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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 15–1248
_________________
McLANE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER
v.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[April 3, 2017]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
permits the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue
a subpoena to obtain evidence from an employer that is relevant to
a pending investigation. The statute autho-rizes a district court
to issue an order enforcing such a subpoena. The question presented
here is whether a court of appeals should review a district court’s
decision to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena
de novo
or for abuse of discretion. This decision should be reviewed for
abuse of discretion.
I
A
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” §703(a), 78Stat. 255, 42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a). The statute entrusts the
enforcement of that prohibition to the EEOC. See §2000e–5(a);
EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54 –62 (1984).
The EEOC’s responsibilities “are triggered by the filing of a
specific sworn charge of discrimination,”
University of Pa.
v.
EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 190 (1990) , which can be filed
either by the person alleging discrimination or by the EEOC itself,
see §2000e–5(b). When it receives a charge, the EEOC must first
notify the employer,
ibid., and must then investigate “to
determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true,”
University of Pa., 493 U. S., at 190
(internal quotation marks omitted).
This case is about one of the tools the EEOC has
at its disposal in conducting its investigation: a subpoena. In
order “[t]o enable the [EEOC] to make informed decisions at each
stage of the enforcement process,” Title VII “confers a broad right
of access to relevant evidence.”
Id., at 191. It provides
that the EEOC “shall . . . have access to, for the
purposes of examination, . . . any evidence of any person
being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful
employment practices covered by” Title VII and “is relevant to the
charge under investigation.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–8(a). And
the statute enables the EEOC to obtain that evidence by
“authoriz[ing] [it] to issue a subpoena and to seek an order
enforcing [the subpoena].”
University of Pa., 493
U. S., at 191; see §2000e–9.[
1] Under that authority, the EEOC may issue “subp[o]enas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of any evidence.” 29 U. S. C. §161(1). An
employer may petition the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, see
ibid., but if the EEOC rejects the petition and the employer
still “refuse[s] to obey [the] subp[o]ena,” the EEOC may ask a
district court to issue an order enforcing it, see §161(2).
A district court’s role in an EEOC subpoena
enforcement proceeding, we have twice explained, is a
straightforward one. See
University of Pa., 493 U. S.,
at 191;
Shell Oil, 466 U. S., at 72, n. 26. A district
court is not to use an enforcement proceeding as an opportunity to
test the strength of the underlying complaint.
Ibid. Rather,
a district court should “ ‘satisfy itself that the charge is
valid and that the material requested is “relevant” to the
charge.’ ”
University of Pa., 493 U. S., at 191.
It should do so cognizant of the “generou[s]” construction that
courts have given the term “relevant.”
Shell Oil, 466
U. S., at 68–69 (“virtually any material that might cast light
on the allegations against the employer”). If the charge is proper
and the material requested is relevant, the district court should
enforce the subpoena unless the employer establishes that the
subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for an “illegitimate
purpose,” or is unduly burdensome.
Id., at 72, n. 26. See
United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632
–653 (1950) (“The gist of the protection is in the requirement
. . . that the disclosure sought shall not be
unreasonable” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B
This case arises out of a Title VII suit filed
by a woman named Damiana Ochoa. Ochoa worked for eight years as a
“cigarette selector” for petitioner McLane Co., a supply-chain
services company. According to McLane, the job is a demanding one:
Cigarette selectors work in distribution centers, where they are
required to lift, pack, and move large bins containing products.
McLane requires employees taking physically demanding jobs—both new
employees and employees returning from medical leave—to take a
physical evaluation. According to McLane, the evaluation “tests
. . . range of motion, resistance, and speed”and “is
designed, administered, and validated by a third party.” Brief for
Petitioner 6. In 2007, Ochoa took threemonths of maternity leave.
When she attempted to return to work, McLane asked her to take the
evaluation. Ochoa attempted to pass the evaluation three times, but
failed. McLane fired her.
Ochoa filed a charge of discrimination, alleging
(among other things) that she had been fired on the basis of her
gender. The EEOC began an investigation, and—at its request—McLane
provided it with basic information about the evaluation, as well as
a list of anonymous employees that McLane had asked to take the
evaluation. McLane’s list included each employee’s gender, role at
the company, and evaluation score, as well as the reason each
employee had been asked to take the evaluation. But the company
refused to provide what the parties call “pedigree information”:
the names, Social Security numbers, last known addresses, and
telephone numbers of the employees who had been asked to take the
evaluation. Upon learning that McLane used the evaluation
nationwide, the EEOC expanded the scope of its investigation, both
geographi-cally (to focus on McLane’s nationwide operations) and
sub-stantively (to investigate whether McLane had discriminated
against its employees on the basis of age). It issued subpoenas
requesting pedigree information as it related to its new
investigation. But McLane refused to providethe pedigree
information, and so the EEOC filed two actions in Federal District
Court—one arising out of Ochoa’s charge and one arising out of a
separate age-discrimination charge the EEOC itself had
filed—seeking enforcement of its subpoenas.
The enforcement actions were assigned to the
same District Judge, who, after a hearing, declined to enforce the
subpoenas to the extent that they sought the pedigree information.
See
EEOC v.
McLane Co., 2012 WL 1132758, *5 (D Ariz.,
Apr. 4, 2012) (age discrimination charge); Civ. No. 12–2469 (D
Ariz., Nov. 19, 2012), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28–30 (Title VII
charge).[
2] In the District
Court’s view, the pedigree information was not “relevant” to the
charges because “ ‘an individual’s name, or even an interview
he or she could provide if contacted, simply could not shed light
on whether the [evaluation] represents a tool of . . .
discrimination.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29 (quoting 2012 WL
1132758, at *5; some internal quotation marks omitted).
The Ninth Circuit reversed. See 804 F. 3d
1051 (2015). Consistent with Circuit precedent, the panel reviewed
the District Court’s decision to quash the subpoena
de novo, and concluded that the District Court had
erred in finding the pedigree information irrelevant.
Id.,
at 1057. But the panel questioned in a footnote why
de novo review applied, observing that its sister
Circuits “appear[ed] to review issues related to enforcement of
administrative subpoenas for abuse of discretion.”
Id., at
1056, n. 3; see
infra, at 7 (reviewing Court of Appeals
authority).
This Court granted certiorari to resolve the
disagreement between the Courts of Appeals over the appropriate
standard of review for the decision whether to enforce an EEOC
subpoena. 579 U. S. ___ (2016). Because the United States
agrees with McLane that such a decision shouldbe reviewed for abuse
of discretion, Stephen B. Kinnard was appointed as
amicus
curiae to defend the judgment below. 580 U. S. ___ (2016).
He has ably discharged his duties.
II
A
When considering whether a district court’s
decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate
review—at least absent “explicit statutory command”—we
traditionally look to two factors.
Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988) . First, we ask
whether the “history of appellate practice” yields an answer.
Ibid. Second, at least where “neither a clear statutory
prescription nor a historical tradition exists,” we ask whether,
“ ‘as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question.’ ”
Id., at 558, 559–560 (quoting
Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985) ).
Both factors point toward abuse-of-discretion review here.
First, the longstanding practice of the courts
of appeals in reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or
quash an administrative subpoena is to review that decision for
abuse of discretion. That practice predates even Title VII itself.
As noted, Title VII confers on the EEOC the same authority to issue
subpoenas that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) confers on
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See n. 1,
supra. During the three decades between the enactment of the
NLRA and the incorporation of the NLRA’s subpoena-enforcement
provisions into Title VII, every Circuit to consider the question
had held that a district court’s decision whether to enforce an
NLRB subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
NLRB v.
Consolidated Vacuum Corp., 395 F. 2d
416, 419–420 (CA2 1968);
NLRB v.
Friedman, 352
F. 2d 545, 547 (CA3 1965);
NLRB v.
Northern Trust
Co., 148 F. 2d 24, 29 (CA7 1945);
Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, 122 F. 2d 450, 453–454 (CA6
1941). By the time Congress amended Title VII to authorize EEOC
subpoenas in 1972, it did so against this uniform backdrop of
deferential appellate review.
Today, nearly as uniformly, the Courts of
Appeals apply the same deferential review to a district court’s
decision as to whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena. Almost every
Court of Appeals reviews such a decision for abuse of discretion.
See,
e.g., EEOC v.
Kronos Inc., 620 F. 3d 287,
295–296 (CA3 2010);
EEOC v.
Randstad, 685 F. 3d
433, 442 (CA4 2012);
EEOC v.
Roadway Express, Inc.,
261 F. 3d 634, 638 (CA6 2001);
EEOC v.
United Air
Lines, Inc., 287 F. 3d 643, 649 (CA7 2002);
EEOC v.
Technocrest Systems, Inc., 448 F. 3d 1035, 1038 (CA8
2006);
EEOC v.
Dillon Companies, Inc., 310 F. 3d
1271, 1274 (CA10 2002);
EEOC v.
Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 771 F. 3d 757, 760 (CA11 2014) (
per curiam).
As Judge Watford—writing for the panel below—recognized, the Ninth
Circuit alone applies a more searching form of review. See 804
F. 3d, at 1056, n. 3 (“Why we review questions of
relevance and undue burden de novo is unclear”); see also
EPA v.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F. 2d
443, 445–446 (CA9 1988) (holding that
de novo review
applies). To be sure, the inquiry into the appropriate standard of
review cannot be resolved by a head-counting exercise. But the
“long his-tory of appellate practice” here,
Pierce, 487
U. S., at 558, carries significant persuasive weight.
Second, basic principles of institutional
capacity counsel in favor of deferential review. The decision
whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena is a case-specific one that
turns not on “a neat set of legal rules,”
Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983) , but instead on the
application of broad standards to “multifarious, fleeting, special,
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization,”
Pierce,
487 U. S., at 561–562 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
the mine run of cases, the district court’s decision whether to
enforce a subpoena will turn either on whether the evidence sought
is relevant to the specific charge before it or whether the
subpoena is unduly burdensome in light of the circumstances. Both
tasks are well suited to a district judge’s expertise. The decision
whether evidence sought is relevant requires the district court to
evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought
and the particular matter under investigation—an analysis “variable
in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry.”
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327
U. S. 186, 209 (1946) . Similarly, the decision whether a
subpoena is overly burdensome turns on the nature of the materials
sought and the difficulty the employer will face in producing them.
These inquiries are “generally not amenable to broad
per se rules,”
Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn, 552 U. S. 379, 387 (2008) ; rather, they
are the kind of “fact-intensive, close calls” better suited to
resolution by the district court than the court of appeals,
Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
384, 404 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).[
3]
Other functional considerations also show that
abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate here. For one, district
courts have considerable experience in other contexts making
decisions similar—though not identical—to those they must make in
this one. See
Buford v.
United States, 532 U. S.
59, 66 (2001) (“[T]he comparatively greater expertise” of the
district court may counsel in favor of deferential review).
District courts decide, for instance, whether evidence is relevant
at trial, Fed. Rule Evid. 401; whether pretrial criminal subpoenas
are unreasonable in scope, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(c)(2); and
more. These decisions are not the same as the decisions a district
court must make in enforcing an administrative subpoena. But they
are similar enough to give the district court the “institutional
advantag[e],”
Buford, 532 U. S., at 64, that comes with
greater experience. For another, as we noted in
Cooter &
Gell, deferential review “streamline[s] the litigation process
by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence
and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the
district court,” 496 U. S., at 404—a particularly important
consideration in a “satellite” proceeding like this one,
ibid., designed only to facilitate the EEOC’s
investigation.
B
Amicus’ arguments to the contrary have
aided our consideration of this case. But they do not persuade us
that
de novo review is appropriate.
Amicus’ central argument is that the
decision whether a subpoena should be enforced does not require the
exercise of discretion on the part of the district court, and so it
should not be reviewed for abuse of discretion. On
amicus’
view, the district court’s primary role is to test the legal
sufficiency of the subpoena, not to weigh whether it should be
enforced as a substantive matter. Cf.
Shell Oil, 466
U. S., at 72, n. 26 (rejecting the argument that the district
court should assess the validity of the underlying claim in a
proceeding to enforce a subpoena). Even accepting
amicus’
view of the district court’s task, however, this understanding of
abuse-of-discretion review is too narrow. As commentators have
observed, abuse-of-discretion review is employed not only where a
decisionmaker has “a wide range of choice as to what he decides,
free from the constraints which characteristically attach whenever
legal rules enter the decision[making] process”; it is also
employed where the trial judge’s decision is given “an unu-sual
amount of insulation from appellate revision” for func-tional
reasons. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed
From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 637 (1971); see also 22
C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §5166.1
(2d ed. 2012). And as we have explained, it is in large part due to
functional concerns that we conclude the district court’s decision
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Even if the district
court’s decision can be characterized in the way that
amicus
suggests, that characterization would not be inconsistent with
abuse-of-discretion review.
Nor are we persuaded by
amicus’ remaining
arguments.
Amicus argues that affording deferential review
to a district court’s decision would clash with Court of Appeals
decisions instructing district courts to defer themselves to the
EEOC’s determination that evidence is relevant to the charge at
issue. See
Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, v.
Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F. 3d 1304, 1307 (CADC
1997) (district courts should defer to agency appraisals of
relevance unless they are “obviously wrong”);
EEOC v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,
Aero & Naval Systems, 116
F. 3d 110, 113 (CA4 1997) (same). In
amicus’ view, it
is “analytically impossible” for the court of appeals to defer to
the district court if the district court must itself defer to the
agency. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. We think the better reading of those
cases is that they rest on the established rule that the term
“relevant” be understood “generously” to permit the EEOC “access to
virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
against the employer.”
Shell Oil, 466 U. S., at 68–69.
A district court deciding whether evidence is “relevant” under
Title VII need not defer to the EEOC’s decision on that score; it
must simply answer the question cognizant of the agency’s broad
authority to seek and obtain evidence. Because the statute does not
set up any scheme of double deference,
amicus’ arguments as
to the infirmities of such a scheme are misplaced.
Nor do we agree that, as
amicus suggests,
the constitutional underpinnings of the
Shell Oil standard
require a different result. To be sure, we have described a
subpoena as a “ ‘constructive’ search,”
Oklahoma Press,
327 U. S., at 202, and implied that the Fourth Amendment is
the source of the requirement that a subpoena not be “too
indefinite,”
Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 652. But not
every decision that touches on the Fourth Amendment is subject to
searching review. Subpoenas in a wide variety of other contexts
also implicate the privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but courts routinely review the enforcement of such
subpoenas for abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., United States
v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974) (pretrial subpoenas
duces tecum);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696
F. 3d 428, 432 (CA5 2012) (grand jury subpoenas);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F. 3d 1186, 1201
(CA10 2010) (same). And this Court has emphasized that courts
should pay “great deference” to a magistrate judge’s determination
of probable cause,
Gates, 462 U. S., at 236 (internal
quotation marks omitted)—a decision more akin to a district court’s
preenforcement review of a subpoena than the warrantless searches
and seizures we considered in
Ornelas v.
United
States, 517 U. S. 690 (1996) , on which
amicus
places great weight. The constitutional pedigree of
Shell
Oil does not change our view of the correct standard of
review.
III
For these reasons, a district court’s decision
to enforce an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion, not
de novo.
The United States also argues that the judgment
below can be affirmed because it is clear that the District Court
abused its discretion. But “we are a court of review, not of first
view,”
Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709 ,
n. 7 (2005), and the Court of Appeals has not had the chance
to review the District Court’s decision under the appropriate
standard. That task is for the Court of Appeals in the first
instance. As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals may also
consider, as and to the extent it deems appropriate, any arguments
made by McLane regarding the burdens imposed by the subpoena.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.