.
Mathews has subsequently
been used more widely in civil cases, but we should pause before
applying its balancing test in matters of state criminal procedure.
“[T]he States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal
procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of
common-law tradition.”
Medina,
supra, at 445–446.
Applying the
Mathews balancing test to established rules of
criminal practice and procedure may result in “undue interference
with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.”
Medina,
supra, at 443. Where long practice has struck
a particular balance between the competing interests of the State
and those charged with crimes, we should not lightly disturb that
determination. For these reasons,
Medina’s historical
inquiry, not
Mathews, provides the proper framework for use
in these cases.[
1]
II
Under
Medina, the Colorado scheme at
issue violates due process. American law has long recognized that
when an individual is obligated by a civil judgment to pay money to
the opposing party and that judgment is later reversed, the money
should generally be repaid. See,
e.g., Northwestern Fuel Co.
v.
Brock, 139 U. S. 216, 219 (1891) (“The right of
restitution of what one has lost by the enforcement of a judgment
subsequently reversed has been recognized in the law of England
from a very early period . . . ”);
Bank of United
States v.
Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 8, 17 (1832) (“On
the reversal of an erroneous judgment, the law raises an obligation
in the party to the record, who has received the benefit of the
erroneous judgment, to make restitution to the other party for what
he has lost”). This was “a remedy well known at common law,”
memorialized as “a part of the judgment of reversal which directed
‘that the defendant be restored to all things which he has lost on
occasion of the judgment aforesaid.’ ” 2 Ruling Case Law §248,
p. 297 (W. McKinney and B. Rich eds. 1914);
Duncan v.
Kirkpatrick, 13 Serg. & Rawle 292, 294 (Pa. 1825).
As both parties acknowledge, this practice
carried over to criminal cases. When a conviction was reversed,
defendants could recover fines and monetary penalties assessed as
part of the conviction. Brief for Respondent 20–21, and n. 7;
Reply Brief 7–8, 11; see,
e.g., Annot., Right To Recover
Back Fine or Penalty Paid in Criminal Proceeding, 26 A. L. R. 1523,
1532, §VI(a) (1923) (“When a judgment imposing a fine, which is
paid, is vacated or reversed on appeal, the court may order
restitution of the amount paid . . . ”); 25 C. J.
§39, p. 1165 (W. Mack, W. Hale, & D. Kiser eds. 1921) (“Where a
fine illegally imposed has been paid, on reversal of the judgment a
writ of restitution may issue against the parties who received the
fine”).
The rule regarding recovery, however, “even
though general in its application, [was] not without exceptions.”
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Florida, 295 U. S.
301, 309 (1935) (Cardozo, J.). The remedy was “equitable in origin
and function,” and return of the money was “ ‘not of mere
right,’ ” but “ ‘rest[ed] in the exercise of a sound
discretion.’ ”
Id., at 309, 310 (quoting
Gould
v.
McFall, 118 Pa. 455, 456 (1888)). This was true in both
civil and criminal cases. See,
e.g., 25 C. J., at 1165
(noting that “restitution [of fines paid on a conviction later
reversed] is not necessarily a matter of right”); Annot., 26 A. L.
R., at 1532, §VI(a) (Restitution for fines upon reversal of a
conviction “is not a matter of strict legal right, but rather one
for the exercise of the court’s discretion”). The central question
courts have asked is whether “the possessor will give offense to
equity and good conscience if permitted to retain [the successful
appellant’s money].”
Atlantic Coast Line,
supra, at
309.
This history supports the Court’s rejection of
the Colorado Exoneration Act’s procedures. The Act places a heavy
burden of proof on defendants, provides no opportunity for a refund
for defendants (like Nelson) whose misdemeanor convictions are
reversed, and excludes defendants whose convictions are reversed
for reasons unrelated to innocence. Brief for Respondent 8, 35,
n. 18. These stringent requirements all but guarantee that
most defendants whose convictions are reversed have no realistic
opportunity to prove they are deserving of refunds. Colorado has
abandoned historical procedures that were more generous to
successful appellants and incorporated a court’s case-specific
equitable judgment. Instead, Colorado has adopted a system that is
harsh, inflexible, and prevents most defendants whose convictions
are reversed from demonstrating entitlement to a refund. Indeed,
the Colorado General Assembly made financial projections based on
the assumption that only one person every five years would qualify
for a financial award under the Exoneration Act. Colorado
Legislative Council Staff Fiscal Note, State and Local Revised
Fiscal Impact, HB 13–1230, p. 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), online at
http://leg.colorado.gov (as last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
Accordingly, the Exoneration Act does not satisfy due process
requirements. See
Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U. S.
348, 356 (1996) (A state rule of criminal procedure may violate due
process where “a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant
has had a long and consistent application”).
III
Although long-established practice supports
the Court’s judgment, the Court rests its decision on different
grounds. In its
Mathews analysis, the Court reasons that the
reversal of petitioners’ convictions restored the presumption of
their innocence and that “Colorado may not presume a person,
adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty
enough for
monetary exactions.”
Ante, at 7. The implication of this
brief statement is that under
Mathews, reversal restores the
defendant to the
status quo ante, see
ante, at 3. But
the Court does not confront the obvious implications of this
reasoning.
For example, if the
status quo ante must
be restored, why shouldn’t the defendant be compensated for all the
adverse economic consequences of the wrongful conviction?[
2] After all, in most cases, the fines
and payments that a convicted defendant must pay to the court are
minor in comparison to the losses that result from conviction and
imprisonment, such as attorney’s fees, lost income, and damage to
reputation. The Court cannot convincingly explain why
Mathews’ amorphous balancing test stops short of requiring a
full return to the
status quo ante when a conviction is
reversed. But
Medina does.
The American legal system has long treated
compensation for the economic consequences of a reversed conviction
very differently from the refund of fines and other payments made
by a defendant pursuant to a criminal judgment. Statutes providing
compensation for time wrongfully spent in prison are a 20th-century
innovation: By 1970, only the Federal Government and four States
had passed such laws. King, Compensation of Persons Erroneously
Confined by the State, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1091, 1109
(1970);
United States v.
Keegan, 71 F. Supp.
623, 626 (SDNY 1947) (“[T]here seems to have been no legislation by
our Government on this subject” until 1938). Many other
jurisdictions have done so since, but under most such laws,
compensation is not automatic. Instead, the defendant bears the
burden of proving actual innocence (and, sometimes, more). King
,
supra, at 1110 (“The burden of proving innocence in the
compensation proceeding has from the start been placed upon the
claimant”); see also Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent:
The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State
Compensation Statutes, 44 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 123, 145
(2010) (Most U. S. compensation statutes “require that
claimants prove their innocence either by a preponderance of the
evidence or by clear and convincing evidence” (footnote omitted)).
In construing the federal statute, courts have held that a
compensation proceeding “is not . . . a criminal trial”
and that the burden of proof can be placed on the petitioner.
United States v.
Brunner, 200 F. 2d 276, 279
(CA6 1952). As noted, Colorado and many other States have similar
statutes designed narrowly to compensate those few persons who can
demonstrate that they are truly innocent. The Court apparently
acknowledges that these statutes pose no constitutional difficulty.
That is the correct conclusion, but it is best justified by
reference to history and tradition.
IV
The Court’s disregard of historical practice
is particu-larly damaging when it comes to the question of
restitution. The Court flatly declares that the State is “obliged
to refund . . . restitution” in just the same way as fees
and court costs.
Ante, at 1. This conclusion is not
supported by historical practice, and it overlooks important
differences between restitution, which is paid to the victims of an
offense, and fines and other payments that are kept by the
State.
Although restitution may be included in a
criminal judgment, it has many attributes of a civil judgment in
favor of the victim. This is clear under Colorado law. Although the
obligation to pay restitution is included in the defendant’s
sentence, restitution results in a final civil judgment against the
defendant in favor of the State
and the victim. Colo. Rev.
Stat. §18–1.3–603(4)(a)(I) (2016). Entitlement to restitution need
not be established beyond a reasonable doubt or in accordance with
standard rules of evidence or criminal procedure.
People v.
Pagan, 165 P. 3d 724, 729 (Colo. App. 2006); Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§18–1.3–603(2)–(3). And the judgment may be enforced either
by the State or the victim. §§16–18.5–106(2),
§§16–18.5–107(1)–(4).
The Court ignores the distinctive attributes of
restitution, but they merit attention. Because a restitution order
is much like a civil judgment, the reversal of the defendant’s
criminal conviction does not necessarily undermine the basis for
restitution. Suppose that a victim successfully sues a criminal
defendant civilly and introduces the defendant’s criminal
conviction on the underlying conduct as (potentially preclusive)
evidence establishing an essential element of a civil claim. See,
e.g., 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §298, 473–477 (7th
ed. 2013) (discussing the admissibility, and potential preclusive
effect, of a criminal conviction in subsequent civil litigation).
And suppose that the defendant’s criminal conviction is later
reversed for a trial error that did not (and could not) infect the
later civil proceeding: for example, the admission of evidence
barred by the exclusionary rule or a Confrontation Clause
violation. It would be unprecedented to suggest that due process
requires unwinding the civil judgment simply because it rests in
part on a criminal conviction that has since been reversed. And a
very similar scenario could unfold with respect to a Colorado
restitution judgment. The only salient difference would be that, in
the Colorado case, the civil judgment would have been obtained as
part of the criminal proceeding itself. It is not clear (and the
Court certainly does not explain) why that formal distinction
should make a substantive difference.[
3]
It is especially startling to insist that a
State must provide a refund after enforcing a restitution judgment
on the victims’ behalf in reliance on a
final judgment that
is then vacated on
collateral review. Faced with this fact
pattern, the Ninth Circuit declined to require reimbursement,
reasoning that the Government was a mere “escrow agent” executing a
then-valid final judgment in favor of a third party.
United
States v.
Hayes, 385 F. 3d 1226, 1230 (2004).
The Court regrettably mentions none of this. Its
treatment of restitution is not grounded in any historical
analysis, and—save for a brief footnote,
ante, at 2–3,
n. 3—the Court does not account for the distinctive civil
status of restitution under Colorado law (or the laws of the many
other affected jurisdictions that provide this remedy to crime
victims).
Nor does the Court consider how restitution’s
unique characteristics might affect the balance that it strikes
under
Mathews.
Ante, at 10. The Court summarily
rejects the proposition that “ ‘equitable
considerations’ ” might militate against a blanket rule
requiring the refund of money paid as restitution, see
ibid., but why is this so? What if the evidence amply
establishes that the defendant injured the victims to whom
restitution was paid but the defendant’s conviction is reversed on
a ground that would be inapplicable in a civil suit? In that
situation, is it true, as the Court proclaims, that the State would
have “no interest” in withholding a refund? Would the Court reach
that conclusion if state law mandated a refund from the recipients
of the restitution? And if the States and the Federal Government
are always required to foot the bill themselves, would that risk
discourage them from seeking restitution—or at least from providing
funds to victims until the conclusion of appellate review?
It was unnecessary for the Court to issue a
sweeping pronouncement on restitution. But if the Court had to
address this subject to dispose of these cases, it should have
acknowledged that—at least in some circumstances—refunds of
restitution payments made under later reversed judgments are not
constitutionally required.
* * *
For these reasons, I concur only in the
judgment.